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LINGUA INDISCIPLINATA. A STUDY OF TRANSGRESSIVE SPEECH IN THE 
“ROMANCE OF THE ROSE” AND THE “DIVINE COMEDY” 
 
 Gabriella Baika, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
 
My dissertation is an investigation of the two masterpieces of medieval, allegorical 
literature from the perspective of the Latin moral tradition of their time. Discussing Jean de 
Meun and Dante’s obsessive concern with the sinfulness of speech, I relate the numerous verbal 
transgressions treated in the Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy to what historians of 
moral philosophy have called “the golden age of the sins of the tongue” (1190-1260), a time span 
during which moralists, theologians and canonists wrote a great number of Latin texts on peccata 
linguae. I argue that the radical inclusion of the sins of speech among the other classes of sins 
treated in the Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy is to be accounted for in light of the 
major thirteenth-century treatises on peccata linguae. While Jean de Meun, in the wake of Alain 
of Lille, treats the sins of the tongue in a dispersed manner, without regard to a classification 
based on the gravity of the sins, Dante follows a scholastic approach and assigns most of the sins 
of tongue he is dealing with to the infernal area of Fraud, in a hierarchical order. Taking up 
elements from William Peraldus's Summa vitiorum and Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica, 
both very popular at the time, Dante constructs his own micro-system of peccata linguae, a 
system within a system. Written shortly after the golden age of the sins of the tongue, the 
Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy extend this cultural period and transfer the 
preoccupation with sinfulness of human speech from the exclusive sphere of Latin moral tracts to 
the realm of vernacular poetry.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
As early as the fifteenth century, critical readers of the Romance of the Rose and the 
Divine Comedy likened the two poetic narratives, discovering analogies between them and listing 
a common concern with human vices as first among the poem’s many striking similarities. 
Christine de Pizan and Laurent de Premierfait were the first to comment upon the two medieval 
allegorical poems from a comparative point of view, thus pioneering a tradition that would 
extend to the present day, a tradition of associating the Rose and the Comedy from various 
viewpoints and using the poems as illustrations of specific aspects related to the Middle Ages.1
The year 1878 marked a turning point in this comparative tradition with the discovery of 
the Fiore and the Detto d’Amore, two thirteenth-century Italian translations of the Romance of 
the Rose. Gianfranco Contini and Luigi Vanossi credited Dante Alighieri with penning the Fiore, 
an authorship that would represent the irrefutable piece of evidence for both Dante’s familiarity 
with the Rose and the influence of the French narrative on the Comedy.2 By providing the 
                                                 
1 For an outline of the history of these comparative attempts, see Earl J. Richards’ book Dante and the “Roman de la 
Rose.” An Investigation into the Vernacular Narrative Context of the “Commedia.” (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 
1981), 71-81.  An insightful comment on Christine de Pizan’s assessment of the French and Italian poets is provided 
by Sylvia Huot, “Seduction and Sublimation: Christine de Pizan, Jean de Meun and Dante,” in Romance Notes, 25 
(1985), 361-373. 
2 See Gianfranco Contini, “Un nodo della cultura medievale: la serie Roman de la Rose-Fiore-Divina Commedia,” 
in Un’idea di Dante, (Turin: G. Einaudi, 2001), 245-283. For Luigi Vanossi, see Dante e il “Roman de la Rose”: 
Saggio sul “Fiore” (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1979). The question of the authorship of the Fiore has been reopened 
by Zygmunt Baránski and Patrick Boyde in: The Fiore in Context. Dante, France and Tuscany (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). The most recent findings and standpoints with respect to the Fiore as a work 
attributable to Dante have been reunited by Johannes Bartuschat and Luciano Rossi in Studi sul canone letterario del 
Trecento: Per Michelangelo Picone (Ravenna: Longo, 2003). 
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“missing link” in the circular chain from the Rose to the Comedy, the hypothesis of Dante’s 
authorship of the Fiore —which, in fact, has remained until now a controversial issue in Dante 
studies—would validate the theories about the kinship between the Romance of the Rose and the 
Divine Comedy. 
What is striking, however, in the critical studies likening the Divine Comedy to the 
Romance of the Rose is that among so many common aspects taken into consideration by 
scholars throughout time, aspects ranging from astronomy to mythology, poetics and scholastic 
philosophy, the common concern with vices noted by de Pizan and de Premierfait, in the 
fifteenth century, has not been investigated. We lack today a thorough and fundamental study 
that examines the two allegorical poems from the viewpoint of moral theology, a branch of 
medieval thought to which both Jean de Meun and Dante owed a great deal. Although the 
denomination “medieval summae,” applied to both the second part of the Rose and the Comedy, 
has become commonplace in literary criticism, this denomination is ordinarily left in a sphere of 
indeterminacy. The term summa had, in medieval times, a rather broad spectrum of meanings; 
the works of Vincent of Beauvais, who practiced this genre from multiple perspectives, best 
exemplify this polysemy. According to the field of knowledge envisioned, the summa--the Latin 
medieval term for the more modern coinage encyclopedia--could be naturale (when it dealt with 
natural sciences), historiale (when it investigated the historical past), doctrinale (when it 
considered the corpus of theological doctrines), and finally, morale, when it focused on the vices 
and virtues of human beings.  
In the wake of Christine de Pizan and Laurent de Premierfait’s remarks about Jean de 
Meun and Dante’s common preoccupation with morality, I suggest that the Romance of the Rose 
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and the Divine Comedy should be considered first and foremost in their intersection as moral 
summae. In my opinion, the treatment of vices and sins represents the main meeting point 
between the Romance of the Rose and Divine Comedy. It is here that we need to look for 
affinities, before any other considerations related to the narrative form, to the Fiore…or to the 
moonspots.3
While we do have today attempts at treating Dante’s Comedy from either the viewpoint 
of its genre as a moral summa (in the pioneering book of Patrick Boyde on Human Vices and 
Human Worth) or of its virtual connection with Latin medieval treatises on vices (in the 
groundbreaking studies of Siegfried Wenzel, for instance), we lack such fundamental studies in 
Rose criticism. Surprisingly, no scholar has yet undertaken to respond to the subtle, provocative 
challenge launched by Jean de Meun in the second part of the Romance, that of discovering and 
“counting” the vices he scattered throughout his poem (vv.19870-19887).4 Since, to my 
knowledge, no Rose scholar has either verified the real number of sins, or explored the possible 
connections between them, or further identified, even tentatively, the sources Jean might have 
drawn on for his handling of sins, I undertake to gently take up the gauntlet thrown by Jean at the 
face of his so often scandalized readers and to look more closely at a class of sin to which the 
moral treatises from the thirteenth century were particularly conducive: the sins of the tongue.  
                                                 
3 The latter are usually evoked in literary criticism when it comes to proving the influence of the Romance of the 
Rose on Dante’s Comedy.  
4 This lack of responsiveness on the part of the critics is all the more surprising when we consider that one of Jean’s 
chief literary models was Alain of Lille, the author, among others, of an important treatise on virtues and vices, and 
at the same time one of the pioneers of the tradition on verbal sins. Should Jean have been unaware of Alain’s 
Tractus de vitiis et virtutibus? Or of his fascinating dictionary of philosophical and moral terms, the Liber de 
Distinctionibus? These texts were popular in the later Middle Ages, due to the great theological and intellectual 
authority of their author, surnamed Doctor Universalis. But even if we cannot ascertain Jean de Meun’s knowledge 
of these other writings of Alain of Lille, it is enough to remember that Nature’s diatribe against homosexuality in the 
Rose is modeled on Alain’s vigorous attack on male homosexuality from De planctu naturae to ascertain that echoes 
from Alain’s view of human morality resound in the Romance of the Rose.   
 3 
The intellectuals of the Middle Ages--and I am referring here to the French and Italian 
contexts--developed a powerful discourse about the virtues and evils of human speech. The first 
sign of this increased sensitivity to the dangerous potential of spoken words appeared at the 
dawn of the twelfth century, in the work of the brilliant thinker Hugh of St. Victor. As a Parisian 
master in theology operating at the Augustinian monastery of St. Victor, Hugh concentrated his 
religious efforts on the elaboration of a moral reform designed to help the “outer man” (an 
Augustinian concept) to reach a state of inner perfection close to divine bliss. This state of inner 
felicity could be reached only by means of a rigorously disciplined behavior, including gestures, 
attitudes and use of language.5 For Hugh of St. Victor, speech ought not be a spontaneous and 
arbitrary flow of words; rather, it was a matter of knowledge and method. Underlying all human 
utterance, there was a specific scientia (‘science, knowledge, know-how’) that provided norms 
for a disciplined speech. This science needed to be acquired so that discipline in speech might be 
followed. Hugh of St. Victor’s notion of disciplina in locutione (‘disciplined speech’) thus 
involved the observance of a set of rules meant to regulate the production of words, a set that he 
took from classical rhetoric and reworked in a Christian context. According to the Greco-Roman 
art of oratory, every public speaker was supposed to adapt his speech to five criteria: what is 
spoken, to whom, when, where, how. These criteria that in classical rhetoric had been parameters 
for forging a convincing public argumentation, became, at the hands of Hugh of St. Victor, 
norms designed to model the morally correct speech of Christians. Each of these five 
circumstances of speech enabled the pious speaker to achieve discernment in words; it helped 
                                                 
5 This whole complex of behavioral attitudes belonged to what Hugh called the scientia recte vivendi ‘the art of 
leading a virtuous life’, which he elaborated in De Institutione novitiorum, a moral tract intended for young monks. 
The Latin text of this treatise, seemingly written before 1125, can be found in Patrologia Latina 176, 925-952. 
Important remarks about Hugh’s contributions to the development of a moral and theological lexicon in medieval 
Latin are made by Roger Baron, “Hugues de St. Victor lexicographe,” in Cultura Neolatina 16 (1956), 109-145. 
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him produce a discretio loquendi, a carefully thought-out discourse.6 The language user who 
failed to observe these linguistic-moral norms was an ‘indiscrete,’ i.e., inconsiderate, speaker, 
and the tongue with which he uttered the indiscriminate words, a lingua indisciplinata, i.e., an 
unruly tongue. 
Under the influence of St. Victor, toward the end of the twelfth century, another 
important ecclesiastic thinker in France, the Franciscan master Raoul Ardent, elaborated a vast 
ethical work entitled Speculum Universale, which advanced new norms for virtuous speech.7 
Preoccupied with the problematic of good and evil in human mores, Raoul Ardent devoted an 
entire book of his work to the uses of speech (De moribus linguae), a book in which he not only 
expounded norms for morally proper speech, but also discussed deviances from these norms, 
transgressions of them. In forging his anthropological system, Raoul Ardent started from the 
same Augustinian distinction inner/outer man that had been operative in the thought of Hugh of 
St. Victor. For Ardent, either man had specific habits. As far as the outer man was concerned, 
Ardent distinguished between habits of deeds, of thought and of word (Mores exteriores hominis 
in tribus considerantur: in verbo, in sensu, in opere; XIII.1. f. 161r). 8  
In Ardent’s view, five moral criteria were supposed to govern the production of bonum 
verbum or bona locutio: veritas (‘truth’), utilitas (‘usefulness’), honestas (‘propriety’), discretio 
                                                 
6 Hugh of St. Victor’s contribution to the medieval discourse on the use of language is, thus, also important from the 
viewpoint of the creation of a meta-language, i.e., of a lexicon employed to describe speech. We will find again the 
label discrete Hugh applied to morally correct speaking in the most prominent moralists on the sins of the tongue, 
such as Radulfus Ardens, William Peraldus, Thomas Aquinas… and Dante. 
7 Francesco Minuto has carefully studied the presence of Hugh of St. Victor’s ideas in Ardent’s Speculum. See “Sui 
rapporti tra lo “Speculum Universale’ di Radulfus Ardens e il “Didascalicon’ di Ugo di San Vittore,” in Atti 
dell’Istitutto Veneto di Scienze (Lettere ed Arti, 1948-1949, CVII. II, Classe di Scienze Morali e Letterari), 103-117. 
8 The manuscript I have worked with for Raoul Ardent is: Paris, BnF, lat. 3240. The Speculum morale seems to have 
been written between 1193-1200. My main sources for the life and work of Raoul Ardent are: Johannes Gründel’s 
Die Lehre des Radulfus Ardens von den Verstandestugenden auf dem Hintergrund seiner Seelenlehre (Munich: 
Schöningh, 1976), and the chapter “Rodolfo Ardente: I costumi della lingua,” from Carla Casagrande and Silvana 
Vecchio’s book I peccati della lingua, Disciplina ed etica della parola nella cultura medievale (Roma: Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1987), 35-71. 
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(‘discernment’) and directio (‘direction’). All of these criteria had to act simultaneously in the 
act of speech; when just one of them was transgressed, the words failed to be morally perfect 
(irreprehensibilis) and a mala locutio occurred. For instance, when the moral criterion of truth 
was violated, the locutio ceased to be virtuous, becoming mendacious and giving rise to sins 
such as lying, perjury, false promise, false doctrine, etc.; when the criterion of utility was 
violated, the words became otiosa, risoria, irrisoria or took the shape of evil counsels. When the 
imperative of honestas was disobeyed, the sin of turpitudo (‘obscenity’) was committed, whereas 
when the quality of discretio was transgressed, several verbal sins such as stultiloquium (‘foolish 
talk’), secreta revelare (‘disclosing of secrets’), etc., occurred.9
Unlike Hugh’s theory of disciplined speech from De institutione novitiorum, which had 
focused exclusively on the verbal behavior of monks, Ardent’s chapter on the usages of speech 
from the Speculum Universale offered a much larger opening on the habits of speech of society, 
and dealt with several socio-professional categories: aside from the linguistic conduct of the 
ecclesiastics, Ardent also considered the speech of laymen in all aspects of their everyday 
communications (political, family or commercial exchanges).10 Ardent’s encyclopedic Speculum 
is, according to Johannes Gründel, the masterpiece of medieval ethics in twelfth-century Europe. 
It is of great relevance to my dissertation that such a work is deeply concerned with the good and 
evil of language. Like Hugh of St. Victor, but on a much ampler scale, Raoul Ardent was 
concerned to establish norms for an impeccable use of speech and to inveigh against the 
                                                 
9 As to the criterion of discernment, Ardent faithfully follows in the footsteps of his model, Hugh of St. Victor, and 
maintains the same rigorous scheme of the circumstances of speech. If just one of the circumstances was not 
observed, the entire speech was considered failed (Si autem unum istorum defuerit, sermo indiscretus erit; 
Speculum, XIII.12, f. 164v). For--and here Ardent becomes very severe-- just as the well-discerned speech comes 
from intellect and fore-thinking, so the non-considerate speech is born out of numbness of mind and lack of fore-
thought: Sicut autem discretus sermo nascitur ex intellectu et ex preconsideratione, sic sermo indiscretus nascitur 
ex hebetudine mentis aut ex impreconsideratione. (ibidem). 
10 Ardent’s complex sociological opening was facilitated by the Aristotelian framework he adopted, through the 
agency of Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon: the tripartition of ethics into political, familial and solitary.  
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transgressions of these norms. All these transgressions were as many sins of the tongue that 
could harm God, another or oneself. 11 Through the agency of William Peraldus, terms and 
concepts pioneered by Raoul Ardent would permeate the discussion of transgressive speech of 
great scholasticism. 
Contemporary with Raoul Ardent and preoccupied with the same problematic of sinful or 
transgressive speech is a leading figure of French culture who had a great impact on both the 
theology and the poetry of the European Middle Ages: Alain of Lille. The concern with the harm 
one can do in speaking runs like a thread in the works written by Doctor Universalis, from his 
Summa of Preaching, which considers three verbal sins in three distinct chapters (garrulousness, 
lying and slander), through his Treatise of Vices and Virtues or his Dictionary of Theological 
Terms, to his celebrated allegorical poem the Plaint of Nature.12 Although Alain’s approach to 
the sins of the tongue is traditional, in the sense that he does not come up with a personal and 
original system, but considers verbal transgression as an offspring of the capital sins, his activity 
as a moralist on speech is relevant to my dissertation inasmuch as Alain of Lille was one of Jean 
de Meun’s and Dante’s greatest models.13
                                                 
11 Raoul Ardent takes up this classification of verbal sins from Peter the Cantor’s influential moral tract, Verbum 
abbreviatum (written about 1191). 
12 Evil silence and pompousness are criticized in the Plaint of Nature, which also violently inveighs against the sins 
of flattery and slander, as progeny of the capital sin of envy. The work on virtues and vices offers a micro-treatise on 
lying, false testimony and perjury [Tractus de Virtutibus, et de Vitiis et de Donis Spiritus Sancti. O. Lottin, ed., 
Medieval Studies 12 (1950), 20-56]. The vast theological dictionary defines several terms dealing with evil speech 
(see Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologicalium, in PL 210, 685-1012). Alain of Lille’s famous collection of 
sermons associates sins of the tongue with various social and professional categories: merchants, lawyers, monks, 
etc., and condemns the dissolute words triggered by drunkeness or lust, verbal offenses caused by anger, or the 
verbosity of the proud (see Summa de arte praedicatoria, PL 210, 120-190). 
13 Since my dissertation is not concerned with the sphere of influence exerted by Alain of Lille on Jean de Meun, I 
will not develop the argument on Alain’s approach to verbal transgressions. Here, I confine myself to mentioning 
that Alain was one of the pioneers of the medieval tradition of the sins of speech, whereas in the chapters of my 
dissertation I will frequently allude to, or quote, Alain’s ideas or definitions. Regarding Jean de Meun’s debt to 
Alain of Lille in the field of allegorical poetry, thorough studies have been written by Ernest Langlois, Origines et 
sources du ‘Roman de la Rose’ (Paris: E. Thorin, 1890), Pierre-Yves Badel, Le Roman de la Rose au XIVe siècle. 
Etude de la réception de l’œuvre (Geneva: Droz, 1980), G. Raynaud de Lage, Alain de Lille, poète du XIIe siècle 
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The efforts made by the French ecclesiastic intellectuals who in the twelfth century 
attempted to provide norms for morally correct speech and sensitize Christians to the harm 
derived from the transgressions of these norms bore remarkable fruits in the mid-thirteenth 
century. About 1236, William Peraldus, a Dominican monk from Lyon, wrote an encyclopedia 
of vices, in which after seven chapters devoted to the seven capital vices, he inserted an eighth, 
called De peccato linguae, in which he grouped twenty-four (!) manifestations of this sin. The 
element of originality of this endeavour was that Peraldus no longer considered the verbal 
trespasses “daughters” of the seven deadly sins, as they had been considered in Cassian or 
Gregory’s ethical systems, but gave them an autonomous status and grouped them under the 
same heading, as sins committed through the medium of speech. Needless to say, the great 
number of linguistic trasgressions Peraldus unites under the caption De peccato linguae goes far  
beyond the number of verbal sins scattered as progeny of the capital vices in Cassian and 
Gregory’s systems.14
Between 1260 and 1270, another Dominican writer, Steven of Bourbon, drew up a 
treatise on preaching, within which, under the confessed influence of William Peraldus, he 
introduced a chapter dedicated again to the sins of the tongue, a chapter comprising a generous 
assortment of exemplary stories about the personal and social consequences of wicked speech. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Paris: Vrin, 1951), Alan Gunn, The Mirror of Love, a Reinterpretation of the ‘Romance of the Rose’ (Texas: Texas 
Tech Press, 1952), Daniel Poirion, “Alain de Lille and Jean de Meun,” in Alain de Lille, Gautier de Chatillon, 
Jakemart Giélée et leur temps (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1980, 134-159), Barbara Newman, God and the 
Goddesses: Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
For the relationship Alain of Lille - Dante, see: Peter Dronke, Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1986) , “Boethius, Alanus und Dante” [Romanische Forschungen 78 (1966), 119-125], and A. 
Ciotti’s “Alano e Dante,” in Convivium 27 (1960), 257-288. 
14 In Cassian’s eight-fold system, fornicatio (‘lust’) has as progeny: obscenity, scurillity and idle talking; from 
avarice spring: lying, perjury, false testimony; from sloth springs verbosity; cenodoxia (‘vanity’) gives rise to 
discord and boasting and superbia to blasphemy, murmur, and slander (Cassianus, Collatio V, SC, 42, p. 209). In 
Gregory’s seven-fold scheme, we have the following relationships: from inanis gloria: boasting, quarrel and discord, 
from invidia: whispering and slander; from ira: strife, insult, contradiction and blasphemy; from avarice: deceit and 
perjury, from ventris ingluvies: lewd language and loquacity. 
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The preoccupation with the sins of the tongue became so acute that it ended up pervading the 
major theological treatises of the time: Alexander of Hales, Vincent of Beauvais, and Thomas 
Aquinas, all devoted a privileged space to sinful speech in their Summae. 
The proliferation of such texts have prompted Silvana Vecchio and Carla Casagrande, 
two reputed Italian medievalists concerned with the moral systems of the European Middle Ages, 
to state that the timeframe between 1190-1260 represented ‘the golden age of the sins of the 
tongue’ (il secolo d’oro dei peccati della lingua). Two major phenomena are responsible, in 
Casagrande and Vecchio’s view, for this explosion of morals texts dealing with speech 
transgressions: the rise of new forms of lay piety, triggered by the intense activity of the two 
preaching orders, the Franciscans and the Dominicans, and the development of new forms of 
expression in vernacular languages. 
Thorough and extremely well documented, 15 Casagrande and Vecchio’s book on the 
medieval ethics of speech has, in recent years, been instrumental for researchers of cultural and 
literary phenomena in various fields.  Richard Newhauser has included the findings of the two 
Italian medievalists in his history of moral tracts in the Middle Ages. Edwin Craun has resorted 
to the theses expressed in I peccati della lingua to substantiate his claim that four major poets of 
the English Middle Ages--Chaucer, Gower, Langland and the Patience poet--drew heavily on the 
tradition of the sins of the tongue in their works.16 Bettina Lindorfer,17 and, more recently, the 
                                                 
15 The two authors have examined dozens of primary texts, some of them never edited, from short sermons to vast 
moral and theological encyclopedias, and hundreds of secondary texts covering an impressive span of time and 
drawn up in several European languages. 
16 Lies, Slander, and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature. Pastoral Rhetoric and the Deviant Speaker. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
17 “Peccatum linguae and the Punishment of Speech Violations in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times,” in 
Speaking in the Medieval World, Jean E. Godsall-Myers, ed. (Leiden, NLD: Brill, 2003), 23-46. 
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historian Sandy Bardsley18 have also used I peccati della lingua as a background for their own 
research in the field of medieval habits and assessments of speech. 
In I peccati della lingua, Casagrande and Vecchio note that the medieval preoccupation 
with the verbal sins exceeds the golden period of seventy years between 1190-1260. Concerned 
with the overwhelmingly vast material of primary texts, the two scholars focused mostly on this 
period and dealt chiefly with the major authors who established a tradition of the sins of the 
tongue in the Middle Ages: preachers, confessors, canonists and theologians. Understandably, 
the consideration of the writers of literary works of the period would have exceeded the scope of 
such a study.  
My dissertation on transgressive speech in the Romance of the Rose and the Divine 
Comedy has been inspired by the findings of Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio. The two 
masterpieces of medieval poetry in France and Italy, one of which (the Rose) allegedly a model 
for the other one (the Comedy), testify to the same preoccupation with the evils of speech 
Casagrande and Vecchio document in I peccati della lingua. The dates at which these two 
literary works were written (about 1280 the Romance of the Rose, and 1306-1320, the Divine 
Comedy) situate them in the immediate temporal proximity of the golden age of the sins of the 
tongue. Both Jean de Meun and Dante Alighieri reserve an impressive space for the 
transgressions of speech in their poems: in the Rose, each and every protagonist discusses uses 
and abuses of language, whereas Dante punishes several sins of the tongue in the Inferno and 
still alludes to them in the Paradiso.  
The assimilation of the ecclesiastic tradition of verbal sins is compounded in Jean and 
Dante by the specificity of their “trade”: they are both poets and, as practitioners of an art based 
                                                 
18 Venomous Tongues. Speech and Gender in Late Medieval England. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006). 
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on written words, they are doubly more sensitive to (and responsible for) what they “say,” i.e., 
cast on paper, than an ordinary speaker. Moreover, both of them write from the positions of 
Christian writers, at a time when poetry was required to express the truths of theology and to be 
an expressive vehicle for faith and moral values.19 Another important aspect that gives 
specificity to a consideration of the treatment of sins of the tongue by the two poets is the 
idiom(s) in which they write. The medieval tradition of the sins of the tongue was drawn up 
mainly in Latin. Jean de Meun and Dante write their allegorical poems in the vernacular. They 
both write at a time when the vernacular languages were opening themselves up to the formation 
or reception of new words, some of them unacceptable by the norms of the written language.20 In 
this framework, the two poets are concerned not only with other people’s verbal transgressions, 
but also with their own potential sins, as writers.  
The examination of the multiple ways in which two leading figures of the literary culture 
in medieval France and Italy absorbed the pastoral and theological discussion of peccata linguae 
has enabled me to formulate the thesis which underlies this dissertation: that the preoccupation 
with transgressive speech was not the exclusive apanage of the ecclesiastical circles. Poetry, as 
represented by Jean de Meun and Dante-- poetry in the vernacular--participated in original ways 
in the moral debate on the vices of speech. 
Starting from the premise that only the recourse to the medieval tradition of peccata 
linguae can facilitate our understanding of the verbal transgressions discussed by Jean de Meun 
and Dante, I first undertake to highlight the ethical systems of transgressive speech that were 
                                                 
19 For the inextricable link between poetry and ethics in medieval times, see the groundbreaking study of Judson 
Boyce Allen, The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), in which 
the author also devotes a few pages to Dante. 
20 For meticulous research on the changes undergone by vernacular languages in this period of time, see Jacques le 
Goff and Jean-Claude Schmitt: “Au XIIIe siècle. Une parole nouvelle,” in Histoire vécue du peuple chrétien, Jean 
Delumeau ed., (Toulouse: Privat, 1979), 257-279 
 11 
popular in France and Italy at the time when the two poets were writing. Thus, my first chapter 
focuses on William Peraldus, whose De peccato linguae was seminal in the field of texts on 
immoral speech, and on two of his translators into Romance vernacular: Laurens d’Orléans and 
Domenico Cavalca. Since the former wrote his Somme le Roi in French, and the latter his 
Pungilingua in Italian, their moral lexicon provides us an important key for grasping the notions 
and vocabulary used to qualify acts of speech in the Romance of the Rose and the Divine 
Comedy. I also take a look at Thomas Aquinas’s ethics, as his viewpoint of the pivotal role 
played by the will in verbal sins may illuminate Jean de Meun and Dante’s standpoint with 
respect to transgressive speech. 
The second chapter of my dissertation seeks to draw the contours of a moral theory of 
speech in Jean de Meun and Dante, and proposes itself as a necessary propedeutics for an 
investigation of the transgressions of speech discussed in the Romance of the Rose and the 
Divine Comedy. For the Rose, I examine Lady Reason, Nature and Genius’s pronouncements on 
speech and bring to the fore the three main aspects of Jean de Meun’s view of linguistic 
morality: the preoccupation with obscene speech, the will as the chief agent in verbal sins, and 
the negative view of female eloquence. For the Comedy, I consider three of Dante’s minor 
works: De vulgari eloquentia, De monarchia and the Convivio, which, along with the Purgatory 
and the Paradiso, enlighten Dante’s treatment of verbal sins in the Inferno. 
Chapter three brings together several verbal transgressions (flattery, double-talking, 
fraudulent counsel, sowing of discord and falsifying of words) under the heading Lingua dolosa 
(‘The Guileful Tongue’), as both Jean de Meun and Dante seem particularly concerned about 
linguistic fraud. Here, I analyze the positions of the characters in the Rose with respect to the sin 
of adulatio, and then compare them with Dante’s handling of this sin in the Inferno. The sin of 
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pravum consilium also has representatives in both literary works: The Old Woman and Ami, two 
main figures in the Rose, recommend the use of fraud in speech, while Ulysses and Guido da 
Montefeltro are punished by Dante in the area of Malebolge for exactly the same sin. Faus 
Semblant, the remarkable chameleonic figure of the Romance of the Rose, embodies the habits of 
double-talking and sowing of discord. Dante punishes the sowers of discord and the falsifiers of 
words in two of the deepest areas of hell. 
The last chapter of my dissertation is two-pronged and somewhat particular in that it 
addresses the problem of blasphemy from an unusual perspective. The sin of blasphemy is not 
overtly tackled in the Romance of the Rose, but rather implied by Jean de Meun when he speaks 
of his authorial persona. The possible charge of blasphemy the poet feared from his readership, 
because of his too daring freedoms with language, would eventually be actualized by Jean 
Gerson, a reputed theologian involved in the Querelle de la Rose, a great admirer of William 
Peraldus and a moralist of speech himself. My dissertation will, at this point, consider the 
charges of blasphemy that Gerson leveled at Jean de Meun and how Jean de Meun anticipated 
them in the proleptic segment of the Rose in which the poet apologized to the reader and to the 
Catholic Church for his linguistic misdemeanor. I will then move on to the issue of blasphemy in 
Dante to discuss the idiosyncratic way in which Dante handled this verbal trespass. In the 
medieval tradition of the lingua-texts,21 blasphemy was generally considered the most grievous 
verbal transgression. Dante reverses this taxonomy, and by placing blasphemers in the upper part 
of hell, devises an original hierarchy of verbal sins in which blasphemy is outweighed in 
seriousness by sins such as flattery, fraudulent counsel, sowing of discord, and falsifying of 
                                                 
21 I borrow this term from Ralf G. Bogner, who uses it to describe the medieval productions concerned with verbal 
sins: Die Bezähmung der Zunge. Literatur und Disziplinierung der Alltagskommunikation  in der frühen Neuzeit 
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997). 
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words. The reasons for this reversal of terms seem to be the social and political consequences 
triggered by the last four verbal sins, consequences that were uppermost in Dante’s mind. 
My method is historical in nature in that throughout my analysis I bring concepts posited 
by the medieval theorists on immoral speech to bear on the transgressions of speech discussed by 
Jean de Meun and Dante. It is also essentially comparative, as I constantly seek to highlight the 
similarities or dissimilarities between the treatments of verbal sins in the Romance of the Rose 
and the Divine Comedy. At the same time, I take care to highlight the new ideas or terms the two 
poets brought to the conventional categories from the moral tractates on verbal sins. 
As far as the title of this dissertation is concerned, I would like to draw attention to two 
terms. The word indisciplinata (‘unruly’) I use with respect to the tongue is taken from Hugh of 
St. Victor, and with exactly the same technical meaning: that of a tongue which breaks the rules 
of orderly speech, rules imposed by the moral imperatives of self-control and discernment. The 
term transgressive centers around the same idea of words that violate unseen spiritual 
boundaries. Aquinas constructed his theory of sinful speech on the Augustinian notion of words 
as signs. The implication is that there is a moral borderline within the use of speech, a borderline 
beyond which one cannot pass without incurring the great risk of losing salvation. Trans-gressive 
speech is an ethical tra-passar del segno by human beings, of which Dante’s Ulysses is the 
perfect paradigm. It is a way of speaking based on lie and deceit, as is seen in Cavalca’s 
Pungilingua, where perjury is defined as a tra-passar of the licit and truthful oath. Trans-
gressive speech is, ultimately, the opposite of Dante’s imparadised speech in writing the third 
cantica, a linguistic and moral level the poet was able to attain only by the extraordinary 
experience of his tras-umanar. 
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2.0  MEDIEVAL AUTHORITIES ON TRANSGRESSIVE SPEECH 
The notion of the relationship between language and the sacred is as old as the Old 
Testament. The universe began as a response to God’s verbal command. Language was thus as 
miraculous as creation itself. The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation further elaborated this 
idea and posited the notion of Christ as the embodied Word. Since ordinary humans were 
endowed with the gift of speech as well, for Christians, human language became the most 
immediate connection between the world down here, corrupt and corruptible, and the 
transcendental world, perfect and eternal. As early as the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine, the 
first philosopher of Christianity, reflected at length on the specular relationship between human 
words and the Word, the verbum dei, and posited a major split within human language. 
According to Augustine, men use two different kinds of language: an outer language, consisting 
of the vocal expression of notions and ideas, and an inner language--the verbum cordis or mentis-
-, the true language, that reflects God’s Word.22 In moral terms, the closer men’s outer words are 
to their inner, mental words, the closer men themselves are to transcendental standards. When a 
discrepancy occurs between what people say and what they actually think, the human language 
becomes tarnished with the sins of lying and hypocrisy. Augustine’s doctrine of interiority, his 
                                                 
22 See De Trinitate, book XV. For an analysis of Augustine’s theory of inner speech, see Claude Panaccio, 
“Augustin, le verbe mental et l’amour,” in Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age. Proceedings of the 
9th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy. Ottawa, 17-22 August, 1992. Vol. 1, 777-785. 
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philosophy of language, as well as his concerns for morality, represent a fundamental cultural 
legacy to Christians in the Middle Ages.  
Taking up major Augustinian notions, which they enriched with their own philosophical 
and moral insights or combined with other strands of thought (Classical or patristic), the 
moralists of the later Middle Ages paid particular attention, as we have seen, to the sins 
committed through the medium of speech. In this chapter, I present four leading moralists--two 
Italians and two Frenchmen--, whose insights and pronouncements on verbal sins have proven 
instrumental in my interpretation of the instances of transgressive speech discussed in the 
Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy.  
William Peraldus was the first great theologian to imply that the verbal vices were so 
grievous that they might constitute an eighth class of capital vice. De peccato linguae, Peraldus’s 
tract on verbal sin, was seminal in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and was soon translated 
into French and Italian. For having transposed Peraldus’s theories about sinful speech into 
vernacular, Laurent d’Orléans and Domenico Cavalca may also shed a great deal of light on the 
terms used by Jean de Meun and Dante to describe sins men commit in speech. Thomas Aquinas, 
whose doctrine of peccata verbi will close my series of presentations, is fundamental for my 
dissertation not only because he was one of Dante’s confessed authorities in matters of ethics, 
but also because he introduced the notion of will as the moral agent for verbal sins, a notion that 
underlies both Jean de Meun and Dante’s view of sinful speech. 
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2.1 PERALDUS’S EIGHTH “CAPITAL” VICE  
In a study written in 1948, the French scholar Antoine Dondaine deeply deplored the fact 
that William Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum et virtutibus, a work which enjoyed an exceptional 
popularity not only in the Middle Ages but also in the following ages up to the seventeenth 
century, had, in modern times, slipped into oblivion along with the name of its author.23 
According to Dondaine, Peraldus should be granted a place of honor in the doctrinal history of 
the Middle Ages. His moral Summa is an exceptional product of a Christian moral theology, 
essentially traditional and Latin, very different from the Greco-Arab wisdom which began to 
infiltrate late-medieval Christian thought.24  
The last three or four decades have brought a marked change in the attitude of medieval 
scholarship toward Peraldus. Two projects, one initiated by a group of five American scholars, 
the other by a Dutch team, have undertaken to provide a modern edition of Peraldus’ Summa.25 
Casagrande and Vecchio’s book has also contributed a great deal to the revival of interest in the 
figure and works of the medieval moralist. Peraldus’s name is also more and more cited in the 
field of Dante studies, as we shall see in what follows. But who was this ecclesiastic figure, so 
                                                 
23 “La faveur accordée par le moyen âge et les siècles suivants à la ‘Somme des vices et des vertus’ du dominicain 
Guillaume Peyraut n’a de comparable que l’oubli dans lequel cette même oeuvre est tombée de nos jours. Peu 
d’ouvrages, dans toute l’histoire littéraire connurent un aussi brillant succès,” [“Guillaume Peyraut, vie et oeuvres,” 
Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 18 (1948), 162]. 
24 Here are the enthusiastic words with which Dondaine describes the specificity of Peraldus’s moral encyclopedia: 
“A la différence des traités spéculatifs, où l’apport philosophique grec devient souvent prépondérant, la Somme des 
vices et des vertus ne perd pas un seul instant le contact avec les sources scripturaires et patristiques. Une inspiration 
profondément chrétienne anime toute l’oeuvre et plonge le lecteur dans une atmosphère d’intense vie spirituelle. 
(…) Du fait de ces sources la Somme est comme le dernier témoin d’une tradition qui va se trouver en partie 
submergée par l’envahissement de la morale péripatéticienne” (“Guillaume Peyraut,” 189). 
25 Kent Emery Jr., Joseph Goering, Richard Newhauser, Catherine Pinchetti, and Siegfried Wenzel have started The 
Peraldus Project, a semi-critical edition of the Summa Vitiorum. A part of their work has already been published on-
line, at:  www. english.upenn.edu/~swenzel/peraldus.html. The Dutch scholars from the Institute of Historical, 
Literary and Cultural Studies  (Nijmegen), lead by Dr. A.M. Verwij,  have prepared a critical, annotated edition of 
the third section of the Summa de virtutibus, “De Virtutibus cardinalibus.” For more about the current state of their 
work, see: www.onderzoekinformatie.nl. 
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famous in the late Middle Ages, and why is he so important in the context of our discussion of 
transgressive speech in the Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy? 
Born about 1200 in Peyraud, in the department of Ardèche, William Peraldus (Guillaume 
Peyraut, in the French version) was a Dominican friar, a brilliant preacher whose intense 
religious activity was concentrated in Lyon, where, about 1260, he was a prior of the Dominican 
convent; and also in Vienna. Several testimonies contemporary with Peraldus and recalled by 
Dondaine portray Peraldus as a man of exceptional erudition, whose intellectual and rhetorical 
qualities were matched only by his strong Christian qualities: according to some medieval 
sources, even at an old age, Peraldus was climbing the hard slopes of the Alps to reach the most 
isolated settlements of Christians in need of spiritual assistance. His sermons and preaching skills 
had made him famous in all of Europe to the point that intellectuals who met him noted down the 
impressions left by their encounter with him. 
Among the five main works that are attributed to him, the Summa Vitiorum and virtutibus 
is by far the most celebrated. Written in its entirety before 1250,26 the Summa is a work of moral 
theology with a bipolar structure: its first part deals with the capital vices, and its second with the 
cardinal and theological virtues, as well as with the beatitudes. The Summa Vitiorum adopts but 
at the same time explodes the traditional Gregorian scheme of the capital vices: to the seven 
vices postulated by Gregory the Great, and treated by Peraldus in seven different tracts or 
chapters, Peraldus adds an eighth, which he examines in a distinct chapter called De peccato 
linguae.27 The interpretations given to this structural aspect of the Summa Vitiorum by 
                                                 
26 Judging from a manuscript from Combray, dating from 1277, the Summa Vitiorum probably dates from as early as 
1236. The Summa de virtutibus was written after the section on vices, and would date from 1248. These dates 
advanced by Dondaine have generally been accepted by modern scholars. 
27 Siegfried Wenzel correctly points out that the addition of a new category of vice is not the only liberty Perladus 
takes with respect to the Gregorian system. The Dominican moralist also changes the order of the vices within the 
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Peraldus’s scholars converge into the idea that by adding this “new” vice to the traditional seven, 
Peraldus conferred to the verbal sin the status of an eighth capital sin. The implication of 
Peraldus’s addition was that the harm men may commit with their tongue is as serious as the 
evils they commit by other means. According to the same interpreters (Casagrande, Vecchio, 
Wenzel, Lindorfer, Craun) the inclusion of an eighth capital vice, the vice of the tongue, 
represents the hallmark of Peraldus’s moral system.  
Under the generic heading De Peccato linguae, the medieval moralist discusses twenty-
four classes of verbal sin, in twenty-four separate chapters:  
 
1. blasphemia (blasphemy) 
2. murmur (tale-bearing) 
3. peccati defensio (excusing sin)  
4. periurium (perjury)  
5. mendacium/falsum testimonium (lying/false testimony) 
6. detractio (slander) 
7. adulatio (flattery) 
8. maledictio (cursing) 
9. convitium (insult)  
10. contentio (quarreling) 
11. bonorum derisio (mocking good people)  
12. pravum consilium (evil counsel) 
13. peccatum seminantium discordiae (sowing of discord)  
14. bilinguium (double talking) 
                                                                                                                                                             
system, coming up with the arrangement: gluttony, lechery, avarice, accidia, pride, envy and wrath, which reverses 
the Gregorian order. See Wenzel: “By the early thirteenth century, the seven vices had, in moral theology, as well as 
in its practical applications, become the standard topic of discussing the major inclinations to evil in human 
behavior. What was not standard, and hence surprises us, is the order in which Peraldus presents the seven, which 
contrasts with the normal one, derived form Gregory the Great, that begins with pride and ends with lechery.” [“The 
Continuing Life of William Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum,” in Ad litteram. Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval 
Readers, Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery Jr., eds. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 137]. 
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15. rumor (rumor) 
16. iactantia (boasting)  
17. secretorum revelatio (ferreting of secrets) 
18. indiscreta comminatio (blunt threats)  
19. indiscreta promissio (imprudent promise)  
20. verbum otiosum (idle talk)  
21. multiloquium (loquacity)  
22. turpiloquium (lewd talk)  
23. scurrilitas (scurrility)  
24. indiscreta taciturnitas (imprudent taciturnity) 
 
The rationale for the inclusion of an eighth vice in a work structured on a sevenfold 
system is given in the first paragraph of the tract on verbal sin, where Peraldus obliquely 
complains of the insufficiency of the Gregorian scheme: Ultimo inter peccata dicendum est de 
peccato linguae quia istud peccatum remanet post alia peccata (‘lastly among the sins we must 
speak of the sin of the tongue, because this sin remains after the other sins’; 9.1).28  To this 
argument which bears on the technical necessities related to the structure of his work, he adds 
another complaint, which has to do with a compelling moral reality: among people, even those 
truly regretful of their sins, few are aware of, and therefore try to shun and redeem, the evils they 
commit in speech: Multi cavent sibi de aliis peccatis qui non cavent a peccato linguae; ‘many 
people guard themselves against other sins, but they do not do so against the sin of the 
tongue’).29
                                                 
28 Peraldus uses the terms ‘vice’ and ‘sin’ interchangeably, as synonyms. The technical distinction between vice, as 
a steady moral disposition toward evil, and sin, the actual accomplishment of the disposition, will be made only later 
on, by Thomas Aquinas. 
29 Unless otherwise specified, the translation of the Latin quotes I use from medieval authors is mine. 
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In the tract on verbal sin, Peraldus maintains the tripartite pattern of treatment he had 
hitherto applied to the other capital vices: detestatio (a list of reasons why Christians should 
abhor the respective vice), species (subclasses of each chief vice), remedia (practical solutions 
for fighting the evil inclinations). Taking up Hugh of St. Victor’s theory of the disciplina in 
locutione, just as Raoul Ardent had done before him, Peraldus individuates, as we have seen, the 
evils of speech in the tongue, an organ which by its anatomic slipperiness is prone to moral 
deviance, and advances no fewer than eighteen reasons that should move men to control their 
speech. These reasons constitute the part of detestatio within the tractate.  
As far as the sins themselves are concerned, the first four (blasphemy, murmur, excusing 
sin and perjury) offend God directly, whilst the last twenty vices offend man. Among the twenty-
four, blasphemy is considered the gravest, but no other attempt at arrangement according to a 
criterion based on gravity is pursued by Peraldus. In other words, there is no explicit reference to 
a hierarchy of sins in his tract on verbal transgressions. Each of the twenty-four chapters 
provides several definitions of each vice, but even these definitions are schematic, very concise. 
The moralist is more interested in the phenomenology of the sin, and most often obliquely 
characterizes the sin by the specific behavior of the sinner. A keen observer of the contemporary 
social scene, Peraldus frequently associates verbal sins with specific segments of society: 
murmur and rumor with monks, lying with merchants, scurrility with minstrels, women with 
quarreling, and… blasphemy with drunkards. To reinforce his ethical message, Peraldus draws 
extensively from scriptural and patristic authorities, which he intersperses with quotes from 
classical sources, such as Cicero, Seneca, Horace. The style of the writing is highly 
metaphorical, and the obsessive insistence with which certain motives or images recur are the 
 21 
apanage of the skilled Christian orator concerned with convincing the sinners to avoid evil 
tendencies. 
The last part of the tract provides a list of eight remedies against verbal transgressions, 
which are in fact repressive attitudes against sinful tendencies of the tongue. The theme of the 
custodia linguae, with which, in the wake of Hugh of St. Victor and Raoul Ardent, Peraldus had 
begun his treatise on De peccato linguae recurs in this final part, giving thus a circular structure 
to the last tract of the Summa Vitiorum.30
In the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, Peraldus’s moral encyclopedia 
enjoyed an exceptional fortune: more than three hundred manuscripts are known from the 
thirteenth to the fifteenth century alone.31 In the fifteenth century, Jean Gerson, the famous 
chancellor of the University of Paris, mentions Peraldus’s Summa in one of his writings from 
1423, called De examinatione doctrinarum, and it seems that the esteem in which he held the 
Peraldian work was extremely high: Gerson allegedly said that if it happened that all the books in 
the world would suddenly vanish, and only Peraldus’s Summa survived, the loss would not be 
that bad.32 In the sixteenth century, three editions of the Summa were printed in 1571 alone, and 
in the seventeenth century, four different editions were printed in the same year, 1668. Of the 
medieval manuscripts of the Summa, Edwin Craun counts thirty-three copies in England alone.  
Modern scholarship on Peraldus has proven with many irrefutable arguments that Summa 
Vitiorum’ s influence on subsequent European moral thought was strong and took various 
                                                 
30 I do not dwell longer on Peraldus in this introductory part, since I will return to his De peccato linguae for each of 
the verbal sins Dante treats in the Inferno. For an overview of Peraldus’s system of oral sins, see Casagrande and 
Vecchio’s chapter “Guglielmo Peraldo: I vizi capitali e il peccato della lingua,” (in I peccati della lingua, 103-140), 
and more recently, Craun’s account of Peraldus’ approach to verbal sin, in Lies, Slander and Obscenity, 14-17. 
31 Wenzel also notes: “In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries both Summae could be found in practically any major 
library all over Europe, whether monastic or secular or eventually lay, often even in multiple copies.” (“The 
Continuing life of William Peraldus,” 136). 
32 Quoted by E. J. Arnold, in Le ‘Manuel des péchés’. Etude de littérature religieuse anglo-normande (Paris: Droz, 
1940), 29. 
 22 
shapes: from expansions of the Summa, to abbreviations of it, adaptations or simple quotes. 
Siegfried Wenzel has thoroughly examined and detected Peraldus’s presence in works such as: 
Erchantnuzz der Sund (‘Knowledge of Sin’, fourteenth century, Vienna), De Lingua (Oxford, 
fourteenth century), Summa iusticie (England, beginning of the fourteenth century), Alexander 
Carpenter’s Destructiorum vitiorum (England, fifteenth century), Primo videndum est and 
Quoniam ut ait sapiens (late-medieval England, sources for Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale). 
Casagrande and Vecchio have also contributed strong arguments for the influence of Peraldus’s 
Summa on Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomew of San Concord, John of Friburgh, Steven of 
Bourbon, Servasanto da Faenza, Laurens d’Orléans, and Domenico Cavalca. 
The last three names are very important in the context of our discussion of the Romance 
of the Rose and the Divine Comedy, and I will treat Laurens d’Orléans and Cavalca separately for 
reasons that I will explain in due course. Servasanto da Faenza was a Franciscan friar, who, 
between 1277 and 1285, wrote an adaptation of Peraldus’s Summa in Florence. Entitled Liber de 
virtutibus et vitiis, da Faenza’s work offers a summary of Peraldus’s tract on verbal sin (De vitio 
lingue et eius multiplici speciei) and deals with selected verbal sins, such as: blasphemy, 
murmur, slander, flattery, sowing of discord, double-talking.33 We know from Dante’s biography 
that he had a strong sympathy for the Franciscan order, and da Faenza’s work in Florence during 
the years preceding Dante’s exile increases the probability of Dante’s familiarity with Peraldus. 
To my knowledge, Casagrande and Vecchio’s mention of Servasanto da Faenza has not yet been 
connected with Dante.  
Another name with a strong resonance in Dante’s biography might have been the 
intermediary between Peraldus’s Summa and Dante: according to J. Th. Welter, Brunetto Latini 
                                                 
33 My sources for this information are Casagrande and Vecchio, I peccati della lingua: 132 
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undoubtedly drew on Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum, in his Le livre du trésor, written about 1266, a 
work reputedly known to Dante. Dondaine and Lindorfer subscribe to Welter’s assertion.34 As 
far as the relationship Dante-Peraldus is concerned, two studies dealing with this subject have 
been written that leave no doubt as to Dante’s familiarity with the Summa Vitiorum. In 
“Un’Auctoritas di Dante,” Franco Mancini contends that the work of the Dominican friar is one 
of the models Dante visited most frequently.35 Mancini compares textually fragments from the 
Summa Vitiorum with passages from the Divine Comedy, giving an overwhelming list of 
similarities between the two works. Although some of these analogies seem to me a little far-
fetched (like the comparison of Ulysses’ orazion picciola with Peraldus’s words on superbia: 
[Indocti] miseri sunt in vita ista. Quodammodo enim brutis inferiores sunt; ‘The unlearned are 
unhappy in this life. They are even inferior to beasts’),36 other similarities Mancini has 
highlighted are too striking to be discarded: the punishment imagined by Dante for the usurers 
with Peraldus’s identical image, the description of Cayaphas in Inferno XXIII with an eerily 
similar description in Peraldus, etc. According to Mancini, the portrayal of the veglio di creta 
should also be related to Peraldus, just as dozens of other images or metaphors that Mancini 
generously selects from the three canticas of the Comedy and compares, with  painstaking care, 
with textual quotes from the Summa Vitiorum. The evidence gathered by Mancini is, in the main, 
                                                 
34 See L’exemplum dans la littérature religieuse et didactique du Moyen Age, (Paris: Guitard, 1927), 168, for 
Welter; Guillaume Peyraut. Vie et oeuvres, 191, for Dondaine; and “Peccatum linguae,” 27, for Lindorfer. Although 
Lindorfer’s article does not deal with Dante, it is worth noting that she mentions Brunetto and Dante in the same 
connection with the moral category of peccatum linguae: “ It is not surprising, therefore, that Albertanus da Brescia 
in his Art of Speaking and Being Silent, Brunetto Latini in his Li Livres dou Tresor, Erasmus in Lingua and even 
Dante in the Divine Comedy all refer, explicitly or implicitly, to the Summa Vitiorum et virtutibus.” (id.) 
35 Studi danteschi 45 (1968), 95-119. The critic does not fail to note, first, Peraldus’s sway on Iacopone da Todi and, 
again, Brunetto Latini, and to signal the presence of many copies of the Summa Vitiorum in Dante’s time in cities 
like Pisa, Assisi, Perugia. 
36 In this very passage, Peraldus reinforces his idea with a kindred quote from Boethius, an author whose influence 
on Dante was avowed by Dante himself. Ulysses’ orazion picciola may thus have been shaped by Boethius through 
a direct influence, not necessarily through the intermediary of Peraldus. 
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overwhelming.37 One idea, especially, seems to me tantalizing in Franco Mancini’s study: that 
Dante’s relationship to Peraldus did not take the shape of slavish imitation. Peraldus’s Latin 
Summa Vitiorum represented an inexhaustible source of inspiration, from which Dante gleaned 
scraps of information, concepts and metaphorical images that he used in idiosyncratic ways in 
his poem written in the vernacular [my emphasis]. Thus, Dante would be a traduttore-traditore 
of Peraldus, a splendid idea, which I will retain for my treatment of the sins of the tongue in the 
Inferno. My discussion of the infernal circles punishing verbal sins will add more affinities 
between Dante and Peraldus to the already long list drawn up by Franco Mancini.  
Although focusing on just one aspect of the connection Summa Vitiorum-Divine Comedy, 
Siegfried’s Wenzel’s article on “Dante’s Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins,” brings more 
compelling evidence to support Dante’s reliance on Peraldus. The seven forms of evil love 
according to which Dante disposes the seven terraces of the mount Purgatory correspond 
faithfully to the forms of amor inordinatus with which Peraldus characterizes the moral term sin. 
The theory of disorderly love through which, in Purgatory XVII, Virgil explains the structure of 
Purgatory to the pilgrim reproduces Peraldus’s doctrine of sin as amor inordinatus, from Summa 
Vitiorum (De Superbia). According to Wenzel, this approach to sin is unique in the moral 
theology of the Middle Ages, and Dante could have taken it only from Peraldus. 
Recently, other Dante critics like Bruno Porcelli and Richard A. Shoaf have contributed 
more evidence supporting the theory of a connection between Dante’s Comedy and Peraldus’s 
Summa.38 As both Shoaf and Purcelli’s contributions analyze (each) one specific aspect of this 
                                                 
37 The Italian critic does not confine himself to the Comedy, he also mentions Convivio I.V.5, as being indebted to 
Peraldus.  
38 Porcelli, Bruno. “Peccatum linguae, modello mosaico, climax narrativo nel canto di Ulisse.” Critica letteraria 
19.72 (1991): 423-443. 
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connection, I will refer more extensively to them when I will discuss the respective places in the 
Comedy (the circle of evil counselors, and falsifiers, respectively). Although the main goal of my 
dissertation is not to add further proof to Peraldus’s sway on Dante, the examination of the 
Perldian treatment of the sins of the tongue in connection to Dante seems to me unavoidable and 
born of common sense, therefore I will point to possible affinities between Dante’s text and the 
text of De peccato linguae every time it will be necessary. 
As to the question whether Dante knew the Summa Vitiorum directly or indirectly, I 
adhere to the conclusion Siegfried Wenzel has reached: “(…) whether or not Dante knew 
Peraldus’s Summa directly is hard to say. The material which Peraldus had collected was soon 
used and propagated by authors of Latin and vernacular manuals on the sins and on confession. 
Hence it is possible that Dante became acquainted with our passage at second hand, although the 
rationale itself is usually not found in the less speculative, more popular handbooks of the time. 
On the other hand, Dante may have seen the Summa during his contacts with Dominican friars at 
Santa Maria Novella in Florence or at the Sorbonne.”39
Since Wenzel reached this conclusion in 1965, many years before Casagrande and 
Vecchio published the results of their research on the variegated dissemination of Peraldus in 
France and Italy, in Wenzel’s two suppositions regarding the places where Dante might have 
“met” the Summa, I would only substitute the Florence of Servasanto da Faenza for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Richard A. Shoaf. “Dante and Peraldus: The acqua falsa of Maestro Adamo (A Note on Inferno 30. 64-69)”, in 
Quaderni d’Italianistica 10 (1980), 311-313. 
39 “Dante’s Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins (Purgatorio XVII),” Modern Language Review 60 (1965), 533. 
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Sorbonne. Seemingly, Dante’s trip to Paris is more of a legend than a historically grounded 
fact.40 Why look for “Dante’s Peraldus” in France, when we can find him in Florence? 
In what follows I will describe two vernacular compilations of Peraldus, one in French 
the other in vernacular Italian. 
 
2.2 LAURENT D’ORLÉANS AND LES PECHIÉS DE LA LANGUE 
“Quelqun’un entreprit alors d’accommoder en langue d’oïl l’oeuvre du célèbre 
dominicain.”41 These are the words with which, in the wake of Charles Langlois, we could 
characterize Laurent d’Orléans’s work, and more notably, his French tract on the pechies de la 
langue. The “famous Dominican” Langlois speaks of as the object of such a linguistic process of 
“accommodation” is, of course, William Peraldus.  
Somme le roi, also known as Somme Lorens or Li Livres royaux des vices et des vertus is 
a moral encyclopedia which, according to several of its interpreters, bears the irrefutable imprint 
of Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum et virtutibus.42 Written in 1279-80 by Laurent d’Orléans, a 
                                                 
40 The hypothesis of Dante’s visit to Paris has been accredited especially by those critics who have studied the 
possibility that Dante might have become acquainted with the Romance of the Rose during a trip to the French 
capital. There is, however, no biographical evidence to support such a hypothesis. 
41 Charles V. Langlois, La vie en France au Moyen Age, (Geneva: Slatkine, 1970,  IV), 134. 
42 The earliest assertion in this sense belongs to R.E. Fowler, who, in a study from 1905, advances the hypothesis 
that both Gower (in Mirour de l’Omme and the Confessio Amantis) and the author of the Somme le Roi drew 
extensively on Peraldus’s Summa (Une source française des poèmes de Gower, Mâcon, 1905).  Speaking of 
Peraldus’s legacy in the later Middle Ages, Welther also asserts: “La Somme-le-Roi (…) renferme de larges 
emprunts faits à la Summa (de Guillaume Peyraut), à côté de traités latins antérieurs.” (L’Exemplum, 169). Let us 
mention in passing that in the list drawn by Welter of writers influenced by Peraldus, Somme le Roi immediately 
follows Brunetto Latini’s Livre du Trésor. One of the places where Peraldus’s sway on Laurent d’Orléans is more 
easily recognizable seems to be the chapter on the sins of the tongue, from the Somme le Roi. (See I peccati, 132-
133). 
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Dominican friar, confessor to King Philip III, Somme le Roi was commissioned by the king 
himself, who wanted to have and offer to his court a major book of moral instruction drawn in 
the living, everyday language.43  
The book is structured in six major tracts: 1. the ten commandments; 2. the twelve 
articles of faith; 3. the seven deadly sins; 4. the virtues; 5. the commentary on the Pater nostrum; 
and 6. the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.44 None of these parts is original; they are translations or 
adaptations of previous writings, mostly Latin. Charles Langlois remarks that the entire Somme, 
a generally ‘badly wrought book’ (un livre mal fait), is a short version of another moral tract 
called Le Miroir. Even when the Somme deviates from the Miroir, Langlois says,  (in the 
chapters on the sins of the tongue and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for instance), it is still not 
original, because these two chapters are borrowings from Peraldus.45 The great eclecticism on 
account of which Langlois pronounced his severe judgment on the originality of the Somme does 
not weigh negatively in our consideration of Laurent d’Orléans.46 Our purpose is precisely to 
examine the way in which a moral writer in French vernacular adapted Peraldus’s Latin tract on 
                                                 
43 Charles Langlois notes that a great part of the immediate success of the Somme must be attributed to the fact that, 
being a book commissioned by the king himself, the Somme easily aroused the curiosity of the aristocratic circles of 
the time (La vie en France, 123).  
44 In Ms. 2071 of the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal which I use, the order is as follows: the seven deadly sins are placed 
at the very beginning, so as to emphasize the importance of the ethical component of the Somme. The same 
manuscript ends with the ten commandments, while the part devoted to the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit is 
missing.There are several other French manuscripts of the Somme beginning with the seven deadly sins instead of 
the ten commandments (Ms. 409 and 22932, two of the oldest ones, and the Ms. of Alençon). 
45 For a systematic cross-reading of the Miroir and the Somme, see E. Brayer, “Contenu, structure et combinaison du 
‘Miroir du monde’ et de la Somme le Roi’,” Romania 79 (1958), 1-38, and 433-470. 
46 Despite his negative assessment of d’Orléans as a writer, Langlois is quick to evoke the enormous and long 
success of the Somme le Roi, a work preserved in nearly one hundred manuscripts and translated early on into 
several European languages (Italian, Spanish, Provençal, English and Flemish). For the English adaptations of the 
Somme, see Leo Carruthers, La Somme Le Roi de Lorens d’Orléans et ses traductions anglaises: Etude comparée 
(Paris: Association des Médiévistes Anglicistes de L’Enseignement Supérieur, 1986). One of the English versions of 
the Somme is available in a modern edition: The Book of Vices and Virtues. A Fourteenth century English 
translation of the ‘Somme le Roi’ of Lorens d’Orléans. N. Francis, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1942).  
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verbal sins. What matters for us is Laurent’s work as a translator, the terms and notions he used 
to describe verbal transgressions. 
In the French Somme, the section on les pechies de la langue is imbedded into the larger 
category of pechies de la gueule (‘sins of the mouth’), which occupy the seventh position within 
the scheme of the capital sins. The general framework Laurent adopts in his moral tract is an 
allegorical presentation of the seven capital vices starting from St. John the Apostle’s vision of 
the seven-headed beast coming out of the sea. Within this general framework, each individual sin 
is a head (chief) of the beast. The simile makes sense if we are to consider the etymological 
association between the heads of the beast and the seven sins as “capital” (‘heads’ from which 
subsequent offspring derives). The ten horns of the beast are, then, the trespassemens 
(‘transgressions’) of the ten commandments. Unfortunately, however, and this is one of the main 
charges addressed by critics to Laurent, when he comes to treating the subdivisions of the seven 
sins, he gives up the allegory of the seven-headed beast, and speaks of branches and twigs of the 
tree of evil. 47
The seventh head of the apocalyptic beast is, thus, represented by les pechies de la 
gueule, a ‘head’ subdivided into the… tree of gluttony and the tree of les pechies de la langue. 
Although in the Summa Vitiorum Peraldus had not treated the sins of the tongue along with the 
sins of gula, the association between gluttony and verbal sin was not unusual, but rather a 
traditional coupling, as Casagrande and Vecchio have pointed out. In Laurent’s Somme, the sins 
of the tongue flow quite naturally from a virulent condemnation of drunkenness, as a 
                                                 
47 The allegory of the trees of good and evil was the general framework in which the Miroir treated the virtues and 
vices. Thus, although, Laurent replaced the image of the tree of evil with that of the apocalyptic beast, he was unable 
to move further within this framework, and switched to the tree, which could lend itself more easily to divisions and 
ramifications. 
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manifestation of the sin of gluttony. The drunkards have the evil habit of frequenting the taverne 
(‘tavern’). Here, in this ecole et chapelle du diable (‘school and chapel of the devil’), people no 
longer pay attention to the way they speak and are prone to committing very many sins of the 
tongue.  
This is the springboard from which Laurent launches his disquisition on the sins of the 
tongue. If we were to read this section in parallel with the De peccato linguae one major 
difference would strike the eye: only ten main verbal transgressions are posited by Laurent. The 
French moralist justifies his reduction with the help of a new biblical metaphor. The evil tongue 
(la male langue) is the dry tree Jesus cursed on his way to Jerusalem, because it was bearing no 
fruits. Counting the ways in which the male langue manifests itself would be as hard and 
daunting as counting the leaves of a tree. What can be counted, however, more easily in a tree 
are its branches, and Laurent identifies ten such main branches: idle talk (oiseuse), boasting 
(vantise), flattery (losenge/losengerie), slander (detraction), lying (mensonge or fallace), perjury 
(perjure or faus serment), contention (contenz), murmur (murmure), rebellion (rebellion) and 
blasphemy (blaspheme).  
In the category of oiseuse enter the vain words, the words of the peddlers, the stories and 
jokes. All the practitioners of idle speech waste not only time, but also their inner self (vuident le 
tresor du coeur), says Laurent taking up an Augustinian-Peraldian idea. Vantise (the former 
iactantia, of Peraldus) is also a form of transgressive speech, as the one who boasts acts like a 
thief (voleur de Dieu) who attributes to himself what is God’s work. For the sin of flattery, the 
third branch of the tree of the evil tongue, Laurent uses two terms adulateur, a reminiscence of 
Peraldus’s adulator, but also--and more often--the terms losengeur (‘the one who sings praises’, 
 30 
‘praiser’), or flateur, that were more common in the everyday language. We will encounter these 
French terms in the Roman de la Rose, when the habit of flattery is discussed.  
Peraldus’s detractio came down to the Somme as detraction, but the practitioner of this 
sin is not so much the detractor/ ‘detracteur’ as in Peraldus, but rather the medisans (which 
etymologically means ‘evil speaker’, or ‘the one who speaks evil’). The technical moral terms 
used by Peraldus are thus not only gallicized (like in the couple detractio-detraction), but also 
replaced with more understandable terms from the living language, that the laymen were able to 
grasp.  
The sin of mendacium is translated by Laurent as mensonge and is described, along 
Peraldian lines, as a falsification of reality. Lying falsifies man (fausse lomme) as one falsifies 
the royal seal or money, therefore the liar (le menteur/mensongier) will be judged at the Last 
judgment as a faussaire (falsifier). From lying, Laurent moves on, just like Peraldus, to 
periurium, translated as perjure or faus serement, the latter term being less cryptic, and defines it 
as a transgression (trepassemenz) of the truthful oath. The next category, contenz, is Peraldus’s 
former contentio, but here again new moral terms are introduced, as the sin is subdivided into 
seven twigs: estriver (‘contradicting’), tencier (‘quarreling’), ledengier (‘name calling’ or 
‘insulting’), mal dire (‘cursing’), remponer (‘reproaching’), menassier (‘menacing’), descorde 
sosciter (‘sowing of discord’). Among these seven divisions of contenz (of which several were 
separately treated by Peraldus as autonomous categories), Laurent establishes a slight hierarchy, 
asserting that the most dangerous is the sin of sowing of discord, because it disrupts cities and 
agreements (destourbe les pais et les concordes).  
The sin of murmure follows that of contenz, as the ones who do not dare to quarrel 
overtly, start speaking in a low voice, between the teeth. This class of verbal sin is further 
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divided into 1. murmuring against man (like the servants against their masters, or the poor 
against the rich, etc.) and 2. murmuring against God. The next verbal sin, rebellion, flows 
naturally from murmuring. For if protesting in a low voice is a bad thing, it is even worse to 
rebel (male chose est de murmurer, mais trop vault pis rebellion), says Laurent, who draws again 
comparisons among verbal sins. It is worth noting that rebellion was not among the twenty-four 
classes of peccatum linguae established by Peraldus; it is Laurent’s own contribution, likely 
made to please the one who had commissioned the book. No other “virtue” could more please a 
king than submission, the diametrical opposite of rebellion, a sin to be inveighed against 
virulently, as Laurent does. Why is rebellion a verbal transgression? Because the “rebels,” in 
their desire to impose their will on others, do not heed other’s people’s advice, but make fun of 
them. Moreover, if they are chided, they defend themselves verbally and protest against 
scriptural warnings.  
The last sin treated is blasphemy, again a deviation from Peraldus’s line of thinking, 
according to which blasphemy was the utmost form of trangressive speech and was thus treated 
at the very beginning of the De peccato linguae. Although the reasons that may drive man to 
insult God or the saints are taken up by Laurent, the harsh tone of Peraldus’s condemnation of 
blasphemy does not subsist in the confessor of king Philip. Again, the reason for this 
depreciation of the gravity of blasphemy might lie in the addressee of the book. As a king, Philip 
was likely to be more concerned with political and worldly matters than with religious ones, and 
Laurent was undoubtedly well aware thereof. In La littérature française au moyen âge, Gaston 
Paris notes the mild tone of Laurent’s moral tract, and explains it by the fact that the moralist did 
not want to turn the world into a cloister (il ne veut pas faire du monde un cloître)48, while 
                                                 
48 (Paris: Hachette, 1914), 157. 
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Langlois, with his outspokenness, does not hesitate to speculate about the embarrassment 
Laurent may have felt in writing a book of moral instruction for his king: “Il n’est pas douteux, 
du reste, que frère Laurent se soit senti gêné, à la longue, par la conscience qu’il était amené a 
rabâcher.” 49
All these factors may account for the major differences in structure and in tone between 
the De peccato linguae and Laurent’s chapter on the sins of the tongue. The reason why the latter 
is important for us is the moral lexicon that Laurent d’Orléans introduces in the French language, 
and this shortly before Jean de Meun started writing his Mirroir aus amoureux. Several of the 
terms used by Laurent are present in the Romance of the Rose, as well, therefore a reading of the 
Somme, even a perfunctory one, as I have provided here, may cast a great deal of light on the 
verbal habits that the characters of the Rose are debating obsessively. 
2.3 DOMENICO CAVALCA 
 
Like Peraldus and d’Orléans, Domenico Cavalca was a Dominican friar, one of the most 
prolific writers of his order. Born about 1270 in Vicopisano, near Pisa, into the noble family of 
the Gaetani, he was educated at the ecclesiastic school of St. Catherine of Alexandria, in Pisa. 
According to the Chronicles and the Annals of the Dominican priory in Pisa, the sources that 
document his life and career, Cavalca did not hold an academic degree, but was extremely active 
as a preacher and ecclesiastic reformer. During his life, he helped reform the nuns from two 
                                                 
49 La vie en France, 140. 
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monasteries, St. Anna and the Misericordia, and himself founded another monastery, called 
Santa Marta. His constant support for the poor and the sick in the hospitals and prisons earned 
him the name Dominicus hospedalarius. He died in 1342, with a reputation of holy man.50
 All throughout his life, Cavalca alternated his charitable works with study and writing. 
His religious works are numerous and variegated and have proven very influential in Dominican 
circles. An important aspect of these works is represented by the so-called volgarizzamenti 
(‘translations into vernacular’), such as: Atti degli Apostoli (‘Acts of the Apostles’), Dialogo di 
san Gregorio (‘Dialogue of St. Gregory the Great’), Vite dei Santi Padri (‘Lives of the Fathers’), 
Lo specchio de’ peccati (‘Mirror of Sins’), Medicina del cuore ovvero trattato della Patientia 
(‘Medicine of/for the Heart or Treatise on Patience’), Pungilingua (‘The Wounding Tongue’), 
Epistola a Eustochio (‘Epistle to Eustochio’), translations highly valued by both Cavalca’s 
contemporaries and even more recent criticism.51 The last three texts are compilations of 
materials drawn from Peraldus’s works: the Lo specchio de’ peccati is a synopsis of the Summa 
Vitiorum, the Medicina del cuore ovvero trattato della Patientia is a lengthy reworking of 
Peraldus’s chapter on anger, whereas the Wounding Tongue is an ample adaptation of Peraldus’s 
tract on the sins of the tongue.  
                                                 
50 The Annals report that the entire city took part in the funeral, especially the underprivileged, who mourned deeply 
the loss of their protector, whereas the Chronicles mention the reputation of saintly man he deservedly had at his 
death. My source for these pieces of information is Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., “Dominic Cavalca and The 
Spirituality of the Word,” published electronically at http:/www.op.org/domcentral/study/Ashley/cavalca.html. More 
information about the life and works of Cavalca can be found in Carmelina Naselli’s Domenico Cavalca (Città di 
Castello: Il Solco, 1925) and in Telio Taddei’s “La vita del Cavalca dai suoi scritti,” in Memorie domenicane, 
Pistoia: Riviste dei Padri Domenicani, 1942. Other than these three above-mentioned studies and brief entries in 
various modern dictionaries about Italian authors, I have found no recent study dealing with the figure or works of 
Cavalca. For the complete list of critical studies written about Cavalca in the nineteenth century, see Dizionario 
critico della letteratura italiana, Vittore Branca, ed. (Turin: Unione Tipografica-Editrice Torinese, 1986), 563. 
51 In assessing Cavalca’s skills as a translator from Latin into vernacular, Sebastiano Bastionetto notes: “Nel 
tradurre, il Cavalca partecipa allo spirito del testo talmente da dar l’impressione di proporre un testo originale.” 
(‘When he translates, Cavalca adheres so well to the spirit of the text that he seems to write an original text.’ 
Dizionario critico, 562; translation mine). Benedict Ashley also notes that along with Cassian’s Conferences (a text 
dear to St. Dominic, the founder of the Dominican order), Cavalca’s Italian version of the Lives contributed to the 
transmission of the important legacy of Byzantine spirituality to the Latin West. (op. cit., 2). 
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In translating, Cavalca was well aware of the hermeneutic mechanisms and difficulties 
involved in the process of volgarizzamento and left us a compelling proof of this awareness in 
the Prologue to the Dialogo di San Gregorio:52
 
Tal cosa par ben detta per grammatica, che ridotta in volgare secondo 
l’ordine delle parole par niente e meno utile; e alcune volte una piccola 
parola per grammatica è di tanta significazione che non si può trarre 
intendimento se non per molte parole; e alcuna volta per fare ben dettato si 
pongono molte parole e volendo recare a volgare intendimento si possono 
e debono molto abbreviare per trarne più bella sentenza.  
 
A thing which seems well said in Latin, when transferred in the vernacular with the same 
word order, seems nil and less useful; at other times, a small Latin word is so meaningful 
that one can preserve its shade of meaning only by using lots of words; and sometimes, to 
form a good expression in Latin, one uses many words, and willing to translate this 
expression into the vernacular, one can and must abbreviate a great deal in order to come 
up with a more beautiful vernacular phrase.53
 
The second level of Cavalca’s work is constituted by a series of more original writings, 
such as Specchio di croce (‘Mirror of the Cross’), Frutti della Lingua (‘The Fruits of the 
Tongue’), Disciplina degli spirituali (‘The Discipline of Spiritual Persons’), Trattato delle trenta 
stoltitie (‘Tractate on the Thirty Follies’). Although still using a multitude of quotes from various 
sources, such us patristic writings (from both the Western and Eastern traditions) or moral 
authors closer in time (the Victorines and Peraldus, in particular), these texts reveal, according to 
interpreters, more of the creative side of Domenico Cavalca. 54
                                                 
52 Quoted by Ashley, in “Dominic Cavalca.” 
53 Since there is no English version of Cavalca’s works, the translation of the passages from Cavalca is mine. 
54 The Specchio di croce is an original meditation on the Passion, the first text of this type in the Dominican culture, 
whereas the Trattato delle trenta stoltitie analyses the spiritual abuses made by those engaged in a combat against 
the world and its evils (among such abuses or ‘follies’ are: practicing penances in excess, hoping to win the battle 
without God’s help, getting discouraged after the first defeat, etc.). In manuscripts, the Trattato is often joined to the 
Disciplina degli spirituali, a text dealing with the defects of the pious (lukewarmness, self-righteousness, 
depression, etc.) and bearing the imprint of Peraldus’s thought.  I frutti della lingua is an optimistic response to 
Peraldus’s tract on verbal sin… and to Cavalca’s own popularization of it, the Wounding Tongue. In I Frutti, 
Cavalca develops Peraldian insights on the benefits of the human ability to speak and structures his material in three 
main parts: one on prayer, one on preaching and the last on confession.  
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What is common to all these works is the moral obligation Cavalca feels toward the 
unlearned Christians unable to understand Latin. In the prologue to the Specchio di croce, the 
writer confesses: ho pensato che, ben che io non possa di grande cosa, possa almeno del mio 
poco sapere una opera fare; non sottile né per grammatica, ma in volgare, accioché alquanti 
devoti secolari, perocché sono idioti e molto occupati abbiano alcuno induttivo a devozione.55 (‘I 
have thought that, although I am not very skilled, with the scanty knowledge I have, I can at least 
write a work; not a subtle one, nor in Latin, but in the vernacular, so that some devout laymen, 
who are unlearned and very busy, may find in it an incentive to devotion’). Cavalca’s concern 
with the instruction in the vernacular of laymen is somewhat similar to the goal of Dante’s 
Convivio, that of sharing the light of knowledge with those who find themselves in spiritual 
darkness. 
One of the most notable aspects about Cavalca, an aspect mentioned by practically all the 
secondary sources I have consulted, is the style of his writing, a style characterized by simplicity 
of syntax and clarity, in which the living language is elevated to the rank of literary koiné. It is 
relevant in this respect that the Italian purists considered Cavalca’s language and mode of writing 
models of perfection, characteristic of the aureo Trecento.56 Speaking of the cultural osmosis 
proper to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, an age in which many efforts were directed to 
the creation of a vernacular literary language faithful to the spirit of Latin works but 
comprehensible even by the unlearned, S. Bastianetto considers Cavalca a leading exponent of 
                                                 
55 Quoted by Sebastiano Bastionetto, in Dizionario critico, 561. There is a modern edition of the Specchio by Tito S. 
Centi: Domenico Cavalca. Specchio della croce. Testo originale e versione in italiano corrente (Bologna: Edizioni 
Studio Domenicano, 1992). 
56 For a critical consideration of Domenico Cavalca as a vernacular writer, see Cesare Segre, Volgarizzamenti del 
Due e Trecento (Turin: Unione Tipografica-Editrice Torinese, 1953) and G. de Luca, Prosatori Minori del Trecento, 
I (Milan: R. Ricciardi, 1954). 
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this process, a pioniere di un linguaggio e di una spiritualità (‘a pioneer of language and 
spirituality’). 
2.3.1 The Pungilingua (‘The Wounding Tongue’) 57 
The modern reader who undertakes to read Cavalca’s Pungilingua after Peraldus’s De peccato 
linguae might get the impression that Cavalca is Peraldus’s voice in the vernacular, so similar the 
two authors sound. If we consider things in their historical context, it is not difficult to 
understand why the latter exerted such a powerful influence on the former. Born just one 
generation apart from Peraldus and belonging to the same fraternal order, sharing thus the same 
preoccupations with preaching and moral reformation, Cavalca could not remain insensitive to 
the production of the French master from Lyon. By the time that Cavalca was writing in Pisa, the 
Summa Vitiorum et Virtutibus was, as we have seen, already present in several places in Italy. 
The fact that Cavalca decided to recare a volgare intendimento Peraldus’s moral texts testifies to 
the great authority the French moralist had in Italy in the first half of the fourteenth century, 
when Dante was still alive.  Peraldus’s chapter on verbal sin from the Summa Vitiorum must 
have impressed Cavalca particularly, since he decided to translate it apart from the Summa, as an 
autonomous book, with a new title. It is highly likely that one of the reasons why Cavalca was so 
attentive to this class of sins was his intellectual formation as a preacher. Preaching, the main 
apostolic activity of the Dominicans, was predicated on an intimate relationship to spoken words. 
Another plausible reason for Cavalca’s idiosyncratic treatment of De peccato linguae might have 
been the fact that this chapter was, as we have seen, one of Peraldus’s most salient features of 
                                                 
57 I borrow the English version of the title from Ashley. 
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originality in the Summa. And finally, we have to consider that, along with being a moralist and a 
preacher, Cavalca was also a translator. Reproducing a Latin tract on the sins of the tongue in the 
Florentine dialect must have seemed a very appealing undertaking to him, since it provided him 
with the opportunity to verify how Peraldus moral-linguistic theories transferred to the 
vernacular. Would the spirit of vernacular Italian fit into the mold of Peraldus’s Latin examples? 
This is one of the questions that might have challenged Cavalca’s mind. 
 Cavalca’s Pungilingua is more than a slavish reproduction of the De peccato linguae. 
Pungilingua follows the general pattern of the Peraldian treatment (the division into twenty-four 
sins, for example), but at the same time, takes many freedoms with respect to it, in the form of 
new ideas, additions and amplifications. This ambivalent attitude toward the original text--
fidelity and distance--is clearly expressed in the Prologue to Pungilingua, in which Cavalca gives 
the rationale for his writing this work and explains the new title. I will reproduce here this 
prologue not only for its relevance to Cavalca’s relationship to Peraldus, but also for the beauty 
of the Italian language explaining the harm the tongue can do. It is the same language in which, 
just a few years before Cavalca, Dante deplored the evils of speech in the Inferno. Cavalca’s 
prologue can enlighten our understanding of why Dante embedded several verbal sins in the 
structure of his hell. 
 
Imperocchè, come dice santo Iacopo Apostolo nella sua Epistola, la lingua 
nostra è inquieto male, piena sì, che versa, di veleno mortifero, ed 
infiammata di fuoco infernale, ordina, attizza, semina, e nutrica tutti i 
mali; e macula e disordina la ruota della nostra natività, cioè tutto il tempo 
e corso della nostra vita; imperocchè presto comincia e persevera insino 
alla fine; parmi molto utile di scrivere alcune cose a biasimo de’ vizj della 
lingua, e di dimostrare la loro gravezza e le spezie, i gradi e i remedj, 
sicchè ciascuno li possa ben vedere, conoscere, odiare e confessare. E 
perciocchè di questa materia e di questi peccati molto bene, e 
singolarmente parlò il divoto e sapientissimo Fra Guglielmo di Francia, 
dell’Ordine dei frati Predicatori, nella sua Summa de’ vizj, nella quale 
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descrive, e pone ventiquattro peccati mortali, i quali della lingua 
procedono; intendo principalmente recare a commune volgare la detta 
opera, aggiugnendovi alcune altre poche cose, ragioni, ovvero esempj, che 
parlino di simile materia, sicchè, come ogni uomo e letterato ed idiota in 
questo vizio della lingua offende, così ciascuno in questo volgare trattato 
possa questi vizj conoscere e confessare. E perchè quest’ opera è fatta per 
voler reprimere e vituperare i peccati della lingua, così voglio che si 
chiami Pungilingua; che siccome ella mal punge, così sia punta.  
 
Since, as the Apostle St. James says in his Epistle, our tongue is a restless evil, so full of 
mortal poison that it spills out, and enflamed with infernal fire, orders, ignites, sows, and 
nurtures all evils; and it stains and disrupts the wheel of our birth, that is to say, all the 
time and course of our life, since once it gets started it perseveres up to the end, it seemed 
very useful to me to write a few things to blame the vices of the tongue, and to prove 
their gravity and species, the(ir) degrees and the(ir) remedies, so that everyone may see 
them well, know them, hate them and confess them. And as of this topic and of these sins 
spoke, in a unique way, the devout and most wise Father William of France, of the order 
of the Preachers, in his Summa Vitiorum, in which he describes and posits twenty-four 
mortal sins proceeding from the tongue, I mainly undertake to translate into the 
vernacular the above-mentioned work, adding to it a few other things, reasons, or 
examples which speak of the same topic, so that, since every man both learned and 
unlearned offends in this vice of the tongue, everyone may be able to know these vices 
from this vernacular tract and confess them. And because this work is designed to repress 
and vituperate against the sins of the tongue, I want to call it Pungilingua (‘The 
Wounding Tongue’), for just as the tongue wounds, I want it to be wounded.  
 
 
Here, Cavalca introduces himself as a humble compiler of Peraldus, whose originality 
and wisdom in writing about matters of transgressive speech he deeply admires and 
acknowledges. It is important, however, that Cavalca forewarn his readers about his personal 
contribution to the Peraldian text: he confesses that he added similar material to Peraldus’s 
insights and enriched it with additions and new examples. Aware of his own originality as a 
translator-author, Cavalca contrives a title for this new product and calls his adaptation 
Pungilingua, a pun articulated on the twofold ability of the tongue, that of harming and being 
harmed. 58 The same vehicle for sin that is the tongue can be harmed by this tract in the 
vernacular, which aims at repressing, through a positive and virtuous language this time, the 
                                                 
58 This title, just as the notion of the tongue as the main “culprit” for the evils of sppech is typical of Peraldus and 
Cavalca, but will be abandoned by the great scholastics, Aquinas, in particular, who will stress that the one 
responsible for the sins of the tongue is not the anatomic organ, but a more subtle spiritual segment: the human will. 
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tongue’s proneness to evil. Cavalca’s self-awareness as a writer is paralleled by his concern as an 
ecclesiastic writer in the vernacular: he motivates his linguistic choice by the universality of the 
verbal sin, which can affect both the educated and the unlearned. His pastoral care encompasses, 
thus, a category of people unable to read Peraldus’s tract in the original: the uninstructed laity, 
barred from access to Latin. The laymen, too, had to be made aware of all the harm that may 
derive from speech, and in this process of spiritual education, the vernacular language, in its 
most quotidian and accessible aspect, was for Cavalca the ideal linguistic tool.  
After the prologue, the author dedicates the first chapter of his book to the ideal of 
raffrenare or guardare la lingua (the now traditional appeal to custodia linguae), and speaks Di 
quelle cose che c’inducono a bene guardare la lingua, e mostranci la gravezza dei suoi peccati 
generalmente (‘Of those things that motivate us to control the tongue, and, in general, of those 
things which show us the gravity of its sins’). In this chapter, the eighteen reasons for the 
custodia linguae listed by Peraldus at the beginning of the De peccato linguae are reduced to 
twelve.59 The first of these motives speaks of the unique gift God made to man by giving him the 
power to speak. The great benefit of such a gift can be verified through the fact that, when a man 
loses his speech, he would rather get it back than gain a large amount of money. It is therefore a 
great misfortune that man uses specifically the tongue, the anatomic organ in which God honored 
him, to offend the divinity. Secondly, we should consider that the tongue is reason’s vehicle; 
therefore we should only speak according to reason, not to the senses. Being such a noble organ, 
the tongue ought to be used only in verbal functions like praying, praising, thanking God, 
confessing, getting the Eucharist and preaching, and not to vituperate against God or others. 
Another reason regards the intimate connection between heart and words: since the spoken 
                                                 
59 It is likely that Cavalca did not fail to notice that some of Peraldus’s ‘reasons’ for custodia linguae were 
overlapping. 
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words express the inner thoughts or feelings, the better one controls his speech, the better he will 
be able to dominate his feelings, and therefore a better person and Christain he will be. 
Unfortunately, says Cavalca, the tongue is located, in the human body, in a very humid and 
slippery place; therefore it is prone to many ‘slips’ or sins. Indicative of the tongue’s natural 
disposition toward sin is the fact that it is the only limb imprisoned in the body; 60 all the others 
are palese (‘in sight’). Cavalca reiterates St. James’s notion that every animal nature, bird or 
beast, or serpent, can be tamed, but nobody can tame the human tongue. When the Holy Spirit 
showed himself to the Apostles, he chose to manifest himself as a fiery tongue, because it was 
necessary that the evil of the tongue be redeemed and purified by a transcendental tongue. For 
the same need for purification, the Holy Church decreed that at baptism, one grain of salt be 
placed into the mouths of those to be baptized. If St. James, Cavalca explains, chose for the 
tongue the metaphor of fire, it is because fire is the most dangerous of all the natural elements, 
able to cause the greatest destruction in the shortest time. In the same way, spiritually, the harm 
produced by the tongue is the most rapid and the most destructive. For, Cavalca says, the tongue 
of an evil lawyer, or counselor, immediately gives rise to wars, scandals, and many other 
misfortunes. (Che, come veggiamo, la lingua d’un malo avvocato, o consigliere, o renunziatore 
subitamente genera guerre, scandoli e mali assai). It is a Peraldian perception of speech that we 
will see masterfully exemplified both in the Divine Comedy, through the figures of Ulysses and 
Guido da Montefeltro, or Bertrand de Born, and in Pungilingua, through very many exemplary 
stories used to illustrate the sins of the mali consilieri and the seminatori di discordie. 
For Cavalca, the tongue is a three-fold knife, for it may harm three beings: God, oneself 
and the other. It may harm nearby or at a distance, secretly or publicly. Thus, it is no wonder, 
                                                 
60 “Imprisoned” by physical barriers like lips and teeth, which can limit the evils the tongue may cause. 
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that once in hell, the sinners painfully bite their tongues. At work is the divine law according to 
which the sinner is punished in the limb with which he has sinned. 61 
The eleventh consideration that should motivate us to rein in our tongue—the utility that 
might ensue—is Cavalca’s most developed motive. With our tongues we can do very many 
useful things, such as enriching ourselves spiritually, praising God or praying, accusing 
ourselves or teaching others, confessing our sins and obtaining the absolution. Under the same 
eleventh consideration, Cavalca takes up the doctrine of verbal discretio (‘discernment), and lists 
the main circumstances that the speaker should consider: chi dice, la qualità di chi ode, il 
tempo.62 The last of the twelve considerations that should move men to govern their tongues is 
the example of the Saints, who all used their spiritual gift of speech in positive and virtuous 
ways. In the wake of Peraldus, a multitude of biblical quotes are amassed under each of the 
twelve considerations to reinforce the moral teaching.63 All these quotes are common places in 
the lingua-texts drafted in Latin, in the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries. Cavalca’s merit is that of 
having translated them into Italian vernacular, in a form of expression accessible to his fellow 
countrymen deprived of education in Latin. 
Unlike Peraldus’s De peccato linguae, which was divided into twenty-four chapters 
according to the twenty-four sins of the tongue he had established, Cavalca’s book is structured 
in thirty chapters, because some of the sins are paid more attention to than others, and treated in 
more than one chapter. The list of the sins is as follows:   
                                                 
61 As an example, Cavalca invokes the scriptural story of the rich man, who, in Hell, begged Abraham to send down 
Lazarus, to put his cool finger on the rich man’s inflamed tongue. This story, was, of course, a common place 
exemplum in the lingua-texts.  
62 Here these circumstances concern, however, only the preacher. 
63 To give just a few examples: the Proverbs’ aphorism Morte e vita è in mano della lingua, Jesus’s warnings: Per le 
tue parole sarai giustificato, o condannato, or: per l’abbondanza del cuore parla la lingua; John Chrysostom’s 
connection between the moral quality of the speech and the moral quality of the speaker: Tale è l’uomo quale è la 
lingua sua, ciascuno si conosce alla lingua, s’egli è di cielo, o di terra o di inferno;  St. James’s notion that Vana è 
la religione di colui  il quale la sua lingua non raffrena. 
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 1. bestemmiare Dio  
2. mormorare (four distinct chapters) 
3. difendere e scusare il peccato suo o altrui 
4. spergiuro, e male giudicare 
5. bugiare  
6. detrazione (three chapters) 
7. peccato degli adulatori (accompanied, in the same chapter, by the 
kindred sin of those who listen to flatterers) 
8. maladire e bestemmiare 
9. convizio  
10. contenzione e garrire 
11. derisione (two chapters),  
12. peccato de’mali consiglieri e confortatori al male  
13. peccato dei renunziatori e seminatori di discordie 
14. peccato dei bilingui e novellieri 
15. peccato della jattanza 
16. peccato del rivelare i secreti 
17. peccato dello stolto promettere e minaciare altrui 
18. peccato del parlare ozioso e multiloquio 
19. peccato del parlare disonesto e giullaresco 
20. peccato di varj e dissoluti balli e canti (two chapters) 
21. peccato degl’indovini ed incantatrici e malefici 
 
If we compare this list with that of Peraldus, the structural changes are obvious: Cavalca 
conflates two distinct sins in Peraldus: murmur with rumor, adds a new category of verbal 
sinners (the novellieri ‘peddlers’), which he treats in the same chapter with the double-talkers, 
groups the sins of foolish promise and menace in one chapter; he does the same with idle talk 
and loquacity, whereas he develops the scurrilitas into the sins of dissolute songs… and dance, 
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of which the French Dominican had not spoken. The last sin in Peraldus’s list, indiscreta 
taciturnitas is replaced in Pungilingua by the sins of the diviners and magicians, who misuse 
their verbal gifts to predict future events or to drive people to idolatry. Cavalca does 
acknowledge the existence of a transgression such as mal tacere (‘evil silence’), but he considers 
it a twenty-fifth sin (Peraldus spoke only of twenty-four), and promises to deal with it at length, 
in a separate tract, since this type of transgression is too serious to be treated in just one 
chapter.64 The idea of such a new project might also explain the most striking omission with 
respect to Peraldus’s treatment: the absence of the tally of remedies for verbal sins with which 
the French ecclesiastic concluded his De peccato linguae. 
Like Peraldus, Cavalca defines the sin through the behavior of the sinner. Sometimes, 
however, Cavalca does not mention the technical name of the sin (adulatio, or pravum consilium, 
for instance, as Peraldus did at the beginning of his chapters), but introduces it indirectly (‘the sin 
of the flatterers’, ‘the sin of evil counselors’, etc.). A new aspect in Pungilingua, an aspect that is 
to be accounted for by Cavalca’s skills as a translator, is the constant care he takes to explain the 
technical terms he uses. When he introduces terms such as convizio, adulatori or derisione, for 
instance, he immediately specifies the meaning of the words: del convizio, cioè di villaneggiare e 
vituperare il prossimo con parole d’obbrobrio (‘of insult, that is, of vilifying and vituperating 
against one’s neighbor with words of disgrace’), or: del peccato degli adulatori ciòe dei 
lusinghieri, (‘of the sin of the sweet-talkers, that is to say flatterers’, or again: della derisione, 
cioè di fare beffe d’altrui ‘of derision, that is to say, mocking the other’).  
                                                 
64 Cavalca will keep the promise made at the end of the Pungilingua, by writing, a few years later, a new tract, I 
frutti della lingua, which is, as I have mentioned, a thorough study of the benefits of speech (prayer, confession, 
etc.) 
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Thanks to Cavalca’s efforts at proper and subtle translation, many lexical resources of 
Italian vernacular have been exploited and fixed in a written form. Unfortunately, we do not 
possess today a modern study devoted to a thorough examination of Cavalca’s outstanding 
activity and talent as a translator from Latin into Italian. His contribution to the creation, 
enrichment or consolidation of a moral lexicon in vernacular Italian deserves a much deeper 
consideration than I can give here. As far as this dissertation is concerned, however, Cavalca’s 
activity as a moralist of speech, albeit briefly underscored, is fundamental. The lengthy 
explanations Cavalca furnished in the everyday language to the so great variety of verbal sins 
Peraldus had discussed in Latin, just as the wealth of exemplary stories with which Cavalca 
illustrated these sins can constitute a major key in understanding Dante’s own view of the sins of 
the tongue and their treatment in a poetic work written in vernacular at about the same time. I 
will use this hermeneutic key and will, thus, constantly refer to the Pungilingua throughout my 
discussion of the verbal sins punished in the Inferno. 
2.4 THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE SINS OF WORD 
Peccata verborum maxime sunt ex intentione 
dicentis dijudicanda. (II-II. Q. 73. Art. 4, vol. 38, 174). 
(‘Sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention 
of the speaker.’ vol. 3, 1498)65
 
                                                 
65 For the Latin text of Secunda Secundae I rely on Summa Theologiae. Latin Text and English Translation, 
Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossary T.C. O’Brien. (London: Blackfriars, 1974), whereas for the English 
version I use Summa Theologica. I-V. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Notre Dame, IN: 
Ave Maria Press, Inc., 1981). The latter version seemed to me closer to the spirit of Aquinas’s text. All throughout 
my dissertation the references for the Latin text (volume and page) will be taken from T.C. O’Brien, while those for 
the English translation from the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
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 Written about 1270, more than two decades after Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum, Summa 
Theologica (or Theologiae) is the fruit of one of the finest Dominican thinkers of the Middle 
Ages, the one surnamed Doctor Angelicus and who was elevated to the rank of Saint by the 
Catholic Church, which adopted Aquinas’s theological views as the official doctrine of 
Catholicism.  
The Summa Theologica includes an important section on moral questions: the celebrated 
Secunda Secundae, which was (and still is) generally considered the most important ethics of the 
Middle Ages. Built on Aristotelian premises, Aquinas’s moral system is essentially a Christian 
one, in which the most significant aspects developed by previous Christian moralists are 
absorbed in an idiosyncratic way and elevated to the heights of scholastic philosophy.  
For Aquinas, morality is a movement of the rational creature toward God (motus 
rationalis creature ad Deum), an ascending aspiration achieved by means of human actions. The 
philosopher investigates these actions from the perspective of the freedom of choice (liber 
arbitrium), which, like reason and language, represents a divine gift bestowed exclusively on 
man. If it were not for man’s free will, the punishments or rewards, the commandments, the laws 
could not find a justification. Since etymologically arbitrium means judgment, Aquinas defines 
the notion of free will in intellectual terms, as a choice-based act. Depending on whether the 
choice operates between good or evil, a human action is qualified as moral or immoral. In the 
theologian’s view, in the process of examining whether an action is moral or not, the most 
important role is played by the object and end of that particular human act, by its finality: “A 
moral act takes its species from two things, its object and its end: for the end is the object of the 
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will, which is the first mover in moral acts.” (Q.110, Art. 1, vol. 3: 1658).66 As he makes it 
explicit in I-II, Q. 74, Art. 1, sin, as such a moral act, takes its origin in the power of free choice: 
“Sin is an act (…). Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, it follows that the 
will, which is the principle of all voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the 
principle of sins” (vol. 2: 919).  We will see that the postulate of the will as the cause of evil 
actions will have a major bearing on Aquinas’s conception of the sins of word, as well.  
 In human operations, however, will, as the main moral “trigger,” works in tandem with 
the faculty of deliberation (‘judgment’), as the operating subject must be aware of his goal and 
means. Thus, an involuntary action of violence, committed out of anger, is pardonable, since the 
willful movement of the soul was affected by a disorderly state of mind. When, however, the will 
of the agent is not affected by impulses but exerts itself with deliberation and in all awareness, 
the agent is fully responsible and has no palliative excuses for his act: “The accidental gravity of 
a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately 
than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a certain 
levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much 
forethought.” (II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3). It is worth noting that this extremely significant remark 
concerning the scale of gravity of sins is made in a question dealing with a verbal sin, a fact 
which proves the importance Aquinas gives to the transgressions committed by the way of 
speech. Here the moralist discusses degrees of comparisons of sins, and does not hesitate to put 
sins of word in balance with sins of deeds. His postulate is that, although sins of word are, by 
                                                 
66 For a groundbreaking overview of Thomas Aquinas’s ethical doctrines, see Etienne Gilson: Moral Values and the 
Moral Life. The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas. (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1961). Also useful and 
thorough are two more recent studies: Aquinas and Empowerment: Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives, G.S. Harak, 
ed, (Washington, DC: Washington University Press, 1996), and Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of 
Norman Kretzmann, S. MacDonald, and E. Stump, eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), which bring 
fresh and original insights into the ethical system of Doctor Angelicus. 
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their nature, less grievous than sins of deed, it may happen that in certain circumstances (like, for 
instance when a verbal sin is committed deliberately, with ‘premeditation’, as he says), this 
verbal sin becomes mortal: “while an idle word, which is generally speaking, venial, may even 
be a mortal sin” (Pt. I-II, Q. 72, Art. 6, vol. 2, p. 907). 
Assessing deeds, words or thoughts, as specific human operations is, thus, not an easy 
task for the moralist, for every act is to be seen from all angles, i.e, considering all the 
circumstances in which a specific deed/word/thought has occurred. Weighing these 
circumstances is of utmost importance, because, in the case of moral errors, the circumstantial 
situation may decide whether an error, i.e., sin, is mortal or venial, whether the soul will end up 
in hell or not. Salvation or damnation is, thus, often a matter of conjectural framework. For if the 
origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e, on the thing to which the sin turns, the 
gravity of a sin, which determines the fate of the soul after death, depends on what it turns away 
from:  
The essential gravity of sins committed against one’s neighbor must be 
weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is thence that they 
derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the 
greater the injury. And while man’s good is threefold, namely the good of 
his soul, the good of his body, the good of external things; the good of the 
soul which is the greatest of all cannot be taken from him by another save 
as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not 
induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz., of the body 
and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the 
goods of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins which 
injure a man’s body are more grievous than those which injure his external 
things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one’s neighbor, 
murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he 
already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right 
order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place 
come external things, among which a man’s good name takes precedence 
of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written 
(Prov. XXII.1): A good name is better than great riches. Therefore 
backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, but it is 
less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ 
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by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances. (…) A backbiter is 
a murderer occasionally, since by his words he gives another man an 
occasion for hating or despising his neighbor.’ (II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3. Vol. 3: 
1499). 67
 
The question of the ‘gravity’ (gravitas) of sins is of paramount importance for Aquinas, 
running like a thread throughout his ethical project. His premise is that sins are different from 
one another in the same way as sicknesses diverge from one another (I-II, Q. 73, Art. 3). Just as a 
physical condition affecting the body can be more or less serious than others, so sins have 
various degrees of gravity. With this consideration in mind, Aquinas takes constant care to 
establish relationships between sins, to set up hierarchies, in which often sins of deed, which he 
considers a priori the most serious (gravius est peccare facto quam verbo, Q. 73, Art. 3, v. 38, 
178), are compared to (and exceptionally deemed less grievous than) sins of word.68  The notion 
of a hierarchy among sins based on their varying degree of gravity also underpins the belief in a 
hierarchy of punishments: ‘Punishments are medicine intended to keep man away from sin: so 
that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted.’(Q. 
39, Art. 2, vol. 3, 1351). This leads the philosopher to make a major and severe pronouncement 
also on the punishments operative in Hell: it is a heretic error, he states, to consider all sins to be 
equal and that all the pains of hell are equal (Pt. I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2). 
                                                 
67 It is interesting that Aquinas considers friendship the most valuable of man’s external things. This consideration 
leads him to establish degrees of comparisons among verbal sins such as backbiting, tale-bearing and reviling: ‘Now 
of all one’s external goods a friend takes the first place, since no man can live without friends, as the Philosopher 
declares (Ethic. Viii,1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. VI.15): Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend. Again, a 
man’s good name whereof backbiting deprives him is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. 
Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to 
be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher’, II-II, Q.74, Art. 2, vol. 3, 1502) 
68 See, for instance, the suggestive comparison between murder, theft and blasphemy:  ‘Wherefore a sin which is 
about the very substance of man, e.g., murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft, and 
graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g., unbelief, blasphemy and the like’  (Pt. I-II, Q. 73, Art. 3, 
vol. 2, 912). 
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But what place did Aquinas reserve for the sins committed through the medium of 
speech? The question is extremely important, since Aquinas operates a major shift with respect 
to his predecessors in this field. The verbal sins are no longer the results of the wildness and 
slipperiness of the tongue. Verbal sins are not even intrinsic to a word or another, or to a kind of 
speech or another. For Aquinas, the sins committed by means of the mouth, belong, like any 
other class of sins, to the field of the will. And they are no longer a separate category, as they 
used to be in Peraldus, but along with the sins of deeds and thoughts they constitute subspecies 
(or degrees) of the same moral act. In order to prove his point, the medieval moralist takes up the 
illustrative Aristotelian metaphor of the house, and likens the sins of thought with the foundation 
of the house, the sins of word with its walls and the sin of deed with its roof: 
 
The building is the complete generation of the house, while the laying of 
the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as 
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. X.4). (…) Accordingly sins are divided 
into these three, viz., sins of thought, word and deed, not as complete 
species, but as degrees. For the consummation of sin is in the deed, 
wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning 
of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree 
is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration 
of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the 
deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of 
sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to one complete 
species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry 
man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he 
breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; 
and the same applies to lust and to any other sin. (…) Conclusion:  Sin of 
thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are 
united together with it, but when each is found by itself; even as one part 
of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the 
movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement. 
(I-II, Q. 72, Art. 7, vol. 2, 908) 
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What allows Aquinas to compare sins of word with sins of deed is the similar way they 
manifest themselves: unlike the sins of thought that are committed secretly, the sins of word and 
deed are both committed openly.69 More importantly, the sins of word no longer proceed from a 
natural inclination of the human tongue, as a slippery part of the body, toward sinfulness, but 
from an exercise of will: (…) verba, inquantum sunt soni quidam, non sunt in nocumentum 
aliorum, sed inquantum significant aliquid. Quae quidem significatio ex interiori affectu 
procedit, et ideo in peccatis verborum maxime considerandum videtur ex quo affectu aliquis 
verba proferat. (Q. 72, Art. 2, vol. 38,160-162 ‘(…) words are injurious to other persons, not as 
sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker’s inward intention. Hence, in 
sins of word it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered.’(vol. 3, 
1495, emphasis mine).70  
In assessing words, Aquinas, like Augustine, makes the distinction between the phonic 
aspect of words, their signifier, in more modern terms, and what is signified. The ability of a 
word to do harm (the potestas nocendi Peraldus was speaking of, but in reference to the tongue) 
                                                 
69 As far as verbal sins are concerned, the way Aquinas defines them is of a disarming simplicity: Peccata enim oris 
consistunt in hoc quod aliquis mala dicit, vol. 38, 188. ‘For sins of word consist in speaking evil’, vol. 3, 1501). 
Aquinas rarely uses the phrase peccatum, –a oris ‘sin(s) of the mouth’, as here; most often he uses peccatum,-a 
verbi/verborum, a syntagm which I have found translated either as ‘sin(s) of word(s)’ or ‘of speech.’ The translation 
of the Dominican Fathers I use privileges the variant ‘sin(s) of word,’ even where Aquinas says peccata oris, like 
here. This variant seems acceptable to me, in light of Casagrande and Vecchio’s remark that with Aquinas the 
causality of verbal sins irrevocably moves from the sphere of the anatomic organ (tongue or mouth) to that of will. 
For more on this topic see: “Il peccatum oris nella scolastica: da Alessandro di Hales a Tommaso d’Aquino,” in I 
peccati della lingua, 175-203. 
70 The foundation of the Thomistic treatment of verbal sins is Augustine’s theory of words as signs, a theory that 
Aquinas quotes several times throughout his Secunda Secundae. One of these times occurs in the major section 
dedicated to lying, as Augustine was the foremost authority on which the medieval theorists on peccata linguae 
relied for their view of the sin of lying. See, for instance, Aquinas: (‘As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. I.I), 
words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that a lie is a false signification by words, the 
term words denotes every kind of sign.(…). For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and 
undue for anyone to signify something that is not in his mind.’(Q. 110, Art. 1-3, vol. 3, 1658-1660). An excellent 
reading of Aquinas’s semiotic theory and its relationship to Augustine is made by Marcia Colish: “Thomas Aquinas 
and the Conception of the Word,” in The Mirror of Language. A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge. 
(Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1983), 111-150. 
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derives for Aquinas from the signified of words.71 In the treatment of the sins of word, Abelard, 
with his doctrine of intention, thus joins Augustine in helping Aquinas assert authoritatively his 
most important postulate regarding the criterion to be used in the ethical valuation of an act of 
speech. And what is more, the differences among subjective intentions enable Aquinas to forge 
his own system of verbal sins: peccata verborum praecipue pensanda sunt secundum 
intentionem proferentis. Et ideo secundum diversa quae quis intendit contra alium loquens 
hujusmodi peccata distinguuntur. Q. 75, Art. 1, vol. 38, 192 (‘sins of word should be weighed 
chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the 
various intentions of those who speak against another’, vol. 3, 1502).  
Following the principle of differentiation of verbal sins, Aquinas treats eighteen such 
sins, which he considers transgressions of the cardinal and theological virtues. Thus, the sin of 
blasphemy is opposed to the theological virtue of ‘faith’, contention to ‘charity’, perjury to 
‘justice (with its subclass ‘religion’); reviling, slander, tale-bearing, derision and cursing are also 
opposed to justice, but in its subclass ‘piety.’ Lying, boasting and ‘irony’ (the latter taken in its 
medieval meaning) are opposed to ‘truth’, another subspecies of justice, and flattery and 
quarreling to ‘friendship’, also a subclass of justice. The remaining sins of word: scurrility, 
loquacity, obscene talk, wanton word, foolish talking, all trespass the rules of ‘temperance’, in 
various subcategories of this virtue. Thus, scurrility and loquacity are transgressions of 
abstinence; obscene talk, wanton words and foolish talking violate ‘chastity’. Three of the 
eighteen sins of word treated by Aquinas belong to more than one category: blasphemy, for 
instance, is opposed not only to faith, but also to temperance, as a manifestation of anger. 
                                                 
71  ‘Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e., as audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring 
on the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of 
others, they may do many kinds of harm. (II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1, Vol. 3, 1494).  
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Quarreling violates not only justice, but also temperance, as another symptom of wrath. Finally, 
boasting opposes both justice (with its subclass ‘truth’) and temperance (with its subclass 
‘humility’), being a manifestation of pride. What is interesting is that Aquinas treats 
preferentially the sins of word: while he devotes entire questions, with several articles each, to 
sins like blasphemy, contention, derision, lying, reviling, slander, tale-bearing, cursing, flattery 
and quarreling, he mentions the others (scurrility, obscene speech, loquacity, and wanton 
speech), only in passing. The criterion for such discrimination must certainly lie in the degree of 
gravity Aquinas associated with these sins.  
Echoes of the scholastic theories about the sins of word and the pivotal role played by the 
will can readily be detected in the Romance of the Rose. Here, through the highly theological 
discourse of Lady Nature, Jean de Meun makes authoritative statements about the critical 
intervention of free will in the acts of speech. I treat these aspects in Chapter Two, section 
“Nature on the (Verbal) Vices of Humans.” 
As to the Divine Comedy, both the principle of the hierarchy of sins and that of a varying 
scale/nature of divine punishments are visibly at work in the system of hell. As far as the verbal 
sins are concerned, we will see that the way in which Dante embeds them into the structure of 
Inferno, presents affinities with Aquinas’s theories about immoral speech, but also deviations 
from it. Since Aquinas was one of Dante’s acknowledged authorities in matters of ethics, 
throughout my dissertation I will constantly highlight both the similarities and the dissimilarities 
between Dante and Aquinas in the treatment of specific verbal transgressions. 72
                                                 
72 As far as the general relationship Dante-Aquinas is concerned, fundamental studies have been written by Pierre 
Mandonnet, Dante le théologien (Paris, Bruxelles: Desclée de Brouwert & Cie, 1935), Etienne Gilson, Dante and 
Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963), and Bruno Nardi [see especially Saggi di filosofia 
dantesca. (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1967), 341-381, where, engaged in a virulent polemic with Busnelli, 
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3.0  FROM JEAN DE MEUN’S MULTIDISCURSIVE DISPERSAL TO DANTE’S 
SYSTEM OF SINS 
Neither Jean de Meun nor Dante wrote tracts on verbal sins, but instances in which they 
assess habits of speech from a moral standpoint are so numerous in their works that, by sorting 
out these instances, we can work out an ethical theory about speech for each author. It has been 
noted that since Jean speaks in so many voices in his poem, it is hard to detect his “real” voice as 
an authorial persona. In what follows, I will seek to demonstrate that three of the discursive 
voices in the Rose express standpoints with respect to verbal sins that are representative for Jean 
de Meun as a moralist of speech. Lady Reason speaks at length about linguistic obscenity, Lady 
Nature about will as the first mover in verbal acts and Genius about the wicked female speech. I 
will attempt to prove that these three concerns lie at the core of Jean de Meun’s overall approach 
to speech.  
Dante did not leave us either a unique text dealing with his view of humans’ use of 
speech from a moral perspective, but he made references to this topic in virtually all his outputs. 
De vulgari eloquentia is a work of linguistic and literary theory concerning the status of Italian 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nardi reaches the conclusion that Dante is as much a Tomista as he is a non-Tomista]. In the United States, the 
absorption of Aquinas’s ethical views by Dante has thoroughly been studied by William H.V. Reade in The Moral 
System of Dante’s Inferno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909. Rpt. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1969). Reade, however, does not investigate Dante’s relationship to Aquinas in the field of verbal sins. More 
recently, Marc Cogan has undertaken a systematic reading of the three canticles of the Divine Comedy in light of the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the three appetites: concupiscible, irascible and of the will [See Design in the 
Wax: The Structure of the Divine Comedy and its Meaning. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame UP, 1999)]. One of the 
conclusions Cogan reaches with regard to Inferno—that the Malebolge correspond to the inner disposition of the 
will—will support my theory of Dante’s scholastic approach to the sins of the tongue. 
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vernacular, but even in such a technical work, Dante cannot obliterate his concern with human 
morality, but makes connections between language and sin. De Monarchia places the use of 
speech into a political perspective and shows that transgressions of speech may lead to divisions 
of the body politic. Convivio has all the features of a moral tract, and in it the discussions about 
vices and virtues of language are preponderant. All these tracts, and the clues about sinful speech 
scattered throughout the Purgatory and the Paradiso converge into a unique, coherent ethical 
perspective about transgressive speech that can help us grasp Dante’s handling of verbal sins in 
the complex construction of hell. 
It is, thus, the goal of this chapter to show that the label “moralist of speech” applies to its 
fullest extent to Jean de Meun and Dante. 
 
3.1 ORIGIN, FUNCTIONS AND SINS OF SPEECH IN THE “ROMANCE OF THE 
ROSE” 
3.1.1 Lady Reason on speech and its transgressions 
The world of the second part of the Rose is a world depicted in apocalyptic tones. Long before 
we get to Faus Semblant’s sequence, where he explicitly defines himself as an Antichrist, Lady 
Reason, the first allegorical character to emerge in Jean de Meun’s Rose, already presents the 
contemporary scene in very dark colors: Fraud (Baraz) took possession of the whole world and 
corrupted all good mores and honest practices. The virtues which had hitherto dominated the 
world, all vanished under the terror of malice, this mother of all kingdoms that brought along 
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only evils and sins. Guile, avarice, usury and their cohorts of vices have now replaced the virtues 
of the golden age. Merchants, lawyers and medicine men practice their crafts for money and 
privileges. Even preachers speak the words of the gospel not for the sake of evangelization but to 
acquire riches and social benefits. Judges no longer take the side of the innocent, but accept false 
testimonies and make unjust decisions. 
Reason’s discourse is so imbued with remarks about human morality that critics have 
often labeled it as a moral tract in its own right.73 It tackles problems related to good and evil, to 
malice, to fraud, to injustice, and, most importantly for us, fraudulent behavioral practices in 
which speech plays a pivotal role. The springboard from which this allegorical character with a 
long tradition in literature launches her long disquisition is a discussion about love.74 Amors is a 
word with several meanings in French, corresponding to several types of feelings: there is, first, 
erotic love, a sort of catastrophic disorder of the senses from which the Lover, Reason’s 
interlocutor, suffers; in the same category of unhealthy attachments lies the love of riches. 
Opposed to these, there is a positive and noble love, governed by the rules of friendship and 
charity, and, finally, the noblest form of love of all: the one represented by the attachment to 
reason, the highest human faculty. Lady Reason embodies, obviously, the last kind of love, and 
as such, she offers herself as an alternate to the Lover’s cupidinous feelings for the Rose. 
In her attempt to convince the Lover to follow her, Reason launches a virulent campaign 
of denigration against carnal love, a campaign verbalized in a long oxymoronic series, designed 
                                                 
73 If we are to consider the text, Lady Reason’s discourse is an exemplar of pastoral literature: the character brands 
her own speech a sermon (4671-2), and the Lover labels her lesson with the same term (4656). For the French text of 
the Romance of the Rose, I use Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun. Le Roman de la rose, Armand Strubel, ed. 
(Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1992), whereas for the English version, I use The Romance of the Rose by 
Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun. Charles Dahlberg, translator. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995). 
74 Spanning about three thousand lines, Reasons’s sequence is the longest in the Rose: it represents one sixth of 
Jean’s sequel. All of the major interpreters of the Rose have meditated on this complex allegorical character, and of 
the two books John Fleming has written on the Rose, one is dedicated entirely to Reason and her interlocutor. See: 
Reason and the Lover (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984). 
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to present this type of love as full of contradictions and dangers: a heinous peace and a lovely 
hatred, a healthy languishing and a feverish health, a sweet evil and an unpleasant sweetness, 
etc.75 One expression is striking in Reason’s fastidious list of metaphors and oxymorons: love, 
Reason says, is a sin stained with forgiveness, a pardon stained with sin: entechiez de pardon 
pechiez,/De pechiez pardon entechiez.’ 4312-3). Eros is, thus, presented from the outset as an 
immoral attitude. Carnal love is characterized without ambiguity as incompatible with Christian 
values, a transgressive set of feelings that humans need to shun. In these positions vis-à-vis the 
world and erotic love lies the essence of the extremely long discourse of Lady Reason: it is a 
discourse built upon the values of Classical rationalism, shored up by numerous quotations from 
Roman authors, but framed within the conceptual context of Christianity.76
It will thus come as no surprise that Reason’s approach to the complex problematic of 
human behavior will bear the marks of this amalgam of Classical theories of morality and the 
Christian attitude towards virtues and vices.77 By the same token, her numerous references to 
verbal practices will rest on both pagan Roman sources and biblical authorities. In what follows, 
I will discuss the most important points Reason makes about the use of speech and will highlight 
those linguistic practices that she considers abusive or transgressive. I will also tackle the theme 
of the custodia linguae (‘the guard of the tongue’), a theme shared by numerous medieval tracts 
on the sins of the tongue, and which Reason insistently offers as solution to the transgressions 
committed by the way of speech. I will treat the question of flattery in a separate chapter, since 
                                                 
75 Barbara Newman reminds us that this extended oxymoronic series is a borrowing from Alain of Lille’s De planctu 
Naturae. (God and the Goddesses, 100). 
76 When she invokes Suetonius, she calls him a desloial homme (‘man of no faith’), noting outraged that he had 
considered the Christian religion false, uncanny and dangerous (6454-8). 
77 Minnis casts Jean as a sort of follower of Bernard de Cluny, who promoted the assimilation of the pagan criticism 
of vices to the Christian contempt of the world: “I believe that the same process of assimilation and adaptation of 
satiric theory and tradition may be found in the Rose,” says Minnis in Magister amoris. The « Roman de la Rose » 
and Vernacular Hermeneutics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), 96. 
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this habit has complex features in the Rose and becomes a moral category in its own right in 
Dante’s Comedy. In the economy of my dissertation, flattery constitutes, thus, the first major 
point of intersection between the Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy. 
References to deceitful verbal methods occur early on in Lady Reason’s discourse, when 
she starts complaining about the decay of courtly love. We remember from the first part of the 
Rose that fin’amors implied specific behavioral norms, one of which being a most polite and 
reverent way of using language. The Lover himself, at the beginning of his conversation with 
Reason in the second part of the Rose, recalls that he had three faithful companions: Doux 
Penser (‘Sweet Thought’), Doux Parler (‘Sweet Talk’), Doux Regard (‘Sweet Glance’), which 
have all abandoned him. He now has to face alone several fierce enemies: Danger, Fear, Shame 
and Evil Mouth (Malebouche). ‘Sweet Talk’ and ‘Evil Mouth’ are reminiscences of the linguistic 
universe of the idealized courtly love; the latter will persist in the Rose until the meeting with 
Faus Semblant who will kill him.78 But at this point of the narrative, lady Reason is concerned 
with lovers for whom the ‘sweet talk’ no longer corresponds to the inner voice of the heart, but 
becomes a deliberate method of seducing women: Toutevois fins amans se faignent,/Mais par 
amours amer ne daignent/Et se gabent ainsi des dames/Et lor promettent cors et ames/Et jurent 
mensonges et fables/A ceuls qu’il tiennent decevables. Tant qu’il ont leur delit eü. (4387-92; 
‘they always pretend to be pure lovers and do not deign to love par amour; thus they deceive 
ladies by promising them their hearts and souls and by swearing lies and fables to those whom 
                                                 
78 This character is little developed by Jean, who portrays him not by having him speak, but by noting the evil way 
in which his words affect people’s lives (male bouche/Qui envenime et qui entouche /Touz ceuls dont el fait sa 
matire:/Par langue les met a martire (4101-3; ‘He poisons and taints all those with whom he has to do and by his 
tongue he delivers them to martyrdom’). 
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they find gullible, until they have taken they pleasure with them’).79 Se faindre (‘to pretend’), se 
gaber (‘to fool’), decevable (‘gullible’) belong to a lexicon of deception that is placed in 
immediate relationship with acts of speech:  lies, oaths and false promises. With these types of 
verbal practices, the lovers leave the refined space of fin’amors and enter the sphere of fraud. 
Further evil verbal habits are condemned, this time in the framework of the discussion on 
friendship. Within the series of good and bad loves listed by Reason, one form of love that 
should definitely be cultivated is friendship, a feeling which is built on social bounds and which, 
unlike carnal love, may lead the soul on the path of virtues. Unmindful attitudes, however, can 
undermine this noble feeling and one may easily lose a friend not only through pride or anger, 
but also by using words in an inadequate way: Len le pert par orgueill, par ire,/Par reprouche, 
par reveler/Les secrez qui font a celer,/Et par la plaie doulereuse/De  detracion venimeuse 
(4930-35). That you can lose a friend in these five different ways proves that the consequences 
evil verbal habits have may equal the consequences caused by two deadly sins: pride and anger. 
In this passage, three verbal habits--reproach, detraction and revelation of secrets--are implicitly 
raised to the “rank” of capital vices, since superbia and ira figure on all the medieval lists of the 
seven capital vices. 
If we compare this approach to speech to the list of the seven capital vices, we realize that 
this relationship of equality--capital vice=vice of the tongue--is not usual. In the Gregorian 
scheme, for instance, there are established hierarchical relationships between the main vices and 
the sins of speech, in the sense that the latter are subordinated to the former. If we consider, 
                                                 
79 The passage is to be read in opposition to a remark about the use of speech Reason makes in another place in the 
poem: normally, what is in your mouth reflects or should reflect what is in your heart: Car volentiers recorde 
bouche/Chose qui pres dou cuer li touche (6863-4; ‘for the mouth willingly utters what touches one near the heart’). 
What is not uttered in a specular relationship to the inner language of feelings constitutes an act of deception and 
thereby a linguistic transgression. 
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however, this approach in comparison to Peraldus’s treatment of the sins of the tongue, it will 
seem less unusual. For Peraldus, the twenty-four manifestations of sinful speech constituted a 
category on a par with Gregory’s seven capital vices. Two of the verbal practices mentioned by 
Jean in the above passage--detractio and amici secreta revelare--are among Peraldus’s twenty-
four vices of the tongue, and they are treated specifically in relationship to friendship. This 
remark is not to suggest that Jean made the association of two capital vices with three acts of 
speech under the immediate influence of Peraldus. What I intend to point out is rather that, due 
to its extraordinary popularity, Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum imposed a specific approach to 
speech in the cultural climate of the time, an approach which considered the sins of the tongue as 
serious as the seven capital vices. Thus, Jean de Meun’s equation of vicious verbal habits with 
two deadly sins should not surprise. The poet not only wrote his sequel to the Rose during the 
years when Peraldus’s Summa was very popular (1275-1280), but he also wrote it on Rue St. 
Jacques, the nucleus of the Dominican activity in Paris, where Peraldus’s Summa was certainly 
very well known. Laurent d’Orléans also translated the Summa during the same years (1279-
1280). Even if there is no evidence to suggest that Jean de Meun had knowledge of the Summa—
although he was a great reader of, and translator from Latin--or of the French Somme Le Roi, the 
cultural context in which Jean was writing was so imbued with pastoral debates about sinful 
speech that he could not remain untouched by them. 
Moreover, whereas detraction is in the Gregorian scheme of sins the daughter of envy, 
secreta amici revelare is a moral category that owes its existence to French ecclesiastics from the 
twelfth-thirteenth centuries. In the book XIII of his Speculum Morale, Raoul Ardent discusses 
the practice of disclosing one’s friends’ secrets as a vicious verbal habit.  About fifty years after 
Ardent, Peraldus considers this type of habit so immoral that he decides to include it among his 
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twenty-four classes of sinful speech. Peraldus’s followers will preserve it as well in their 
compilations in Latin, French or Italian.80 In short, at the time when Jean was writing his poem, 
la révélation des secrets des amis was a fashionable moral category, so fashionable in fact that it 
might have entered the Rose as well. 
At the polar opposite of the man who discloses his friends’ secrets stands the true friend, 
who will never betray his companion and will never reproach him with anything: Quant son 
secré dit li avra,/Jamais li tierz ne le savra./ Ne de reproche n’a il garde,/Car sages hons sa 
langue garde./Ce ne savroit mie fous faire:/Nus fous ne set sa langue taire (4726-30; ‘When one 
has told a secret to him, no third person will ever know it; nor will the teller fear any reproach, 
for a wise man keeps watch over his tongue, a thing no fool could do, for a fool doesn’t know 
how to keep his tongue still’). The theme of the guard of the tongue is also a product of the 
cultural period in which Jean lived: introduced by Peter the Cantor, in his Verbum Abbreviatum, 
taken up by Alain of Lille and Raoul Ardent in their moral writings, the ideal of controlled 
speech was developed again, very close in time to Jean, by William Peraldus. In the wake of 
Classical authors and of the scriptural writings, Solomon especially, with his numerous 
references to undisciplined speech, Peraldus insistently underlines the necessity to rein in one’s 
tongue, and to carefully choose the proper time to speak and the words to utter. The De peccato 
linguae is divided into three main parts, one of which (prima pars) is entirely devoted to the 
problematic of the guarded tongue. Here Peraldus sets out to discern the reasons why a person 
should rein in his tongue, and he finds no less than eighteen such reasons quod debet hominem 
movere ad custodiam linguae (‘that ought to move one to keep his tongue’). The purpose of the 
                                                 
80 In Latin, it was preserved by pseudo-Vincent’s Speculum morale, a work modeled after Peraldus’s Summa; in 
French, by Laurent d’Orléans in his Somme le Roi and in Italian by Domenico Cavalca. The two last authors are, as 
we know, translators of Peraldus’s Summa. 
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custodia lingua is a moral ideal: only by one’s ability to master one’s speech, can one attain the 
highest standards of goodness and wisdom. 
In the Romance of the Rose, Lady Reason is obsessed with the idea that she needs to 
impart the Lover the lesson of disciplined speech. She posits herself as a linguistic model, 
teaching the lover that gossip and quarrel are two great villonies (‘vile things’) that she never 
practices.81 If the Lover makes mistakes in words or deeds, she will correct him by her own 
deeds or words but in doing so she would never appeal to blame or denigration.82 Her speech is 
always good and true (parole bonne et voire) and when she chastises people she takes extreme 
care not to utter any foolish thing or harm them with her words.83 After having expressed the 
notion that speech makes the difference between a wise and a foolish man in the context of 
friendship, as we have seen, later in her discourse, she develops this notion with a greater wealth 
of details and references:  
 
Si rest taire vertu petite,/Mais dire les choses a taire/C’est trop grant 
diablye a faire./Langue doit estre refrenee,/Car nous lisons de Tholomee 
/Une parole mout honneste/Au commencement de l’Almageste:/Que sages 
est cil qui met paine/A ce que sa langue refraine,/Fors sanz plus quant de 
dieu parole/La n’a on pas trop de parole/Car nus ne puet dieu tro loer. (…) 
Chatons meïsmes s’i acorde,/S’il est qui son livre recorde./La puez en 
escrit trouver tu/Que la premeraine vertu/C’est de mettre a sa langue 
frain:/Donte don la toe et refrain/De folie dire et d’outrages,/Si feras que 
preuz et que sages,/Qu’il fait bon croire les paiens/Com de leur diz granz 
biens aiens. (7030-7058) 
                                                 
81Qu’il est voirs, et ne te deplaise,/Tenciers est venjance mauvaise,/Et si doiz savoir que mesdire/Est encore 
venjance pire (7001-7005; ‘It is true—don’t let it displease you—that a quarrel is a bad vindication, and you should 
know that detraction is a still worse form of vindication’; emphasis mine). Let us note in passing that both tencier 
and mesdire are on the list of verbal sins drawn by Laurent in French. 
82Car se tu meffais ou mesdis/Ou par mes fais ou par mes dis,/Sürement t’en puis reprendre/Pour toi chastier et 
aprendre/Sanz blasme et sanz diffamement (7007-7011; ‘for if, through what I do or say, you misspeak or 
misbehave, I can, without blaming or slandering you, correct you privately in order to chastise you and teach you’). 
83Je ne vueill mie as gens tencier/Ne par mon dit desavancier,/Ne diffamer nulle personne/Quel qu’ele soit, 
mauvaise ou bonne (7019-7022; ‘I do not want to quarrel with anybody, nor, by what I say, to lessen or defame any 
person, whatever he may be like, bad or good’). 
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 To keep silent remains a small virtue; but to speak the things to be kept silent is to 
commit a diabolical deed. The tongue should be held in check. We read a very honest 
saying of Ptolemy at the beginning of the Almagest: he who takes trouble over what 
restrains his tongue is a wise man, except when he speaks of God and nothing more. On 
that subject one does not speak too much, for no man can praise God too much. (…) Cato 
himself agrees, if there is anyone who recalls his book, where you may find in writing 
that the fist virtue is to put a bridle on one’s tongue. Subdue yours then, and refrain from 
saying foolish and wild things; then you will do only what is worthy and wise. It is good 
to believe the pagans, for we may gain great benefit from their sayings. 
 
 
Important traces of the theories of the French ecclesiastics about silence have permeated 
Lady Reason’s discourse as well. Keeping silence is a virtue, not a major one, since silence is 
morally ambiguous, but however a virtue. Not being able to practice silence when this is required 
is of great danger, since loquacity and betrayal spring directly from the devil. Such a theory 
clearly echoes the pastoral discourse on speech as represented by the moralists I have mentioned. 
This pastoral echo is further reinforced when Reason starts speaking about the necessity of 
holding one’s tongue in check, an idea she expresses twice in a relatively short passage (langue 
doit estre refrenee and que la premeraine vertu/C’est de mettre a sa langue frain), thus 
displaying an obsession with custodia linguae worthy of Peraldus. Even the reference to Cato, 
where this quote is taken from, is a certified topos in the medieval moral tracts on peccata 
linguae.84 The pagans Reason mentions constitute one of the two major source-strains in the 
medieval tracts, the other one being the scriptural writings.85 Cicero, Seneca, Horace, to name 
just a few, are authors from which the medieval moralists on speech drew extensively to 
legitimize their own theories about virtuous vs. transgressive speech. Even the idea that the only 
                                                 
84 Edwin Craun points out that Cato’s maxims are omnipresent in the moral encyclopedias of the fourteenth century 
(Lies, Slander and Obscenity in Medieval English Literature, 67).  
85For a thorough examination of the sources underlying the moral summae, see Richard Newhauser. The Treatise on 
Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1993). 
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good loquacity is that when one praises God, is a common denominator of the above-mentioned 
tracts on speech.  
 However, not even in this passage fraught with references to the sinfulness of speech, do 
we encounter yet the word ‘sin’. This comes--surprisingly--when Lady Reason sets out to assess 
the quality of her own discourse. One of the most controversial and debated moments in the 
narrative of the Rose is when Reason recounts the castration of Saturn by his son Jupiter and she 
refers to Saturn’s male genitalia as viz (‘prick’) and coilles (‘balls’). Her lexical choices prompt 
the outraged reaction of the Lover, who qualifies Reason’s speech as parleüre baude (‘bawdy 
speech’), and expresses his attachment to good linguistic manners, that he had learned from the 
God of Love: 
  
Mais or vous oÿ nommer ci/Si com moi samble, une parole/Si esbalouvree 
et si fole/Que, qui voudrait, ce croi, muser/A vous enprendre a 
encuser,/L’en n’i porroit trover deffenses.(…)/ Si m’a mon maistre 
deffendu/-Car je l’ai mout bien entendu-/Que ja mot n’isse de ma 
bouche/Qui a ribaudie s’aprouche (…) De tant vous puis or chastoier,/Si 
rapercevroiz vostre outrage/Qui vous faingniez estre si sage. (5696-
5720)86
 
But I heard you speak at one point, it seems to me, some words so shameless and 
excessive that I believe if anyone wanted to waste time in undertaking to excuse you, he 
wouldn’t be able to find any defense. (…) My master has forbidden me—I heard him 
very clearly—ever to let fall from my mouth any word approaching ribaldry. (…) Now I 
can chastise you to that extent, and you who pretend to be so wise will see as well your 
own trespass. 
 
 
                                                 
86 The Lover’s claim to proper language cannot, however, be taken seriously. If we examine his own language 
throughout the poem we will find it fraught with irreverent words, such as the epithets he uses to describe Jealousy: 
L’orde puant vieille mossue (4109; ‘dirty, stinking, foul old woman’). 
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It is true, the Lover says, that God created man and the male genitalia directly, but He did 
not create the words people use to name them and which are full of obscenities.87 The reproaches 
the Lover levels at Reason belong, first, to a courtly literature strain, which imposes the use of 
euphemisms as a norm for language, and a popular, commonsensical strain, which requires even 
uneducated women to use a circumlocutory manner of speech in reference to the body parts.  
 
Si ne vous tieng pas a cortoise/Quant vous m’avez coilles nommées,/Qui 
ne sont pas bien renommées/En bouche a cortoise pucele./Vous, qui tant 
estes sage et belle,/Ne sai com nommer les osastes,/Au mains quant le mot 
ne glosastes/Par quelque cortoise parole/Si com preudefame en parole./ 
Souvent voi neïs ces norrices/Dont maintes sont baudes et nices,/Quant 
leur enfanz tienent et baignent,/Qu’el les debaillent et aplaignent/Si les 
nomment il autremement;/Vos savez or bien se je ment. (6924-6938) 
  
Moreover, I do not consider you courteous when just now you named the testicles to me; 
they are not well thought of in the mouth of a courteous girl. I do not know how you, so 
wise and beautiful, dared name them, at least when you did not gloss the word with some 
courteous utterance, as an honest woman does in speaking of them. Often I see even 
when the nurses, many of whom are bawdy and simple, hold and bathe their children, 
they use other names for them. Now you know well if I lie. 
 
It is worth noting that in this reproach the Lover himself uses exactly the word he said he would 
never use. This detail is symbolic of Jean’s satirical technique, whereby he manages to dismantle 
a character from within, namely by having him say things that eventually turn against the 
character himself. But what is most important in the Lover’s reaction to Reason’s improper 
language is that it causes her to take a stand with respect to her own choice of words and to 
excuse herself:  
 
                                                 
87 Or vaut pis, dis je, que devant/Car bien vois ore aprenant/par vostre parleüre baude/Que vous estes fole et 
ribaude,/Car tout ait dieus les choses faites,/Que ci devant m’avez retraites,/Les moz au moins ne fist il mie,/Qu’il 
sont tuit plain de vilonnie. (6975-82; ‘Now, this is worse, I said, than before, for I see clearly now by your bawdy 
speech that you are a foolish ribald; even if God made the things that you have mentioned before here, at least he did 
not make the words, which are filled with villainy’). 
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Biaus ami, je puis bien nommer/Sanz moi faire mal renommer/Apertement 
par propre non/Chose qui n’est se bonne non. /Voire, dou mal seürement 
/Puis je bien parler proprement, /Car de riens nulle je n’hai honte/S’el 
n’est tels que a pechié monte. /Mais riens ou pechié se meïst /N’est nus 
que faire me feïst, /N’ainc en ma vie ne pechié/N’encor ne faz je pas 
pechié/Se je nomme les nobles choses /Par plain texte sanz mettre gloses, 
/Que mes peres en paradis /Fist de ses propres mains jadis,/Et tous les 
autres estrumenz/Qui sont piliers et argumenz/A soustenir nature humaine. 
/Qui sanz euls fust or casse et vaine. (6941-6960)88
 
Fair friend, I can very well, without creating a bad reputation for myself, name openly 
and by its own name a thing which is nothing if not good. In truth, I can safely speak 
properly of evil, for I have no shame about anything if it is not such that it may be sinful. 
But a thing in which sin lay could make no difference to me, for I never sinned in my life; 
if I name noble things in plain text, without gloss, I still commit no sin, since my father in 
Paradise made them formerly with his own hands, along with all the other instruments 
that are the pillars and arguments for sustaining human nature, which, without them, 
would now be destroyed and empty. 
 
The above quoted passage has given rise to an extraordinary critical response over the 
course of time.89 The interpretations have mainly revolved around the fact that, in this passage, 
Jean explicitly airs his adherence to the nominalist position with respect to language.90 Reason’s 
stand can be summed up as follows: she praises the gift of speech granted to her by God, and 
                                                 
88 Alastair Minnis links this passage with Jean’s antipathy for integumental discourse. Although the poet constantly 
promises to provide gloss on some of his most cryptic definitions, a coherent integumental program does not exist in 
the Rose, asserts Minnis, who notes that for Jean glossing had “the pejorative connotation of inappropriate 
concealment, implying failure to face the facts.” (Magister Amoris, 136). Badel also alludes to Jean’s reluctance to 
the practice of integumentum, and puts it on account of Jean’s  attempt to denunciate “la déviation joachimite de 
l’exégèse.” (Le Roman de la Rose au XIVe siècle. Etude de la réception de l’œuvre (Geneva : Droz, 1980), 15. 
89 This surge of interest is due, in Hult’s view, to the modern development of semiotics and hermeneutics. 
“Language and dismemberment: Abélard, Origen, and the Romance of the Rose,” in Rethinking the Romance of the 
Rose (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania UP, 1992), 109. Other notable studies of Jean de Meun’s view of language are: 
Marc-René Jung, “Jean de Meung et l’allégorie,” Cahiers de l’Association Internationale des Etudes Françaises 28 
(1976), 21-36, Gustav Ineichen, “Le discours linguistique de Jean de Meun,” Romanistiche Zeitschrift für 
Literaturgeschichte 2 (1978), 245-53, and more recently Maureen Quilligan, “Allegory, Allegoresis and the 
Deallegorization of Language: The Roman de la rose, the De planctu naturae, and the Parlament of Foules,” in 
Allegory, Myth and Symbol, Morton W. Bloomfield, ed., Harvard English Studies 9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 163-86. John Fleming also makes a detailed analysis of Reason’s view of language and 
indicates the sources for it; see chapter “Words and Things,” in Reason and the Lover, 97-135. 
90 The mouthpiece for this critical trend is Daniel Poirion, with “Les mots et les choses selon Jean de Meun,” 
L’Information littéraire 26 (1974): 7-11, and “De la signification selon Jean de Meun,” Archéologie du signe, E. 
Vance and L. Brind’amour, eds. Recueils d’Etudes Médiévales 3 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1983), 165-85. 
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invokes Plato according to whom speech is given for expressing feelings, for teaching and 
learning. God, the source of all courtesy, allows Reason to speak anyway she wants, so it is her 
wont to speak literally about things, whenever she likes so, without wishing to gloss them. 
(7074-6; Par son gre sui je coustumiere/De parler proprement des choses/Quant il me plaist 
sanz mettre gloses. ‘It is my custom to speak properly of things when I please, without using any 
gloss’). She is the maker of words, and since she considers male genitalia beautiful, any word 
she would use to name them would be beautiful. Thus, the dispute between Reason and the 
Lover may primarily arise not from the choice of words, but from a difference in the perception 
of the private parts. These are base for the Lover, whereas for Reason they are beautiful as any 
other thing made directly by her divine father. How can she not name by their own names God’s 
works?--she asks rhetorically. Reason asserts that she has nothing against the women who use 
euphemisms by prudery, but she reserves herself the right to use the proper, non-figurative terms 
when she wants to speak clearly. Reason thus touches upon a limit of language, in that she 
considers euphemisms as sources of referential ambiguity. With the notion of euphemism, 
Reason arrives at the issue of linguistic hypocrisy that she overtly criticizes. In this discussion, 
the question of sin arises again: even if these women would call the male genitalia unashamedly, 
with their proper names, they would commit no sin: Et se proprement les nommassent/ Ja certes 
de riens n’i pechassent. (7137-7138; ‘And if they call them with their proper names, they do not 
sin in any way’). 
Discussions about Jean’ s philosophy of language from a Platonic position do not exhaust 
the overall significance of this celebrated fragment of the Rose. An apparently minor detail 
seems to have eluded the interpreters of the poem: Lady Reason vividly argues that by naming 
the male genitalia with their ‘proper’ (i.e, non-euphemistic) names she committed NO SIN.  The 
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Lover had not once made this charge: he had accused Reason of being foolish and rude, but he 
had never mentioned anything about language as sin. This word appears, significantly, only in 
Reason’s vocabulary and from her own initiative. Why she is so determined to refute the 
potential sinfulness that hovers above her linguistic acts, and what particular sin of the tongue 
she has in mind, are questions that require an immediate attention. 
 In the moral writings on the habits of language, constant attention is paid to obscene 
talk.91 Among the authors I have perused, Raoul Ardent makes the most significant and detailed 
contribution to this kind of speech.92 For Ardent, turpiloquium is a morally unhealthy linguistic 
habit that can affect both the speaker and the listener. It has two subspecies: speaking about base 
things performed according to the laws of nature and speaking of base things committed against 
nature. The latter type is exemplified by speech about sodomy, incest, or sexual intercourse 
between men and animals, and is considered the most grievous. The former type is represented 
by speech about natural physiological processes, such as heterosexual intercourse, elimination of 
bodily fluids in men and women, etc. This type of obscene talk is less shameful and serious, but 
still transgressive, in that it describes acts that even nature chooses to hide. When speaking about 
these natural but intimate acts, extreme care should be taken to describe them: the euphemism is 
the only solution recommended. 93 If proper care in language is not taken, obscene words sully 
                                                 
91 Charles Muscatine sees linguistic obscenities in the framework of the notion of courtliness, and remarks that a 
strong sensitivity to dirty language had developed already by the early thirteenth century. (“The fabliaux, Courtly 
Culture, and the (Re)Invention of Vulgarity,” Obscenity. Social Control and Artistic Creation in the European 
Middle Ages. Jan Ziolkowski, ed. (Boston: Brill, 1998), 281-292. Muscatine does not make, however, the connection 
with the medieval lingua-texts. 
92 In Peraldus’s taxonomy this sin is treated extremely schematically, in just a few lines that could be reduced to the 
following definition: Hoc peccatum est turpitudo in ore, ubi multum indecens est immunditia (Summa Vitiorum, 
414). No example is given to illustrate this vague definition. 
93 Que [turpitudines] si quando necesse est significari honestioribus verbis sunt significanda et occultanda, sicut 
occultat ea et ipsa natura. Nonne vides quomodo horum inhonestatem honestioribus verbis significant sacra 
scriptura.” (Speculum Universale, XIII, f. 164r). (‘If vile things must be expressed, these things must be coached or 
concealed in honest words, as nature herself conceals them. Cannot you see how, in the Sacred Scripture, the 
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the one who utters them and, at the same time, may corrupt the mores of the one who listens, 
because lewd language often arouses carnal desires.  
 So, the sin of the tongue Lady Reason had in mind when she refuted an accusation of 
sinfulness no one had leveled at her is the sin of turpiloquium. She chose to directly name 
intimate parts of the body that are natural, but that are not normally displayed. Instead of 
choosing euphemisms (and here the linguistic standards of courtly love meet those of the 
scriptures), she decided to shamelessly name the male genitalia. But why does Reason seem so 
concerned about her potential linguistic transgressiveness? The answer to this question can be 
found only if we relate Lady Reason’s discourse to Jean’s apologetic gesture that comes later on 
in the poem. The only instance in the Rose in which Jean drops the masks of the characters he 
impersonates and speaks in his own voice is when he decides to apologize to the audience and to 
the Catholic Church for all the verbal transgressions he may have committed while writing his 
poem.  
 
Si vous pri, seigneurs amoreus,/ Par les geus d’amours savoreus,/ Que se 
vous i trouvez paroles/Semblanz trop baudes ou trop foles,/Par quoi 
saillent li mesdisant/Qui de nous aillent mesdisant/Des choses a dire ou 
dites,/Que cortoisement les desdites./Et quant vous les avrez des 
diz/Repris, retardez ou desdiz,/Se mi dit sont de tel maniere/Qu’il soit 
droiz que pardon en quiere/Pri vous que le me pardoingniez/Et de par moi 
leur respoingniez/Que ce requeroit la matire/ Qui vers teus parole me 
tire/Par les proprietez de sai:/Et pour ce teus paroles ai. (…)/Et s’il y a 
nule parole/Qui sainte eglise tiengne a fole,/Presz sui k’a son voloir 
l’amende/Se je puis souffire a l’amende. (15163-15306) 
 
Therefore I beg you, amorous lords, by the delicious games of love, if you find here any 
speeches that are too bawdy or silly and that might make slanderous critics who go 
around speaking ill of us rise up over things that I have said or will say, that you will 
courteously oppose them. Then when you have reproved, prevented, or opposed these 
                                                                                                                                                             
dishonesty of those men is expressed through more honest words?’). When Raoul speaks of nature’s concealing vile 
things, he alludes to the medieval belief according to which, at God’s command, nature chose to hide the shameful 
parts of the body, by placing them in the lower section of human anatomy. 
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speeches, if what I say is of such a nature that I may justly ask pardon for them, I beg you 
to pardon me and to reply to them through me that my subject matter demanded these 
things; it draws me toward such things by its own properties, and therefore I have such 
speeches. (…) And if I make any utterance that Holy Church may consider foolish, I am 
ready at her wish to change it if I am capable of making the change. 
 
 
What is striking in this passage is the coincidence between the Lover’s assessment of 
Reason’s language as baude (‘bawdy’) and fole (‘foolish’) and Jean de Meun’s “personal” 
apologies for the same type of words. This important textual indication points us to the fact that 
Lady Reason’s concerns about her deviations of language betray, in fact, the authorial awareness 
of potentially transgressive speech. Lady’s Reason sin of turpiloquium is in fact Jean de Meun’s 
own. If she refutes such a possibility by obliquely invoking the Platonic theory of naming it is 
because Jean de Meun himself is constantly conscious of the accusation of obscene (written) 
speech he may face. His apologies to the reader and to the Church are evidence in this respect. 
The problem is all the more serious since turpiloquium, as we have seen, constitutes a real moral 
danger for the listener/reader, in that it may prompt him to sin himself. Both Christine de Pizan 
and Jean Gerson will accuse Jean de Meun of lewd language conducive to sin and of evil 
influence on readers.94 I will return to this question later on in my dissertation, when I will 
discuss problems related to authorial speech.  
                                                 
94 Sylvia Huot reminds us that for Gerson “Jean’s linguistic and poetic transgressions are not essentially different 
from bodily transgressions. To name the body part in a public document is tantamount to exposing one’s own body 
to the eyes of the world.” [The “Romance of the Rose” and Its Medieval Readers. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 22]. I treat Jean’s transgressions of speech and Gerson’s response to them in my section 
devoted to the “blasphemies” of Jean de Meun. 
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3.1.2 Nature on the (verbal) vices of humans 
On the level of the plot in the Romance of the Rose, a combat takes place that opposes the 
Lover’s supporters (Openness, Pity, Skillful Concealment, Boldness) to the defendants of the 
castle where Fair Welcoming is imprisoned (Resistance, Shame, Fear). What is important for us 
in this parodic imitation of Prudentius’s Psychomachia is that the weaponry that some of these 
allegorical characters display bears symbolic representations of acts of speech. The tip of 
Openness’ lance is made of sweet prayer. Her shield is made of supplications, and bordered with 
promises, agreements, oaths and engagements. (15334-41). Pity’s shield is made out of relief, 
bordered by sighs and laments. Engaged in a close combat with Danger, Pity wins over him only 
when she starts crying. Her tears, notes the narrator, hurts the enemy more than any deed or word 
(emphasis mine) could have done (Onques mais pour faiz ne pour diz/Ne fu si durement hurtez! 
15414-5), a brief remark that bespeaks Jean de Meun’s awareness of the psychological detriment 
speech can cause. Shame’s target has a name, like the swords of the famous knights from the 
Arthurian romances. It is called Doute de male renomee (‘Fear-of-a-Bad-Reputation’) and has 
several tongues painted on it (mainte langue ot ou bort portraite 15472). Skillful Concealment 
has a silent sword, similar, says the narrator, to a cut off tongue. The figure Boldness is 
introduced into the action by a characterization focused on his behavior: aperz par faiz et par diz 
(‘honest in deeds and words’ 15540; emphasis mine). 
After a tough fight, the two “armies” reach an armistice, but this does not last long: the 
one who breaks it is Venus’s son, Cupid, who, says the narrator, never kept any engagement, 
promise or word. When the fight resumes even more intensely than before, the characters shoot 
at each other arrows feathered with promises, services and gifts. Each of these arrows, Jean is 
emphasizing, is entirely made of promises and their tips are covered with the iron of the given 
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word and the oath: Car il n’i entra onques fust/Qui touz de promesses ne fust,/Du fer ferrés 
fermement/De fiance et de serement ‘for no wood will ever go into them that is not made entirely 
of promises; the arrows were tipped firmly with points made of oaths and assurances’ 15819-22). 
The whole picture seems to represent not a physical combat, but a verbal one. We witness 
a huge allegorical clash between vices and virtues in which the acts of speech are prevalent: the 
shields are painted with tongues or made out of human utterances, the swords look like tongues, 
too, whereas the arrows are entirely made of various forms of verbal commitment. What is most 
worrying about this allegorical fight is that the moral worth of this intense verbal activity seems 
to be… nil. If we were to “translate” this allegory, an allegory of human speech, we could see 
this multitude of utterances as a flamboyant rhetorical display that men readily show each other, 
but which is devoid of substance. Humans are quick to throw at each other numerous words, to 
commit to each other through various linguistic acts, their lives bubble with oaths of all kinds, 
but the truth--or the danger--is that this whole intense and noisy activity may be devoid of 
essence. In the text, the combat takes place under the patronage of Cupid, a god famous for his 
lack of constancy and seriousness, for his failure to keep his word. Love, Jean de Meun seems to 
be suggesting, is a sum of promissory words that most of the time become meaningless because 
they are not corroborated by deeds.  
On a mere narrative level, before we know what the outcome of the clash between vices 
and virtues is, we have to go through two more long disquisitions--Nature’s and Genius’s--that 
have only an indirect bearing on the plot. When the fight reaches an impasse, we see Cupid 
asking for his mother’s help, and then swearing together to help the Lover and the laws of nature. 
At hearing them, the divine Lady Nature, who was forging human beings in her workshop, 
leaves her work for a while, and, thanking Venus and Cupid for their help, begins her own 
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speech.95 Her intercession starts as a painful lament on the issue of male homosexuality, but soon 
deviates and branches off into a dizzying array of highly philosophical themes, such as divine 
foreknowledge, predestination, free will, and others. Within the complex framework of the 
discussion of free will, Jean de Meun introduces new aspects of his view of human morality, 
aspects that require special attention.  
The theological idea of predestination springs naturally from a discussion of the heavenly 
bodies and their influences. Although Jean de Meun does not deny that these bodies exert a 
certain influence on the sublunary world and the individual subjects, he rejects the idea of their 
absolute influence. He admits that the spheres can affect human characters, in the sense that they 
instill certain attributes in men--the so-called predispositions--but at the same time, Jean de 
Meun argues, men can oppose these innate dispositions through their power of choice. Through 
education, says Jean, proper nourishment, good company, reason or other remedies, men can 
obtain different results in their lives, if they know how to bridle their natural ways. From this 
point the discussion slides into the apparent contradiction between the notions of predestination 
and divine foreknowledge, on the one hand, and that of free will, on the other. This conflict is not 
easy to explain to lay people, says Jean de Meun (Forz est a gens lais a descrivre; 17110). How, 
despite all appearances, free will accommodates very well predestination is a thing difficult to 
                                                 
95 Together with Genius’s intercession, which is imbedded in Nature’s discourse, the entire Nature-Genius segment 
covers five thousand verses. Although Jean patterned the character Nature on Alain of Lille’s Natura, he also altered 
it. George Economou remarks that in Alain, the goddess Natura represented not only man’s sensitive nature but also 
the functions of human reason, whereas in Jean, Reason and Nature are two distinct characters, each with its specific 
role. Economou also points out that whereas Alain posited a clear contrast between (immoral) Venus and (moral) 
Nature, in Jean, both Nature and Genius are enlisted in the service of Venus and her son, Cupid: “Whether this 
means a victory for Natura or for Venus, one thing is certain: Alain’s Natura could never have participated in such a 
‘cooperative’ effort, for, in her view, Venus and her son were responsible for the waywardness of man.” [The 
Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 120]. 
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understand even if one is offered all the answers to all the possible objections.96 The temptation 
to undertake such a challenging theological task as that of clarifying this false conflict is too 
great for Jean de Meun; he will indulge in it and will explain (espondre), raise objections 
(opposer), reply to these objections (respondre), and give examples (mainz examples en deïsse) 
in a purely and brilliantly scholastic way.97
Along Boethian lines, Jean de Meun argues that the predestination instilled by the 
celestial influences cannot overcome man’s reason and free will.98 If free will did not prevail 
over the innate dispositions there would be no rewards for the good works of men, and no 
punishments for the evil ones.99 This would practically mean that there would be no vices or 
virtues, which is a completely false argument, since virtues and vices do exist, and divine justice 
exerts itself in accordance to them. At the same time, there can be no conflict between divine 
foreknowledge and the power of choice: God knows all the actions a man can take, and the 
results to which each of these actions may lead, but the eventual course of action is decided by 
man himself, not by God.100 The destiny is not fixed to that point, Jean says, that men cannot 
decide for themselves. 
It is, therefore, false to believe that everything men do, say or think is predestined. Those 
who believe this actually try to excuse themselves for everything they do wrong, by claiming that 
they cannot have done otherwise. Jean quotes the defective thinking of these people in the 
                                                 
96 Et qui vorroit la chose enprendre, /Trop leur seroit fort a entendre,/Qui leur avroit neïs solues/Les raisons 
encontre meües (17111-4; ‘Anyone who wanted to undertake the task would find it hard to make it understood, even 
if he has solved the arguments brought up in opposition’). 
97 These technical scholastic terms appear all grouped in three lines, that serve Jean de Meun to express his regret for 
not being able to develop this theme even more than he had already done (and he developed it quite well: the whole 
sequence dedicated to predestination and free will spans 815 lines, from v. 17063 to v. 17878).  
98 The terms in the text are le frans voloirs (17203), pooir d’eslection, franche volonté (17432) and franc voloir 
d’ellire (17750). 
99 This is one of the main postulates of Scholasticism, one of the pillars on which Aquinas, as we have seen, built his 
system. 
100 Vv. 17372-5. 
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following way: Donc couvient il par vive force,/Quant voloir d’omme a riens s’efforce,/De 
quanqu’il fait, k’ainsi le face,/Pense, die, vueille ou porchace: Donc est ce chose destinee/Qui ne 
puet estre detornee (17151-6; ‘Hence, when man’s will exerts itself in any direction, he must 
perforce, in whatever he does, perform it, think, say, wish or obtain it in just that way. Then the 
thing that cannot be defected is destined’ [my emphasis]. This kind of argumentation is 
unacceptable, Jean maintains, because it basically leaves no room for man’s free choice. Jean’s 
reproduction of the erroneous reasoning of those who oppose the pivotal role of free will is of 
utmost importance: it obliquely conveys the poet’s notion that the deeds, words and wishes of 
men depend entirely on their intentions, not on predestination. Man is fully responsible for the 
consequences of his deeds or sayings. With this, speech is from the outset assigned to the sphere 
of interiority, as a human act sprung from an inner intention.  
This principle is reiterated when Jean evokes a new possible objection to the idea of free 
will. Those who oppose the importance of free choice maintain that if a possible thing happens, 
if someone had foreseen this thing and said: “This will unavoidably happen,” he would have told 
the truth. And since truth and necessity are interchangeable, it results that the thing that happened 
was necessary, i.e, predetermined. This argumentation, Jean says again, is not worth a penny, 
since in such a case we would be dealing with conditional necessity, not with absolute necessity. 
Were the adversaries of free will right, men would not feel the urge to work or seek advice in 
various circumstances of life. If things were divinely preordained, all human counsel would be 
futile and all undertaking vain. By the same token, the notions of more or less, better or worse, 
could not apply to our thoughts, deeds or words:  
 
D’autre part, qui garde i prendroit,/Jamais as genz ne couvendroit/De nulle 
chose conseill querre/Ne faire besoingnes en terre,/Ca pour coi s’en 
conseilleroient/Ne besoignes pour coi feroient/Se tout ert avant destiné/Et 
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par force determiné?/Pour conseill, pour oeuvres de mains/Ja n’en seroit 
ne plus ne mains/Ne mieus ne pis n’en porroit estre/-Fust chose nee ou 
chose a nestre,/Fust chose faite ou chose a faire/, Fust chose a dire ou 
chose a taire. (17243-56) 
 
On the other hand, if one were to follow this logic, he should never seek people’s advice 
on anything or do any work on earth; for why should one get advice or do any work if 
everything were predestined and predetermined? There would never be more or less, and 
there could not be any better or worse, because of any advice or manual labor, whether it 
was a thing born or to be born, done or to be done, something to be said or something to 
keep silent about. (my emphasis). 
 
Again, Jean’s subliminal message is that we should be mature enough to assume the 
consequences and the responsibility for our actions and speeches. We should not blame the 
divinity for whatever we do or undertake as individual human beings. The decision to translate 
an idea into action, or to say something or keep quiet lies entirely in the sphere of men’s personal 
choices. Human deeds or words do not happen by necessity; men are the only ones to choose 
what to do or what to say. Both the realm of actions and that of spoken words depend on men’s 
inner intentions, on their free choices:  Ainz font bien ou mal franchement,/Par leur voloir tant 
seulement (‘Instead people do good or evil freely through their will alone.’ 17265-6). Examples 
of free will applied to the use of speech come in the text when Jean de Meun evokes another 
sample of erroneous reasoning: 
 
Qu’il meïsmes seult souvent dire/Qu’il n’a pas franc voloir d’ellire,/Car 
Dieus par sa prevision/Si le tient en subjection,/Qui tout par destinee 
maine,/Et l’oeuvre et la pensee humaine,/Si que s’il veult a vertu traire,/Ce 
li fait Dieus a force faire/Et s’il de mal faire s’efforce,/Ce li refait Dieus 
faire a force,/Qui mieus le tient par le doit,/Si qu’il fait ce que faire 
doit/De tout pechié, de toute aumosne,/De biau parler et de ramprosne,/De 
los et de detracion,/de larrecin, d’occision/Et de pais et de mariage,/Soit 
par raison, soit par outrage:/”Ainsi, fait-il, couvient il estre…” (17757-67) 
 
He himself is accustomed to say often that he does not have the free will to choose, 
because God, with his foresight, holds him in such subjection that he directs every human 
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thought and deed by destiny. Thus if he wants to draw toward virtue, God makes him do 
so by force, and if he strives to do evil, it is again God who forces him to do it. God does 
more than hold him by the finger, so that he does whatever he must—sinning, 
almsgiving, speaking well or cuttingly, giving praise or detraction, thieving, killing, 
making peace or marriage—either reasonably or foolishly. “Thus,” he says, “it must be”. 
(emphasis mine). 
 
In this passage, Jean ridicules again the view according to which human actions are 
independent from men’s power of will, being entirely dictated by divine providence. He gives 
examples of how some people mistakenly attribute even their ways of speech to a superior force. 
From the rejection of such a notion, we can again glean Jean’s approach to the sins of speech: 
insolence, which is opposed to beautiful words, and slander, which is opposed to giving praise, 
depend exclusively on man’s individual choice. Attributing these acts of speech to God is a 
preposterous idea, at which Jean de Meun can only laugh. Reason and speech are divine gifts that 
men should be proud of and use properly, because these gifts are what distinguish men from 
animals.  
The received Augustinian idea that speech was given to men for mutual comprehension 
and instruction could not lack in a text so obsessed with speech, as is Jean de Meun’s.101 Jean’s 
kernel of originality with respect with this idea is that he develops it to the point where he 
imagines an apocalyptic potential scenario in which animal could think and speak. Within this 
scenario, the domestic animals would never serve man and obey his commands, the wild ones 
would all want to strangle him. Birds would pull out man’s eyes when he would sleep. Man 
would not be in any way superior to animals, since they would know how to make pieces of 
weaponry and clothes. And as far as the use of speech is concerned, the beasts would make such 
                                                 
101 Sanz faille, toutes bestes mues,/D’entendement vuides et nues,/Se mesconnoissent par nature./ Car, s’il eüssent 
parleüre/Et raison pour euls entr’entendre,/Qu’il s’entrepeüssent aprendre,/Mal fust as homes avenu. (17797-803; 
‘Without doubt, all dumb animals, empty and bare of understanding, are by nature incapable of knowing themselves, 
for if they had speech and reason with which to understand one another, so that they could instruct each other, it 
would be an evil occurrence for men’). 
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a skillful use of it that they could be even writers (17839; et porroient estre escrivains). The 
passage describing this apocalyptic scenario is much longer and detailed than the summary I 
have just given.102 I have evoked this fragment for two reasons: for the manner in which it 
presents the act of writing as the utmost form of expression a creature endowed with reason can 
practice, and for the conclusion to which it leads and which justifies this otherwise unexpected 
deviation. Animals’ real ignorance comes from their nature, Jean asserts at the end of the 
imagined scenario. In the same way, man’s (or angels’) intellectual capacities come from the 
nature God gave to them. But if man, as a reasonable creature, refuses to use these divine gifts, 
this is a defect that comes from his own vice that confuses his senses. Only the inner vice is 
responsible for man’s straying from the right path, because naturally he is endowed with reason 
and the ability to choose. This argument, says Jean de Meun, should put an end to the foolish 
discussions of those who claim that man is not responsible for his actions: Et pour ce tant dit 
vous en ai/Et tels raisons vous amenai/Que leur jangles vueill estanchier,/Car nus ne s’en puet 
revanchier (17875-78; ‘It is for this reason that I have said so much to you about it and brought 
up arguments to quell men’s gossip on the subject, for nothing can defend them against it.’). This 
final remark is important for two reasons: it justifies Jean’s disquisition on the rebellion of 
animals, a disquisition that may have seemed out of place, and it gives us a measure of the extent 
to which Jean’s contemporaries were obsessed with the problematic of free will. 
 In Jean de Meun’s perspective, human deeds and words are not dictated by necessity or 
providence, but performed by virtue of the individual human choices. There is no excuse for an 
evil action or a wicked word; the blame for them should be fully assumed on a personal basis. 
                                                 
102 Although the whole discussion about what animals could do had they reason may seem a new extended 
parenthesis in Jean’s text, it is not out of place since it leads to a specific point Jean de Meun wants to make: it is not 
(human) nature per se that is defective, it is the human’s use of free will that may be so. 
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This type of approach is patterned on the scholastic view of morality as a sum of actions 
springing from individual intentions. We will find this line of thought in Dante as well. In the 
Rose, Jean de Meun gives specific examples of what kinds of (verbal) sins man is prone to. The 
mouthpiece through which he exemplifies human sinfulness is again Nature. Toward the end of 
her discourse, the allegorical female character expresses her regret for having made man and 
gives as reasons for her regret a comprehensive list of men’s main sins. Also interesting is the 
way in which she frames this list: she invokes her femininity as basis for her right to speak up. 
As a woman, she says, she cannot keep silent, since women cannot hide anything. She will 
therefore tell the whole, unaltered truth about human nature. As the list of sins she gives is very 
complex, I will quote it here fully: 
 
Orgueilleus est, murtriers et lerres,/Fel, couvoiteus, avers, 
trichierres,/Desesperez et mesdisanz/Et haïnneus et despisanz,/Mescreanz, 
envieus, mentierres,/Parjurs, faussaires, foz, vantierres,/Glouz, inconstanz 
et foloiables,/Ydolastres, desagreables,/Traïstres et faus ypocrites./Et 
pareceus et sodomites./Briement, tant est chaitis et nices/Qu’il est sers a 
trestouz les vices/Et trestouz en soi les heberge. (19229-19241) 
 
He is a proud, murderous thief, cruel, covetous, miserly, and treacherous. He is desperate, 
greedy, slanderous, hateful, and spiteful; unfaithful and envious, he lies, perjures himself, 
and falsifies; he is foolish, boastful, insconstant, and senseless; he is a quarrelsome 
idolatror, a traitorous, false hypocrite, and a lazy sodomite; in short he is such a stupid 
wretch that he is slave to all the vices, and harbors them all within himself. (emphasis 
mine)  
 
Nature’s tally of human vices is an eclectic sum of traditional capital vices (pride, 
avarice, envy, gluttony, lust, sloth, etc.) and their offspring, and other, less conventional, moral 
categories, such as: hatred, inconsistency, folly, scorn which belong more to what we would call 
today psychology. The reason why Jean considers these psychological aspects “vices” is that 
they are manifestations reflected in human behavior. As by the medieval definition, ethics deals 
with behavioral practices, it is not surprising that Jean grouped manifestations like folly and 
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senselessness together with consecrated vices as envy and pride under the generic denomination 
‘vices.’ Important for us in this long record is the presence of several sins of the tongue: slander, 
lying, perjury and boastfulness. These are verbal sins that belong to the traditional Gregorian 
scheme, as offspring of the capital vices, and also to Peraldus’s taxonomy. Also interesting, the 
label faussaire (‘falsifier’) Jean applies to man comes, in the list, right after two sins of the 
tongue—lying and perjury--, which are both associated in the medieval moral tracts with the 
notion of falsity in speech. Dante will also be sensitive to the alignment of speech and falsehood, 
and will group liars and perjurers with other types of falsifiers in the Malebolge.103
What we should also note about Jean’s list of human vices is the lack of a rigorous 
system; the absence of order and classification. He enumerates vice after vice at random, with no 
regard for a coherent organization. Nature (and, through her, Jean de Meun) is a moralist, but an 
unconventional one. Jean’s approach to human behavior is very flexible; his concern is not to 
come up with a new moral system; there were so many theologians around him who could 
assume this task. His goal is to give a global vision of human sinfulness, to encompass and 
exemplify as many bad behaviors as possible. To put order in so rich a material was not his 
concern. Jean himself is aware of this lack of organization: later in the poem, when Genius will 
speak, he will invite his audience to read the Romance of the Rose, in order to find in it 
exemplifications and discussions of vices: Ces vices conter vous voudroie,/Mais d’outrage 
m’entremetroie:/Assez briement les vous expose/Li jolis romanz de la rose,/S’il vous plaist, la les 
regardez/Pour ce que d’euls mieus vous gardez. (19883-8; ‘I would tell these vices to you, but to 
do so would be an excessive undertaking. The lovely Romance of the Rose explains them to you 
quite briefly; please look at them there so that you may guard against them better’). In other 
                                                 
103 I treat this aspect in the chapter Lingua Dolosa. 
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words, these discussions of (some of them, mere allusions to) vices are dispersed all throughout 
the poem. In general, Jean de Meun rarely names vices in an explicit way; Nature’s tally is one 
of these rare occurrences. 104
In the context of our discussion of the sins of the tongue in the Romance of the Rose, it is 
important to mention that after lady Nature delivers her ethical amalgamation, she also evokes a 
serious of horrendous punishments that await in hell those who give in to these vices. By 
implication, even those who commit the sins of speech above mentioned—lying, perjury, slander 
and boastfulness--will end up in hell. No sinner will be able to escape the infernal punishments, 
says Nature, because there is a supreme judge, who in the afterlife judges all deeds and words of 
men (Qui tout juge en faiz et en diz; 19320). The way in which this idea is framed establishes a 
relationship of equivalence between deeds and words. What is weighed at the eternal judgment is 
not only what people did in their earthly lives, it is also what they said. Words and deeds are of 
an equal weight in attracting the eternal fate of the soul after death. This important indication 
gives us a new measure of Jean’s preoccupation with the use and/or misuse of the tongue. Dante 
will also phrase the equivalence between deeds and words in almost identical terms.105
                                                 
104 I, therefore, cannot agree with Denise Baker’s assertion that unlike for Alain’s Nature, for Jean’s “morality is 
clearly beyond her ken” [“The Priesthood of Genius,” Speculum 51/2 (1976), 285]. On the contrary, I hope to have 
proven that Jean’s lady Nature delivers one of the most important discourses on human morality (if not the most 
important) in the Romance of the Rose. 
105 See my section Dante’s Moral Approach to Speech. 
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3.1.3 Genius’s Grievances against Feminine Speech 
Nature’s long and eclectic disquisition is bracketed by two segments of Genius’s intercession.106 
He is introduced as Lady Nature’s priest, and is the recipient of her confession.107 
We have seen Nature invoking her femininity as a pretext for her right to speak her mind, 
for not hiding things. But what is a good justification for Nature is a poor excuse for Genius. 
When, at the beginning of her confession, Nature starts weeping and apologizes for this female 
weakness, Genius immediately follows on that and begins an enflamed critical discourse about 
women’s temper and ways of speech.108 Woman, says Genius, in a phrase that has now become 
legendary in criticism of the Rose, is an irritable animal.  Not only is she easily prone to wrath, 
but she also harbors a great predisposition to sinfulness. Resorting to the authority of the 
Scriptures and that of a Roman historian (Titus Livius), Genius highlights women’s fickleness 
                                                 
106 According to Heather Arden, the two parts of Genius’s discourse represent “two functions that he fulfills in 
medieval allegorical works, god of generation, and tutelary spirit or moral guide.” [Romance of the Rose, (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1987), 63]. Jean took up the idea of Genius as Lady Nature’s priest and a moral guide from 
Alain of Lille’s The Plaint of Nature. We will see, however, that Jean ridiculed both Genius’s missions. 
107 The studies on the figure of Genius in classical and medieval literary works are numerous. In The Genius Figure 
in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Jane Chance Nitzsche investigates a comprehensive list of Genius’s multifarious 
roles (New York: Columbia UP, 1975). George Economu draws a detailed parallel between the roles of Genius in 
the two French poets and Gower, their English admirer (“The Character Genius in Alan de Lille, Jean de Meun, and 
John Gower,” Chaucer Review 4 (1970), 203-210; later also published in The Goddess Natura in Medieval 
Literature). Denise Baker focuses on Genius’s embodiment as a priest (“Priesthood of Genius”) and makes 
important remarks about Alain of Lille’s sources in the conception of this character (Bernardus Silvestris, Apuleius 
and Martianus Capella) and about Jean’s debt to Alain. She also makes the significant point that the dual priesthood 
of Gower’s Genius “testifies to the English poet’s awareness of the difference between this character’s tutelary role 
in De planctu naturae and in the Roman de la Rose.” (p. 287). A.J. Minnis (“Moral Gower and Medieval Literary 
Theory,” in Gower’s Confessio Amantis: Responses and Reassessments [(Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1983), 50-78], 
Winthrop Wetherbee [“The Literal and the Allegorical: Jean de Meun and the De planctu naturae,” in Medieval 
Studies 33 (1971), 264-291] and Edwin Craun (in Slander, Lies, Obscenity) further study the role played by Genius 
in English literature. The latter examines Genius’s sermon in Gower’s Confessio Amantis from the perspective of the 
sins of the tongue that Genius condemns (see chapter “Confessing the Deviant Speaker: Verbal Deception in the 
Confessio Amantis,” in Lies, Slander and Obscenity, 113-157).  
108 It is worthwile to note that Nature herself readily admits that women have an immoral interaction with speech. 
First, because they swear and lie more frequently than men (Plus hardiment que nus hon/Certainement jurent et 
mentent; 18140-1), especially when they feel guilty about some misdeed, and second, because they really talk too 
much (Bon fait prolexité foïr./Si sont fames mout ennuieuses/Et de parler contrarieuses; 18302-4). Nature makes 
this assertion to excuse herself for her own prolixity, but behind her lies Jean de Meun who misses no occasion to 
lacerate women for their ways of speaking. 
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and their sensitivity to flattering words: vers leur meurs nulles prieres/Ne valent tant comme 
blandices (16344-5; ‘with their ways entreaties are not worth as much as blandishments’). 
Amidst all the vices that women are prone to, what mostly upsets Genius is their 
extraordinary propensity to speech, their inability to keep the secrets their husbands reveal to 
them.109 Sharing one’s feelings and thoughts with one’s wife is a great mistake, because soon 
those intimate things will become public knowledge and the social image of the man will be 
dramatically diminished:110
 
Et quiconques dit a sa fame/Ses secrez, il en fait sa dame./Nus hons qui 
soit de mere nez,/S’il n’est yvres ou forsenez,/Ne doit a fame reveler/Nule 
rien qui face a celer/Se d’autrui ne le veult oïr:/Mieus vaudroit dou païs 
foïr/Que dire a fame chose a taire,/Tant soit loiaus ne debonnaire./Ne ja 
nul fait secré ne face/S’il voit fame venir en place,/Car s’il y a perill de 
cors,/El le dira bien le recors,/Conbien que longuement atende./Et se nus 
riens ne l’en demande/Le dira ele vraiement/Sanz estrange 
amonestement:/Por nule rien ne s’en teroit;/A son avis morte seroit/S’il ne 
li sailloit de la bouche,/S’il i a peril ne reprouche. (16351-72) 
 
Whoever tells his secrets to his wife makes of her his mistress. No man born of woman, 
unless he is drunk or demented, should reveal anything to a woman that should be kept 
hidden, if he doesn’t want to hear it from someone else. No matter how loyal or good-
                                                 
109According to Patterson, the theme of the wicked delight woman takes in “ferreting out masculine secrets that she 
may publish abroad” is a common denominator of the medieval misogynist literature. Patterson exemplifies this 
theme with Chaucer’s Wife of Bath and the “Sermon Joyeux de la patience des femmes obstineées contre leur maris” 
(“Feminine Rhetoric and the Politics of Subjectivity: The Old Woman and the Wife of Bath.” In Rethinking the 
Romance of the Rose. K. Brownlee, S. Huot, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 321, 350. 
110 Studying various attitudes toward women’s voices in medieval England, Sandy Bardsley notes that: “the late 
Middle Ages were a period in which perceptions of women’s speech underwent a sea change.” [Venomous Tongues. 
Speech and Gender in Late Medieval England. (Penn Press: University of Pennsylvania, 2006, 2]. Bardsley explains 
this acute cultural interest for women’s relationship to speech by the pastoral discourse on the sins of the tongue. 
Her argument is that the notion of morally deviant speech was increasingly feminized in the later Middle Ages. 
Female speech was often ridiculed by an eminently patriarchal society, and a woman who dared speak her mind was 
considered a threat to family and society. Feminine rhetoric was often associated and held responsible for crimes 
like sexual disorder, assault and eavesdropping. In an attempt to control feminine, “disruptive” speech, the British 
legal system devised the category of “scolding” woman: “Condemnations of women’s speech played an important 
role in determining women’s status, for even if an individual woman escaped such charges, her voice was surely 
restrained, her words tempered, by the ever-present fear of falling into the category of the scolding woman.” 
(Venomous Tongues). Among the writers and artists who imposed attitudes toward feminine voices in medieval 
England, Bardsley also mentions Chaucer, the English translator of the Romance of the Rose, who was greatly 
influenced by Jean’s misogynistic views. 
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natured she is, it would be better to flee the country than tell a woman something that 
should be kept silent. He should never do any secret deed if he sees a woman come, for 
even if there is bodily danger, you may be sure that she will tell it, no matter how long 
she may wait. Even if no one asks her anything about it, she will certainly tell it without 
any unusual coaxing; for nothing would she keep silent. To her thinking she would be 
dead if the secret did not jump out of her mouth, even if she is in danger or reproached. 
 
 
The man who dares hit his wife to punish her for her loquacity incurs the risk of being 
publicly exposed by her. He who trusts a woman is a great fool who is risking his very own life, 
because if he dares make any negative comment about her, or reproach her with anything, she 
will have him killed.  
Genius pushes the idea of women’s control over their husbands to a ridiculous extreme 
and gives the example of a couple in which the man has something on his conscience. This 
foolish husband who committed (or plans to commit) a crime for which he could pay with his 
life, if things came to be known, is in great danger in the bed, by his wife… and because of her. 
Although he wants to keep quiet about what lies on his conscience, at night, in their matrimonial 
bed, if she sees him worried, she will draw him to her with sexually charged gestures and will 
manipulate him with her smooth talk until he will start disclosing all of his secrets. Here Genius 
adopts a female voice and reproduces at length the manipulative discourse the woman holds in 
the conjugal bed. She first reassures her husband that there is no one around, that their room is 
safely isolated from the rest of the house. Then she tells him how much she loves him and how 
faithful to him she is. She invokes Jesus’ name and the sacred oath of matrimony to convince 
him that they form a sacred unity and, as such, she is entitled to know everything about her 
husband. She gives him the example of other married couples, where at night, in their beds, the 
men tell their wives all their secrets and ask for their advice. These men, she says, confess 
themselves to their wives more often than to the priest. The style of the reproduced discourse of 
the curious wife becomes ironical when she admits that she knows about what happens in other 
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people’s beds… from the wives themselves—her female friends who tell her everything they had 
discussed with their husbands. Unlike these women, says Jean de Meun’s female character to her 
man, she dislikes talking too much, gossiping or quarrelling. Again, she invokes the name of 
God to make her husband open up to her and she emotionally blackmails him by telling him that 
she will die if he does not talk to her.  
At this point of the poem, the direct discourse of the inquisitive wife ceases, and Genius 
intervenes with a comment: after delivering her devilishly skillful speech, the wife will start 
caressing and covering her spouse with hypocritical kisses and tears. The result of this 
extraordinary tactic of verbal and gestural manipulation is that:  
 
 
Adonc li mescheanz li conte/Son grant damage et sa grant honte,/Et par sa 
parole se pent./Et quant dit l’a, si s’en repent./Mais parole une foiz 
volee/Ne puet puis estre rapelee!/Lors la prie qu’ele s’en taise,/Com cil qui 
plus est a mesaise/C’onques avant esté n’avoit/Quant sa fame riens n’en 
savoit./Et cele li redist sanz faille/Qu’ele s’en taira vaille que vaille./Mais, 
li chaitis, que quide il faire?/Il ne puet pas sa langue taire:/Or tent a 
l’autrui retenir!/A quel chief en puet il venir? (16545-60) 
 
The unfortunate wretch tells her his great sorrow and shame and with his words hangs 
himself. When he has said it he repents; but once a speech has taken wing it cannot be 
called back.111 Then he begs her to keep quiet, for he is more uneasy than he had ever 
been before, when his wife knew nothing about it. She in turn tells him without fail that 
she will keep quiet, no matter what happens. But what does the wretch think he can do? 
He cannot keep his own tongue silent. Is he going to try now to restrain another’s? What 
result does he think he can do? 
 
 
Knowledge is power, and from the moment when a wife knows the secret of her man, she 
will have a very strong means with which to hold him under her control.  He will no longer 
afford to get mad at her or mistreat her, for she now has absolute power over him. In the best 
                                                 
111 A Horatian dictum, at the origin, that becomes a commonplace quote in all the major medieval tracts on 
transgressive speech. The fact that Jean did not bother to mention the author of it testifies to the fact that this quote 
was so well assimilated by the pastoral discourse of the time that it became common knowledge, while the name of 
the author slipped into oblivion. 
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case scenario, she might remain faithful to her husband and not reveal his secrets until they break 
up, but not even this is sure, so great the female urge to speak is. Chances are that she will share 
her man’s secrets with somebody else even before she breaks up with her husband. Genius’s 
belief in women’s malice is so firm that he exhorts his followers to preach the lesson of mistrust 
of women, so that every man will know how to protect himself against this terrible enemy. He 
who will preach the sermon against women might displease them, Genius admits, for they have a 
very sharp tongue (fames qui mout ont de jangles; 16579), but that preacher will at least have 
told the truth. Genius’s sermon becomes dramatic at this point, as he urges all men to guard 
themselves against women in the following terms: 
 
Seigneur, gardez vous de vos fames/Se vos cors amez ne vous ames,/Au 
mains que ja si mal n’ouvrez/Que les secrez leur descouvrez/Que dedenz 
vos cuers estuiez./Fuiez, fuiez, fuiez, fuiez,/Fuiez, enfanz, fuiez tel 
beste:/Jel vous conseill et amoneste/Sanz decepcion et sanz guile. (16581-
9) 
 
‘Fair lords, protect yourselves form women if you love your bodies and souls. At least 
never go to work so badly that you reveal the secrets that you keep hidden inside your 
hearts. Fly, fly, fly, fly, fly, my children; I advise you and urge you without deception or 
guile to fly from such an animal.’ 
 
 
Genius is, however, like all the others counselors in the poem, a contradictory character. 
His discourse is highly inconsistent with itself, since right after urging men to avoid the female 
beast, he reframes his position, and advises men to respect, love and cultivate women. Men 
should cherish women, dress them well, overwhelm them with their attention and serve them 
properly, so that the human race will be perpetuated. Then, again, Genius jumps to the opposite 
extreme and warns men about the harm women can do to them if they know too many things 
about them. The greatest danger that might arise within a couple, says Genius, is in the bed: it is 
when women seduce men with their sexuality that the latter are most prone to speak. Speaking in 
 86 
bed is a foolish mistake. Sex is good, says the god of procreation, but should always be 
differentiated from the act of speech: 
 
  Mais ja tant ne vous i fioiz/Que chose a taire leur dioiz. (…) Bien affiert 
qu’el sachent chascunes/Assez des besoignes communes/Mais se preuz 
estes et senez/Quant entre vos bras les tenez/Et les acollez et 
baisiez,/Taisiez, taisiez, taisiez, taisiez!/Pensez de vos langues tenir,/Car 
riens n’en puet a chief venir/Quant des secrez sont parçonierres,/Tant sont 
orgueilleuses et fieres/Et tant ont les langues cuisanz,/Et venimeuses et 
nuisanz/Mais quant li fol sont la venu/Qu’ils sont entre leur braz tenuz/Et 
qu’il les acollent et baisent/Entre les geus qui tant leur plaisent,/Lors n’i 
puet avoir riens celé:/La sont li secré revelé./Ci se descuevrent li 
mari,/Dont puis sont dolent et mari. (16633-16678) (emphasis mine) 
 
But never trust them so much that you tell them anything to keep quiet about. (…) It is a 
good thing for each of them to know enough about matters of mutual concern. But if you 
are wise and intelligent you will keep quiet when you hold them in your arms and hug 
them and kiss them. Keep quite, quite, quite, quite.112 Think about holding your tongue, 
for nothing can come to any conclusion when they share secrets, so proud and haughty 
are they, with such corrosive, venomous and harmful tongues. But when fools come to be 
held in their arms and hug and kiss them in the games that are so pleasing to them, then 
nothing can be hidden from them. There the secrets are revealed; there husbands reveal 
themselves and afterward they are sorry and chagrined. 
 
 
To reinforce the truth of his message, Genius adduces a biblical exemplum. Dalila first 
seduced Samson with her flattering words, and then made him open up to her and reveal his 
deepest secrets to her. As a result, she cut off Samson’s hair while he was sleeping and deprived 
him of his powers. Genius considers that this cautionary tale is amply sufficient to illustrate the 
malice of women, but he still finds useful to reinforce his mistrust of women with a biblical 
quote. Solomon who was well aware about the great harm woman may cause to a man if he tells 
her too many things, explicitly warned: De cele qui te dort ou sain,/Garde la porte de ta 
bouche/Pour fuir perill et reprouche (‘In order to flee from danger and reproach, guard the gates 
of your mouth against her who sleeps in your bosom’; 16698-700). 
                                                 
112 Dahlberg translates this verse as ‘Stay still, still, still’, which does not reflect very well the original taisez, taisez, 
taisez, taisez, this is why I took the liberty to retranslate this verse in a way closer to the French text. 
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The first part of Genius’ sermon ends with these prophetic words. The second half of his 
intercession in the poem follows Nature’s confession, and is somewhat different than the first. 
Whereas hitherto, under the pretense of a conversation with Nature, he had addressed men in 
general, now, he addresses the god of Love and his barons. In this new sermon, he promises that 
the gates of paradise will be open to all men who will work hard toward procreation, regardless 
of the framework in which they will consumate their sexual encounters: within the marriage or 
outside of it.113 By virtue of this fact, Genius harshly condemns such Christian practices as 
abstinence and chastity. His unorthodox view of Christianity also allows him to promote an 
“extremist” idea: that all the sins of men will be forgiven if, and only if, they work to fulfill 
Nature’s greatest law: procreation.  
It has been noted that Jean’s Genius is a parodic representation of the Christian priest.114 
His sermon on morality is just a caricature of what such discourse should entail. Although 
Genius does exhort people to avoid vices, instead of really broaching a sermon on them, he sends 
                                                 
113 This is a great departure with respect to Alain of Lille’s Genius, who insisted that the only licit context of erotic 
love was the marital institution. 
114 Heather Arden notes that: “Jean has created the satiric portrait of a demagogic preacher who has taken an idea 
(procreation has a function in the natural order) to an extreme (procreation is the only good), a monomaniac who has 
some familiarity with current ideological disputes and much skill in rhetorical manipulation.” (p. 64). Arden also 
explains Genius’s misogynistic views by his reducing women to their procreative function. Genius’s misogyny is, 
however, a more complex phenomenon than Arden believes. In fact, Genius has a high opinion about women as 
participants in the act or procreation, this is why he concedes that men should worship women, for the natural good 
they can accomplish. Genius’s main problem with women comes rather from the fact that they do not let themselves 
be reduced to their procreative role. They have their own intelligence, their own ways and especially their own 
voices. Genius maligns women only insofar as they do not always submit to male desires and control. This is why he 
vituperates against female fickleness and above all, the female use of speech. Women’s temper and power of speech 
are two domains man have difficulty controlling. On the other hand, if we leave the world of fiction, we will retrieve 
misogynistic ideas not only in Genius discourse, but in several others: in Ami’s discourse (especially in the segment 
produced by the Jealous Husband), in Nature’s, in Jean’s apologetic speech toward his readership, and even in the 
final part of the poem, when the Lover talks about the way both young and old women make a devilish use of their 
power of speech and drive men into temptations (21455-21540). In an attempt to exculpate Jean de Meun from the 
charge of misogyny leveled at him as early as the Renaissance, Lionel J. Friedmann took great care to show that 
Jean’s attacks against women are only literary clichés and cannot be explained by his so-called “realism.”  
Friedman’s investigation fails, however, to consider all the voices who speak against women in the Rose, focusing 
only on Jealous Husband and briefly mentioning Genius (“Jean de Meun, ‘Antifeminism’, and ‘Bourgeois 
Realism’,” Modern Philology, LVII (1959), 13-23. 
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the audience back to Nature’s discourse, which allegedly comprised twenty-six of them: Contre 
les vices batailliez/Que nature vostre maistresse/Me vint huy conter a ma messe:/Touz les me 
dist, ainc puis ne sis;/Vous en truoverez .XXVJ./Plus nuisanz que vous ne cuidiez! (19870-5; 
‘Fight against the vices that Nature, our mistress, has just told me about today at my mass. She 
told me them all, and I never sat down afterward. You will find twenty-six of them, more 
harmful than you think’). 115 The “priest” bluntly states that counting these vices would be a 
challenging undertaking (d’outrage m’entremetroie; 19884) and with a simple invitational 
gesture asks his audience to look for them in other parts of the poem.116 Refuting the task to go 
over the vices of man, Genius confines his sermon to just a few words which exhort Christians to 
serve the laws of nature, to return what they have stolen, to stay away from murder, to be loyal, 
thoughtful of others, and also to keep both hands and mouth clean (Netes aiez et mains et 
bouche; 20650). Taking into consideration the condensed form in which this sermon on vices is 
delivered, we can surmise the emphasis the medieval pastoral discourse routinely placed on 
speech. The priest in the Romance of the Rose teaches that harmful words may sully the mouth to 
the same extent as evil deeds sully the hands.117 If Christians wish to avoid ending up in hell for 
their afterlife, they should pay as much attention to their sayings as they do to their actions.    
                                                 
115 This exact numeric mention seems made up here for ironic purposes. The truth is that, in the long history of the 
reception of the Rose, no reader has undertaken to verify the correctness of Genius’s assertion. Are there really 
twenty-six vices disseminated in the texture of the poem? The readerly lack of interest in this question may be 
explained by the very nebulosity of Jean’s own notion of “vice.” 
116 Genius’s remark that these vices are explained in a succinct manner (Assez briement les vous expose/Li jolis 
romanz de la rose; 19885-6) can be read as new proof of Jean’s awareness of the allusive and unsystematic fashion 
in which he approached morality. 
117 The same point of view had already been expressed by Lady Abstince: Sire, la vertu premeraine,/La plus gran, la 
plus souveraine/Que nus hom mortieus puisse avoir/Par science ne par avoir,/C’est de la langue refrener:/A ce se 
doit chascuns pener,/K’ades vient mieus qu l’en se taise/Que dire  parole mauvaise;/Et cil qui volentiers 
l’escoute/N’est pas preudons ne dieu ne doute./Sire, seur touz autres pechiez,/De cestui estes entechiez! (12183-
12192; ‘Sir, the chief virtue, the greatest and most sovereign that any mortal man may have, through knowledge or 
possession, is to bridle his tongue. Everyone should take the trouble to do so, since it is always better to keep silent 
than to utter a wicked thing, while he who listens to it willingly is neither worthy nor God fearing. Sir, you are 
stained with this sin above all others’). 
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Alan Gunn considered the character Genius the mouthpiece of Jean de Meun’s own 
philosophy. 118 If this were true, we would expect to see Jean adhere to his pastoral precepts. But 
as an author, i.e. as a user of speech himself, Jean seems to systematically and vigorously 
trample underfoot all the good advice about the moral use of speech Genius (and many other 
characters in the poem) give. He speaks more like the women whose sinuous, guileful and 
sometimes dirty talk have him so outraged. 119 As we shall see in the fifteenth-century debate 
over the Romance of the Rose, keeping one’s mouth clean is a beautiful moral precept that Jean 
himself, although he repeatedly gives, is not able to follow. 
3.2 DANTE’S MORAL APPROACH TO SPEECH 
That speech is a concern central to Dante’s thought has been acknowledged by virtually 
any commentator who considered Dante’s prophetic claims or his art.120 As far as Dante’s 
                                                 
118A. Gunn, The Mirror of Love. A Reinterpretation of the “Romance of the Rose,” (Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1952), 
396-410, 493-95. 
119 I find brilliant Lee Patterson’s idea that in medieval poetry “the voice of the poet is inescapably aligned with that 
of women.” (Feminine Rhetoric, 319). Patterson gives Matheolus’ Lamentations as an example of how the poetic 
function becomes associated with feminine speaking: “in complaining about her (his wife’s) endless nagging 
Matheolus repeats himself verbatim and at length, just like a woman.” (ibid., 321). 
120 Numerous studies have been written that examine either Dante’s linguistic thought or the poet’s preoccupation 
with the immorality of speech, in general, and with his own potential verbal sinfulness, in particular. Joan Ferrante 
thoroughly investigates Dante’s view of the sinfulness of speech in: “The Relation of Speech to Sin in the Inferno.” 
Dante Studies, 87 (1969), 33-46. Many of her insights from this article are taken up and developed in the chapter 
“Exchange and Communication,” from her book on the Political Vision of the Divine Comedy. (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1984). Steven Botterill makes important points about Dante’s philosophical view of language in the preface to 
his edition of De vulgari eloquentia from 1996. The same author considers the exemplification of Dante’s view of 
language through the figure of Bernard of Clairvaux in the Paradiso. Dante and the Mystical Tradition. Bernard of 
Clairvaux in the Commedia (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994). Within the context of the relationship between 
heresy and faith, Giuseppe Mazzotta discusses the prophetic content of Dante’s own message and argues that for 
Dante, because of his metaphorical language, prophecy is prone to turning into blasphemy (Dante, Poet of the 
Desert. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979). Also important is his more recent study from 2001, a brilliant demonstration 
of how Dante’s view of language from the treatise on vernacular is recast in the cantos of the lower hell in the 
Comedy. “L’esilio da Firenze. Il De Vulgari Eloquentia e il cerchio della frode.” Dante. Da Firenze all’aldilà 
(Firenze: F. Cesati, 2001), 233-247). Teodolinda Barolini wrote two groundbreaking books, both of which tackle 
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philosophy of language is concerned, Bruno Nardi has correctly pointed out that a theory of 
language per se does not exist in Dante, but that the poet elaborated several important linguistic 
concepts in the Convivio, De vulgari eloquentia, and the Paradiso. Analyzing these concepts 
from a philosophical perspective, Nardi has come to the conclusion that, despite the apparent 
“discontinuity” in Dante’s views, there is a unity of thought in the poet’s speculative approach to 
speech.121
Since the object of this study is an investigation into the nature of the sins with verbal 
connotations in Hell, I will begin by taking a look at the works written before the Comedy. The 
references to the proneness of speech to sin Dante scattered throughout his other works may help 
us understand better his treatment of verbal sins in the Inferno.  
At the same time, additional references woven into the text of Purgatorio and Paradiso 
also shed a great deal of light on Dante’s view of the sins of speech. I undertake, thus, to gather 
                                                                                                                                                             
the problem of Dante’s truth claims in the Comedy. In the chapter “Ritornerò poeta” from Dante’s Poets (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1984), Barolini argues that the chief concern of Dante’s textuality is the question of truth and falsity, 
a pervasive concern that motivates Dante’s assessment of his poetic precursors and his own poetic output, including 
the Comedy. In the Undivine Comedy, Barolini studies more closely and amply the problem of the poem’s credibility 
and discloses the technical mechanisms by which Dante achieved the supreme artistic paradox: that of “situating the 
menzogna of art within the framework of a prophetic stature that guarantees truth” (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992). 
John Fyler wrote a book on the decay of language in Chaucer, Jean de Meun and Dante, considering, for the latter 
poets, Reason’s discourse in the Rose and Paradiso XXVI in the Comedy (Language and the Declining World in 
Chaucer, Dante and Jean de Meun. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007). There are certainly many other studies, 
published both in the United States or in Europe, which, in one form or another, starting from one point or another, 
approach, or allude to, Dante’s complex and tortuous relationship to speech. Enumerating these studies here would 
take too long and would cause too great a diversion from the focus of my dissertation. Some of them will be, 
however, referred to, or quoted throughout the chapters of my dissertation. My selection of the titles cited above has 
been dictated by the fact that these were the books that helped me best in grasping the complexity of Dante’s 
linguistic and philosophical universe. They were the ones that weighed most on the course and shape of the Dante 
component of my work. 
121 Nardi interprets Dante’s revisions of his own linguistic theories as a remarkable sign of maturation, not as 
condemnable inconsistencies; see “Il Linguaggio,” in Dante e la cultura medievale (Bari: Laterza, 1984). Stefano 
Rizzo also argues for an evolution rather than an inner contradiction in the poet’s linguistic perspective; see Il ‘De 
vulgari eloquentia’ e l’unità del pensiero linguistico di Dante (Dante’s Studies, LXXXVII (1969), 69-88). For a 
complex overview of all the major critical opinions expressed on Dante’s view of language, see Ileana Pagani’s 
book La teoria linguistica di Dante, which peruses a wide range of critical studies from Marigo and Nardi, through 
Pagliaro, Pézard, to Dragonetti, Contini and Mengaldo, all of whom contributed to the “storia critica” of De vulgari 
eloquentia (Napoli: Liguori, 1982). 
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all these scattered pieces of information about the immorality of language and use them as a 
springboard from which to tackle the verbal sins punished in the Inferno. I will begin with De 
vulgari eloquentia, which contains some significant clues about the relationship speech-sin, and 
then continue with the De Monarchia, the Convivio and the Comedy. I adopt this order because I 
follow a criterion based on the wealth of information about Dante’s view of transgressive speech. 
There are just a few indications in this respect in De Vulgari and De Monarchia, but more 
numerous in the Convivio and the last two canticas of the Comedy. The Paradiso and the 
Purgatorio have also the advantage of providing solutions for the sins of speech, thus rounding 
out Dante’s treatment of these sins.  
Chapters II and III from Book 1 of the treatise on vernacular eloquence are cast within a 
pronounced Augustinian framework. Like for Augustine, for Dante language is a system of signs 
by which humans represent the concepts that form in their minds.122 This system of 
representation arises from the need humans have to share their ideas and  feelings: “Now, if we 
wish to define with precision what our intention is when we speak, it is clearly nothing other than 
to expound to others the concepts forming in our mind.”(I. II.3).123 Sharing is thus for Dante the 
basic principle at the root of all human utterance. In this context, language, this egregium humani 
generis actum (‘distinguished human act’), is a meeting of the minds and of the souls; ideally, it 
is the vehicle that may help us achieve a wonderful, universal communion. From the fact that 
terms like ‘intention’ and ‘sharing’ belong to a moral lexicon, we can see that the origin of 
human speech is from the outset placed by Dante within a moral context. The impression 
                                                 
122 Dante’s debt to Augustine’s epistemology of language has carefully been studied by Marcia Colish, who peruses 
all of Dante’s works to argue that the Italian poet reformed the artistic language simultaneously with his working out 
of a poetics of rectitude.  (The Mirror of Language, 152-221.) 
123 For the English text of the De vulgari eloquentia, I use Steven Botterill’s translation (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1996). 
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becomes even more marked when Dante discusses the famous biblical episode of the Tower of 
Babel. Until Nimrod’s presumptuous attempt to build an edifice able to reach the sky, this divine 
abode, humans had all been able to communicate harmoniously with each other. But Nimrod’s 
transgressive gesture attracted the divine anger which decreed that from then on humans would 
start speaking different languages. The transcendental power punished Nimrod and his workers 
in their speech, a punishment with much more instructive, stronger and far-reaching 
repercussions than would have been the physical death. The diversification of speech into many 
languages would turn out to be a barrier to communication and to social concord, a lesson for 
human kind. That Dante might have seen in this story an illustration of the principle of 
contrapasso seems plausible: speech was the means by which Nimrod united so many people 
and had them work together in the construction of the transgressive edifice, therefore, the 
punishment visited on them affected particularly this manifestation of human intelligence and 
sociability. 124 The excursus into the Old Testament’s stories of Nimrod and Adam elicits from 
Dante an exclamation paradigmatic for his polar concern with speech and sin: O semper natura 
nostra prona peccatis! (‘Oh, human nature, always inclined toward sin!’ I.VII.2:12). This bitter 
exclamation would clearly have been more fitted to the moral universe of the Comedy, and had it 
not been for the moral framework in which Dante develops his theory of original speech, these 
words would have seemed odd and inadequate in a scientific treatise on the status of vernacular 
eloquence. The bottom line is that even when he is mainly preoccupied with scholarly matters 
such as dialects and poetry, Dante cannot obliterate his concerns with sin.  
                                                 
124 For Dante, the Tower of Babel represents the third major transgression of human kind, after the fall and the flood, 
with which it is put on the same par  (I. VII). The evocation of the tower gives the poet the opportunity to develop 
his theory of the Adamic language, which was the holy tongue (sacratum ydioma), created by God together with the 
first man and preserved by the Jews, among whom Jesus would be born. Dante will subsequently revise this view in 
the Paradiso.  As for Nimrod, the “author” of the tower, we will find him in hell among the traitors, speaking 
tongues that nobody is able to understand (Inf. XXI, 77-81) 
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Another place in which De vulgari foreshadows the Comedy is where Dante argues for 
the necessity of speech to humans, a necessity that differentiates them from other species: 
“Between creatures of different species, on the other hand, not only was speech unnecessary, but 
it would have been injurious, since there could have been no friendly exchange between them,” 
(I.II.5:5). Here speech is cast between two polar opposites that mark its potentiality: by virtue of 
its social nature, speech can be injurious, and this is unnatural; or it can promote friendly human 
interactions, and this is its natural function. Speech as a perverted means by which people may 
harm each other will become a dimension fully exploited by the first cantica of the Divine 
Comedy. The poem’s solution to the sins of speech is also prefigured by the Latin tract: speech is 
a divine gift bestowed on man, of whom it is required to use this gift for the glorification of the 
divine. Speech is ultimately a sign of the divinity in us, the most powerful link that ties us not 
only one with another, but also to the highest good.125 All of these aspects representative for De 
vulgari eloquentia will be seen at work in the Comedy, in a different context and in a much more 
dramatic way.  
If De vulgari eloquentia informs us about the impact of sin on speech, De Monarchia 
offers us clues about how this relationship can affect humans on a political level. In discussing 
the qualities that make a monarch best disposed for ruling, Dante relies on Aristotle’s authority 
to draw attention to the dangers that result from the discrepancy between one’s outward 
pronouncements and one’s actual deeds: “And from this one can refute the error of those who 
believe they can improve the life and morals of others by saying good things but doing evil. They 
have not noticed that Jacob’s hands were more persuasive than his words, even though the 
                                                 
125 “Yet He still wished that Adam should speak, so that he who had freely given so great a gift should be glorified 
in its employment. And likewise, we must believe that the fact that we rejoice in the ordered activity of our faculties 
is a sign of divinity is us.’ I.V.2, 11). 
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former suggested what was false and the latter what was true. Accordingly, Aristotle says in the 
Nicomachean Ethics: ‘In matters involving feeling and conduct, words are to be believed less 
than deeds’.” 1.13.4: 71).126.
This passage illuminates the placement in hell of figures such as Jason, Ulysses, Guido da 
Montefeltro or Sinon, in all of whom the distance between skillful speech and evil deeds had 
important political consequences. Ulysses will be cast in the Comedy as the paradigm of those 
who want to reform the life and mores of others (for Ulysses, his crew, to whom he holds a 
pompous speech about human virtues), but in reality sacrifices them to his personal ambitions. 
The divorce between artful ways of using the gift of speech (bona loquendo) and the type of 
actions that this (rather) misuse of speech gives rise to (mala operando) counts for the location of 
the above mentioned characters in the area of fraud. Just as from the standpoint of the linguistic 
analyst, Dante cannot forget sinful human nature, so in De Monarchia, from the perspective of 
his political ideas, Dante cannot bracket his moral concerns.  
Seen from a social and political angle, sin receives a definition that is intended by Dante 
to explain the ruinous nature of discord and division: ‘sinning is nothing else than scorning unity 
and moving away from it towards multiplicity’ (peccare nichil est aliud quam progredi ab uno 
spreto ad multa 1.15.3:81). This definition is one of those fascinating cases in which Dante takes 
up classical moral concepts (or characters), and giving them a new spin (or a new face), presses 
them into the service of his own ideas and makes them bear on the reality of his own days. 127 In 
the classical quote, peccare, although per se a moral term, is given not a moral, but a 
philosophical definition, in that the phrases progredire ab uno and spretare ad multa are highly 
                                                 
126 The quotes from this political tract are from Dante’s Monarchia. Translated, with a commentary, by Richard 
Kay. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998). 
127 Dante takes up this thesis from Plutarch, through the filter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, to prove his point that the 
political unity is good and plurality is bad. 
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abstract and indeterminate.  In the moral tracts from Dante’s time, the definitions given to sin(s) 
are extremely specific and precise. They do not describe sin in terms of a sort of universal 
phenomenon of dispersal, but as particular evil acts related to individuals and their wills. Dante’s 
merit in the assimilation of the classical quote is to implement it into the concrete ground of the 
political situation of his country and, thus, restore to the sin its determinacy. It is a tendency that 
we will see best at work in the Divine Comedy, where definitions given to Classical (Aristotelian 
or Ciceronian) terms such as incontinence, violence and fraud will be represented by specific 
characters, who will illustrate these otherwise too abstract terms by their own concrete sins.  
At the other pole of the multiplicity and sin stands social harmony, defined as a union of 
wills: est enim Concordia uniformis motus plurium voluntatum; in qua quidem ratione apparet 
unitatem voluntatum, que per uniformem motum datur intelligi, concordie radicem esse vel 
ipsam concordiam (‘it is apparent that a unity of wills, which is implied by their uniform motion, 
is the root of concord, or simply concord itself.’ 1.15.5, 83). This passage from De Monarchia 
enlightens the treatment of the sowers of discord in the Inferno, just as the awareness Dante has 
of Aristotle’s concept of ebulia ‘prudence’ accounts for the link between fraudulent counselors 
and sowers of discord. 128 Ulysses and Guido da Montelfeltro are assigned to the eighth pouch of 
Malebolge specifically because they infringed the norms for prudence and gave fraudulent 
counsel. They are followed by the sowers of discord, who, by their evil counsel, caused social 
disintegration and wars. All these links between words, sins and politics emerge already in De 
Monarchia and will be apparent again, in a more complex way, in the Comedy. Due to these 
                                                 
128 Dante invokes the Aristotelian term in 2.5.23, 136. By ebulia, Aristotle (and in his wake Thomas Aquinas) 
understood excellence of deliberation manifested in the rectitude of counsel. For the Aristotelian definition, see the 
Nicomachean Ethics 6.9 (10), and for Aquinas’s Summa Theologica II-II. Q. 47-52). As I will highlight in the 
section dedicated to the fraudulent counselors, a trend in the Dante criticism has been to interpret Ulysses as the 
embodiment of Aquinas’s definition of ‘false prudence’.  
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interconnections between Dante’s prose works and his poem, I will reutilize some of the 
passages quoted above in the treatment of the specific sins in the Inferno. 
In the series of Dante’s prose works, I have left the Convivio for the end, because, 
through its pervasive concerns with morality, this work constitutes an ethical tract in its own 
right and, thereby, prefigures best Dante’s mission as a moralist in the Comedy. 129 In Book 
Four, he describes himself as studying carefully people’s behavior and becoming so disgusted 
with this view of human sinfulness that he undertook the task of trying to correct moral errors: 
proposi di gridare a la gente, che per mal cammino andavano, acciò che per diritto calle si 
dirizzasse (‘I resolved that I would cry out to those who were walking along this evil path so that 
they might place themselves back on the right way.’ IV.1.9, 215).130 A meaningful statement that 
offers us an idea of Dante’s stature as a moralist is the dissociation he operates between bad 
habits and their practitioners: li errori de la gente abominava e dispregiava, non per infamia o 
vituperio de li erranti, ma de li errori; li quali biasimando credea far dispiacere, e, dispiaciuti, 
partire da coloro che per essi eran da me odiati (‘I sought, as far as I was able, to scorn and 
despise the errors of mankind, not to defame or denigrate those who err, but rather their errors. 
By blaming them I sought to render them displeasing, and by rendering them displeasing, to 
                                                 
129 Of the four trattati (‘books’) of the work, it is especially the last one that deals with ethical matters, but 
preoccupations with ideas like malice, justice, will, etc. occur in the previous trattati as well. As a general format, 
the Convivio is patterned on Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy and includes three canzoni (Voi, che’ntendo il 
terzo ciel movete, Amor che nella mente mi ragiona and Le dolci rime d’amor ch’i’solìa) accompanied by the 
attendant commentaries. The declared purpose of this work is to enlighten men spiritually and move them to virtue. 
Highly important in this context is the firm belief Dante has in the ability of literature to reform people’s mores: at 
the beginning of the fourth trattato he asserts that the purpose of the canzone Le dolci rime is to bring people to the 
straight path: riducer la genter in diritta via.  
Useful interpretations of the Convivio are provided by Patrick Boyde, who dwells at length on the issue of the 
twofold happiness [Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante’s “Comedy.” (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP, 
2000), 84-99], and by John Took, who analyzes the tract as a point of intersection between Neo-Platonism and 
Aristotelian thought [Dante: Lyric Poet and Philosopher. An Introduction to the Minor Works (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990]. 
130 For the Italian text of this work I use: Convivio. A cura di Giorgio Inglese. (Milan:  RCS Rizzoli, 2004), and for 
the English version: Richard Lansing, Dante’s Il Convivio (The Banquet) (New York: Garland, 1990). 
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remove them from those persons whom I hated because of them’. IV.1.5: 214). Dante’s scorn has 
a direct target: the moral errors, and the blame he addresses to the morally weak has an active 
value--that of helping them mend their ways. He hates them only to the extent that they are 
tarnished by their vices, but it is a benign form of hate that hopes to cure the diseases for the 
benefit of the spiritually ill.  
The view of the costumi disordinati (‘disorderly mores’) and the difetti di vita (‘defects of 
life’) worries Dante and prompts him to appeal to that particular science that is best able to help 
him understand the inner motivations that underlie the behavioral mechanisms of men: moral 
philosophy, that he considers the supreme science, to which all others should be subservient.131 It 
is here that all men who want to reform their lives should look, because this science, moral 
philosophy, teaches the rules for a good behavior and drives the vices away: li costumi sono 
beltà de l’anima, cioè le vertudi massimamente, le quali tal volta per vanitadi o per superbia si 
fanno men belle e men gradite… E però dico che a fuggire questo, si guardi in costei, cioè colà 
                                                 
131 In Book one, when he discusses the structure of heavens in correlation with the sciences, he assigns moral 
philosophy to the Crystalline Heaven and quotes Thomas Aquinas on his view of the pre-eminence of ethics with 
respect to all other sciences: Lo cielo cristallino, che per Primo Mobile dinanzi è contato, ha comparazione assai 
manifesta a la Morale Filosofia; che Morale Filosofia, secondo che dice Tommaso sopra lo secondo de l’Etica, 
ordina noi a l’altre scienze. (…) E non altrimenti, cessando la Morale Filosofia, l’altre scienze sarebbero celate 
alcuno tempo, e non sarebbe generazione né vita di felicitade, e indarno sarebbero scritte e per antico trovate, (‘ 
The Crystalline Heaven, which has previously been designated as the Primum Mobile, has a very clear resemblance 
to Moral Philosophy; for Moral Philosophy, as Thomas says in commenting on the second book of Ethics, disposes 
us properly to the other sciences. (…) Likewise if Moral Philosophy ceased to exist, the other sciences would be 
hidden for some time, and there would be no generation or happiness in life, and in vain would these bodies of 
knowledge have been discovered and written down long ago.’ II.XIV. 14: 134-135). Later on he repeats this idea in 
a metaphoric context, asserting that just as the beauty of the body arises from the orderly disposition of the limbs, so 
the beauty of philosophy resides in that branch of it that deals with orderly moral virtues: La moralitade è bellezza 
de la Filosofia; ché, cosi come la bellezza del corpo resulta da le membra in quanto sono debitamente ordinate, così 
la bellezza de la sapienza, che è corpo di Filosofia, come detto è, resulta da l’ordine de le virtudi morali, che fanno 
quella piacere sensibilmente, E però dico che sua biltà, cioè moralitade, piove fiammelle di foco, cioè appetito 
diritto, che s’ingenera nel piacere de la morale dottrina; lo quale appetito ne diparte eziando da li vizii naturali, 
non che da li altri.  (‘Morality is the beauty of philosophy, for just as the beauty of the body derives from the degree 
to which its members are properly ordered, so the beauty of wisdom, which, as has been said, is the body of 
philosophy, derives from the order of the moral virtues which enable her to give pleasure perceptible to the senses. 
Therefore I say that her beauty (that is, morality) rains down flames of fire (that is, right appetite), which is 
engendered by the pleasure imparted by moral teaching, an appetite that removes us from even the natural vices, not 
to speak of others.’ III.XIV.11, 207). 
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dov’ella è essemplo d’umiltà, cioè in quella parte di sé che morale filosofia si chiama. E 
soggiungo che, mirando costei, dico la Sapienza, in questa parte, ogni viziato tornerà diritto e 
buono.  (III.XV.14: 208; ‘mores are the beauty of the soul, the virtues especially, which 
sometimes by vanity, sometimes by presumptuousness become less beautiful and less likable… 
However, I am saying that in order to avoid this situation, one has to follow philosophy, namely 
that part of philosophy that sets an example of humility, that is, that part of it which is called 
moral philosophy. And I add that by following this one, Wisdom I mean, every vicious man will 
become good and virtuous’; translation mine).132
Along Aristotelian-Thomistic lines, Dante expresses his morale dottrina in terms of 
right/evil appetite, justice/injustice, making the important point that all our decisions and 
operations are rooted in the will, this innate function of reason.133 It is in the will that originate 
our virtues and our vices: Perché nel volere e nel non volere nostro si giudica la malizia e la 
bontade (‘because good and evil are determined by what we will or fail to will’ I.II.6, 46). 
                                                 
132 Lansing’s translation of the Convivio does not cover this passage. 
133 (…) la nostra ragione a quattro maniere d’operazioni (…) operazioni che essa considera e fa nel proprio atto 
suo le quali si chiamano razionali, sì come sono arti di parlare. (…) Sono anche operazioni che la nostra ragione 
considera ne l‘atto de la volontade, sì come offendere e giovare, sì come star fermo e fuggire alla battaglia, sì come 
stare casto e lussuriare, e queste del tutto soggiacciono a la nostra volontade; e però semo detti da loro buoni e rei 
perch’elle sono proprie nostre del tutto, perché, quanto la nostra volontade ottenere puote, tanto le nostre 
operazioni si stendono. (IV.IX. 5: 252; ‘our reason is related to four kinds of activities (…) activitities which it 
contemplates and performs by its own act, and these are called rational, as for example the art of speech. (…) There 
are also activities which our reason contemplates as an act of the will, as for instance giving offense or assistance, 
standing ground or fleeing in battle, and remaining chaste or yielding to lust. These are completely subject to our 
will, and therefore we are considered good or evil, because they are completely of our own making; for as far as our 
will can reach, so far do our activities extend.’ emphasis mine).  For an overview of Dante’s assimilation of Aristotle 
and Aquinas’ s moral theories, see Peter Boyde’s chapter “Aristotelian Values Through Dante’s Eyes,” from Human 
Vices, 77-99. A similar and very solid book is Marc Cogan’s Design in the Wax (1999), which also deals with 
Dante’s relationship with Aristotle and Aquinas. Cogan argues that it is indeed Aristotle’s ethics that underpins the 
structure of the three moral realms of the Comedy, but not Aristotle that we know today, i.e, as we interpret him 
today, but the one that the Middle Ages/Dante knew: Aristotle interpreted through the lenses of Thomas Aquinas. 
Within this thesis, Cogan demonstrates that at the root of each of the three realms of the Comedy lies the tripartite 
structure of the appetite—concupiscible, irascible and intellectual (or of the will), an Aristotelian tripartition that in 
the Divine Comedy was filtered through Aquinas. 
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 The vices mainly represent forms of injustice, such as betrayal, ingratitude, falsity 
(falsitade), theft, deceit, which constitute so many inhuman sins (inumani peccati).134 Speech, as 
a human faculty, is itself rooted in the will, an important point that deserves here a few remarks. 
According to Casagrande and Vecchio, the main contribution of scholasticism to the moral 
theories on the sins of the tongue is the transference of the cause prompting these sins from the 
tongue (which by its slipperiness is prone to sin) to the will. The main representative of this trend 
was, as we have seen, Thomas Aquinas. From the passages I have quoted from the Convivio it 
results that l’arte di parlare, being a rational act, is rooted in the will. By the same token, it 
follows that the SINS germane to speech, are seen from a scholastic angle as rooted in the will. 
As an additional support to my thesis, I adduce here Cogan, in whose interpretive scheme the 
infernal area of Malebolge (where Dante assigns most verbal sins) corresponds to the appetite of 
the will. I will retain the relationship between verbal sins and will posited by Convivio for its 
bearing on the structure of Malebolge and will make references to this relationship throughout 
the sections dedicated to the sins of speech in the Inferno. 
More textual indications in the Convivio prepare us to approach the first cantica of the 
Comedy, and one of them is of utmost importance for elucidating the matter of Dante’s decision 
to embed sins of verbal nature among sins of deeds. In a passage in which Dante stresses the care 
one should grant to all of our actions, and especially to speech, Dante defines words as germs of 
operation:  
 
                                                 
134 Here Dante uses the term peccato as a synonym for vice, a rare occurrence in the text of the Convivio, which 
privileges the terms errore morale or vizio. Being so familiar with Aquinas’s Secunda secundae, as the Convivio 
itself proves it, Dante might have been aware of the Thomistic distinction between vice (a settled evil disposition of 
the will) and sin (the actual realization of that disposition). The Convivio is mainly concerned with vices, which it 
divides into innate and acquired, whereas The Comedy, dealing mostly with sinners, will privilege the word peccato. 
It is, however, important to mention that in Dante these two terms—vice and sin—are less technical than in Thomas 
Aquinas. 
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(…) Da vedere è come ragionevolemente quel tempo in tutte le nostre 
operazioni si dee attendere, e massimamente nel parlare. (…). Per che le 
parole, che sono quasi seme di operazione, si deono molto discretamente 
sostenere e lasciare, perché bene siano ricevute e fruttifere vegnano, sì 
perché da la loro parte non sia difetto di sterilitade. E però lo tempo è da 
provedere, sì per colui che parla come per colui che dee udire. (IV.II.8: 
223)135 (emphasis mine) 
 
It is to consider how reasonable it is that we should await the proper moment in all our 
undertakings, and most of all in speaking. (…) This is why great discretion must be 
shown in using or in avoiding the use of words—which are, as it were, the seed of our 
activity—so that they may well be received and fruitful in effect, so as to avoid any 
defect of sterility on their part. The right moment must therefore be predetermined, both 
for the one who speaks as well as the one who must listen. 
 
 
The act of speech is emphasized in this passage as an act of utmost importance, to which 
proper care should be given. In our words germinate actions, words themselves are a kind of 
deeds; saying is virtually doing and this relationship is envisaged in terms of the social impact of 
our initiatives: when, or even before, we speak, we have to carefully consider and assess the 
impact that our words may produce on their recipient(s). This passage contains in a nutshell the 
doctrine of the disciplined speech, pioneered by Hugh of St. Victor and taken up by the theorists 
of the sins of the tongue in the late Middle Ages.136 In Dante’s time, speaking discretely meant 
                                                 
135 Dante will splendidly reuse the metaphor of the “germinating” power of words in the context of Count Ugolino’s 
acknowledgment that his words may cause the infamy of his mortal enemy, the archbishop Ruggieri: Ma se le mie 
parole esser dien seme /che frutti infamia al traditor ch’io rodo,/parlar e lagrimar vedrai insieme. (Inferno XXXIII, 
7-9; ‘But if my words will be seed to bear the fruit of/infamy for the traitor I gnaw, you will see me speak/and weep 
together.’). 
136 As I have mentioned in the introductory part of my dissertation, this doctrine assimilated the rhetorical scheme of 
the six circumstances of speech and applied it to the way of speech of Christians. In the twelfth century, Hugh of St. 
Victor redesigned the circumstances of speech within the context of his theory of monastic ‘disciplined speech’ and 
from him the circumstances invaded the subsequent moral tracts on speech form the late Middle Ages. (In the 
Paradiso, we will find Hugh’s name mentioned among the inhabitants of the sphere of the Sun.) Under the influence 
of Hugh of St. Victor’s ideas, Raoul Ardent, the author of the Speculum Universale, subsumes the circumstances of 
speech under the criterion of discretio applied to speech. Closer in time to Dante, we will find the scheme of the 
circumstances reutilized by Albertano da Brescia (De Doctrina loquendi et tacendi), Brunetto Latini (Trésor) and 
William Peraldus. As far as the latter is concerned, he takes up some of the vices that Ardent attributed to the 
indiscrete speech, such us indiscreta promissio (‘unfulfilled promise’), secreta amici revelare (‘disclosing 
friends’secrets’) and stultiloquium (‘foolish talk’) and develops them in the chapter “De peccato linguae,” from his 
Summa Vitiorum.
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thinking beforehand to whom one spoke, what the speaker had to say, when, where and to what 
purpose he spoke. Discreet speech meant screening one’s own words through these norms--
become true moral filters--which, if respected, could protect human speech against all potential 
transgressions. Dante gives specific examples of the risks a speaker lacking self-control incurs: 
se’l parladore è mal disposto, più volte sono le sue parole dannose (‘if the speaker is in a bad 
mood, his words can be harmful in many ways’). The lack of self-control may be considered here 
tantamount to the lack of control over speech, exactly the bad kind of situation that the scheme of 
the circumstances is intended to prevent. By the same token, if the hearer is in a bad mood, the 
words of the speaker, even if they came from a good intention, may be ill received (se l’uditore è 
mal disposto, mal sono quelle ricevute che buone siano). The latter case falls under the 
circumstance concerning the addressee: when you are speaking, be aware of the person to whom 
you speak, take into account who that person is, what kind of person it is (morally), what (s)he 
means to you, etc.137And the passage ends with a biblical quote that posits time as a 
circumstance to consider in order to control speech: E però Salomone dice ne lo Ecclesiaste: 
tempo è da parlare, e tempo è da tacere. (‘Even Solomon says in the Ecclesiastics: there is a 
time to speak and a time to keep silent’), a commonplace quote in the moral tracts on speech in 
the late Middle Ages (we will find it for instance in Peraldus, Albertano and again, Brunetto 
Latini).  
                                                 
137 For an extended exemplification of this circumstance, see Brunetto Latini’s Trésor, which under the rubric “the 
person to whom you are speaking” develops an impressive list of potential hearers (friends, enemies, princes, 
knights, parents, priests, nuns, drunk men or wicked women, etc.) and gives indications about the way in which each 
of these categories should be addressed or talked to.  Among these classes of addressees, we also find that hearer 
who is a sower of discord: “it is terrible to have in a city a sower of discord or a person who speaks foolishly, so be 
careful not to speak to a sower of discord, for you will be putting logs on his fire.” [The Book of Treasure ‘Li Livres 
dou Tresor’. Translated by Paul Barrette and Spurgeon Baldwin (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1993), 209]. 
Brunetto’s treatment of the circumstance cui (‘to whom’) may help us better understand Dante’s mistrust of an ill-
disposed listener. 
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Moving on to the Comedy, in the Inferno we find several sins associated with speech: 
blasphemy, a sin of violence, and at least four more sins (flattery, fraudulent counsel, sowing of 
discord, false speech) grouped in the Malebolge, the section of hell where manifestations of 
fraud are punished.138 All of these verbal habits are treated by medieval moralists as forms of 
transgressive speech. Distributed apparently randomly in Dante’s hell among sins of a non-
verbal nature such as simony, hypocrisy, theft, etc., the last four verbal sins above mentioned 
form nearly half of the structure of Malebolge and are embedded into the system of fraud in 
calculated connections with the other sins. The great number of verbal transgressions punished in 
lower hell is, thus, significant for the importance Dante placed on the morality of speech as a 
human institution, whereas the interrelationships these verbal trespasses establish with the sins of 
a non-verbal nature by which they are surrounded shed more light on Dante’s conception of 
immoral speech. The connections among the malicious sins of Malebolge and the way in which 
they are ordered also provide us important clues about the degrees of gravity Dante attached to 
specific speech-related sins.  
In the structure of the Purgatorio, modeled on the Gregorian scheme of the seven capital 
vices, there are no verbal sins, but the preoccupation with speech continues. Here models of 
communication are offered, both on the horizontal level (among individuals), and on the vertical 
level, in the human relationship with the transcendental. Here flattery is excluded, Cato, the 
guardian of the second realm, warns from the outset.139 The souls welcome the visitors with 
courteous speech; Casella goes as far as welcoming them with Dante’s own lyrics, and the 
                                                 
138As far as the cantos depicting Malebolge are concerned, I would like to recall here Barolini’s remark, according to 
which Dante uses these cantos “to question the basis of all human representation, to probe relentlessly the fraud 
inherent in language and indeed in all sign systems.” (The Undivine Comedy, 75). 
139 The same holds for the practice of swearing: on the second spur of the mountain, Jacopo del Cassero tells Dante 
that they all trust his saying, without Dante’s having to swear: Ciascun si fida/del beneficio tuo sanza giurarlo 
(‘Each of us trusts your/good offices without your swearing.’ (Purg. V. 64-65). 
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repentant stress the importance of prayer, a--or rather the only--verbal practice able to break the 
hardest of the divine decrees.140 Manfredi explains that powerful prayers can break even the 
curses pronounced by the Church and shorten the soul’s stay on the sacred mountain. Sapìa 
evokes the defiant words she had thrown at the heaven in a moment of presumptuousness, but 
then explains to the pilgrim that if, despite her human errors, she is given the chance to repent, it 
is thanks to the prayers Pier Pettinaio, a holy man, said for her.  
The level of the social and political implication of speech so well-exploited in the Inferno 
is pursued in the Purgatorio as well: in the context of his bitter invective against the city of 
Florence, the poet draws attention to the shallowness of the Florentine discourses about justice: 
Molti han giustizia in cuore, e tardi scocca/per non venir sanza consiglio a l’arco;/ma il popol 
tuo l’ha in sommo de la bocca. (‘Many have justice in their hearts but loose/the arrow late, so as 
not to come to the bow without/counsel; but your people have it ready on their/lips.’ Purg. 
VI.130-133). 141 That which is on the lips does not correspond to the true speech of the heart, and 
very often, great words about human ideals seduce with their glowing beauty but are not rooted 
in the soul.142
                                                 
140 Moreover, when the repentant souls themselves pray, they do not even do it for themselves but for the sake of 
those left behind, a supreme example of charity: Quest’ultima preghiera, segnor caro,/già non si fa per noi, ché non 
bisogna,/ma per color che dietro a noi restaro. (‘This last prayer, dear Lord, we do not make for/ ourselves, since 
there is no need, but for those who/ have stayed behind.’ Purg. XI. 22-24). 
141 The English verse translation of the Comedy I use all throughout my dissertation belongs to Robert M. Durling, 
The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Oxford: Oxford UP. Volume I, Inferno (1996), volume II, Purgatorio 
(2003), and volume III, Paradiso (forthcoming). Sometimes I also compare Durling’s version with that of Allen 
Mandelbaum: The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Berkeley: California UP. Volume I, Inferno (1980), volume 
II, Purgatorio (1981), and volume III, Paradiso (1982). 
142 The preoccupation with verbal hypocrisy (a sin technically called bilinguium ‘double-talking’ by Peraldus and his 
compilers) runs like a thread in the Comedy. Already in the Inferno, Dante takes the precaution not to fall into the 
trap of saying what is not in his heart, a precaution framed within his agenda of promoting his art as a vehicle for 
truth:  ma quelle donne aiutino il mio verso/ch’aiutaro Anfïone a chiuder Tebe,/sì che dal fatto il dir non sia diverso. 
(‘But let those ladies aid my verse who helped/ Amphion enclose Thebes, so that the word may not/ be different 
from the fact.’ XXXII. 10-12; emphasis mine). The same evil discrepancy between inner self and outer utterances 
are highlighted in the Paradiso, when Dante addresses Cacciaguida, his forefather: Ma voglia e argomento ne’ i 
mortali, per la cagion ch’a voi è manifesta/diversamente son pennuti in ali; (‘But will and knowledge in us 
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Far from being exhausted in the Inferno or the Purgatorio, the question of transgressive 
speech is reopened in the Paradiso, sometimes in dramatic terms:  
 
Un uom nasce a la riva/de l’Indo, e quivi non è chi ragioni di Cristo/ né 
chi legga né chi scriva;/ e tutti suoi voleri e atti buoni/sono, quanto ragione 
umana vede,/sanza peccato in vita o in sermoni./Muore non battezzato e 
sanza fede:/ ov’è questa giustizia che’ l condanna?/ov’è la colpa sua, se ei 
non crede? 
 
A man is born on the banks/ of the Indus, and no one is there to speak of Christ/ or read 
or write of him,/ and all his desires and acts are good, as far as/ human reason can see, 
without sin in life or in/ word./ He dies unbaptized and without our faith: where/ is this 
justice that condemns him?where is his fault/ if he does not believe?’ (Par. XIX. 70-75; 
emphasis mine) 
 
 
In this passage, the Eagle phrases Dante’s question concerning the principle that 
underlies the salvation of the non-Christians: how can a man who has never heard of Christ and 
who has never sinned in deeds or words be condemned to eternal punishment?143 Judging from 
the way this question frames morality, we may infer the utmost importance Dante granted to 
speech. Just like deeds, words too can impact human morality. Like for Jean de Meun, in Dante’s 
Christian scheme of the final judgment, assessing words is equivalent to assessing deeds, 
therefore a verbal transgression, where it exists and it is serious, may cause the loss of the soul. 
                                                                                                                                                             
mortals,for the/reason that is manifest to you, have differently/feathered wings.’ Mandelbaum’s translation of this 
passage is slightly different in that it translates argomento as ‘word’: ‘Whereas in mortals, word and sentiment-/to 
you, the cause of this is evident-/are wings whose featherings are disparate.’ Par. XV.79-81). Here human hypocrisy 
is played against the sincerity of the inhabitants of the heavenly sphere, who are unable to lie. I will return to the 
problem of hypocrisy and double-talking and will treat them more amply in the chapter dedicated to fraudulent 
speech. 
143 For a fine analysis of the theological question of the implicit revelation and its bearing on this canto of the 
Paradiso, see A.M. Chiavacci Leonardi. “La salvezza degli infedeli: Il Canto XX del Paradiso,” in Regnum celorum 
vïolenza pate. Dante e la salvezza dell’umanità (Montella: Accademia Vivarium Noveum, 2002), 193-203. 
Chiavacci Leonardi argues that the great question weighing on Dante’s mind finds its solution in the Virgilian hero 
Rifeo, whose presence in heaven shows that baptism is surpassed by the inner, personal relationship with the 
transcendental. 
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Alongside the Convivio, this quote from the Paradiso may thus elucidate the reasons for Dante’s 
decision to imbed verbal transgressions among sins of deeds in hell.  
Another passage that deserves careful consideration concerns the issue of the broken 
vows treated in the trilogia dei canti (Paradiso III, IV and V). Piccarda Donati, one of the rare 
female characters in Dante’s Divine Comedy, justifies her place in a lower sphere of the celestial 
hierarchy by her unfulfilled monastic vows.144 Although Piccarda’s location is not a punishment 
proper, the fact that she insists on her lower degree of blessedness raises questions about the 
extent of her religious transgression. Piccarda’s failing may be examined under the optic of the 
medieval ethical category of indiscretum votum, a sin of speech defined by medieval moralists as 
the erasure of the moral and institutional pact concluded with God. Dante himself uses the word 
cancellamento ‘erasure’ in his description of Piccarda’s sin. Erasure, however, also works in the 
opposite direction in the Paradiso. Despite her failing to keep her monastic vow, Piccarda is still 
assigned a place in the Empyrean, which shows that il cancellamento functions in Dante’s text 
not only to describe a human failing, but also to explain a transcendental act: forgiveness--or 
erasure of sin--on the part of the providential justice. The encounter with Piccarda offers Dante 
the opportunity to express his solution to the problem of the dispensation of vows: a vow cannot 
be erased, he maintains, it can only be permutated, i.e. recuperated through a harder 
commitment. Within the framework of our discussion about transgressive speech, Piccarda’s 
                                                 
144 The trilogy is intended to draw attention to the too great ease and superficiality with which humans make 
pledges. Making a vow is a serious matter that should be treated with discernment, and Dante expresses this idea in 
an explicit and imperative way: Non prendan li mortali il voto a ciancia;/siate fedeli, e a ciò far non bieci. (‘Let not 
mortals take vows as idle talk;/be faithful, but not crosses-eyed’ Par. V. 64-5) 
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presence in the Celestial heaven proves that, when exceptional circumstances require it, what 
otherwise would have been a mortal sin of the word becomes a forgivable transgression.145 
Paradiso XXVI and XXVII also offer us important indications about Dante’s view of 
language. The former canto gives Dante the opportunity to recast his discussion of the Adamic 
language and to shift to the view that this language was spent by the time the Tower of Babel 
was built. At the same time, through the agency of Adam, il padre antico, Dante expresses his 
views of the mutability of the linguistic sign: at the beginning of time, people called God I, but 
then they replaced this word with El, a shift that bespeaks human inconsistency and the 
variability of language as a system of sign. Opera naturale è che l’uom favella; ma così o così, 
natura lascia/poi fare a voi secondo che v’abella (Par. XXVI.130-2; ‘It is a natural operation 
that man speaks, but/ whether in this way or that, Nature allows you to/ do it as it may please 
you’) is the passage that best illuminates the problematic of speech in this canto. Interpreted 
traditionally in the context of the linguistic theory of the mutability of sign, the phrase ma così e 
così may also be read in a moral key: it is natural that men should speak, but the use or misuse of 
the gift of speech is no longer a natural law but depends on the individual will of each person. 
Paradiso XXVII further deepens this opinion: here age is put in relationship to speech in a way 
that emphasizes the corruption brought to the natural purity of speech by the advanced age: Tale, 
balbuzïendo ancor, digiuna,/che poi divora, con la lingua sciolta,/qualunque cibo per qualunque 
luna;/e tal, balbuzïendo, ama e ascolta/la madre sua, che, con loquela intera,/ disïa poi di 
                                                 
145 It is not the first time that Dante shows how the divine decrees can be changed. In the Inferno, Beatrice justifies 
her being asked by Lucia to help Dante with these words: Donna è gentil nel ciel che si compiange/di 
questo’mpedimento ov’io ti mando,/sì che duro giudicio là sù frange. (‘There is a noble lady in Heaven, who 
grieves/ this impediment to which I send you, so that she/ vanquishes harsh judgment there on high.’ II. 94-96; 
emphasis mine). In the Paradiso, as well, Dante stresses that sometimes the divine counsel willingly lets itself be 
overcome by love: Regnum celorum vïolenza pate/da caldo amore e da viva speranza,/che vince la divina volontate 
(‘Regnum celorum suffers the violence of burning/love and lively hope that overcome God’s will’, XX. 94-96; 
emphasis mine). Through their intense charity, Piccarda and Constance, even if they broke their religious vows, they 
also infringed the Heaven’s severity, and earned their right to a place in the celestial hierarchy. 
 107 
vederla sepolta. (Par. XXVII.130-135; ‘This one, while still a babbler, observes fasts,/and later, 
when his tongue is loosed, devours/whatever food in whatever month,/and this one, while still a 
babbler, loves and/obeys his mother, and later, with full command of/ speech, desires to see her 
buried.’). Just as the incorporation of food grows bigger with the progress of age, to the point 
where it becomes nocuous for the body and turns into a sin, so individual human speech grows 
into evil and breaks sacred family ties. Here gluttony and murderous speech are put on the same 
level, as equal transgressions committed by way of the mouth. The prejudices of the mala bocca, 
a biblical phrase Dante used in the Convivio as a metaphor for the misuse of speech,146 recur 
thus, in the Paradiso, in this association with gluttony. Transgressive linguistic behavior is 
therefore a theme not just in the Inferno, the cantica that most prominently deals with the sins of 
speech, but of the entire Comedy.  
That even in the cantica of the heavenly spheres we encounter characters speaking of the 
evils people may commit with their wicked tongues/mouths is less odd that it might seem at first 
glance. Here the disembodied souls of the holy, besides their harsh criticism of the human 
misuse of the divine gift of speech, often offer themselves models for speech. Thus, in the 
Heaven of Jupiter, the souls forming the Eagle speak at the same time: they all form the same 
words simultaneously, realizing a perfect communion of wills and speeches that stand in sharp 
contrast to the verbal practices of the sowers of discord from the Inferno: ch’io vidi e anche udi’ 
parlar lo rostro,/e sonar ne la voce e “io” e “mio”,/quand’ era nel concetto e “noi” e “nostro” 
(Par. XIX.10-12; ‘for I saw and also heard the beak speaking, and/the voice sounding both I and 
mine, though/logically it was we and ours’). In heaven, the linguistic signs normally used for the 
                                                 
146 E però dice Salomone a lo adolescente figlio “Li schernidori Dio li schernisce, e ali mansueti Dio darà grazia”. 
E altrove dice: “Rimuovi da te la mala bocca, e li altri atti villani siano di lungi da te” (‘This is why Solomon says 
to his adolescent son: God scorns scorners, and to the meek God will give grace. And elsewhere he says: Keep far 
ways from you an evil mouth, and let base actions be far from you.’ IV. XXV. 2, 315-316). 
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idea of individuality—personal pronouns or possessive pronouns--are reinvested with a new 
function: that of expressing unity in plurality or the idea of the common good. 
The figures of St. Francis and St. Dominic are offered as paradigms for virtuous speech 
on earth: they represent that type of preaching in which words concord with intentions and with 
deeds.147 Dante casts the two mendicant friars as the perfect examples of the true preachers, 
examples that should embarrass and modify the hypocritical behavior of those who speak the 
words of the doctrine without believing in its message: the false preachers condemned by 
Beatrice in Paradiso XXIX. But the holy figure that perhaps voices most explicitly Dante’s ideal 
of speech is Thomas Aquinas, the one who in the text praises the merits of St. Francis, and, 
outside the text, is an authoritative scholastic voice on the vices of the word. Aquinas’s speech is 
characterized as ‘l discreto latino (Par. XII.144), a phrase that makes an explicit reference to the 
above-mentioned theory of discrete speech.148 The meaning of the phrase becomes even clearer 
when Aquinas sets out to instruct Dante not to judge or speak too quickly, like those who cannot 
discern between an assertion and a negation: E questo ti sia sempre piombo a’ piedi/per farti 
mover lento com’uom lasso/e al sì e al no che tu non vedi:/ ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso,/ 
che sanza distinzione afferma e nega/ne l’un così come ne l’altro passo;/perch’elli’ncontra che 
più volte piega/l’oppinïon corrente in falsa parte,/e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega. (Par. XIII. 112-
120; ‘And let this ever be lead upon your feet, to make/you move slowly, like a weary man, to 
both the yes/and the no that you do not see:/for surely he is low among the fools who affirms and 
denies without distinction in either case,/for it often happens that a hasty opinion turns/ in a 
wrong direction, and then affect binds the/intellect’). Hastiness can cause men to form erroneous 
                                                 
147 In the texts they are characterized as two champions of the faith, able to move people to virtuous actions with 
their speeches and their deeds: due campioni, al cui fare, al cui dire/lo popol disvïato si raccorse (Par. XII, 44-45). 
148 Coincidentally or not, Hugh of St. Victor, the author of the theory of discreet speech, is mentioned in the same 
canto, just a few lines before (Par. XII. 133). 
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opinions and speak thus in incomplete knowledge of the facts.149 Dante should not fall into this 
trap, but weigh up facts and choose very carefully between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’. In the New 
Testament, Christ had given as parameters for speech just these two, straight, words: yes, or no, 
but in the text Aquinas is implying that even these simple words should be uttered with extreme 
care when the facts are not sufficiently clear. Those who randomly use affirmative or negative 
statements are counter-example of speakers, the stupidest of the stupid (tra li stolti bene a 
basso). Asserting and denying are the most fundamental acts of speech, and when one performs 
them sanza distinzione (‘without discernment’) one speaks indiscreetly, in the medieval 
acceptation of the term. Opposed to these ill speakers is Aquinas himself, whose language 
(latino) does make distinctions between positive and negative values and is characterized by 
Dante as discreto.150 Furthermore, the entire discussion moves around King Solomon, a biblical 
                                                 
149 The last part of Aquinas’ s discourse in canto XIII is fraught with quotes and terms drawn from the Secunda 
secundae. The term regal prudenza ‘kingly, political wisdom” is treated in Q. 47, Art. 11 as one of the three 
categories of prudence (the other two being the personal and the domestic prudence). Even the dangers of the 
hastiness of judgment to which Dante’s Aquinas draws attention are amply treated in the Summa Theologica, where 
the theologian speaks namely of the rashness and levity of mind which can cause unfounded judgments or unjust 
accusations (Q. 53, Arts. 1,2,3 and again in Q. 60, Art. 2). Dante’s Aquinas is, thus, less a fictive construct and more 
the author of the Summa Theologica speaking in his own, doctoral, voice. 
150 The Convivio testifies to the fact that Dante knew the concept of discretio from St. Thomas: sì come dice 
Tommaso sopra lo prologo de l’Etica, ‘conoscere l’ordine d’una cosa ad altra è proprio atto di ragione’; e è questa 
discrezione, (‘For as Thomas says at the head of his prologue to the Ethics, to know the relationship between one 
thing and another is the proper act of reason, and this is discrimination’; IV.VIII.1: 247; emphasis mine). The fact 
that now, in the Paradiso, Dante returns the concept of discretio to Aquinas is the supreme form of compliment. 
Now, it is evident that this concept covers a wide range of intellectual operations, but what seems the most 
significant to me is that both in the Paradiso and the Convivio, discretio is used especially in reference to speech. 
See for instance this passage where acting with discernment is applied to praising or blaming someone: l’uomo non 
dee essere presuntuoso a lodare altrui, non ponendo bene prima mente s’elli è piacere de la persona laudata; 
perché molte volte, credendosi alcuno dar loda, sì da biasimo, o per difetto de lo dicitore o per difetto di quello che 
ode. Onde molta discrezione in ciò avere si conviene (III. X.10: 188; ‘one ought not to be so presumptuous as to 
praise another without first carefully considering whether it would please the person praised; for often a person, 
either through fault of the speaker or through that of the listener, believes he is conferring praise on someone when 
in fact he is laying blame. Therefore in this matter it is necessary to use great discretion.’). 
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figure, who expressed himself on numerous occasions on the abuses of speech: one of Solomon’s 
sentences of the mala bocca is quoted in Convivio, as I have shown above.151 
Further and numerous textual instances justify the adjective discreto with respect to 
Aquinas’s discourse: in Paradiso XI, Aquinas feels compelled to clarify his own enigmatic 
words about the Dominican order (one fattens well, if one does not wander) by voicing Dante’s 
own wonder: Tu dubbi, e hai voler che si ricerna/ in sì aperta e’n sì distesa lingua/lo dicer mio 
(‘You are puzzled, and you wish my words to/make clear, in such open and ample language 
as/befits your hearing.’22-24). Aquinas’s decision to explain his own words bespeaks both his 
fear of being too hermetic and his awareness of the benefits of a message that is delivered with 
no ambiguity. Later on, he explicitly takes again precautions not to speak to abstrusely: Ma 
perch’io non proceda troppo chiuso (‘But that I may proceed not to obscurely,’ 73), and, 
therefore, de-allegorizes the two lovers he had spoken of by naming them: Francesco e Povertà 
per questi amanti/prendi oramai nel mio parlar diffuso (‘take Francis and Poverty for these two 
lovers now in my extended speech’, Par.XI, 73-75). At another moment, aware of the potential 
ambiguity of his speech, he requires Dante’s undivided attention with the words: ‘Or, se le mie 
parole non sono fioche (‘Now, if my words have not been hoarse’, Par. XI.133), and two cantos 
later he passes along his care for discreet speech to the pilgrim: Con questa distinzion prendi’l 
mio detto (‘With this distinction take what I said.’ Par. XIII, 109). 
                                                 
151 It is worth noting that in the Convivio Solomon is given as an example of the political leader who asked God for 
wisdom (prudenza), wisdom from which the gift of counsel is born: Se bene si mira, da la prudenza vegnono li 
buoni consigli, li quali conducono sé e altri a buono fine ne le umane cose e operazioni; e questo è quello dono che 
Salomone, veggendosi al governo del populo essere posto, chiese a Dio (…). (Convivio IV. XXVII. 6: 324-325; ‘If 
we look more closely, good counsel derives from a person’s prudence, which guides both himself and others to a 
good end in human affairs and actions. This is the gift that Solomon asked of God upon finding himself placed at the 
helm of the government of the people.’  ) The idea is again of Thomistic origin (in the Secunda Secundae, Aquinas 
speaks of the ‘gift of counsel’ as deriving form prudentia). This passage from the Convivio has often served Dantisti 
to show that Ulysses’ wisdom is a false prudence. I will return to this question in Chapter Two, when I will discuss 
the sin of fraudulent counsel. 
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Dante casts Thomas Aquinas as the antithesis of the verbal sinners from hell: he is the 
holy man who, in life, imposed himself as a model of virtue and who, even in the afterlife, 
teaches values like prudence (‘worldly wisdom’) and discretion (‘discernment’). The constant 
and conscious care Dante’s Aquinas takes of the quality of his own speech draws attention to the 
necessity of the control over speech. Men should talk sparingly and with discernment; they 
should avoid using speech for promoting false opinions and unjust accusations. Dante himself—
in both his hypostases: as a pilgrim and a poet--takes lessons from Thomas Aquinas. Judging and 
condemning people too hastily or speaking without discernment are transgressions that Dante, 
the demiurgic artist, knows too well: he just built up a hellish world where friends and popes are 
tortured for eternity alongside foes and unbelievers. Speaking too abstrusely, too diffusely or 
using words non fioche are all traps that threaten the author of the Paradiso, while he 
dramatically struggles to represent a world for which no human words had before him been 
invented.  
Dante the pilgrim passed safely by blasphemers and fraudulent speakers in Hell; he 
cleansed the seven Ps on his forehead by ascending the mountain of Purgatory, and finally took 
lessons of wisdom and prudence from his dearest masters in the heavenly spheres. If Dante the 
POET committed linguistic transgressions while writing the Comedy, forgiveness for them 
comes from the Comedy itself, an exceptional work of art into the making of which went both the 
earth’s and heaven’s hand.  
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4.0  LINGUA DOLOSA (‘THE GUILEFUL TONGUE’): SPEAKING UNDER THE 
SIGN OF FRAUD 
Dolus est fraudulenta deceptio. 
(Alain of Lille, Tractus de Virtutibus, et de Vitiis) 
 
 
 
In the Middle Ages, the popular attitude toward guile was highly ambivalent: half 
admiration for the cunning intelligence of the trickster, like in the fabliaux, half reprobation for 
the moral act per se. The shade of admiration inherent in the popular perception of guile does not 
subsist, however, in the moral texts written by the ecclesiastics of the time. In the twelfth 
century, Alain of Lille, who systematically confronted the complex issue of fraud in his works, 
not only gave technical definitions to various terms pertaining to the semantic field of fraud, but 
also drew an apocalyptic picture of the world succumbing to the invasion of fraud and evil. 
These are Alain’s dramatic words:  
 
While the lightning-flash of crime blasts the earth, the night of fraud 
darkens the star of fidelity (…) The evening of fidelity lies heavy on the 
world, the nocturnal chaos of fraud is everywhere. Fidelity fades in the 
face of fraud; fraud, too, deceives fraud by fraud and thus trickery puts 
pressure on trickery. In the realm of customary behavior, accepted 
practices are lacking in morality. Laws lack legal force; rights lose their 
right of tenure. All justice is administered without justice and law 
flourishes without legality. The world is in a state of decline: already the 
golden ages of the world are in decay (…) Fraud no longer seeks the cloak 
of pretence nor does the noisome stench of crime seek for itself the 
fragrant balsam of virtue so as to supply a cloak for its evil smell. (…) 
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Crime, however, doffs all its trappings and does not give itself the colors 
of justice. It openly defines itself as crime. Fraud itself becomes the 
external expression of its frenzy. What remains safe when treachery arms 
even mothers against their offspring? When brotherly love is afflicted with 
fraud and the right hand lies to its sister? 
(The Plaint of Nature, 167-168).  
 
 
For Alain of Lille and the other moral autors I have presented at the beginning of this 
dissertation, guile, as a manifestation of fraud, was not something to be admired, but a sin, and 
cunnning intelligence was nothing less than a falsa prudentia. For Thomas Aquinas, the most 
authoritative voice in moral philosophy in Jean de Meun and Dante’s time, the concept of dolus 
‘guile’, that underlies all fraudulent activity, was closely linked with speech. Dolus was defined 
as “the execution of cunning or of craftiness,” an execution achieved not only through deeds but 
also through words, to which the category of guile seemed to be fundamentally attached:  “The 
execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, 
which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man 
(…), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. (S.T. II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4; emphasis mine).  
Alain of Lille and Aquinas’s concern with fraudulent behavior must have left indelible 
marks on Jean de Meun and Dante’s view of the world. As we have seen, Lady Reason’s 
discourse presents the contemporary scene as invaded by the forces of evil and fraud. As a matter 
of fact, there is no character in the Romance of the Rose who does not participate, from one 
standpoint or another, in a discussion about fraud in behavior or speech practices: all of them 
have something to say, for instance, about cheating or seducing; flattery, as a verbal habit, is 
another point of intersection among the discourses in the poem; Ami and the Old Woman overtly 
recommend the use of guileful verbal strategies in love. Faus Semblant, the most unsettling 
personage of the Rose, makes unashamedly the apology of lying and double-talking. In the 
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Divine Comedy, Dante is also highly concerned with the myriad manifestations of guile and 
fraud. Malebolge, the infernal area that receives the sinners through fraud, is the most complex 
structure in the organization of Hell: it comprises ten levels corresponding to ten different types 
of sins. Four of these sins: flattery, evil counsel, sowing of discord, and falsification of words, 
are based on the interaction with speech.  
In this chapter, I examine several manifestations of fraudulent speech discussed by Jean 
de Meun and Dante and bring them together under the generous umbrella of lingua dolosa, a 
technical term that for the medieval moralists embraced those rhetorical abilities that showed 
human intelligence at its best but that were intended to deceive, overcome or hurt others. 
4.1 FLATTERY AS FORM OF TRANSGRESSIVE SPEECH 
The preoccupation with adulatio as a moral transgression starts as early as patristic-era 
thought.  St. Augustine is the first to give a definition of this morally wrong verbal practice, but 
apparently from his time to that of the theologians of the late Middle Ages there is a substantial 
lack of concern with this type of sin. Just as in the case of blasphemy, theorizing about the sin of 
adulatio owes its recrudescence to the twelfth-thirteenth centuries.152  Two of the medieval texts 
that reopen the discussion of adulatio were written in two different countries but very close in 
                                                 
152 Casagrande and Vecchio point out that the monastic culture, because of its emphasis on the divine word, paid 
scant attention to the sin of adulatio, if at all. Absent from Cassian and Gregory’s typologies of sins, adulatio 
resurfaces forcefully in the moral summae from the twelfth through fourteenth centuries. This would also explain the 
fluctuating origin of this sin in some of the late medieval compilations: “L’assenza dell’adulazione dalle filiazioni 
dei vizi di Cassiano e Gregorio ha comportato una continua oscillazione nell’individuazione dell’origine del 
peccato: lo Speculum conscientiae lo considera filiazione della successione superbia, inanis Gloria, appetitus 
humani favoris; Roberto di Flamborough lo fa derivare dalla vanagloria; Guglielmo d’Auxerre dall’avarizia; Alano 
di Lilla dall’invidia; Grossatesta dalla negligentia; Bromyard dalla cupiditas” (I Peccati della lingua, 362). 
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time, and they both had tremendous success in the late Middle Ages. In England, John of 
Salisbury (1115-1180) wrote a book--appreciated both for its value as a historic document and 
the literary mastery with which it was composed--dedicated to the vices of the courtiers and the 
art of governing. The book is known as Policraticus and is considered by some Dante scholars, 
such as Umberto Cosmo and André Pézard, a main source for Dante’s treatment of flattery and 
for his overall political views. 153
Panicked by the constant and dangerous increase in the number of flatterers, Salisbury 
devotes memorable pages to the practitioners of this vice.154 The background against which they 
are set is clearly a social and political one. In drawing the moral portrayal of the flatterer, 
Salisbury associates the habit of praising highly placed people with deceit practiced for the 
purpose of gaining profit: 
 
The flatterer is inimical to all virtue, and like a sore upon the eye he 
fastens himself by his speech to those with whom he bonds. And what is 
more odious than that fraud and deceit which, under the appearance of 
love and faith, is exercised against the simple, the credulous and (what is 
most detestable), the friendly by perfidious and worthless enemies? Indeed 
men of this sort all speak towards the end of pleasure, not of truth. They 
entreat with iniquitous and deceitful words, which subvert those friends 
who fall into error, repeating ‘Well done, well done’ (…)155  
 
 
                                                 
153Advancing the hypothesis that Dante may have drawn his inspiration from the moral and political concerns 
voiced in Policraticus, Pézard contends that Dante would have known Salisbury’s Policraticus as well as Boetius’ 
Consolation of Philosophy : “Dante a vraiment pratiqué le Policraticus, comme il a par example pratiqué la 
Consolation de Boèce.” [“De Policraticus à la Divine Comédie.” Romania, 70 (1948), 4]. 
154 Chapter six of the third book of Policraticus is literally translated as ‘The multiplication of flatterers is beyond 
number and pushes out of distinguished houses those who are honorable’. [Policraticus. Of the Frivolities of 
Courtiers and the Footprints of Philososphers. Cary J. Nederman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990)]. 
155 Policraticus, III. IV. 
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According to Salisbury, it is not a mistake but an honorable thing for one to seek favor 
with the people among whom he lives, but once he breaks the rules of moderation and 
exaggerates the worth of another for personal profit, he lapses into the heinous mode of flattery. 
Flattery, like tyrannicide, is good to use against tyrants, but is absolutely forbidden among 
friends. Salisbury compares the flatterer with a prostitute who thrives on her fortune by selling 
herself, and highlighting the seductiveness of flatterers, he even gives examples of flattering 
phrases: « my light », « my salvation, » « my refuge, » « my heart and my life, » « invincible 
commander, » « the wisest of those alive, » « the most generous and benevolent of all, » « mirror 
of the virtues »). 156 What is interesting in Salisbury’s view of flattery is that he attributes the 
origin of this practice to the Romans, whom he holds responsible for knowingly and willfully 
spreading this verbal technique throughout Europe. The accusation is occasioned by the Romans’ 
habit of reverently addressing a high-ranking political figure with the plural instead of the 
singular: 157
 
 
If it comes to words, the Romans take precedence in such matters over the 
Greek infidels, since it is the former who were taught the use of flattering 
allurements to the extent that they readily were transformed into a race of 
teachers themselves. This nation invented the speech by which we deceive 
superiors, in so far as we confer distinction on a single person by 
honouring him in the plural, and by the authority of their name the 
Romans have transmitted this technique to their neighbours and to 
posterity.  (Policraticus, III.X, 22)  
 
 
The same idea is expressed by Peter the Cantor, in his widely circulated moral summa 
Verbum Abbreviatum (written before 1187), in which flattery is discussed from an eminently 
                                                 
156 Policraticus III.IX. 
157 By Dante’s time, however, the usage fixed the plural form voi as a reverential pronoun deprived of any shade of 
flattery, as it results from Dante’s encounter with Cacciaguida in the Paradiso. 
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theological perspective. Without mentioning the alleged Roman origin of the verbal practice of 
adulatio, the French theologian considers the habit of using the plural for the singular as an evil 
alteration of speech, both from a grammatical and a moral perspective. For it is a perversion to 
use forms of reverence towards humans, when the singular is used when addressing God. By the 
same token, words of praise should be used only in our discourses about God, not in speaking 
about (or to) one another in our quotidian verbal exchanges. The main line of thought that 
informs Cantor’s treatment of adulatio is essentially an Augustinian one: he starts the chapter 
Contra adulatores from his Verbum with a reference to Augustine’s figurative definition of 
flattery as oil, as false praise that blinds the mind and renders it incapable of perceiving the truth.  
Within this perspective, flatterers are vendors of the oil of false praise and disingenuous delight. 
The tongue of the flatterer--this skillful but mendacious speaker--is described with a phrase taken 
from the biblical text: lingua dolosa--a phrase that, thanks to Cantor’s mediation, will be 
consistently used by the medieval moral theorists to qualify various instances of fraudulent 
speech. The work of Peter the Cantor will be seminal for the subsequent treatment of flattery--
and other verbal deviations he examined in his moral tract--and many of his insights about the 
sinful potential of human language will be taken up by other medieval moralists. 
Contemporary with Peter the Cantor is another great name of French culture, Alain of 
Lille, whose influence on Jean de Meun and Dante has been shown, as we have seen, by 
numerous scholars. Through The Plaint of Nature, the sin of adulatio leaves the realm of the 
theological tracts to enter the sphere of moral poetry. The goddess Natura, the spokesperson of 
Alain in the allegorical poem, complains about the human habit of flattery, which she describes 
in vitriolic terms. Qualified as a malign sin, springing from envy, flattery is a moral disease that 
affects especially those who live in the proximity of rich people: lay people and prelates alike, 
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whom she calls the henchmen of princes and the palace dogs. Flatterers’ main method of getting 
what they want, gifts or a better position at the court, is cheating. For Alain, flatterers are artisans 
of speech, but in a bad way, they are trumpeters of insincere praise, forgers of commendation 
and molders of falsehood. The idea of fraud is repeatedly and emphatically asserted in all the 
passages describing the sin of flattery in The Plaint of Nature. One of these passages is worth 
quoting for it enlightens the perception of flattery from the viewpoint of the medieval philosophy 
of language on which Jean de Meun and Dante themselves relied: 
 
What, then, is the ointment of flattery but cheating for gifts? What is the 
act of commendation but a deception of prelates? What is the smile of 
praise but a mockery of the same prelates? For since speech is wont to be 
the faithful interpreter of thought, words the faithful pictures of the souls, 
the countenance an indication of the will, the tongue the spokesman of the 
mind, flatterers separate, by a wide distance and divergence, the 
countenance from the will, the words from the souls, the tongue from the 
mind, the speech from the thought. For externally they smile on many as 
they whitewash them with praise, while internally they laugh at them in 
mockery. Externally they praise very many with convincing applause, 
while internally they cheat them with a derision that gives the lie to the 
applause. Externally they applaud with a countenance of virgin innocence, 
internally they are stinging with the scorpion’s sting. Externally they rain 
down showers of honied flattery, internally they are heaving with storms 
of detraction. (The Plaint of Nature, XIV. 7) 
 
These are powerful and very harsh words, which together with the medieval sense that 
flattery was a plague of the day, might have shaped Jean de Meun and Dante’s view of this 
disingenuous verbal practice. The specular relationships between thoughts (or things) and speech 
that flattery violates also informs Jean de Meun’s definition of words as the cousins of deeds and 
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Dante’s principle of adequatio rei et orationis,158 that he posits as an indispensable criterion for 
truthful speech.  
Another major moral author who might have swayed Dante’s conception of flattery is 
William Peraldus. In his widely circulated Summa Vitiorum, the sin of adulatio gains for the first 
time an absolute autonomy with respect to the seven capital vices, becoming a sin on its own 
terms, one of the twenty-four sins of the tongue grouped by Peraldus in the section De peccato  
linguae. Here, adulatio is defined as a perverse praise ‘perversa laudatio’, for praise should be 
given only to God, not to men. It is a diabolical mode of speech that enables the dishonest man to 
manipulate his friend and lead him astray. Compared to the chameleon, the flatterer is a seducer 
enlisted in the service of the devil, for he makes people think of themselves exactly what they 
want. The flatterer is a traitor, who, like Judas, sells his benefactor under the pretense of a kiss 
and kills him under the guise of friendship. In the wake of the Scripture and the patristic 
writings, Peraldus compares flattery with a toxic honey, or a wind that turns the city of God into 
the city of the devil, or a net serving to trap the gullible. Taking up a scriptural quote, he defines 
the flatterer as a simulator who deceives his friend with his mouth. 159 
4.1.1 The art of losange in the Rose 
Flattery is a discursive practice omnipresent in the Romance of the Rose. Several characters in 
the poem touch upon the complex issue of adulatory speech, either in order to condemn it, or, on 
the contrary, to warmly recommend it for the social advantages it can bring along.  Flattery is for 
                                                 
158 This Latin phrase is a theoretical concept expressing the tenet of the nominalist position toward language, a tenet 
that in the Vita Nova Dante phrases as Nomina sunt consequentia rerum. For more on Dante’s view of language, see 
Nardi’s study “Il Linguaggio,” in Dante e la cultura medievale (Bari: Laterza, 1984). 
159 Prov. 11: Simulator ore decipit amicum suum (‘The guileful man deceives his friend by the way of mouth’), 
quoted by Peraldus in Summa Vitiorum, 572. 
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the first time (and insistently) treated by the discourse of Lady Reason, where it is openly 
criticized as a form of abusive speech. This insistence translates Jean de Meun’s own obsession 
with a verbal habit that seems to have corrupted both male and female speech, at every level of 
society. This is the impression Jean’s treatment of flattery conveys, for not only Lady Reason, 
but virtually all the other characters in the Rose make numerous references to the ‘art of flattery,’ 
and every time this happens, it is in a negative moral context. Brought and analyzed together, 
these references offer us not only Jean’s general view of the sin of adulatio, but also the first 
great meeting point between Jean’s view of fraudulent speech and Dante’s moral system.  
Within the context of the discussion of the love of riches, Reason describes the greedy 
man’s heart as imbued with false will to love people (fainte volontez d’amer). The reason the 
greedy cannot nurture an honest love for others is that they are passionately attached to material 
values. As a consequence, one cannot count on the friendship or affection of a man obsessed 
with money, since his cupidity is stronger than his friendship. Once his hope of getting some 
profit has vanished, his charitable love or friendship disappears as well. A man who values 
material wealth more than his friends cannot love correctly: he only simulates he loves them and 
overwhelms them with exaggerated praise for the sake of material profit. He does not love the 
others for themselves, but for his own selfish interest: Car ne puet bien estre amoreus/Cuer qui 
n’aime les gens pour eus,/Ainz se faint et les vait flatant/Pour le proufit qu’il en atant (’4775-8; 
‘For the heart which does not love people for themselves can never be a loving one. Instead it 
pretends and goes about flattering for the gain it hopes to have’). 
This idea is reiterated several verses later, this time in the context of the discussion of the 
love of fortune and from the viewpoint of the flattered not of the flatterer.  Those who by a 
favorable move of the wheel of Fortune see themselves placed on the top of the social scale 
 121 
quickly draw to themselves cohorts of friends. These seemingly quick friends do not spare any 
effort in convincing the rich man that they will serve him loyally until his death. They proclaim 
the wealthy man their master and pledge to shed their own blood to protect him and his house. 
The newly minted rich, says Reason, are so naïve that they are quick to believe all these noisy 
declarations of love, when in fact these declarations are nothing but flattery and deceit: Et cil qui 
tels paroles oient,/S’en glorifient et les croient/Ausi com se fust evangile,/Et tout est flatterie et 
guile… (4873-6; ‘And those who hear such speeches glorify themselves and believe them as 
though thery were the Gospel. But all is flattery and guile…’). 
Another reference to flattery sends us to the world of myth: in recounting Phania’s 
interpretation of the dream of Cresus, Reason stresses that the young girl preferred to tell her 
father the truth, instead of flattering him with a beautiful, but false interpretation of the grim 
dream (6510-3). Within her own discourse in the first person, Phania tells her father that she 
cannot spare his pride and flatter him, since the truth is that this dream is of ill auspices (6513-
6536). In this mythic sequence too, flattery is tantamount to mendacious discourse. 
Lady Reason’s overall perception of flattery as a form of fraud is so strong that in some 
places she squarely uses the verb ‘to flatter’ with the sense ‘to lie’. In an exchange of replies with 
the Lover, Reason specifies that she cannot recommend avarice more than foolish liberality 
because they are both abominable vices and that she does not wish to flatter, i.e., lie to her 
interlocutor in this respect: Ja ne te quier de ce flater (5749). The context in which this reply is 
inserted has nothing to do with praises or making false compliments. Reason is not praising any 
of the qualities of the Lover, she does not even speak of the Lover at all; she speaks of her own 
definitions of prodigality and avarice. An identical use of the verb flatter is made on the occasion 
of her recounting the story of Manfred and Conrad in terms of a chess game. In the middle of her 
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story, she pauses to insert this parenthetical comment, meant to assure the Lover (or the 
audience) of the truth of her sayings: Car se verité conter os,/Si n’en quier je nullui flater (6674-
5; ‘If I dare tell the truth and do not seek to flatter anyone’). Again the context has nothing to do 
with false praise: it is a technical depiction of the game of chess that serves to allegorically 
illustrate the whims of the wheel of Fortune. More significantly, in this very passage, Jean de 
Meun explicitly quotes John of Salibury’s Policraticus.160 The quote is extremely important in 
the economy of my dissertation, since Policraticus was the first major medieval text to treat 
flattery in a social context.  
In Reason’s lexicon, there is another term that she uses to convey public praise: lous (Lat. 
laus). When she speaks about the prodigal, she says that they put wings to the money (i.e., they 
make money circulate at a fast rate), because they would rather be tortured than not gain praise 
(lous) and fame (pris) for their liberality (5227-5229). This assessment of the prodigal is 
symptomatic for the central role the praise plays in the general social arena of the time. The idea 
Reason conveys is that being publicly praised is not only a very agreeable thing that many would 
like to get, but also that this praise can enable one to attain public fame. Success and glory are 
two most valuable civic assets, and the way to acquire them is to have your name and deeds 
praised by others. This is the social mechanism that allows flattery to set in and affect people’s 
lives. 
If Reason’s position with respect to flattering speech is of condemnation, the recourse to 
flattery is, in return, overtly recommended by Ami.  When he inveighs against Evil Mouth and 
                                                 
160 The quotation is made in the same context of the chess game, with the invention of which Salisbury credits 
Attalus: Et tu verras en policratique qu’il (Athalus/ s’enflechit de la matire/Ou des nombres devoit escrire,/Et cel 
biau gieu jolif trouva/Qye par demoustrance prouva ( 6690-4 ‘You will see in the Policraticus that he (Athalus) 
digressed from this matter, since he should have been writing of numbers, where he found this excellent, pretty 
game which he tested by demonstration’). 
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his relatives (i.e., lez lozangiers of the courtly romance, or simply people with evil tongues), Ami 
strongly recommends the use of fraud. In his opinion, you can make the gossip and the slander 
stop only if you ally yourself with the slanderers, by flattering them and jollying them along:  
 
 
Male bouche et touz ses paranz/A cui ja dieus ne soit garanz,/Par barat 
estuet barater,/Servir, chuer, blandir, flater,/Par hourz, par adulacions,/Par 
fausses simulacions,/Et encliner et saluer/Qu’il fait trop bon le chien 
chuer/Tant com ait la voie passée. (7387-95) 
 
One has to trick Foul Mouth and his kin—may God never be their surety!—with Fraud: 
one must serve them, caress, blandish and flatter them with ruse, adulation, and false 
simulation; one must bow to them and salute them. It is a very good idea to stroke a dog 
until one has passed by.  
 
In other words, the response to wicked linguistic practices such as gossip and detraction 
is… more wicked verbal habits.161 To support his recommendation of fraud (in speech and acts), 
Ami cannot appeal to stern authorities in ethics (as Reason had done, with Cicero, Horace, Cato, 
and others), but he does try to authorize his own advice by appealing to that strain of popular 
wisdom which encourages men to make all sorts of compromises just to get out of a dangerous 
situation. From a metalinguistic point of view, this passage from Ami’s discourse is illustrative 
of the richness of French vernacular in expressing one and the same sin of the tongue. Adulare, 
adulatio, the Latin terms from the moral tracts of the great scholastics, is translated here through 
a series of three synonyms: blandir, flatter, adulacions, if we do not consider chuer. Jean de 
Meun is linguistically richer than Laurent d’Orléans who used only two terms to describe this 
sin: losange and flatterie. 
                                                 
161 As far as Evil Mouth is concerned, he is no stranger either to the use of flattering speech. In the discourse of Fair 
Welcoming, he will be depicted as one who likes to exaggerate things and spice them up with his flatteries: Qu’il 
disoit plus qu’il ne savoit/Et touz jors par ses flasteries/Ajoustoit as choses oïes (14582-84; ‘his very great fault was 
to tell more than he knew, and by his exaggerations he added to the things that he heard’). It is worth noting that 
Dahlberg’s translation correctly interprets the word flasteries not as praise, but as exaggerations, alterations of truth, 
i.e, lies. 
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Flattery is present in the discourse of Faus Semblant as well: he describes the zeal the 
friars spend to obtain (written or oral) recommendations from the powerful of the day, so they 
can insinuate themselves more easily into people’s houses. The means by which the mendicant 
friars persuade the rich to give them these good references is flattery:  
 
Et pour avoir des genz loanges,162/Des riches hommes par 
losanges/Empestrons que lettres nous doignent/Qui la bonté de nous 
tesmoignent, /Si que l’en croie par le monde/Que vertuz toute en nous 
habonde. (11673-78)163
 
In order to win people’s praise we tell lies to rich men and get them to give us letters 
bearing witness to our goodness, so that throughout the world people will think that every 
virtue abounds in us. 
 
Flattery belongs thus to everyday life and practices of the mendicant friars, especially the 
Dominicans, whom Faus Semblant is intended to represent. Not only that, but here flattery 
belongs to and underlies a veritable vicious circle of fraud: the friars have recourse to flattery, 
this form of verbal fraud, to get recommendations that are themselves fraudulent, in that they do 
not reflect the truth with respect to the mendicants. These letters depict the friars as depositaries 
of virtues, when they are fraught with vices. This is a complex (and complicated) social 
mechanism in which fraudulent speech enables other forms of fraud to take place. 
The Old Woman takes a stand with respect to flattery, as well. She seems to condemn it 
not because it is incompatible with her nature (for she does not hesitate to recommend strategies 
of erotic seduction to the young girls), but because she suffered so much because of it in her own 
                                                 
162 Interestinlgy, the noun loanges Faus Semblant uses here to work out his pun (loanges/losanges) belongs to the 
same semantic family as lous, that we have encountered in Lady Reason’s speech. Whereas losanges clearly 
conveys sweet speech, with a negative ethical connotation, lous and loanges seem to express praise proper, i.e., not 
necessarily associated with flattery. This range of terms bespeaks the efforts of French vernacular to assign shades 
of meaning to closely related words. 
163 Here Jean adds the word losanges, which was also used by Laurent d’Orléans, to his rich list of synonyms for the 
ethical category of adulatio. 
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youth. Thus, she complains that many of her lovers fooled her with their flattering words: Trop 
sont tuit apert menteeur;/Plus m’ont menti li flateeur/Et foi et seremenz jadis,/Qu’il n’a de sainz 
en paradis! (‘All men are very expert liars. These wastrels have told me more lies, made me 
more vows and oaths in past times than there are saints in paradise.’ 13791-4). For The Old 
Woman, as it is for Lady Reason, flattery is tantamount to lying, as her words explicitly reveal in 
the equation flateeur-menteeur. As if to support The Old Woman’s complaint, later on in the 
romance, Genius excoriates women for being too sensitive to male flattery. In his powerful anti-
feminist diatribe, Venus’s priest asserts that no other method is more efficacious with women 
than flattery. Flattery works so well on women because they are weak and naïve, and therefore 
prone to believe anything, be it a lie. To convince the audience of the truthfulness of his 
perception of the female gender, Genius resorts to the authority of Titus Livius: 
 
Et si dist Titus Livus,/Qui connut bien quel sont li us/Des fames et quels 
les manieres,/Que vers leur meurs nulles prieres/Ne valent tant comme 
blandices,/Tant sont decevables et nices/Et de flechissable nature. (16341-
7). 
 
Titus Livius, who knew well what the habits and ways of women are, says that women 
are so easily deceived, so silly and of such pliable natures that with their ways entreaties 
are not worth as much as blandishments. 
 
This short passage is framed by a longer segment that criticizes… not men’s fraudulent 
speech, but the weaknesses of the female gender, described as full of malice, vices and evils 
(meurs pervers). In relationship to flattery, it is not men who are guilty of practicing it, but 
women for yielding to it.  
In conclusion, starting with Lady Reason’s discourse and ending with that of Genius, 
there is practically no character in the Romance of the Rose who does not engage in a way or 
another with the notion of flattery. Lady Reason criticizes this verbal practice and qualifies it as 
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fraudulent, Ami recommends it remorselessly, The Old Woman curses it because it harmed her, 
and to Genius it serves to prove how stupid women are. Throughout these varied positions, 
flattery emerges as an all-encompassing social behavior: it is adopted by lovers (mostly male), 
diligently practiced by religious figures and ardently sought by the rich. It is mainly used to 
seduce, manipulate and help skilled talkers get what they want. It represents such a complex 
phenomenon, that the French vernacular developed an impressive list of terms in an 
extraordinary metalinguistic attempt to describe its myriad manifestations. Flatterie, blandice, 
adulacion, lous, loanges are all terms medieval French—through its major poet, Jean de Meun—
used to represent in vernacular a morally ambiguous, to say the least, habit of speech. Extremely 
important in the Rose is that, although Jean explicitly associated this habit with fraud, he never 
used the word sin or vice with respect to flattery, as he did with Reason’s sin of naming the male 
genitalia. He considers Fraud a “vice,” but never labels flattering talk as sin. He is obsessed with 
it (otherwise he would not have all of his characters speak of it), but in his metalinguistic 
enterprise he did not go further than coming up with an extended series of synonyms. 
In the moral tracts contemporary with Jean de Meun, flattery was however considered a 
sin. The accounts Alain of Lille, Peter the Cantor or William Peraldus give of flattery correspond 
to Jean’s treatment of it: subclass of fraud, spiritual harm, vast diffusion, social implications, 
gender involvement; these are all aspects of false praise that bring together Jean’s treatment of 
flatterie or adulacion with the treatment of the sin of adulatio by the moralists above-mentioned, 
despite Jean’s omission of the technical term sin. About thirty years after the completion of the 
Romance of the Rose, in the context of the Italian moral poetry, Dante will consider the flatterers 
so immoral that he will reserve them a place in one of the deepest zone in hell: Malebolge, the 
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area of Fraud. Thus, Dante implicitly acknowledges sycophantic speech as a sin. In what follows, 
I will investigate Dante’s assimilation of the medieval theories about flattery in Inferno XVIII. 
 
4.1.2 Ornaments of speech: seduction and flattery in Canto XVIII of the Inferno 
After encountering various sinful manifestations of the human disposition toward incontinence 
and violence, punished in the upper and middle sections of hell, respectively, we enter 
Malebolge (‘Evil claws’): the eighth circle of hell, by far the most extended and detailed 
substructure in Dante’s underworld.164  
Minutely divided into ten ditches, Malebolge comprises ten different species of fraud.165 
Thus, whereas in the upper and middle parts of hell the sinners have in common the incapacity to 
anchor their passions in reason, the fraudulent sinners in Malebolge stand out by a certain type of 
cleverness, guile, more exactly, they manifested while alive. Their defect is not the suppression 
of reason, as in the case of the incontinent and the violent, but the willful perversion of it. 
Fraudulent sinners used their intellectual gifts not for supporting the common good but for the 
appropriation of the objects of their desires to the detriment of their neighbors.  
The main means the sinners in the eighth circle of hell used to attain their purposes was 
deceit--‘inganno’--, a conscious and willful immoral practice bound to injure people. La nostra 
                                                 
164 As far as etymology is concerned, Georges Güntert considers Maleboge “un nome violentamente realistico della 
tradizione volgare, (…), in cui riecheggiano i nomi diabolici Malacoda e Malebranche, e forse anche il Malabocca 
del Fiore, un calco del Malebouche del Roman de la Rose, come suppone, ipotizzando una lontana origine francese, 
Gianfranco Contini.” “Inferno XVIII.” Lectura Dantis Turicensis. Inferno, Vol. 1 (Firenze: Franco Cessati, 2000), 
245. 
165 Unlike the sins of incontinence and violence, fraud is specific only to man, as a being endowed with reason and 
speech, and therefore is more distasteful to God: Ma perchè frode è dell’uom proprio male/più spiace a Dio (Inf. XI. 
26). 
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ragione, said Dante in the Convivio, a quattro maniere d’operazioni, (…), operazioni che essa 
considera e fa nel proprio atto suo, le quali si chiamano razionali, si come sono arti di parlare 
(IV.IX. 5: 252; ‘our reason is related to four kinds of activities (…) activitities which it 
contemplates and performs by its own act, and these are called rational, as for example the art of 
speech’). Speech and verbal exchanges are for Dante manifestations of reason, “arts” that play an 
important role in human relationships. In this light, the perversion of the intellectual faculties 
also entails the alteration of the natural functions of human speech. By the same token, if we 
examine some of the sinners Dante places in the area of fraud, we will find them being punished 
for sins of a verbal nature: flattery, divination, evil counsel, sedition and the falsifying of words, 
so many habits that are treated by medieval moralists as forms of transgressive speech.  
Forming a large part of hell, the ten subdivisions of fraud occupy no less than thirteen 
cantos. The first of these is Canto XVIII that synthetically describes two ditches: the one 
inhabited by pimps and seducers, and the one inhabited by flatterers.166  
These categories of sinners share an obsession with erotic concerns:  pimps take 
advantage of the lust of others for personal profit, and seducers abuse the innocent with 
calculated words and deeds. Common to these two categories is, thus, the deliberation with 
which they practice their evil methods: the panderers turn the female body into an object of 
constant traffic, selling, to use Joan Ferrante’s words “something they do not possess,” and 
seducers lead women astray by premeditated erotic techniques. The panders are represented by 
Venedico Caccianemico, a Bolognese credited with the selling of his sister Ghisabella to one of 
                                                 
166 The character who volunteers the name of the latter sin is Alessio Interminei da Lucca, who explains his presence 
in this ditch of Malebolge by the lusinghe (‘flatteries’) he systematically uttered while alive. But before this canto, 
already in Inferno XI, Virgil names this sin as lusinghe, when he explains to the pilgrim the overall structure of Hell. 
Adulatori or lusinghieri are the vernacular terms Domenico Cavalca adopted in reference to the practitionners of 
adulatio. In his treatment of this sin, Cavalca brings no significant elements of novelty with respect to Peraldus, 
therefore I do not appeal to Pungilingua for the sin of flattery. 
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the rich of the day (presumably Obizzo d’Este). Venedico admits to Dante that the ditch is full 
with other people native to Bologna, an assertion that indicates not only Dante’s assessment of 
Bologna but also the frequency of this type of trade. The dialogue between the two is cut short 
by a horned devil who flays the sinner both with his whip and his words: Via, ruffian!/ Qui non 
son femmine da conio (‘Away, pimp! here there are no/ females to coin’; 65-66). Uttered with 
sharp irony, this monetary allusion is strong and intended to cancel the equivalence between 
female flesh and money, on which panders rest their trade. Ruffian, as a linguistic label, is an 
infamous appellation (speech here becomes an instrument of torture), and the moral corrective 
applied to Venedico restores the right angles of the feminine image, conveying that women 
cannot be equated with profit-bringing merchandise. The base language used by the devil 
corresponds to a base type of commerce, and here words are associated with human trade, carnal 
slavery, more exactly, to highlight the sordidness of the sin. 
Also, that the “profession” of pimp has a linguistic side has been acknowledged by 
several Dante scholars: in order to convince women to yield to their evil traffic, the panders have 
to use, among other means, persuasive words and flattery.167 Symbolic is also, in the text, that 
the Bolognese are designated with the assertive particle sipa, ‘yes’, the “word of their trade,” in 
Wayne Storey’s view.  
The seducers are exemplified by a remarkable mythological character, who came down to 
the medieval culture as an “uncontaminated” legendary hero, a model of valiance and tenacity. 
Reflections of this ancient perception can be detected in Inferno XVIII, where Jason is introduced 
                                                 
167 Georges Güntert labels Venedico an “adulatore” (op. cit, 253), and Caretti interprets the phrase femmine da conio 
as: “non solo o semplicemente ‘donne da ingannare’, ma anche ‘donne da ingannare nel modo particolare usato da 
Venedico per Ghisabella, cioè donne da lusingare (emphasis mine) e quindi indurre, per ricavarne denaro, alla 
‘vogla’ altrui, ovvero al venale ‘coniugio’). [“Inferno XVIII.” Lectura Dantis Scaligera. (Firenze: Le Monnier, 
1967), 597]. 
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with the same reverence and high style that Dante reserves for the major figures of antiquity 
(Capaneus for instance, or Ulysses): Guarda quel grande che vene,/e per dolor non par lagrime 
spanda:/ quanto aspetto reale ancor ritene! (83-85; ‘Look at that tall one coming, who does not 
seem to/be shedding any tear for the pain:/how regal is his bearing still!’). A prototype of the 
winner in the Argonautic myth, Jason becomes in Dante’s interpretation, a defeated man. For, 
although Virgil introduces Jason as one who per cuore e per senno/li Colchi del monton privati 
féne (86-87; ‘by courage and wit robbed the Colchians of the ram’), making thus reference to the 
brave enterprise for which the hero became so famous, Virgil suggests that Jason’s courage and 
his wisdom also had a counterpart: con segni e con parole ornate/Isifile ingannò (91-92; ‘with 
tokens and elaborate words he deceived Hypsipyle’). Used in the service of a noble ideal, that of 
acquiring the Golden Fleece, Jason’s senno had a positive connotation: it was the power of the 
mind capable of overcoming the harshest obstacle imaginable. His wisdom, however, turns into 
guile, when through deeds and skillful words he outwits a giovinetta, whom he seduces to satisfy 
his lust. He is a lingua dolosa, a fraudulent speaker, to use Peter the Cantor’s synecdoche. 
Jason’s sin, the deceitful technique he used to ensnare Hypsipyle, is predicated on the misuse of 
language, and the adjective ornate, used to describe his seductive talk, is indicative of this. The 
verbal skills he possessed were used to satisfy his wicked desires, and the embellishments he 
attached to his rhetoric were in fact morally empty and nocuous.168 Used first in the Commedia 
to describe in a highly positive way Virgil’s poetic art, the reoccurrence of ornate in a morally 
negative context draws attention to Dante’s constant assessment of speech as the main means 
                                                 
168 For William H.V. Reade, Jason’s sins would rather consist in the “nocumetum proximi involved in the false 
promises made to Isifile.” [The Moral System of Dante’s Inferno. (New York: Kennikat Press, 1969), 340]. 
Although Reade does not mention this, in the Middle Ages false promise was considered a “sin of the tongue,” 
treated for instance by Radulfus Ardens, William Peraldus and Thomas Aquinas. Both the word ornate in the text 
and Reade’s interpretation of Jason’s empty promises point to the fact that Jason’s main transgression was his 
wicked use of the rhetorical power of speech. He willfully and repeatedly misused words to achieve his selfish 
purposes. 
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used by people in their social interactions. The same fine words that can be used in poetry can 
also be used as means of persuasion for the perpetration of evil.169 What distinguishes the beauty 
of a human utterance from another enchanting one, produced in a different context, is the context 
itself, or, more specifically, the intention that moves the speaker. Virgil used the seductive power 
of his language to create art, Jason used the same tool to manipulate and destroy other people’s 
lives. As a seducer he is also mentioned in the text in relationship with Medea, his other lover, 
whom he abandoned as well, after making her false promises. Through the invocation of Medea, 
Jason’s adorned words acquire an even wider range of action; the history of the couple Jason-
Medea testifies to the fact that the man and the sinners he is supposed to represent use their great 
manipulative art not only to satisfy their lust, but also, as Ferrante put it, “to ensure their safety 
or success in other ventures.”170  Both language and love are subservient in Jason to his 
ambitions, an aspect that had already been highlighted, before Dante, by Jean de Meun in the 
Romance of the Rose.  For Jean, Jason is guilty before all else of lying to Medeea: Que refist 
Jason de Medee/Qui si vilment refu boulee/Que li faus sa foi li menti/Puis qu’el l’ot de mort 
                                                 
169 Steven Botterill asserts in this sense that “the moral validity of eloquence is not, in Dante’s thinking, a given,” 
and that: “Jason’s ‘parole ornate’ are morally quite different from Virgil’s: instead of saving they betray, instead of 
embodying the truth they act as a vehicle of deceit. Their ornamental quality is specious, employed to conceal the 
speaker’s malicious and self-seeking intent; eloquence here has become the means of bringing about another’s 
harm.” [“Dante’s Poetics of the Sacred Word.” Philosophy and Literature 20.1 (1996), 155-157). The discussion of 
the same word (ornate) used to qualify both Virgil (in Inferno II) and Jason’s speech has, on the contrary, prompted 
Teodolina Barolini to contend that classical culture is associated, through both Virgil and Jason, with linguistic 
ornament and deceit. This is how Barolini explains the fact that, toward the end of Canto XVIII, Dante will become 
vulgar on the level of style: he would thus intend to dissociate himself from flatterers, to mark a clear distance 
between fraudulent speakers and himself. (The Undivine Comedy, 77). Due to the semantic elasticity of the adjective 
ornate, I believe that Dante used it for Virgil with an esthetic value, to characterize the Latin poet’s elegant style, 
and for Jason with a moral value, to denounce his sweet-sounding but empty rhetoric. As it is often the case with 
ambiguous, or polysemic words such as this, it is the context that disambiguates the lexeme. Moreover, a careful 
reading of Inferno II disallows the interpretation of Virgil’s parola ornata as a general symbol of classical linguistic 
deceit. In verse 113, Virgil’s speech is described by Beatrice as a parlare onesto, a mode of speech on account of 
which she can come to him in all confidence. She trusts him specifically for the quality of truthfulness of his talk. 
Along the same lines, in v. 126, Virgil himself characterizes his words as ‘l mio parlar che tanto ben ti promette. His 
words promise to bring comfort and enlightenment to the pilgrim, a promise that the narrative of the Inferno and the 
Purgatorio will fully accomplish. 
170 Joan Ferrante, “Malebolge (Inf. XVIII-XXX) as the Key to the Structure of Dante’s Inferno.” Romance 
Philology, 20 (1967), 461. 
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garenti/ (…) Puis la laissa, li maus trichierres, li faus, li desloiaus, li lierrres. (13233-13261; 
‘What did Jason do with Medea? He deceived her shamefully, the false one, when he belied his 
faith to her after she had saved him from death. Then he left her, the evil trickster, the false, 
disloyal thief…’). 
Although the French text offers a long list of the sacrifices Medea made for the false and 
deceitful Jason, and evokes in terrible words her slaying of the two sons she had with Jason, 
what is salient in this description is Jason’s moral profile as a liar and a trickster. The semantic 
field of fraud is textually realized by words like li faus (two occurrences), mentir, maus 
trichierres (an emphatical expression) and li desloyaux, which also might have influenced 
Dante’s decision to place Jason in the infernal area of fraud. The story is echoed in the Fiore, 
where Jason is mentioned three times, twice in the context of his relationship with Medea (when 
he is called quel disleale, Fiore 161), and once in a neutral context that evokes Argus’ ship (Se 
mastro Arguso, che fece la nave/In che Giason andò per lo tosone (...) vivesse…; Fiore, 8). It is 
interesting that in the Fiore Medea plays to some extent the same role as Hypsipile in the 
Commedia; she is the one who, despite her sapienza (190) and incantamenti (161), was unable to 
keep beside her the one who had sworn her love and fidelity. Jason is, in this light, one who 
outwits somebody knowledgeable in matters of guile: Medea (like Hypsipile), a circumstance, 
however, which neither in the Fiore nor in the Comedy, excuses Jason, but which may give one 
more reason for Medea’s alignment with Hypsipile in Inferno XVIII (e anche di Medea si fa 
vendetta, v. 96). The fact that Jason is smarter than two clever women only enhances his 
deceitful ways. 
Outside of the first circle of Malebolge, but within the same canto, we encounter other 
smooth talkers: Alessio Interminei da Lucca and Thaïs, who stand for the lusingatori (flatterers) 
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punished in the second bolgia. All the sinners have their heads smeared by the excrement in 
which they are immersed to the point that one cannot tell if they are laypeople or clerics. This 
indication can be read in light of Alain of Lille’s critique of the prelates’ propensity to adulatio. 
In the passage from The Plaint of Nature I have quoted in this section, the prelates are depicted 
as prone to flattery as the laymen. Dante’s emphasis on the undifferentiated physical appearance 
of these two important social categories in the ditch of flatterers reinforces the idea that the 
ecclesiastics are affected as well by this depraved way of speech.171  
Alessio Interminei confesses directly to Dante:  Qua giù m’anno sommerso le 
lusinghe/ond’io non ebbi mai la lingua stucca. ‘I am submerged down here by the flatteries with 
which my tongue was never cloyed.’  (XVIII. 125-6).172 By self-definition a sweet-talker, 
Alessio turned flattery into a mode of life; he was a con artist, an artisan of speech, as Alain of 
Lille would have put it. The adjective stucca Dante uses pejoratively here conveys, through its 
semantic value, that Alessio’s insincere praises were a constant of his life; they were not 
accidents happening once in a while, but a consciously cultivated practice, a way of being.173 
Both the labeling of Jason’s words as ornate and the description of Alessio’s lusinghe reveals 
that Dante constantly and perceptively evaluates people’s--and his own--ways of speech. In 
Inferno XXXII, the pilgrim willingly puts himself in a favorable light with respect to flattery by 
having Bocca degli Abati say that he, Dante the pilgrim, is a bad flatterer (mal sai lusingar per 
                                                 
171 For the flattering clerics the law established the deposition, a penalty introduced by Gratian in his Decretals 
(1.46.3): “A cleric who is found out in the practice of flattery and scheming is to be degraded,” quoted by Aquinas 
in S.T. II.II, Q. 115, Art. 2).  
172 These two dense lines remind Wayne Storey of the medieval way of bringing dishonor to a person’s reputation 
by drawing disparaging grafitti on public buildings. Officially sanctioned, these grafitti were accompanied by a 
couplet of verses describing the man and the felony he committed: “The summary brevity of Alessio’s confession 
and his punishment vaguely recalls the explicit tituli of the paintings always in the vernacular and usually reduced to 
simple but effective rhymes.” [“Inferno XVIII,” in Lectura Dantis: Supplement. Vol. 6. Dante’s Divine Comedy. 
Introductory Readings, I: Inferno. (Tibor Wlassics, ed., Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1990), 244]. 
173 The intent is, in Aquinas’s interpretation, the factor that determines when flattery becomes a mortal sin (ST. II-II, 
Q. 115, Art. 2). 
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questa lama, ‘you flatter badly here in this swamp!’, 96). In the same way, flattery is banished 
from the outset on the mountain of Purgatory where the repentant are given the chance to redeem 
their errors. Cato averts Virgil’s intent to jolly him along by telling him that here flattery, or 
smooth talk, is not necessary: non c’è mestier lusinghe (Purg. I. 92).  
But why does Dante punish the habit of flattery in hell in the area of fraud? First of all, let 
us recall what one of the finest analysts of this verbal practice said: “Just as the aim of the orator 
is persuasive speech, and the end of a physician is a medical cure, so the aim of flatterers is 
sweetly spoken deception.” (John of Salisbury, Policraticus, III.10). Flatterers are speakers who 
enlist the help of rhetorical procedures to persuade people to act in a certain way that serves their 
selfish purposes. In their relationships with others, flatterers, like physicians, have a well-
established goal, but unlike physicians, they do not intend to cure but to harm by deceit.  Flattery 
is defined as perverse rhetoric; it is a form of persuasive speech that is directed at the 
manipulation of others. Deceit is the essence of this mode of speech; it is its very core.  
Dante’s moral agenda opposes these ways, being overtly predicated on an intelligent and 
virtuous mode of speech. To recall here the assessment from the Convivio, words are to be used 
with extreme caution, because they contain the seeds of all the actions and their consequences: 
Da vedere è come ragionevolemente quel tempo in tutte le nostre operazioni si dee attendere, e 
massimamente nel parlare. (…). Per che le parole, che sono quasi seme di operazione, si deono 
molto discretamente sostenere e lasciare, perché bene siano ricevute e fruttifere vegnano, sì 
perché da la loro parte non sia difetto di sterilitade. (IV.II.8: 223; ‘It is to consider how 
reasonable it is that we should await the proper moment in all our undertakings, and most of all 
in speaking. (…) This is why great discretion must be shown in using or in avoiding the use of 
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words—which are, as it were, the seed of our activity—so that they may well be received and 
fruitful in effect, so as to avoid any defect of sterility on their part’).  
Reception is the magic word that sheds light on all utterance of speech and that gives us 
the key for understanding Thaïs’s presence in the circle of flatterers. The words are uttered in 
conjunction with a receiver, they are addressed to somebody, therefore they can be used to get to 
a person’s mind and heart and influence him in a certain way. In Dante’s text, Thaïs is: la 
puttana che rispuose/al drudo suo quando disse “Ho io grazie/grandi apo te?”: “Anzi 
maravigliose!” (130-135; ‘the whore who, when he said, ‘Do I/ find great favor with you?’ 
replied to her lover: Marvelous favor indeed’).  
Thaïs’s sycophantic reply is premeditatedly formulated to produce a certain type of 
reaction and attitude on the male lover in whom she is interested. What is particular about her 
reply is that she goes too far in trying to please him; an excess that underlies the moral definition 
of the flatterer. She exaggerates her own pleasure so as to ensure her success with her paramour. 
It is true that a most courteous way of speech should govern, in Dante’s opinion, all friendly 
relationships. Friendships are to be built on soavi reggimenti, che sono dolce e 
cortesissimamente parlare, dolce e cortesemente servire e operare (‘kind attitudes, such as 
speaking kindly and very courteously, serving and acting kindly and courteously’). But Thaïs’s 
reply crosses the boundaries of the most courteous speech; it is a calculated fraud, a lie 
masquerading as a compliment. Truth was defined by Dante in the Convivio as that criterion that 
helps us convey a faithful image of ourselves in our speech: Veritade, la quale modera noi dal 
vantare noi oltre che siamo e da lo diminuire noi oltre che siamo, in nostro sermone.174 To be 
truthful, our words should reflect a personal image proportionate with our true self, and in the 
                                                 
174 Convivio, IV. XVII. 
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light of this definition, the same criterion may be extended to our speech about others: the words 
we use to describe them and their gestures should be proportionate with the genuine image we 
have of them. But Thaïs deliberately enlarges the image of her paramour (to paraphrase Dante lo 
vanta oltre che è), just as all flatterers exaggerate the qualities of the people they want to take 
advantage of. The outer, verbal projections flatterers make of their “victims” do not correspond 
to their true inner assessment of them; as a result, the speech of the flatterers becomes, to use 
Peraldus’s definition, a toxic honey. The type of contrapasso Dante reserved for the flatterers is 
justified by this definition; the lusingatori are punished in excrement that reflect the toxic 
speeches they eliminated through their mouths while alive.175 Our words should bear fruits, not 
be sterile, said Dante in the passage I have quoted above, but the only fruits that the flatterers’ 
speeches bear are these toxins in which they are plunged in the afterworld. The verbal residues 
become the excrement in which they bathe in the second ditch of Malebolge as though to 
confirm Dante’s own quote from the Scripture: Li schernidor Dio li schernisce.176
The difference between Alessio and Thaïs is, beyond their different historical origins—
one comes from the bookish universe of the Latin tradition, and the other from Dante’s own 
Italic, and contemporary, world—that Thaïs is from the outset placed by Dante in a social 
                                                 
175 Both Pézard and Güntert attribute the idea of this contrapasso to the possible influence exerted by Salisburry on 
Dante, since in Policraticus (III.4), adulatio is defined as fetor. For more on the relationship between Malebolge and 
physiological processes, see: Robert M. Durling, “Deceit and Digestion in the Belly of Hell.” [In Allegory and 
Representation: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979-1980. Greenblatt, S. ed. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1981), 61-93]. 
176 The symbolism of the human feces may also be interpreted in an erotic framework, since in the Middle Ages, 
stercum could span a wide range of implications. Among the definitions Alain of Lille gives this term in his 
theological dictionary, I have found three that match the idea of profit and lust with which Thaïs is associated: 
Dicitur carnalis voluptas, unde David: Suscitans a terra inopem et de stercore erigens pauperem. Dicitur bonum 
temporale, unde Jer.: Qui amplexantur stercora pro croceis. (…) Dicitur fetor luxuriae, unde propheta: 
Computruerunt jumenta in stercore suo. Jumenta quippe in stercore suo computrescere est carnales quosque in 
fetore luxuriae vitam finire.” (Distinctiones dictionum theologicalium, PL 210, col. 956 B; ‘It is called bodily 
pleasure, hence David: Raising the weak from the dust and the poor from filth. It is called temporal good, hence 
Jeremiah: Those nurtured in purple now lie in ash heaps. It is called the stink of lust, hence the Prophet: The animals 
rot in their dirt. It goes without saying that the animals stand for those who end their lives in the stench of lust’). 
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context: she is a puttana, a whore, who, according to Pézard, was not punished in hell by Dante 
for this single reply, but because this reply was indicative for him of a constant practice.177 
Filtered through Cicero’s or Salisbury’s texts, the Terentian female figure is called to represent 
in Malebolge the type of the female prostitute who turned adulatory speech into a way of life.178 
In the moral texts of the Middle Ages, flattery was commonly associated with depraved women, 
and Thaïs represented, for the same medieval culture, the prototype of the whore.179 It is, 
therefore, easy to understand why for Dante the figure of Thaïs represented the most suitable 
character for his exemplification of flattery as a practice with long roots in the history of 
mankind.  
In the structure of the Inferno, Thaïs also offers the key for understanding Dante’s 
placement of flattery between the sins of seduction and simony. Benvenuto da Imola has long 
ago pointed out Dante’s association of Thaïs and Jason on the grounds of their common 
obssession with seduction and deceit: et sic vide quod supra punivit viros fallentes mulieres in 
persona Jasonis, nunc punit mulieres fallentes viros in persona Thaidis (‘and as it is seen above 
that through Jason he punished men who deceived women, now, through Thaïs he punishes 
women who deceived men’).180 The link between seduction and flattery is not hard to see. Both 
transgressions are based on the use (or rather misuse) of the human tongue: the seducer, just like 
                                                 
177 Pézard, op. cit., 6. 
178Aldo Rossi mentions in this respect “il valore antonomastico del nome, tipico delle meretrici” (Enciclopedia 
Dantesca, 3, 509). 
179 Representative for the medieval perception of prostitutes as flatterers is Peter the Cantor, who in the wake of the 
biblical text, reiterates the notion that flattery is the common way of speech of prostitutes: Mel et lac sub lingua 
meretricis (‘milk and honey under the tongue of the whore’; Prov. 5, quoted in Verbum Abbreviatum (PL 205, 
Col.142 A). As to the medieval perception of Thaïs as the type of the depraved woman, the Liber Esopi of 
Waltherio, that is unanimously acknowledged as a source for Dante’s awareness of Thaïs, is considered by the 
Enciclopedia dantesca: “un documento del fatto che la cultura medievale continuava a fare di Taide il tipo della 
cortigiana, però degradato e infamato…” (Manlio Pastori  Stocchi, ED, 3, 510). 
180 Qoted by Sanguinetti, op. cit., 33. 
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the flatterer, mobilizes his rhetorical skills to reach his self-seeking goals. Both Jason and Thaïs 
are skillful speakers, but there is a sharp line of demarcation between smooth talk and virtuous 
talk. Sweet-sounding words of seduction and flattery are no other than skillful rhetoric put to the 
wrong service. This is why in the system of Hell, the sin of seduction, a complex behavioral 
mechanism that most often enlists the support of words, is put side by side with flattery. And this 
is also why in the Inferno the first two ditches of the Malebolge are treated within the same 
canto, and Jason, the seducer, makes the transition to the episodes of the flatterers Alessio and 
Thaïs. Thaïs, in her turn, marks the passage to simony, a passage easy to understand, since 
simony was defined in the Middle Ages as “a prostitution of God’s bride, the church.” 181 Peter 
the Cantor furnishes again, in his treatment of adulatio, an interesting link between this sin and 
simony, in a passage that I will quote here to suggest that the association of flattery with simony 
was not so extravagant in the moral texts: Attestante Gregorio (lib. XII Moral. c. 25), sicut 
nummus muneris et pecuniae effectus est simoniae, ita et nummus obsecutionis vel exsecutionis 
sordidae, puta adulationis. Munus enim gratis collatum est, sed nec donum gratiae est, quod 
confertur tam culpae quam pecuniae, vel naturae.  (PL 205, 140B; ‘Gregory attests in Moralia, 
book 12, chapter 25, if the retribution for a service and the obtention of money is symony, then 
simony is also the retribution for a vile submission or deed, like flattery. Because the retribution 
was obtained on account of the favors; it is neither a gift of gratitude, which opposes both guilt 
and money, nor (a gift) of nature’). 
Furthermore, according to Pézard, when Dante made the portrayal of Thaïs, he knew that 
he would artistically figure the Roman Church (that Dante saw as fraught with graft) as a 
                                                 
181 Joan Ferrante, op. cit., 462. 
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prostitute. 182 Along these lines it is worthwhile mentioning that the Romance of the Rose posited 
already a connection between (false) eros and simony, in a passage that speaks of the decayed 
state of love, a notion that according to Jean de Meun has become synomymous with fraud and 
deception:  
 
Lors ert amours sanz symonie,/L’uns ne demandoit riens a l’autre,/Quant 
baraz vint, lance seur fautre,/et pechiez et male aventure/Qui n’ot de 
souffisance cure./Orguieulz, qui desdaingne pareill/Vint avoec, o grant 
apareill,/Et couvoitise et avarice,/Envie et tuit li autre vice. (9528-9538) 
 
At that time there was no simony in love; one did not demand something from another. 
Then Fraud came, with his lance at rest, and Sin and Misfortune, who take no heed of 
Sufficiency, and along with them came Pride, equally disdainful in her grand array, 
Covetouseness, Avarice, Envy, and all the other vices. 
 
Inferno XVIII is a canto subtly dominated by female figures: indirectly present in the 
expression femmine da conio that diffusely projects them as unidentified objects on the scene of 
the male desires and trades, women are then figured as intellectually endowed persons through 
Hypsipile and Medea, both capable, according to the legend, of guile and manipulation. The 
female potentiality for inganno evoked in connection with Hypsipyle is then reiterated through 
the figure of Thaïs, who takes the linguistic side of guile (the lingua dolosa) to a high level on a 
perverse scale of values. 183  
Thaïs is the opposite of Dante’s ideal of female speech. In the Comedy, the poet casts 
Beatrice as the model for women’s interaction with language, repairing thus in Limbo, Purgatory 
and Paradise, the corruption brought into and through speech by women of Thaïs’s stock. When 
in Inferno II, Beatrice descends into Limbo to ask Virgil to help the lost and disheartened 
                                                 
182 Dante “sait déjà, quand il peint sa Thaïs, qu’il donnera les traits d’une prostituée a l’église, dans la vision 
apocalyptique qui achève le Purgatoire.” (Pézard, 18). 
183 For Lanfranco Caretti, Dante’s Thaïs represents “il culmine della frode ‘professionale’, dell’inganno di mestiere’ 
and her hyperbolic reply is a grotesque parody of the amorous talk. (op cit., 605) 
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pilgrim, her language is described as soave e piana ‘gentle and soft’; her speech, an 
exemplification of the art that Dante called in the Convivio il cortesissimamente parlare, is 
moved not by concerns of self-promotion, nor by simulated love, but by the most genuine form 
of charity: I’ son Beatrice che ti faccio andare;/vegno del loco ove tornar disio ;/amor mi mosse, 
che mi fa parlare (70-72; ‘I am Beatrice who cause you to go; I come from/ the place where I 
long to return; love has moved me/, and makes me speak.’). Beatrice’s words will not be false as 
those of Thaïs, but characterized by sincerity and truthfulness: Oh pietosa colei che mi 
soccorse!/e te cortese ch’udisti tosto/a le vere parole che ti porse. (133-135; ‘O full of pity she 
who has helped me!/And you/ courteous, hwo have quickly obeyed the true words/ she offered 
you.’; underlining mine). 
The notion of praise is contained also in Beatrice’s emotional plea to Virgil, but here her 
praise of the Latin poet will be uttered, she promises, in front of the highest divine forum, as a 
form of retribution: Quando sarò dinanzi al segnor mio,/di te mi loderò sovente a lui (73-74 ; 
‘ When I shall be before my Lord, I will praise/ frequently to him’) Beatrice restores to speeh 
that golden quality that seducers and flatterers denied to it : generosity; altruism on the level of 
human relationships, of the words and deeds that, according to Dante’s belief, should be 
beneficial to others, not to oneself : Comandamento è de li morali filosofi che de li benefici 
hanno parlato, che l’uomo dee mettere ingegno e sollicitudine in porgere li suoi benefici utili 
quanto puote più al ricevitore. 184
                                                 
184 Convivio IV.XXII. The same idea is couched elsewhere in the Convivio in Aristotelian terms:  Sì come Aristotile 
dice, l’uomo è animale civile, per che a lui si richiede non pur a sé ma altrui essere utile. (IV. XXVII). 
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4.2 EVIL COUNSELING, OR WHAT THE OLD WOMAN AND FRIEND HAVE IN 
COMMON WITH ULYSSES AND GUIDO DA MONTEFELTRO 
4.2.1 The Lover’s evil counselors 
After flattery, the next major intersection between the Romance of the Rose and the Divine 
Comedy is the discussion of evil counsel. Two characters—Friend and the Old Woman--
incarnate for Jean de Meun this form of transgressive speech, whereas Dante conceives a special 
place for evil counselors in Hell, among which he casts Ulysses and Guido da Montelfeltro.  
In the Rose, Reason’s discourse is followed by Friend’s, who also gives the Lover long 
indications on how to cope with the malady of love. Thus, the posture Friend adopts from the 
very outset is that of a counselor in matters of life and relationships with the opposite gender. 
The light in which he describes the torments of passion is less dark than Reason’s; he is a 
practical person, who speaks with the authority given by his own, solid experience in matters of 
life. It is an experience that had its own share of bitterness, therefore, the character will often 
speak sarcastically. Although Friend often invokes the principle according to which wisdom 
must govern all of the Lover’s actions, the advice he will give the Lover will be less 
philosophical and, at the same time, less moral than that of Lady Reason.  In Friend’s scheme of 
things, if the Lover wants to reach his goal (i.e., the conquering of the castle watched by Jalousie, 
in which Fair Welcoming is imprisoned), he must first take care of Evil Mouth and his relatives: 
this implies that the Lover must show an appearance of respect and good mood toward Evil 
Mouth, and serve him and his lineage, even if the Lover hates them. On the occasion of this 
piece of advice, the Friend introduces for the first time in his discourse the basic tenet of his life 
philosophy: deceiving deceivers is a praiseworthy thing (cil font bonne oevre/qui les deceveors 
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deçoivent; 7344-5).185 By virtue of this moral justification of fraud, Friend advises the Lover to 
offer Evil Mouth everything, be that his own body and soul, but not sincerely. Self-dedication 
should be only played, not felt (offrez leur tout par grant faintise; 7351), because--and here 
Friend will reiterate his principle--it is not a sin to deceive those who are already tarnished by 
their own deceitful practices (De ceuls bouler n’est pas pechiez/Qui de bouler sont entechiez; 
7355-6). The moral philosophy that transpires from this approach reveals Friend’s awareness of 
the potential transgressiveness of his advice: he obliquely admits that counseling fraud is a sin, 
but tries to excuse himself by invoking a piece of ‘popular wisdom’ according to which deceit 
practiced on tricksters is morally licit. On account of this justification, flattery and fallacious 
dissimulation (fausses simulations) are encouraged as harmless methods of reaching one’s 
purposes.  
The problem is that Friend encourages the Lover to adopt disingenuous ways in his social 
dealings even with people less immoral than Evil Mouth: the guardians of the Jalousie’s castle, 
or young girls. With the former, Friend encourages the Lover on using lies, swearing, bribing or 
dissimulating: 
  
(…) Pour apaiser leur presentez./ Et puis des maus vous dementez/Et dou 
travaill et de la paine,/K’amours vous fait qui la vous maine./Et se vous ne 
povez donner,/Par promesse estuet sermonner:/Prometez fort sanz 
delaier,/Comment qu’il aille dou paier;/Jurez fort et la foi bailliez/Ainz 
que conclus vous en ailliez;/Si leur priez qu’il vous sequerent./ Et si vostre 
oeill devant euls pleurent,/Ce vous iert mout granz avantages;/Plorez! Si 
ferez mout que sages;/Devant euls vous agenoilliez/Jointes main, et vos 
eulz moilliez/De chaudes lermes en la place,/Qui vous coulent aval la 
face,/Si qi’il les voient bien cheoir:/C’est mout granz pitié a veoir;/Lermes 
ne sont pas despiteuses,/ Meïsmement a genz piteuses. (7443-65). 
 
                                                 
185 This statement will have Christine de Pizan outraged in the Querelle, insofar as she will interpret it as 
declaration of immorality made by Jean de Meun himself. For more on this topic, see my section on Jean de 
Meun’s blasphemies. 
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Lull them by giving them such gifts. Afterward you will complain of your woes and of 
the toil and torment that Love, who brought you there, has made for you. Now if you can 
give nothing you must promise something by oath; however the payment goes, make a 
strong promise without delaying. Swear vehemently and pledge your faith rather than go 
away beaten; beg them to save you. And if your eyes weep in front of them it will be a 
very great advantage for you. Weep; you will do a very wise thing. Kneel down before 
them with joined hands and, right on the spot, moisten your eyes with hot tears that run 
down your face so that they can easily see them falling; it is a very pitiable sight to see. 
Tears are not despicable, especially to men of pity. 
 
 
 
The first strategy recommended in this long list is to corrupt the watchmen (or generally 
those who stand in one’s ways) with presents. Gifts soften everyone’s heart and make them more 
favorable to one’s cause.186 If one wants to get something from people, one has to touch their 
most sensitive chord (here pitié), to impress them with one’s suffering, and once one has fooled 
them, one ought not hesitate to take advantage of their weakness for one’s own selfish benefit; 
this is the lesson Friend imparts to the Lover. The persuasive strategies Friend recommends 
cover a wide range of manifestations, many of which are concerned with the usage of language: 
complaints, promises, oaths and prayers. Out of these strategies, the one that strikes me as most 
                                                 
186 The notion that making presents helps you influence or manipulate people is reiterated later on, in a 
more general context: Sachiez que dons les genz affolent,/As mesdisanz les langues tolent:/Se mal es 
donneours savoient/Tout le bien dou monde en diroient./Biau don soustienent maint bailli/Qui fussent ores 
mal bailli./Biau don de vins et de viandes/Ont fait donner maintes provandes!/Biau don si font, n’en doutez 
mie,/Porter tesmoing de bonne vie;/Mout tienent partout biau lieu don./Qui biaus dons donne, il est 
preudon!/Dons donnent los a donneours/Et enpirent les prenneours/Quant il leur naturel 
franchise/Obligent a autrui servise./Que vous diroie? A la parsomme,/Par don sont pris et dieu et homme. 
(8231-48; ‘Know that gifts fool people and rob the scandalmongers of their gossip. Even if they knew evil 
of the donors, they would speak all the good in the world about them. Fair gifts sustain many bailiffs who 
were formerly in poor circumstances; fair gifts of wine and food have been the source of many prebends; 
and fair gifts, without doubt, bear witness to a good life. Everywhere gifts give strong support to a fair 
place, and he who gives them is a worthy man. Gifts give praise to the givers and put those who take in a 
worse light, for gifts put their natural freedom under the obligation to serve another. What should I say? In 
sum, both god and man are captured by gifts’). Remarkable in this passage is the idea that presents affect 
people’s discourses: those who would normally gossip keep quite if they are jollied along with gifts. Under 
the influence of gifts, even if they would have reasons to speak ill of someone, they change their discourses 
from slander into praise. A similar idea is expressed by Dante, who describes the Bolognese barraters as 
changing the negation into an assertion for the sake of material profit. 
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fraudulent is the excessive usage of promises (sermonner par promesse or: prometez fort) with 
the awareness that they may not become true.  
Making false promises seems to be a very fashionable practice in the Middle Ages, since 
we will find it exemplified in Dante too, through the figure of Guido da Montelfeltro in Inferno 
XXVII. In the Rose, dealing with watchmen requires verbal skills, maintains Friend, and nothing 
is more harmful to a lover’s cause than a careless way of speech. A lover who wants to win over 
fierce guardians should never be a hasty speaker (hastif sermonneur), on the contrary, he should 
take all the time he needs to formulate his request, and moreover, he has to seize the right 
moment when to speak, i.e., when the watchman is in a good mood. We can see from this type of 
advice that Friend gives the Lover a veritable lesson of rhetoric: “be careful how you speak, 
when you speak,” only that the advice concerning these circumstances of speech is pressed into 
the service of ruse. As far as fraudulent crying (plorer par baraz) is concerned, Friend vividly 
recommends the usage of onion juice or other spices for the stimulation of tears. He points out 
that this has always been a very successful practice with women, who wishing to seduce men, 
were themselves fooled by men’s false tears and words (faveles). Through Friend’s remarks 
about the games of Love, Jean de Meun obliquely denounces the code of courtly love, based on a 
series of gestural and linguistic attitudes that for Jean were mere fallacies.187 
More hypocritical attitudes are recommended by Friend in relationships with women: the 
Lover has to try everything to adapt his behavior to the behavior of the young woman he desires. 
If she is childish, he has to play childish; if she is wise and mature he has to behave like a mature 
person himself. If she hates or blames something, he should hate it and blame it himself. He 
                                                 
187 Another exemplification of the hypocrisy of fin’amors that Jean condemns is the convention of writing 
that promoted the concealment of the true gender of the lover under the opposite pronoun (the pronoun il 
designated ‘she’, and elle ‘he’). 
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should be happy when she is happy, cry when she cries, and praise whatever she praises.188 He 
has to flatter her, by eulogizing her looks and manners at all times. That all of Friend’s pieces of 
advice represent exhortations to the use of fraud is made clear by the Lover’s reaction at hearing 
them. Only a hypocrite would do such devilish things, he exclaims, apparently outraged: Nus 
hons, s’il n’est faus ypocrites,/Ne feroit ceste deablie (7798-9).189
But the Lover’s reply does not diminish Friend’s enthusiasm as a counselor of fraud, and 
the remainder of his discourse offers the reader more surprises. An interesting aspect of the 
relationship between language and love occurs when Friend starts speaking about female 
venality:  
 
 
Nepourquant, s’il me requeroit/Conseil, savoir se bon seroit/Qu’il feïst 
rimes jolivetes/Motez, flabiaus et chançonnetes,/Qui’il veuille a s’amie 
envoier/Pour li tenir et apaier:/Ha! Las! De ce ne puet chaloir,/Biau dit i 
puet trop po valoir!/Li dit espor loé seront,/D’autre preu petit i feront. 
(8341-50) 
 
Nevertheless, if he were to ask my advice in order to find out if it would be a good idea 
for him to make pretty rhymes, motets, little stories and songs that he may want to send 
to his sweetheart to hold her and make her happy, I must answer that, alas, it can make no 
difference. Pretty songs can be worth very little in this case. Perhaps the songs will be 
praised, but they will bring in little profit. 
 
 
In sharp opposition with the golden age, when love was sincere, and devoid of simony, in 
Friend’s days love has become a form of commerce, in which the woman lets herself be 
conquered by men with well filled pockets. In this context, the noblest expressions of human 
                                                 
188 It is valuable to note that in the French text, the pronoun used to designate the generic woman for which 
Bel-Accueil stands is il, since the grammatical gender of the noun Bel-Accueil (‘Fair Welcoming’) is 
masculine. For a thorough study of the implications of this pronominal obfuscation, see Simon Gaunt, 
“Bel-Accueil and the Improper Allegory of the Romance of the Rose.” New Medieval Literatures, 2, Rita 
Copeland, D. Lawton, W. Scase, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 65-93. 
189I say apparently, because the Lover will end up heeding to Friend’s devilish advice.  
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language: poetry, tales, songs, in other words all the assets of the literary tradition of fin’amors 
have become powerless and useless in competition with money. Money talks, not the verse, and 
women now run to embrace those rich in their pockets, not in their hearts. Jean places the 
diminishing stature of courtly poetry as a driving force in love in the framework of Friend’s 
depiction of the end of the golden age. This is an extraordinary moment in Friend’s discourse, 
which presents the state of the contemporary scene in terms that will become the hallmarks of 
Dante’s language in the Comedy:  
 
 
 Lors ert amours sanz symonie,/L’uns ne demandoit riens a l’autre,/Quant 
baraz vint, lance seur fautre,/Et pechiez et male aventure/Qui n’ot de 
souffisance cure./Orguieulz, qui desdaingne pareill/Vint avoec, o grant 
appareill,/Et couvoitise et avarice,/Envie et tuit li autre vice. (…) Tantost 
cil doulereus mauffé/De forsenerie eschauffé,/De duel, de corrouz et 
d’envie,/Quant virent genz mener tel vie,/S’escourcerent par toutes 
terres/Semanz descors, contens et guerres,/Mesdiz, rancunes et 
haÿnnes/Par corrouz et par ataÿnnes./ Et pour ce qu’il orent or chier,/La 
terre firent escorchier/Et li sachierent des entrailles/Ses ancianes 
repostailles,/Metaus et pierres precieuses,/Dont gens devindrent 
envieuses;/Car avarice et couvoitise/Ont es cuers des homes assise/La 
grant ardeur d’avoir aquerre./L’une l’acquiert, l’autre l’enserre. (…) 
Tantost com par ceste maisnie/Fu la gens mauvaise et faisnie,/La première 
vie laissierent/De mal faire puis ne cessierent/Car fals et tricheour 
devindrent.(9530-95) 
 
At that time there was no simony in love; one did not demand something from another. 
Then Fraud came, with his lance at rest, and Sin and Misfortune, who take no heed of 
Sufficiency, and, along with them, came Pride, equally disdainful in her grand array, 
Covetousness, Avarice, Envy, and all the other vices. (…) Immediately these wretched 
devils, excited by fury, sorrow, anger, and envy when they saw men leading such a life, 
rushed off through all countries, sowing discord, contention and war, slander, rancor, and 
hatred through anger and quarreling. Because they held gold dear, they had the earth 
flayed for it, and they drew out its bowels for its old deposits of metals and precious 
stones that make men grow envious. For Avarice and Covetousness established in the 
hearts of men the burning desire to acquire possessions. The latter acquire them and the 
former locks them up. (…) As soon as this troop had played its evil tricks, men 
abandoned their first life and after that they did not cease doing evil, for they became 
false and treacherous. 
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Fraud and sufficiency are Aristotelian terms consecrated by the moral tracts of the later 
Middle Ages. They will become fundamental coordinates for Dante’s moral system, which posits 
the notion of fraud as one of the axes of hell, and that of sufficiency as a criterion of distinction 
between insufficient love and excessive love in purgatory. In Jean’s list, Fraud is followed by 
two generic terms with further moral connotations pechiez (‘sin’) and male aventure (‘misdeed’ 
or ‘mischief’, ‘misfortune’), which spring from violating the right mean between two extremes 
(souffisance). In this passage, Classical, Aristotelian theories of morality are intertwined with the 
Christian list of the deadly vices (pride, covetousness, avarice, wrath, sorrow), in an ethical 
amalgam that will characterize Dante’s system of hell, as well. More importantly for us, this long 
and disorderly list contains several sins of the tongue: sowing of discord, contention, slander, and 
quarrelling. Here, Jean’s approach to them seems to follow a Gregorian pattern, with sins of the 
tongue stemming from the seven capital vices.  
The surprises offered by Friend’s discourse do not end with the picture of the dark days 
in which Fraud and his companions conquered the world. As though Friend forgot his complaint 
about the decay of the morals at the very moment when he uttered it, shortly later he resumes his 
office of fraudulent counselor and begins again to recommend the use of ruse and deceit in the 
relationship between men and women.190 Cheating is a perfectly moral practice in Friend’s view 
of life, therefore he meticulously gives instructions on what a cheating man should say or do to 
appease the suspicions of his girl friend or fiancée: he should vigorously deny all the accusations 
of infidelity, he should swear he still loves her, he should flatter and promise her he would 
always stay true to their love (9811- 9898). Not only that, but he should also make some mental 
                                                 
190 This kind of contrast that occurs within the discourse of a character is shocking as it undermines the 
very coherence of that character. This is however a writerly practice that Jean systematically applies to his 
characters: we will see it again at work in the discourses of The Old Woman, Nature, Genius, and 
especially Faus Semblant. 
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efforts and come up with some fictitious dreams he had about her, dreams he should romantically 
tell her before they go to sleep: 
  
Si li doit faindre noviaus songes/Touz farcis de plaisanz mençonges./Et 
quant vient au soir, qu’il se couche/Touz seuls, en sa chamber, en sa 
couche./Avis li est, qaunt il sommeille/-Car pou i dort i mout i veille-
/Qu’il l’ait entre ses braz tenue/Avoeques lui trestoute nue/Par soulaz et 
par druërie,/Toute saine et toute guerie/Et par jour en lieus delitables:/Tels 
fables li cont ou samblables. (9887-98) 191
 
He must pretend to have unusual dreams, all stuffed with pleasing falsehoods. Let him 
say that when night comes and he lies all alone on his bed in his room, it seems to him, 
when he sleeps—for he sleeps but little and is often awake—that she was completely 
healthy and cured, and that all night long and through the day, in delightful places, he 
held her naked in his arms in the solace of love-making. He should tell her such fables or 
similar ones. 
 
 
The ability of speech to convey truth in the relationship between a man and a woman, and 
in a more general way between people, is called into question here. Jean’s female readership 
must have had a shock reading these lines (as indeed had Christine de Pizan), and their trust in 
the male erotic speech must have been seriously shaken. But was not this the very agenda of Jean 
de Meun as the author of the Mireor aus amoureus, a moral encyclopedia for lovers? Jean writes 
a book in which all categories of lovers need to see their images reflected; this entails that even 
those lovers who conquer the object of their desires through sweet talking, lies and ruse (because 
love is, as we have seen, a sin, and a form of simony) will recognize themselves in the mirror. 
Moreover, this book has didactic purposes: it is explicitly written with the goal of instructing 
people (especially the youth) in matters of love and life. As such, by questioning the truthfulness 
of erotic language, this book undertakes to disillusion young women and make them more alert 
                                                 
191 The interesting rhyme songe/mençonges has been used in criticism of the Rose to show Jean’s mistrust 
for the dream as a narrative form. 
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to the traps of verbal strategies of seduction. Words are the cousins of deeds, says Jean in his 
apology, or at least this is what they should be. That this is not always the case is a sad 
occurrence, and Friend’s discourse is the perfect exemplification of such an occurrence. Men use 
language to lie, to charm, to seduce women into their beds, in short, to manipulate. Words are no 
longer expressions of truth but veils that may cover it very well. The moral substance is not in 
the speech, because this can be false and treacherous, but in the intention underlying this speech.  
If Friend’s sequence focuses on the falsity inherent in the male verbal methods of 
seduction, the discourse of the Old Woman teaches exactly the same methods from the opposite 
angle: she instructs young women on how to seduce men.192 The Old Woman introduces herself 
in the Roman as having a great expertise in erotic relationships: she did not need to go to school 
to take lessons on love, she says, for at school one studies only theories, whereas life taught her 
the practice of love: N’ainc ne fui d’amour a escole/Ou l’on seüst la theorique;/Mais je sai tout 
par la pratique:/Experimenz m’en ont fait sage (12806-9). Like in Friend’s case, the Old 
Woman’s idea of wisdom is very different from Lady Reason’s. For Reason, wisdom meant the 
ability to discern between good and evil and to opt for the righteous path in life; it implied 
shunning temptations and vices and keeping measure in desires. It also meant the ability to rein 
in one’s tongue and speak with discernment. The Old Woman’s idea of wisdom is the exact 
opposite of Lady Reason’s moral doctrine. The experience that made her wise, she says, is 
exclusively based on an endless game in which the woman is at times the duped and at other 
times the trickster: Maint vaillant homme ai deceü/Quant en mes las le tins cheü;/Mais ainz fui 
par mains deceüe/Que je m’en fusse aperceüe (12831-4). By virtue of this rich life experience, 
                                                 
192 For a study of this allegorical figure, see Luis Beltrán. “The Old Woman’s Past.” Romanische 
Forschungen 84  (1972), 77-96. Bertran analyzes the Old Woman in the framework of the medieval 
tradition of depicting old women in romances and fabliaux. 
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the Old Woman developed a solid corpus of knowledge--her doctrine, she says—that now she 
imparts to Fair Welcoming. Just as for Friend it was morally licit to trick the trickster, so for the 
Old Woman it is natural that a woman places her heart in several places, not just one. This is an 
idea that runs like a thread throughout her speech. A woman should never offer her heart but sell 
it, and sell it well, to the man who offers the highest price for it.  
Deviant forms of speech are also strongly recommended to women as a constitutive part 
of the game of love: perjury, lies and false promises. These acts form the linguistic ‘weaponry’ 
that any woman should master if she wants to win over a man. Women should not be afraid to 
swear falsely, they should not be afraid they might commit a sin, since even God will not take 
seriously a love oath uttered by a woman, but will readily pardon her perjury: S’ele est parjure, 
ne li chaille:/Dieus se rit de tel serement/Et le pardonne liement (13128-30). To justify her 
support for the linguistic habit of perjury, the Old Woman has recourse to mythology and 
invokes the pagan gods, with Jupiter at the forefront, who made of false swearing in love a 
current practice. In ancient times, it is because men saw their gods betraying their words, that 
men themselves felt justified in lying and making false promises, the Old Woman says (Ce 
devroit mout asseürer/Les fins amanz de parjurer/Saintes et sainz, moustiers et temples/Quant li 
dieu leur donnent examples. 13139-42). Across this veiled critique of mythic morality, perjury as 
a verbal practice is obliquely condemned the very moment it is recommended.  It is one of those 
instances in which Jean de Meun weaves a contradiction into the intimate nature of a character, 
in order to undermine that character’s claims to moral truth and wisdom. The Old Woman seems 
to recommend perjury, but by invoking the values of a pagan world in which gods themselves 
were big liars, she calls into question the very morality of the practice of swearing. From an 
artistic point of view, it is a performance that not many writers could achieve. Jean de Meun 
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rarely says things directly, his artistic intelligence is convoluted rather than straightforward and it 
takes a great art to be able to undermine a position on a moral issue the very moment that 
position is firmly asserted. It is a literary strategy that, as I have argued, represents the hallmark 
of Jean de Meun as a writer concerned with moral themes. Both Friend and the Old Woman (and 
later on False Seeming) recommend deceit in deeds and words, but the foundation of their 
recommendations is compromised by the very contexts in which these recommendations are 
made. In the Old Woman’s speech, perjury is legitimized by the mores of the ancient world, but 
to a Christian, this world made of numerous gods is a priori mendacious. Thus, this form of 
moral legitimization simply does not stand.   
By this illusory solution offered to the issue of false swearing, the trust in the messages 
conveyed through human language is again sapped. The Old Woman explicitly expresses this 
idea, by saying that one must be a fool to believe the words of a lover only because (s)he swore 
they were true: lovers have changing hearts, and both the youth and the old easily deny their own 
words and vows (Juene genz ne sont point estables;/Non sont li vieill souventes foiz,/Ainz 
mentent seremenz et foiz; 13146-9). After she makes this general point, the Old Woman returns 
to questions related to the female gender. A woman who loves just one man deserves all the 
suffering and torments of love, because fidelity is a stupid thing: no matter how experienced a 
woman is, and how well versed in erotic tricks she is, she cannot keep the man she loves for too 
long. Men are masters in the art of making false promises and oaths, as again the myths of the 
ancient world show. Aeneas repeatedly swore fidelity to Dido, but ended up betraying his words 
and abandoning her. Because she trusted too much in his fallacious speeches, when he left, she 
suffered so much that she committed suicide. Phyllis also waited in vain for Demophon to keep 
his promise. He never came back to her and she hung herself. Paris as well had declared fidelity 
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to Oenone in writing, on the skin of a tree, but was quick to forget his vows when he fell in love 
with beautiful Helen. Jason belongs to the same gallery of perjurers in love, for he abandoned 
Medea after he had sworn he would never leave her. Again because she trusted too much in his 
passionate but mendacious words, when he left her, her suffering became unbearable and she 
committed heinous crimes: she killed the children she had with him and then herself. 193
This rich list of mythical exempla, meant to illustrate the currency of the practice of 
perjury among men, becomes a new mean of authorizing the female use of the same verbal 
practice. The implication is that since men have remorselessly been employing verbal deceit 
from the beginning of times, why should ‘modern’ women not do the same? All men cheat, lie, 
and love several women at the same time, why should women not act in the same way? Again, a 
woman who loves just one man is stupid, she ought to flirt with and place her heart in several 
men, and make all of them love her passionately. At this point, the character teaches women how 
to render themselves agreeable to their male companions: how to dress themselves, how to eat, 
how to walk, and especially how to speak. Within the context of the usage of speech, the Old 
Woman draws attention to the importance of being a smooth and sweet talker: women should not 
only know songs and games, but they should necessarily avoid all quarrel and contention. This 
idea is not developed, but later on in the discourse, the character adds a new piece of advice 
concerning the female way of speaking: if women feel they need to cry in front of a man, to 
impress and manipulate him, they can do so, but they should not in any circumstances let any of 
their thoughts transpire through their words or deeds: Mais gart que par voiz ne par oevre/Riens 
                                                 
193 In the text, both the love story between Phyllis and Demophon and that between Paris and Oenone are 
evoked succinctly, in just a few verses, whereas those between Aeneas and Dido and Jason and Medea, 
respectively, are told with a wealth of details. The last two couples are mentioned in the Comedy as well. 
We have seen Jason punished among seducers in Inferno XVIII, where he suffers for his betrayal of Medea, 
and we will encounter Dido evoked as well. 
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de son penser ne descuevre (13387-8) This idea is reasserted in the context of the table manners: 
women are strongly advised not to drink beyond measure, because they may lose control over 
their speech (Et bien se gart qu’el ne s’enyvre,/Car en homme ne en fame yvre/Ne peut avoir 
chose secree/Car puis que fame est enyvree,/Il n’a point en li de deffense,/Ainz jangle tout 
quanqu’el pense/Et est a touz abandonnee/Quant a tel meschief s’est donnee. (‘Now a lady must 
be careful not to get drunk, for a drunk, man or woman, cannot keep anything secret; and when a 
woman gets drunk, she has no defenses at all in her, but blurts out whatever she thinks and 
abandons herself to anyone when she gives herself over to such bad conduct.’ 13453-9). 194
No matter how wicked the intention of a woman is, the appearance of decency must 
always be preserved. This constant interplay between essence and appearance the Old Woman 
recommends as a behavioral strategy to women confers tones of comedy to her speech in the 
poem. Her own advice is often couched in moral language, but placed in an immoral context. 
She says, for instance, that a woman should not yield to the first man who makes her promises; 
she should first check if he speaks with good intentions, springing from a pure heart, or with evil 
ones. But then immediately she teaches the woman how to take advantage of that man, how to 
dupe him with her words and get his money:   
 
Et s’il vient aucuns prometierres,/Soit loyaus homs ou 
hoquelierres,/Qui la vueille d’amours proier/Et par promesse a soi 
loier,/Et cele ausi li repramete,/Mais bien se gart qu’ele ne se 
mete/Pour nulle riens en sa manoie./Devant qu’el tiengne la 
monoie./Et s’il mande riens par escrit/gart se cil faintenment 
                                                 
194 The link between excessive food or drink and verbosity was not uncommon in the Middle Ages.  Both 
Robert de Sorbonne (De confessione), and Laurent d’Orléans (Somme le roi), for instance, treat verbal 
deviations together with gluttony as sins of the mouth (‘peccata gulae’). For more on the link between 
affluentia ciborum-inundatio verborum, see Casagrande and Vecchio, I peccati, the chapter “La lingua tra 
gula e loquacitas” (I peccati della lingua, 141-168). 
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escrit/Ou s’il a bonne entencion/De fin cuer sanz decepcion. 
(13651-62)  
 
And if any man, either an honest man or a swindler, should make promises, 
hoping to beg for her love and bind her to him by vows, she may exchange 
vows, but she must be careful not to put herself at his mercy unless she gets hold 
of the money also. If he makes any promise in writing, she must see if there is 
any deception or if his good intentions are those of a true heart. 
 
On the one hand, a woman must check on her paramour’s honesty (or his money), and on 
the other, she may promise him whatever she wants. Language here is wide open to any 
possibilities; it may be used in any way, as long as these usages of language serve a woman’s 
purposes. The Old Woman encourages female speakers to swear falsely on God or the saints. 
She goes as far as to give women the actual words they should use in addressing their paramours, 
and even how to reinforce the truthfulness of their words by invoking the sacred name of the 
founder of the papal seat. 
 
Cele qui puis a lui s’acorde/Et qui tant set de guiles faintes,/Dieu 
doit jurer et sainz et saintes/ K’ainc ne se vost mais otroier/A nul, 
tant la seüst proier,/Et die: “Sire, c’est la soume,/Foi que doi saint 
Pere de Romme,/Par fine amour a vous me don,/Car ce n’est pas 
pour vostre don./N’est hons nez pour cui ce feïsse,/Pour nul don, 
tant grant le veïsse./Maint vaillant homme ai refusé/Car mout ont 
maint a moi musé./Si croi que m’avez enchantee:/Male chançon 
m’aviez chantee!”/Lors le doit estroit acoler/Et baisier pour mieus 
affoler./Mais s’el veult mon conseil avoir/N’entende a rien, fors a 
l’avoir. (13684-13700) 
 
In giving in to him, she, who knows so many wily ruses, should swear by God 
and by the saints that she has never wished to give herself to anyone, no matter 
how well he may have pleaded; then she should say, ‘My lord, this is my all; by 
the faith which I owe to Saint Peter of Rome, I give myself to you out of pure 
love, not because of your gifts. The man isn’t born for whom I would do this for 
any gift, no matter how greatly he desired it. I have refused many a worthy man, 
for many have gazed adoringly at me. I think you must have cast a spell over 
me; you have sung me a wicked song.’ Then she should embrace him closely 
and kiss him so that he will be even better deluded. But if she wants my advice, 
she should think only of what she can get. 
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Within this veritable lesson of rhetoric, no moral limits are imposed on female speech; 
rather all of them are trespassed. A woman may, or rather should, lie, make false promises, and 
even shore everything up with the names of God and the saints. Everything is allowed to and in 
speech. Perjury and blasphemy are encouraged and brought to the level of art that can be taught 
or imparted. The Old Woman’s advice on the use of speech goes counter the entire pastoral 
tradition on moral speech. She recommends what the authors on moral texts on the sins of the 
tongue forbid. Through her the erotic linguistic code is turned into sacrilegious language.  
Both Friend and the Old Woman strongly recommend the use of fraud in human 
relationships. The Old Woman seems to go a step further than the former, as she presses even 
religious language into the service of deceit.  Although through these characters Jean de Meun 
condemns the wicked use of rhetoric only obliquely, without labeling it a sin, at the time when 
he was building these two characters into his poem, the activity of counseling the use of fraud 
was considered a sin. In his Summa Vitiorum from 1245, William Peraldus introduced the notion 
of pravum consilium as a sin of the tongue. In his moral Summa from 1270-80, Aquinas 
discussed this notion as well. Echoes of these late medieval examinations of the sin of evil 
counsel can also be retrieved in the Divine Comedy, where evil counseling is represented through 
the figures of Ulysses, Diomedes and Guido da Montelfetro. My next section examines these 
literary figures and sets Dante’s view of the sin of consiglio frodolente in the context of Peraldus, 
Aquinas and Cavalca’s treatment of pravum consilium (‘malo consiglio’).  
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4.2.2 The name of the sin: medieval moralists on pravum consilium and Ulysses and 
Guido’s sin 
Two of the most important postulates of hermeneutics found themselves verified in Canto XXVI 
of the Inferno: one concerns the multiplicity of possible interpretations given to one and same 
literary work, and the other the immunity of great art to history. Readers in different times and 
different places see different things in one and the same literary fragment, in one and the same 
episode or character, argues Gadamer, and there is hardly another place in the Divine Comedy 
that illustrates this argument better than the Ulysses episode. Over the course of seven centuries 
of literary criticism, Dante readers and scholars have seen different and sometimes highly 
opposing meanings in the Dantean reinterpretation of the Homeric myth. But if there is one thing 
to be appreciated amidst this great volume of varying and contrasting readings, this is the proof 
all these readings gather in favor of the genius of the medieval Italian poet. Every time we read a 
text, said Gadamer, we awaken that text, we bring it to a new life, and the fact that over the 
course of time Dante’s Ulysses has received so many interpretations is irrefutable evidence for 
the permanence of the textual life of the Comedy. Thanks to the fascinating and highly 
controversial figure of Ulysses--and to many other abiding spiritual insights of Dante’s--the 
poema sacro has so far been immune to historical death. 
The main hermeneutical difficulties of Inferno XXVI, the narrative of which unfolds in 
the eighth circle of Malebolge, are two: the first springs from Dante’s omission of the name of 
the sin in the taxonomic moral list provided in Inferno XI: the sins punished in pouches eight and 
nine are branded by Virgil not as specific sins, but as simile lordura (‘like trash’). Half of this 
strongly pejorative but vague phrase is disambiguated in the narrative of the ninth bolgia, labeled 
as the bolgia of the sowers of schism and discord, a denomination accepted by literary critics 
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with no reservation. But the label consiglio frodolente, given in the text with respect to Guido da 
Montefeltro has been less well accepted, especially when extrapolated from Guido to Ulysses. 
Because Inferno XXVI, which contains the Ulysses episode, gives basically no explicit indication 
of the sin for which Ulysses is punished, an omission that only compounds the mystery of the 
phrase simile lordura, Dante’s readers felt justified in searching for Ulysses’ sin in different 
directions: some have said Ulysses, like Guido, is punished for his evil use of language; some 
have argued for a sin of astutia;195 some others for falsa prudential,196 whereas another category 
has refused to see any kind of sin in Ulysses, insisting on the greatness of the figure, on the 
admiration Dante supposedly felt for him, and completely forgetting that the hero is tortured in 
hell.197
                                                 
195 John Ahern dismisses the theory of the consiglio frodolente, and, drawing on medieval moralists on astutia 
(Grosseteste, Aquinas, Cavalca, etc.), posits slyness as the reason for the Greek’s presence in Hell. See “Dante’s 
slyness: The Unnamed Sin of the Eighth Bolgia,” in Romanic Review, 73. 3 (1982), 275-291. Richard Kay also 
pleads for astutia in “Two pairs of Tricks: Ulysses and Guido in Dante’s Inferno XXVI-XXVII,” in Quaderni 
d’Ialianistica, 1 (1980), 107-124. 
196 See, for instance, Massimo Seriacopi, who, in the wake of an early commentator, develops the Thomistic concept 
with application to Dante’s Ulysses: “Fondamentale, come già notato nel primo capitolo, è poi l’intervento 
dell’Anonimo Fiorentino, che introduce uno dei “termini chiave” per l’interpretazione del canto, quella prudenzia, 
che, come virtù, tiene il mezzo, e il cui vizio-estremizzazione di grado superiore (o sapere finalizzato all’inganno) è 
l’astuzia e la callidità.” All’estremo della “Prudentia.” L’Ulisse di Dante (Roma: Zauli, Arti Grafiche, 1994), 51. 
The list of sins ascribed to Dante’s Ulysses does not end here, however; Nardi has spoken of a Luciferic-Adamic 
superbia, whereas Porena, Donno and others of evil use of ingegno. Rocco Montano has interpreted Ulysses’ 
trespass as vana curiositas (“Il folle volo d’Ulisse.’ Suggerimenti per una lettura di Dante (Napoli, 1956), 131-174, 
whereas Fiorenzo Forti has argued for “fol hardement” [‘Curiositas’ o ‘fol hardement’, in Fra le carte dei poeti 
(Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1965), 41-77]. Other interpretations were offered by Mario Trovato who argues for 
injustice  (“Il contrapasso nell’Ottava Bolgia,” in Dante Studies, 94 (1976), 47-60, and Lawrence V. Ryan, who 
pleads for betrayal (“Ulysses, Guido and the Betrayal of Community,” Italica, 54 (1977), 227-249. 
197 See Mario Fubini, “Il peccato di Ulisse” and “Il canto XXVI,” published in Il peccato d’Ulisse e altri scritti 
danteschi (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1966), 1-76. For an overview of the major interpretive engagements with 
Dante’s Ulysses, see Anthony K. Cassell, “Ulisseana: A Bibliography of Dante’s Ulysses to 1981,” Italian Culture, 
3 (1981), 23-45, and more recently Massimo Seriacopi’s Ulisse all’estremo della prudentia,” which contains ample 
recollections of the main discussions around Ulysses, from the early commentators on Dante to the most modern. 
For a sharp analysis of the interpretive flaws of the chief trends in the approach to Dante’s Ulysses, see Teodolinda 
Barolini, The Undivine Comedy, where the author highlights the paradoxes inherent in the positions sustained either 
by the “pro-Ulysseans. (Those who glorify Ulysses, like Fubini, for instance, forget the relevant fact that he is 
punished in Hell, whereas the “moralists” deny to Ulysses his thematic significance for the whole poem). Ulysses, 
Barolini says, is “privileged by the poet, not morally or eschatologically but textually and poetically” (p. 51). 
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The second hermeneutical node raised by the text figuring circle eight comes from the 
specificity of the contrapasso: on the bottom of this infernal area, Dante and Virgil see a great 
number of tongue-shaped flames which enshroud sinful souls.  
Here too critics have debated the message conveyed by this form of retribution and 
argued that this contrapasso is ambiguous, less clear than other forms of punishment ascribed to 
other sinners.198 Here, however, the contrapasso has served best the interpreters defending the 
thesis of Ulysses punished in Hell for wrongful use of the gift of speech, since there is an 
obvious figural correspondence between the tongue, as an anatomic organ used to utter words, 
and the form of the souls represented as tongues of fire.199 Thus, among the early commentators, 
Pietro Alighieri, introduces the source that provided Dante the image of the tongue-like flames, 
and quotes the famous passage from the Epistle of Saint James, where the tongue is described as 
a dangerous fire, harboring a great destructive potential.200 Pietro’s discussion of the biblical 
source has been convincingly developed in our days by Richard Bates and Thomas Rendall, who 
                                                 
198 “Il grosso dilemma nell’interpretazione di questi versi riguarda comunque i termini del contrapasso che non sono 
chiari, o che, perlomeno, ci lasciano la sensazione di una ‘verità nascosta’ nel profondo e non pienamente 
percepibile al primo contatto con il testo; si avverte la presenza di un referente arcaico—probabilmente biblico-che 
associ analogicamante disposizione al peccato e risposta divina a questo particolare tipo di aversio.” (Seriacopi, op. 
cit., 48). 
199 Mazzotta makes a splendid connection between this contrapasso and Alain of Lille’s description of rhetoric as 
“ignis in ore,” in Anticlaudianus. [See Dante, Poet of the Desert. History and Allegory in the Divine Comedy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 92]. For Boitani, too, this form of retribution figures a “tragedy of 
language,” (“Beyond the Sunset: Dante’s Ulysses in Another World.” Lectura Dantis, Fall 1991, 38), and, in the 
same vein, Truscott, speaks of the flames as punishing the “misuse of the gift of counsel in speech” (“Ulysses and 
Guido. Inferno XXVI-XXVII,” in Dante Studies, XCI (1973), 54.  
200 Lingua modicum membrum est et magna exaltat, ecce quantum ignis quam magnam silvam incendat et lingua 
ignis est inflammans totam nativitatis nostre. Jac. II.5-8 (‘The tongue is a tiny part of the body that accomplishes 
great things. Just as a very small fire ignites a very big forest, so the tongue is a fire that enflames all of our race;’ 
translation mine). Another possible source would be Solomon, Proverb XXXIII: vir impius prodit malum et in labiis 
eius ignis ardescit (‘an ungodly man diggeth up evil and in his lips there is a burning fire’). Throughout my 
dissertation, the translation of the biblical quotes follows the King James version of the Bible. 
For more comments on Pietro Alighieri’s interpretation of the fiery tongues in Malebolge, see Seriacopi, op. cit., 49-
50. 
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analyze textually the Epistle and argue that James is clearly the source that served Dante in his 
figuration of the contrapassso for fraudulent counselors.201
In what follows, I undertake to examine Inferno XXVI and XXVII, with a focus on the 
figures of Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro, and reopen the discussion around the moral 
category of fraudulent counsel. This section of my dissertation is intended as a response to those 
critics who have maintained that Ulysses (and even Guido) are not punished by Dante for 
consiglio frodolente because there was no such moral category in the Middle Ages.202 To 
respond to such an incorrect assertion, I will do a simple test of verification in which I will use 
the main medieval theorists on pravum consilium (‘evil, wicked counsel’) in the late Middle 
Ages, William Peraldus and Domenico Cavalca, in particular, to see if their theories apply to 
Dante’s Ulysses and Guido, and if so, to what extent. Since it is not one of the objectives of this 
part of my dissertation to give a survey of the extremely varied positions within what Teodolinda 
Barolini has rightly called “the Ulysses querelle,” when necessary I will invoke only those 
critical standpoints that are relevant to my discussion of the sin of consiglio frodolente in the 
Inferno. 
The interpretation of fraudulent counsel as the sin punished in the eighth pouch of 
Malebolge starts early on, with Dante’s own sons Jacopo and Pietro, both of whom argued for 
                                                 
201 Bates and Rendall complain about those interpreters who ignore the link between the sin and the contrapasso in 
Ulysses’ case, a link that they consider “one of the most satisfying congruencies of the Inferno,” since: “Not only is 
the Greek’s sin presented through his punishment, but, as in the earlier scene of the barrators, we actually witness 
the sinner practicing his sin, upon his men in the orazion picciola (XXVI, 112-120), upon the poets in the whole 
narration of his last voyage, and, most importantly, upon the reader, who may very well be taken in, as many critics 
have been, by the great orator’s specious rhetoric.” “Dante’s Ulysses and the Epistle of James,” Dante Studies, 108 
(1989), 35. 
202 It is mainly Ahern who denied the existence of consiglio frodolente as an established moral concept: “Nor do 
most readers realize that there is no Christian tradition of a sin of Fraudulent Counsel” (in “Dante’s Slyness,” 275). 
This position is resumed in the Dante Encyclopedia: “Fraudulent counsel is not a recognized classification of sin in 
the Middle Ages and is used by Dante very specifically to describe only the evil guidance of Guido.” [Richard 
Lansing, ed., (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000), 423]. 
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the linguistic side of Ulysses and Guido’s transgressions.203 For Francesco da Buti, as well, there 
was no doubt that the moral category of fraudulento consiglio was to be applied also to Ulysses, 
not only to Guido da Montelfeltro.204 In modern times, the same is the position defended by 
Giorgio Padoan,205 Giorgio Brugnoli,206 Anna Dolfi,207 Maria Corti, Bruno Porcelli, and the 
above-mentioned Bates and Rendall. 
Since two of these scholars have made important assertions about Dante’s possible 
connections with the medieval theorists on the sins of the tongue, I will briefly highlight their 
contributions, before proceeding to my analysis of the sin of the eighth pouch. 
Analyzing the topos of lingua ignea in the ecclesiastic tradition of the Middle Ages, 
Maria Corti expands her discussion of Ulysses around the link between the metaphor of the fiery 
tongue and the medieval moral theories of speech: “Vaggheggiatori di postille al tema, i 
commentatori vi hanno costruito la teoria dei ‘peccati della lingua’, due dei quali, fondendosi in 
uno, riguardano direttamente Ulisse a livello di fabula e di allegoria: il consiglio fraudolento 
(una delle forme del mendacium) e la fraus dei filosofi che, con la loro nefasta garrulitas 
separano la coscienza scientifica da quella religiosa; in entrambi i casi il peccatore viene definito 
homo linguosus e la sua lingua, lingua ignea (…) Così l’uomo falsidicus, che è un tipo del 
                                                 
203 Jacopo Alighieri characterizes the sinners of the eighth pouch as “coloro che frodolentemente consigliano 
altrui”[in Chiose alla cantica dell’Inferno di Dante Alighieri scritte da Jacopo Alighieri, G. Piccini, ed., (Florence: 
Bemporad, 1915), 130], and Pietro describes the sin as “consulendo et suggerendo calidissime, idest astute, alicui 
consilia” [in Super Dantis ipsius genitoris Comoediam Commentarium, V. Nannucci ed., (Florence: Garinei, 1844), 
232]. 
204 See the Commento di Francesco da Buti sopra la Divina Commedia, C. Giannini, ed. (Pisa: Nistri, 1858-1862, I), 
673. 
205 See “Ulisse ‘fandi factor’ e le vie della Sapienza,” in which Padoan calls Ulysses “persuasore frodolente.” (1960, 
rpt. In Il pio Enea, l’empio Ulisse (Ravenna: Longo, 1967), 170-99. 
206 Brugnoli, Giorgio. “Dante Filologo: l’esempio di Ulisse.” Studi danteschi III. (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 1998), 27, 
where he speaks of the “possibilità d’inganno della communicazione verbale in fase di persuasione.” 
207 In her argument for the sin of fraudulent counsel, Ana Dolfi considers a fraud not only the orazion picciola of 
Ulysses but also his speech to Dante and Virgil [See “Il canto di Ulisse: occasione per un discorso di esegesi 
dantesca,” Forum Italicum 7-8 (1973-4), 22-45]. 
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linguosus, può agire su cose materiali (i consigli fraudolenti di Ulisse nella fabula) o su spirituali 
(i filosofi transgressivi); nel secondo caso la fraus può servirsi della mala loquacitas (cfr. Pietro 
Cantore, PL 205, 197.”208
 More recently, Bruno Porcelli has made an even more specific connection between the 
sin of pravum consilium treated by William Peraldus in his popular Summa Vitiorum and the sin 
of the eighth bolgia. Arguing for a greater influence of Peraldus on Dante’s selection of the sins 
of the tongue punished in the Inferno, Porcelli speaks of Dante’s sources for the imagery of the 
tongue in the following terms: “I passi sopracitati Dante li poteva trovare, insieme con altri tratti 
dello stesso Giacomo, in uno almeno dei tanti tratti sui peccati della lingua diffusi tra la fine del 
XII e il XIII secolo (…) Intendo riferirmi al Tractatus de peccato linguae che tiene dietro alla 
presentazione dei sette peccati capitali nella Summa Vitiorum di Peraldo, nota a Dante e da lui 
utilizzata nella Commedia, come con valide ragioni è stato da più d’uno affermato.” 209 Recalling 
previous scholars such as S. Wenzel, F. Mancini, C. Delcorno, who all have shown textual links 
between the Summa Vitiorum and the Comedy, Porcelli does not question at any moment 
Peraldus’s influence on Dante’s decision to incorporate a category like ‘fraudulent counsel’ into 
the moral structure of hell. 
                                                 
208 Maria Corti. “Le metafore della navigazione, del volo e della lingua di fuoco nell’episodio di Ulisse (Inferno, 
XXVI),” Miscellanea di studi in onore di Aurelio Roncaglia. (Modena: Mucchi, 1989; 2), 489-490. 
209 Bruno Porcelli, “Peccatum linguae, modello mosaico, climax narrativo nel canto di Ulisse,” in Critica letteraria, 
19, 72 (1991) 425-6. Alfred A. Triolo points as well to the category of malum consilium, as a sin of the tongue 
treated by Pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais: “The Speculum Morale of the pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais, a work written 
in Dante’s time and obviously indebted to Aquinas, strikes me as an excellent sounding board, if not necessarily a 
source for this and other matters in Dante.” [“Ira, Cupiditas, Libido: The Dynamics of Human Passion in the 
Inferno,” Dante Studies 115 (1977), 12]. Quoting the very passage in which the Speculum morale defines the sin of 
pravum consilium, Trioli rightly notes that this passage has never been taken into consideration in the discussion of 
the sin of bolgia eight.  The critic also notes that the passage has at least the advantage of showing “fraudulent 
counseling as a sub-species of discord, indeed of the sowing of discord, which stems both from superbia and ira. 
Dante’s expansion of this relatively minor category can be seen in a somewhat new light.” (op. cit., 37). What Triolo 
fails to notes is that the sins of the tongue treated in the Speculum Morale are compilations after Peraldus, from 
whom pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais draws extensively. 
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 Keeping in mind Corti and Porcelli’s pronouncements, it is imperative to take a closer 
look at the historical context in which the Divine Comedy was produced, and see why the notion 
of counsel was so important for the Christians of the late Middle Ages. One of the foremost 
authorities in religious concepts was Alain of Lille, who in his Liber in distinctionibus gives us a 
useful medieval dictionary of spiritual terms. What is striking in his definition of consilium is the 
polysemy of the word, which had many interrelated connotations: verbal suggestion, consensus, 
deliberation, judgment, precept.210 The ability to practice consilium was not a purely human 
skill; it was a divine gift stemming from the Holy Spirit. This idea recurs in Aquinas’s Summa 
Theologica, which stipulates that the rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel, which is, 
in turn, an exercise of the virtue of prudence (S.T. II-II, Q. 52, Art. 2). By the same token, 
inordinate counsel partakes of false prudence, which is associated with craftiness or cunning 
(astutia). For Aquinas, however, astutia was inextricably related to dolus (guile), the latter being 
considered the execution of the former (dolus, qui est astutiae executio…).  Along these lines, the 
execution of craftiness (astutia) with the purpose of deceiving is effected, as we have seen, first 
and foremost by words, which are the main signs used by man to signify something to another 
man (S.T. II-II, Q. 55 , Art. 4). There is no disconnection, therefore, between astutia and 
fraudulent counsel, as John Ahern argues, but a clear and irrefutable link. In Aquinas’s moral 
system, both fraud and guile belong to astutia; in its manifestation as dolus ‘guile’, astutia is 
executed by words. 211
 One of the major contributors to the medieval discussion of sinful words is, as we have 
seen, William Peraldus. In his tract on the vices of the tongue, Peraldus establishes twenty-four 
                                                 
210  PL 210, col. 750 
211 In Q. 55, Art 5 entitled “Whether fraud pertains to craftiness,” Aquinas asserts: “The object of fraud is to 
deceive. Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness. Just as guile consists in 
the execution of craftiness, so also does fraud.”  (S.T., II-II, vol. 3, 1418). 
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manifestations of evil speech, among which the pravum consilium occupies a central position 
(the twelfth vice). Rather than giving a mere abstract definition of this sin, Peraldus attempts to 
define pravum consilium through a description of the moral profile of the perpetrator of such a 
sin, the pravus consiliarus. Compared to a traitor, the evil counselor is portrayed as someone 
who through deceitful words betrays the confidence of the people who turn to him for advice. He 
is someone who fraudulently harms his friend with his speech.212 Endowed with astutia, evil 
counselors are familiar with, and practitioners of, all kinds of evil. Because of this great 
adherence to evil, there is hardly another sin that is more dangerous to spiritual salvation than the 
practice of depraved counsel. Moreover, besides the personal side of the sin, pravum consilium 
has tragic consequences also for the militant Church and the body politic, endangering the unity 
of both. 213
 Peraldus’s complex treatment of the moral outlook of the depraved counselor is relevant 
to our discussion inasmuch as several aspects underlying the sin of pravum consilium--
fraudulence and astutia, in particular--are salient in the literary portrayals of Ulysses and Guido 
da Montefeltro.  
 To gain an even better understanding of the fraudulent practice of evil counsel, it is 
worthwhile to examine another excellent source for this sin, a source not only coeval with Dante 
                                                 
212 Pravus consiliarus proditor est. Decipit enim eum qui in eo confidit; scilicet eum qui ab eo consilium petit; quod 
non est parvum peccatum. Unde Prov. 26, Sicut noxius est qui mittit laceas et sagittas in mortem: ita vir qui 
fraudulenter nocet amico suo. (Summa Vitiorum: 579; ‘The evil counselor is a traitor. For he deceives the one who 
trusts him and turns to him for counsel; and this is no small sin. Hence, the Proverb: ‘like a mad man who casteth 
firebrands, arrows and death’--so is the man who does harm to his friend through fraud’; underlining mine).  
213 Pravi consiliarii quasi omnia malum faciunt: sic tamen ut nihil mali fecisse videantur. Ipsi dant palmas in faciem 
Christi et in membris eius. (…) Quasi Dominus ignorare posit astutia eorum.(…) Nullum peccatum est quod magis 
impediat homines a salute, quam istud. Peccatum istud multum nocivum est ecclesiae Dei. Unus enim malus 
consiliarius destruit quandoque totam unam patriam. Illi qui astuti sunt ad dandum consilia nociva aliis, in 
consulando sibiipsis iusto Dei consilio fatui inveniuntur. (op. cit.: 579-580; ‘The evil counselors do evil like any 
other things, but they do it in such a way as to look like they did nothing wrong. They strike Jesus’ face and his body 
(…) As if God could not know their ruse. There is no sin that may hinder salvation more than this one. This sin is 
very harmful to God’s Church, for an evil counsel may destroy an entire country at one stroke. Those who are good 
at giving harmful counsels to others are proven mad by God’s just design, to their betterment’). 
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but of Italian origin: Domenico Cavalca. Displaying an even greater adherence to the social 
reality of the time than Peraldus’s chapter on verbal sins, the Pungilingua offers major 
developments on Peraldus’s insights. Fitting into three pages in its editions from the sixteenth 
century, Peraldus’s section on pravum consilium, for instance, is significantly shorter than 
Cavalca’s, which counts twelve pages in the 1837 Bottari edition.214 Representing one of the 
longest sections of the Pungilingua, the chapter dedicated to evil counsel--Del peccato de’ mali 
consilieri e confortatori al male—bespeaks from the outset, through its remarkable length, the 
great importance the matter of evil counsel had for the Italian moralist.  
Although the Pungilingua was apparently written shortly after the completion of the 
Divine Comedy, this tract is important to us for two reasons: the first is that, being an Italian 
translation of Peraldus made only a few decades after the Latin original, it gives us a clear 
indication of the success Peraldus’s moral treatise had in Italy, in Dante’s time, which increases 
the circumstantial likelihood that Dante was acquainted with Peraldus. Had Peraldus’s chapter on 
the sins of the tongue not been considered a major contribution to the medieval construction of 
morality, we could not speak today of Pungilingua and probably would not have sins like 
fraudulent counsel or dissemination of discord in the Divine Comedy. The second reason why Il 
Pungilingua is important to us is that Cavalca’s insights into the sin of evil counsel can help us 
frame and understand better why this sin was so important to Dante that he felt the need to insert 
it in the structure of Malebolge. 
The sin of evil counsel, says Cavalca has two subspecies, depending on the cause that 
prompts it. It can be caused by ignorance, when the counselor, on account of his poor judgment 
and advising skills, gives a piece of advice that further developments will prove wrong. This 
                                                 
214 Il Pungilingua, 180-192. 
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species of evil counsel is similar to the situation in which a blind man guides another blind man 
and both fall into a ditch.215 And if the physical blindness is so debilitating for the general state 
of health and well-being of the body, how much greater then spiritual blindness is, exclaims 
Cavalca. Moral blindness leads the prelates and the clerics to give poor advice to Christians and 
thus to put the mystical church at risk.216 And as though this evil were not great enough already, 
the second species of evil counsel is even greater because it is prompted by malizia and executed 
in perfect awareness and with deliberation: 
 
Ma vie più sommamente e più pericoloso e diabolico è il peccato di quelli, 
i quali saputamente ed a malizia danno mali consigli, ed a male inducono e 
confortano. E questo peccato è grave più e più, secondo la qualità della 
perversa intenzione di chi consiglia, o secondo il male che ne seguita, o 
può seguitare. 
 
But most of all and most dangerous and devilish is the sin of those who, knowingly and 
maliciously, give evil counsels, and drive and encourage people to do evil. And the 
gravity of this sin depends on the quality of the perverse intention of he who gives 
advice, and on the evil that ensues or may ensue. 
 
 
It is mainly on this second type of evil counsel that Cavalca focuses his attention. Two 
criteria are salient in this new definition given to the sin of evil counsel, a definition which does 
not exist in Peraldus but is Cavalca’s original contribution: malice as a cause of evil counsel and 
                                                 
215 Although it is caused by ignorance, not by malice, this species of “male consigliare” is also a sin, because the bad 
counselors are motivated by material profit and forget that one of the precepts of morality is that one should not 
engage in a profession if he is not well prepared or qualified for it. On this occasion, Cavalca speaks of the 
negligence of those who, in need of advice, do not search for the best counselor, but are satisfied with any kind of 
counselor who crosses their way.  Having a good advisor is paramount, for the advisor is like a physician of the soul; 
just like the good physician helps the sick heal with his medical advice, so the good counselor gives Christians the 
best advice for their spiritual health. Along these lines, if a sick man tries hard to find the best physician for his 
bodily condition, it as all the more important to find the best counselors for problems of the soul. 
216 Che se veggiamo che la cechità degli occhi corporali è in pericolo ed in pregiudizio di tutto il corpo, sicchè 
spesso incappa e cade; molto più dobbiamo credere che la cechità degli occhi spirituali, cioè de’ sacerdoti, o 
prelati e cherici, è in grande danno e pericolo di tutto il corpo mistico della chiesa.  (‘For if we see that the 
blindness of the bodily eyes is dangerous and jeopardizes all the body, so that this one trips and falls, even more we 
have to believe that the blindnes of the spiritual eyes, that is the say, of the sacerdotes, the prelates and clerics is 
dangerous and harms the entire mystical body of the Church’, op. cit., 181). 
 166 
the criterion of the consequence. Either the perverse intention that underlies counsel or the dire 
consequences that may derive from an instance of counsel helps the moralist—or the 
Christians—identify a counsel as evil. We will retrieve both of these aspects in Dante’s text.  
The speech of the evil counselor is fraudulent—a parlare fraudolentemente (p. 183)--, 
that has diabolic roots, because just like the devil, the perverse counselor makes evil pass as 
good: sotto spezie di bene e di cosa lecita, a male induce e consiglia (p. 182; ‘under the guise of 
a good and licit thing, they induce to, and counsel, evil’). The terms Cavalca uses to describe this 
deceit that takes place in/through language are strikingly similar to Dante’s description of 
Geryon as a symbol of fraud: the monster has the face of a just judge, but the second part of his 
body is that of a dragon. Taking up Dante’s imagery and transferring it to speech, we could label 
the verbal activity of the fraudulent counselors as Geryonic: their words bear the appearance of 
righteousness, whereas the essence of their speech is made of pure evil.  
The suggestion of an advisor motivated by an evil intention is an unjust counsel—iniquo 
consiglio (p. 183)—that eventually turns against the perpetrator himself. Thus, most often, the 
deceiver falls into the trap set by his fraudulent suggestions. The divine justice alters the vicious 
counsels and very often ridicules the astutia of the evil counselors by changing the course of 
events and reestablishing equity.217 Among the many examples of this sort, Cavalca gives one 
                                                 
217 Comprende Iddio i savi colle loro astuzie, e dissipa, e perverte i loro consigli, sicchè non gli possano reducere 
ad effetto. (…) Sono alquanti enfiati d’umana stoltizia e sapienza che vedendo che Iddio co’ suoi giudici impedisce i 
suoi mali desideri, s’assottigliano con astuti consigli e pensano di contrastare al consiglio ed alla disposizione di 
Dio. Ma per mirabile modo Dio sapientissimo gli conchiude sì, e comprende che al tutto per quella astuzia e per 
quella via, e per quello ingegno e consiglio, col quale credevano contrastare a Dio, si fanno venire fornito il 
consiglio divino, sicchè appunto serve alla disposizione di Dio, ciò che per l’umana astuzia gli contraddice.” (op. 
cit., 183-184; ‘Gods understands the smart men with their craftiness, and dissipates and distorts their advices so that 
they cannot be accomplished (…) Full of human stupidity and cunning are those who, seeing that God with His 
judgments, prevents they evil desires, want to be subtle with cunning advice and think of holding up against the 
counsel and disposition of God. But God the wisest, in a miraculous way, sees in them and understands them so well 
that specifically through that craftiness and way, cleverness and advice, with which they thought they could hold up 
against God, the divine counsel is carried out, in such a way that the human craftiness that contradicts God, in fact 
serves His disposition.’). 
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that illustrates best the providential changing of evil counsel against the intention of the 
counselor: the Pharisees and leaders of the Jews advised the slaying of Christ, in order to prevent 
people from believing in him, but by having him killed the exact opposite of their wicked desire 
occurred: people started worshipping Christ, and the new faith spread from Judea into the Roman 
world.218
For Cavalca, the biblical archetype of the evil counselor is the serpent, who, in the 
Garden of Eden, advised Adam and Eve to taste from the forbidden fruit, inducing them into the 
original sin. The fall of humankind from its Edenic state into sinfulness is thus the result of an 
astute counselor who with skillful words prompted two human souls to break a divine 
interdiction, to trespass the sign (trapassar il segno, are the words Dante used to describe the 
same event in the Paradiso). Those counselors, who, like snakes, use their words to induce other 
people into evil, betray in fact those who trust them.219 It is therefore imperative for every one to 
take good care in choosing one’s counselors because of the virtual betrayal that hides underneath 
friendly counseling: molto si debbe l’uomo guardare d’avere mali consiglieri e procurare 
d’avergli buoni (p. 189; ‘man has to take great care to shun evil counselors and try to have good 
ones’). The same imperative is uppermost in Dante’s mind when, in Convivio, he analyzes the 
political consequences of the words of counselors and draws attention to the risk the leaders of 
the world incur when they choose dishonest advisors: e dico a voi, Carlo e Federigo regi, e a voi 
                                                 
218 More than ten biblical stories (from both the Old and New Testaments) are told by the moralist as exempla of 
wicked counsel, all to illustrate the catastrophic repercussions of perverse suggestions. At the end of these stories, he 
concludes: Or così potremmo contare molte istorie, per le quali si conchiude, e mostra che molti mali e guerre, e 
grandi ingiustizie sono fatte per gli consigli ed impronti (p. 188; ‘And so we could tell many stories, by means of 
which we deduce and show that many evils and great injustices are done by means of advices and promptings’). 
219 Questi dunque tali consiglieri sono traditori in ciò che ingannano chi si fida di loro semplicemente.  (p. 182; ‘So 
these counselors are traitors, in that they deceive those who trust them in good faith’). 
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altri principi e tiranni; e guardate chi a lato vi siede per consiglio, e annumerate quante volte lo 
die questo fine de l’umana vita per li vostri consiglieri c’è additato. 220
For Cavalca, the only perfect counselor is Christ: he is the only one who does not betray, 
and who in his great wisdom and charity cannot err in his advice.221 As to the degree of gravity 
of this sin, according to Cavalca, there seems to be no other sin more dangerous for one’s soul 
and for the social harmony and peace than evil counsel. We remember this notion from Peraldus, 
but there this idea was mentioned in passing, whereas in Cavalaca it is amply developed and 
reiterated throughout the chapter: 
 
E dico, che singolarmente questo peccato si grava per gli mali di colpa e di 
pena che ne seguita; che tutto dì per continua esperienza veggiamo; che 
uno male consigliere più guasta e dannifica in uno punto che non 
racconcia e non edifica tutto il tempo della vita sua in ciò che, 
consigliando ed ordinando una guerra, n’escono danni e guasti ed omicidi, 
e danni tanti e mali tanti e di colpa e di pena. (…). Sicché chi ben guata, 
nessun peccato è, che tanto impedisca la salute dell’uomo, quanto questo, 
per lo molto danno e male che ne procede, del quale tutto è tenuto a 
restituzione chi consigliò ed ordinò; senza la quale nessuno assolvere lo 
può, se egli è in istato che restituire possa. Ma pognamo che non possa, 
rade volte avviene che questi consiglieri di guerra bene si pentino e bene 
finiscano. (p.186) 222
 
                                                 
220 Convivio IV.VI, 242 . 
221 Come dunque dice l’Ecclesiastico, molto si debbe l’uomo guardare d’avere mali consiglieri e procurare 
d’avergli buoni. E però dice: Abbi molti amici, e fra mille ne scegli uno per consigliere. E questo uno per verità 
dovrebbe essere Cristo solo, perochè lui solo vede e conosce il meglio, ed è fedele che non inganna. (p. 189; ‘ So, as 
the Ecclesiastic puts it, man must shun the evil counselors, and try to have good ones. For he says: have many 
friends, and among thousand choose one as a counselor. And this one, in truth, should be Christ alone, for he is the 
only one who sees and knows best, and he is faithful and does not deceive.’). This remark gives Cavalca the 
opportunity to deplore the moral decay of those who do not pay heed to Christ’s counsels (related to poverty, 
chastity, humility), but shun these teachings as if they were bad. 
222 Cavalca’s words bear a strange resemblance to Pietro Alighieri’s comment on the dire repercussions of an 
instance of wicked counsel, a comment made within the discussion of the sin of the eighth bolgia: just as one spark 
can destroy a city by provoking a big fire, so can one word, one piece of advice: sicut ex una favilla potest destrui 
tota civitas incendio, ita uno verbo et uno consilio. (Super Dantis, 232; ‘just as a spark can destroy an entire city, in 
the same way can do so a word and a piece of advice’). 
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And I say that the gravity of this sin may be gleaned from the evils of guilt and 
puninshment that ensue and which we see every day by ongoing experience; that an evil 
counselor does more damage and harm at one moment that he can mend and build in all 
of his life, since, by recommending and ordering war, there follow so many harms and 
damages and murders, and many harms and so many evils of guilt and punishment. So 
that, if we consider things well, there is no other sin that hinders the man’s salvation than 
this one, because of the harms that follow for which he who gave advised and ordered 
war is called to restitution, if he is able to restitute, without which restitution no one can 
absolve him. Supposing that he cannot (restitute), it rarely happens that these war 
counselors repent well and end up well. 
 
 
These are prophetic words that we will find exemplified in the stories of Ulysses and 
Guido in the Inferno. Cavalca describes in great detail the economic and social disasters that can 
ensue evil counsel. When a perverse piece of advice leads to war, many men, because they lose 
their property, become thieves or get ill; women, by losing their families, become whores, and all 
this collective sinfulness attracts the divine anger and further terrible punishments. All because 
of one counselor of war, because of just one counsel of war… 
In conclusion, there is no man in the world who does not need a good piece of advice on 
matters of life, and those who assume the function of counseling others assume a great 
responsibility. By the same token, if they are bad counselors with poor judgment, they fail like a 
blind man leading the blind; if they are bad counselors by malice, they distort a Christic function 
and lose their souls.  
Cavalca’s treatment of male consigliare as a form of fraudulent speech rooted in malice 
applies in privileged ways to the narratives of the eighth pouch of Malebolge. In Dante’s system 
of Hell, malizia is the third disposition toward evil and is punished in Malebolge; fraudulent 
counsel is located in the eight pouch of Malebolge as a sin of malice. In order to highlight more 
aspects of this moral category in the text of the Inferno, I will now examine Dante’s encounters 
with the mythic hero Ulysses and with the Italian condottiere Guido da Montefeltro, both 
represented as flames on the bottom of the eighth circle of Malebolge.  
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What is particular about Ulysses’ soul is that it is entwined in death with Diomedes, his 
companion from the Trojan war. Whereas every other soul inhabiting this pouch is enveloped by 
an individual flame, the souls of these two legendary heroes share the same, bi-forked flame. The 
only difference between them is that the horn representing Ulysses is bigger than the one that 
hides Diomedes.  
The reasons for the two Greeks’ presence in this pouch are three, explains Virgil to the 
pilgrim: the ambush of the horse, the art that caused Deïdamia’s pain at the loss of Achilles, and 
the story of the Palladium. 
 
 
Là dentro si martira/Ulisse e Dïomede, e così insieme/a la vendetta vanno 
come a l’ira;/e dentro da la lor fiamma si geme/l’agguato del caval che fé 
la porta/onde uscì de’i Romani il gentil seme./Piangevisi entro l’arte per 
che, morta,/ Deïdamìa ancor si duol d’Achille,/e del Palladio pena vi si 
porta. (55-60) 
 
There within are punished Ulysses and Diomedes; thus together they go to/punishment as 
they went to anger./ And within their flame they bemoan the deceit of/the horse that made 
the gate to send forth the/ Romans’noble seed;/there within they weep for the art that 
makes/Deidamia, though dead, still grieve for Achilles; and/there they bear the 
punishment for the Palladium. 
  
 
Evidence gathered by most modern critics argues that all three crimes involve, more or 
less manifestly, deceitful rhetorical techniques related to Ulysses.223 Sinon, thanks to whose lies 
the Trojans accept the horse into their city, is instructed by Ulysses on how to speak and what to 
say.224 The Trojan horse is a fraud and the way it is introduced into Troy is itself based on verbal 
fraud and manipulation. Furthermore, Cavalca’s criterion for the identification of a counsel as 
                                                 
223 According to Truscott, the trap of the Trojan horse is based on an “implicit suggestion of false promise.” James 
C. Truscott, “Ulysses and Guido. Inferno XXVI-XXVII.” Dante Studies, XCI (1973), 62]. 
224 Truscott qualifies Sinon’s speech to the Trojans as “eloquence commanded by Ulysses,” (op. cit., 63), whereas 
Brugnoli calls Sinon “l’ agente di Ulisse”, (op. cit., 25). 
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evil (criterion concerning the consequences that derive from that counsel) applies in privileged 
ways to the story of the horse. The destruction of the city that followed the success of Ulysses’ 
setting up the trap of the Trojan horse amply demonstrates, if it is still necessary, that Sinon’s 
advice to the Trojans to accept the horse, a counsel commanded by Ulysses, was a malicious one. 
In the case of the second crime as well, we deal with a fraudulent form of persuasion, with verbal 
suggestions that bear the appearance of truth but hide the ugly face of lies. Ulysses lures Achilles 
into joining him in the war against Troy with skillful words depicting the bright side of the war: 
personal military fame. What war really entails, the hideous, fatal side of it, is not mentioned by 
Ulysses. The criterion of the consequence applies once again: Achilles will die in the war, 
triggering the great pain of Deïdamia, his wife, whose name is mentioned by Dante’s text in 
relation to Ulysses. It seems that every time Ulysses opens his mouth people around him die or 
suffer.  
As to the third crime mentioned by the text--the one related to the Palladium--David 
Thompson points out that: one, Dante’s text does not mention the word theft, and two, according 
to the legend, not Ulysses is the real author of the theft, but the giant Antenor. It is therefore 
highly likely that even in this mythic episode Dante saw an indication of malicious counsel.225 
Thus, all three sins indicated by Virgil in relation to Ulysses and Diomedes seem to 
involve verbal suggestions with a main tragic consequence: the destruction of Trojan civilization. 
But God alters the human counsels, said Cavalca, and turns the tragedy into the seed of a new 
                                                 
225 “What Ulysses and Diomedes did, presumably was to counsel Antenor in connection with his fraudulent 
activities (treason being, after all, one of the ultimate forms of fraud). We do not find anything as explicit as Guido’s 
advice to Boniface, but given this whole series of negotiations between Antenor and the two Greeks, it would not 
have been too wild to surmise on Dante’s part if he had concluded that Ulysses and Diomedes were guilty of 
‘consiglio frodolente’ in this as in their other exploits.” [“A Note on Fraudulent Counsel,” in Dante Studies 92 
(1974), 151]. As regards the real author of the text, Thompson relies on an Italian source contemporary with Dante: 
Guido delle Colonne, who in Historia destructionis Troiae maintains that, although Ulysses was eventually accused 
of stealing the Palladium, it is Antenor who actually did it. As we know, Antenor is the giant who gives Dante the 
name for one of the zones of Cocito, the circle of traitors. 
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prosperity. There is a divine counsel--here, in the sense of judgment and decision--that alters and 
corrects the wicked human counsels—here, in the sense of verbal suggestions--, and we see this 
correction at work in the Ulysses episode. Ulysses and Diomedes’ judgments and suggestions 
were all turned toward the annihilation of the Trojan nation, but divine providence intervened 
and changed the disaster into the birth of a new people: the Romans. This is Dante’s 
interpretation of the mythical and historical events: the ambush of the horse--l’agguato del 
caval--opened the door through which the noble seed of the Romans sprang: fé la porta/onde 
uscì de’i Romani il gentil seme. 
In the story of Ulysses’ end, Dante changes some fundamental data to the point that his 
Ulysses emerges from the text completely transfigured. The most important change the poet 
effects concerns the circumstances of his death. Instead of ending peacefully, after twenty years 
of wanderings, in his country, next to his faithful family, Ulysses abandons everything and sets 
out on new adventures. Despite his old age, he is animated by one main desire: expertise of the 
world, and not just in a geographical sense, but also in a moral one; he wishes to become expert 
in human vices and worth: 
 
(…) né dolcezza di figlio, né la pieta/del vecchio padre, né’l debito 
amore/lo qual dovea Penelopè far lieta,/vincer potero dentro a me 
l’ardore/ch’i’ebbi a divenir del mondo esperto/e de li vizi umani e del 
valore. (94-99)  
 
(…) neither the sweetness of a son, nor compassion for/my old father, nor the love owed 
to Penelope, which/should have made her glad/could conquer within me the ardor that I 
had to/gain experience of the world and of human vices and worth. 
 
Another major element in Dante’s reworking of the myth is the way Ulysses enlists the 
support of his crew for his adventurous projects: he talks to them. The reproduction of this 
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speech is made in Hell by Ulysses himself, who recounts to Virgil with what words he convinced 
his men to follow him: 
 
“O frati”, dissi, “che per cento milia/perigli siete giunti a l’occidente,/a 
questa tanto picciola vigilia/d’i nostri sensi ch’è del rimanente/non 
vogliate negar l’esperïenza,/di retro al sol, del mondo sanza 
gente./Considerate la vosta semenza:/fatti non foste a viver come bruti,/ma 
per seguire virtute e canoscenza.’ (112-120) 
 
‘O brothers,’ I said, ‘who through a hundred/thousand perils have reached the west, to 
this so/brief vigil/of our senses that remains, do not deny the/experience, following the 
sun, of the world without/people. Consider your sowing, you were not made to live/like 
brites, but to follow virtue and knowledge. 
 
Ulysses’ handling of the ethical vocabulary already projects a shadow over the moral 
quality of his speech: there is a tension between the notions vices and virtue that he withholds 
from his crew. He reserves for himself the expertise in vices, whereas to his men he speaks only 
about virtue and knowledge.226 The wish to be an expert in vices is itself intriguing, for in what 
other way can one be an esperto other than experiencing these vices, than running the whole 
gamut of them? The tradition of Ulysses hortatur scelerum on which Dante relies excludes the 
option of the Greek’s gaining expertise in vices only by… watching them in others.227 Ulysses’ 
desire to become a specialist/connoisseur in li vizi umani is one of the most interesting things he 
                                                 
226 Paradoxically, this contrast has eluded Patrick Boyde, who has dedicated to Ulysses a chapter in his book about 
human vices and human worth in the Commedia. Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante’s “Comedy” 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge UP, 2000).  
227 As to the sources for Dante’s story of Ulysses, critics have indicated two main texts: Virgil’s Aeneid, where the 
spare references to Ulysses are mainly negative, and Statius’ Achileid, “where Ulysses is truly seen in action and 
which shows the spell-binding effect of his words.” [Mark Musa, “Virgil’s Ulysses and Ulysses’ Diomedes.” Dante 
Studies XCVI (1978), 188].  Brugnoli finds in Achileid. I the most significant of Ulysses’ fraudulent discourses, 
most of which addressed to people of good faith who trust him: the good king Licomedes and the young Achilles 
(op. cit., 27-38). It is in this part of Achileid that Ulysses is described as “sleepless in counsel and deeds of arms” 
(1.472), Susan Hagedorn also points out. Hagerdon also notes that: “Statius makes fraud a major theme of the 
Achileid (…); the poem presents Ulysses in the same unflattering light that Virgil and Ovid do, with a special 
emphasis on the rhetorical skill of the Greek hero.” [“Statius’s Achilleid and Dante’s Canto of Ulysses. Fraud, 
Rhetoric and Abandoned Women,” in Abandoned Women: Rewriting the Classics in Dante, Boccaccio and 
Chaucer, (Ann Arbor:  Michigan UP, 2004), 47-74]. 
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says about himself. Other than Dante himself who, at the end of his poetic journey through the 
three realms, will be the Commedia’s true expert in vices and virtues, there is only one other 
being who can lay claim to expertise in sins, in the Inferno: this is Minos, the monster who 
judges the newly arrived souls in Hell and who, with the flickering of a tail, sends the souls to 
specific infernal areas.228 Ulysses’ design and wish to become an expert in human sinfulness, far 
from being a noble ideal, tarnishes him and dooms him to hell. Moreover, as I have noted, he 
likely wants to keep this type of expertise for himself as an asset in case he needs to practice 
these vices for self-serving purposes. The fact that he does not propose the same type of 
expertise to his men may be interpreted as a protective measure; he does not want his men to be 
expert in vices as well, because he does not want them to be able to recognize these vices in him, 
their leader, the one who has control over their lives.229
Before proceeding to an examination of the orazion picciola from the viewpoint of 
Cavalca’s theory of evil counsel, it is worth drawing a brief history of the interpretations given to 
this segment of the canto, since Ulysses’ speech to his aging crew represents one of the pillars of 
the controversy around Ulysses. Seriacopi points out that early commentators did not consider 
this discourse a trap; only modern interpreters have done so. Seriacopi himself, in the wake of 
Forti, considers that Ulysses’ orazion is free from any sign of deceit, despite the hero’s blatant 
                                                 
228  quando l’anima mal nata/li vien dinanzi, tutta si confessa;/e quel conoscitor de le peccata/vede qual loco 
d’inferno è da essa;/cignesi con la coda tante volte/quantunque gradi vuol che giù sia messa. (Inf. V. 7-12; ‘when 
the ill-born soul comes before/ him, it confesses all; and that connoisseur of sin/ sees which is its place in Hell; he 
girds himself/ with his tail as many times as the levels he wills the/soul to be sent down.’). 
229 In this light, I cannot agree with Mario Trovato, who considers vv. 90-105 as representing the “momento giulivo 
della conversione di Ulisse alla sapienza; distacco non solo dal mondo del peccato, ma degli affetti più puri” (“Il 
contrapasso nell’ottava Bolgia,” p. 49). There is not enough evidence in the text to support a moral conversion of 
Ulysses; there is indeed a detachment from family life and love of country, but the idea of expertise in vices 
undermines Trovato’s claim that Ulysses also detached himself from the world of the sin. 
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persuasive qualities.230 The prevalent opinion among modern critics is, however, that the orazion 
is a fraud. Giorgio Padoan interprets it as a new, textual instance, of fraudulent counsel.231 
Pézard, Bates and Rendal all concur with this argument.232 Freccero notes that “the essential 
characteristic of the orazion is that it is completely self-serving,” a trait that identifies the orator 
as corrupt. Mazzotta sharply notes Ulysses’ confusion between powerful eloquence and ethics: 
the former substitutes for the latter.233
It is true that, as Maria Corti has pointed out, the language of radical, lay Aristotelism 
with which Ulysses’ orazion is imbued figures the character as one of the wise of the world, the 
sapientes mundi.234 But again, Dante’s own definition of wisdom, as opposed to cunning, helps 
us read Ulysses not as homo sapiens, but as a guileful  person: Sì come dice lo Filosofo nel sesto 
de la Etica, “impossibile è essere savio chi non è buono’, e pero non è da dire savio uomo chi 
con sottratti e con inganni procede, ma è da chiamare astuto. (‘For as the Philosopher says in 
the sixth book of the Ethics, It is impossible for a man to be wise without being good, and 
therefore one who proceeds with subterfuge and deceit is not to be called wise but astute.’).235 
Many critics have used this passage from Convivio to establish that Dante’s Ulysses, despite the 
lofty ideals expressed by the orazion picciola, is not a noble character, but a trickster. 
                                                 
230 Starting form the remark that in Ulysses’ orazion “non mancano certo le capacità di suasione, a chi dell’uso 
accortissimo, intelligente e raffinato della parola ha fatto un modus vivendi, come testimoniano tutte le fonti 
classiche consociute da Dante,” Seriacopi concludes: “Dunque la fraudolenza non è insita nella nobile orazione di 
Ulisse.” (op. cit., 84-91). 
231 Padoan: “L’orazione di Ulisse, nonostante che muova da un innegalabile desiderio di perfezionamanto 
dell’umana natura, è in definitive un consiglio fraudolento, come benissimo avverte il Buti, proprio perché 
apparentemente è l’esaltazione degli ideali più giusti.” (“Ulisse ‘fandi fictor’,” 87). 
232 André Pézard considers the orazion a deceiving counsel (“Le Mythe d’Ulysse chez Dante, ” in Annuaire du 
Collège de France: résumé des cours de 1952, pp. 271-75, de 1953, pp. 271-77 et de 1954, pp. 306-310). 
233 “As Ulysses quotes Cicero to justify the higher moral imperative of the journey, he contrives ethical fictions. Far 
from being an ethical quest, or the case of rhetoric supported by ethics, rhetoric appears without foundation and is 
itself the ground of choices given as ethics.” (Dante, Poet of the Desert, 81) 
234 Corti, op. cit., 488. 
235 Convivio, IV.XXVII, 324. 
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According to Mazzotta’s fine analysis, the orazion “means something other than what it 
says.”236 Padoan memorably underlines the contrast between Ulysses’ overall moral profile and 
the sudden nobility of his ideals:  “Sic notus Ulixes? Così conosciamo dunque Ulisse? L’hortatur 
scelerum, il fandi factor, l’antagonista di Enea, il malo consigliere, direbbe ora le verità più 
sublimi? (…) Alle parole di un Greco non è da prestar fiduccia (…): presteremo fiducia a quelle 
di Ulisse, quando Sapiamo che dietro il suo discorso può celarsi il sorriso dolcissimo di 
Gerione?” 237
Although all these critics consider Ulysses’ “little speech” a form of linguistic 
fraudulence, none of them took the time to actually confront the orazion with the medieval 
theories of pravum consilium and see the results. A basic application of Cavalca’s criteria for the 
identification of an instance of malicious counsel reveals that the orazion is, indeed, such an 
instance. Cavalca defines the notion of consiglio as una esaminata ragione d’alcuna cosa fare, o 
non fare (1837, p. 190). Four factors have to be taken into account when giving a piece of 
advice: one, what is expedient and useful; two, what is easy; three, what is certain; and four, 
what is safe. By the same token, in order for one to give good counsel, one has to suggest and 
choose the useful and necessary thing over the non-useful, the easy over the difficult, the certain 
over the uncertain and, finally, the safe over the dangerous. 238 None of these requisites for good 
counsel is observed by Ulysses in the address to his crew: the new adventures Ulysses asks his 
                                                 
236 op.cit., 103. 
237 “Ulisse ‘fandi fictor’,” 186-7. 
238 “Anco conciossiacosachè consiglio sia, e così si definisce, una esaminata ragione d’alcuna fare, o non fare; 
quattro cose in ciò si debbono considerare; cioè quello che è spediente ed utile, quello che è leggieri, quello che è 
certo, e quello che è sicuro. E così i contrari; cioè, che sempre si debbe proponere, e preelegere la cosa utile e 
necessaria alla non utile; la leggiere alla difficile; la certa alla incerta; la sicura alla pericolosa (p. 190; ‘Then a 
counsel is, and may be defined as, a well thought-out reason of doing or not doing something; herein, four things 
must be considered, that is, what is expedient and useful, what is easy, what is certain, and what is safe. And in the 
same way the opposites; that is to say, that one must always propose and prefer the useful and necessary thing to the 
useless; the easy to the difficult; the certain to the uncertain; the safe to the dangerous.’). 
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companions to accompany him in are neither useful, nor necessary to them, but—at the most--for 
himself.  The new enterprise is not easy, since it requires the exploration of land hitherto 
uncharted and inhabited by people, whence the dangers of such a project: the sailors do not know 
what awaits them beyond the pillars of Hercules. These pillars are markers beyond which no 
living man had ever ventured, and Dante scholars have interpreted them as signs of a divine 
interdiction. Like the evil-counselor serpent in the biblical story told by Cavalca, Ulysses makes 
his companions transgress this interdiction—a new trapassar del segno, of which he is the 
unique counselor. The result of all this: collective death. 
Ulysses’ speech to his men has, therefore, a Geryonic aspect, insofar as his high-flown 
rhetoric not only manipulates and promises something it cannot offer, but also insofar as, let us 
not forget, the character is punished in Dante’s Hell in the “post-Geryon world,” to take up 
Barolini’s formula. Disconnected from the context of the Malebolge, Ulysses’ orazion could 
have convinced readers of its truthfulness, but the fact that the orazion is textually inserted in, 
and framed by, the infernal area of fraud undermines its claims to sincerity and nobility. And 
there is one more thing to consider in the text of Inferno XXVI, a clue that comes right after the 
“reproduction” of the orazion. Critics have noted the detachment and the note of pride with 
which Ulysses describes to Virgil the powerful effect of his words on his crew.239 It is the 
passage that introduces the label “little speech” which Ulysses applies to the persuasive 
argument he addressed to his sailors:  
 
                                                 
239 S. Botterill notes the “scathingly ironic image of Ulysses” congratulating himself. (“Dante’s Poetics of the Sacred 
Word,” 158). 
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Li miei compagni fec’io sì aguti,/con questa orazion picciola, al 
cammino,/che a pena poscia li avrei ritenuti.” (121-123)240
 
My companions I made so sharp for the voyage,/with this little oration, that after it I 
could hardly/have held them back. 
 
The adjective picciola that Ulysses chooses (or rather that Dante has Ulysses choose) in a 
moment of great awareness of his verbal power is emblematic for Ulysses’ relation to speech. 
What the character conveys through this lexical choice is that, on account of his extraordinary 
oral abilities, he did not even have to make such a great effort of persuasion. He was so good at 
the “art” (the same “art” that made Deïdamia lose her husband, the same “art” for which Virgil 
says Ulysses is punished in hell) that a few words were enough to drive his audience crazy and 
capable of anything. Ulysses’ mention of the effect of his words confirms our sense that the 
orazion was not a spontaneous and genuine outpouring of emotions, but an artifact. Ulysses is in 
fact congratulating himself for a good job; his self-satisfaction is the feeling of pride of the 
artifex who contently evaluates the product of his creative work.  
Mazzotta points out that the weakness of rhetoric is that it promises something, the 
fulfillment of which depends on extra-discursive conjunctures.241 Along these lines, the end 
Dante reserves for Ulysses and his crew highlights the emptiness and the speciousness of 
Ulysses’ orazion. The words of the “little speech” fall into the same category as Jason’s: they 
seduce because they promise, but eventually give nothing in exchange. Like Jason’s, Ulysses’ 
words, too, are merely parole ornate that deceive through their Geryonic beauty. Ulysses’ speech 
is a Geryonic speech, insofar as his dual rhetoric seduces but ultimately leads to disaster: the 
                                                 
240 Susan Hagerdon thinks this text might have been inspired by Ulysses’ speech to Achilles, in the Achileid. There 
too, the Greek hero “congratulates himself on his ability to play with Achilles’ emotions.” (op. cit., 67). 
241 “By making virtue a purpose of rhetoric, Dante lays open the intrinsic error of rhetorical language: virtue is 
contained within the rhetorical statement, but its fulfillment lies outside of the statement.” (op. cit., 83). 
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shipwreck that marks the death of the sailors invalidates the nobility to which the orazion lays 
claim. Thus, although I do acknowledge the nimble-wittedness of Ulysses, my sense is that we 
have to focus not on the intellectual but on the moral type Dante proposes through Ulysses. The 
classical nobility conveyed by Ulysses’ orazion is what Ulysses could have represented if he had 
really converted his expertise in vices into virtue(s). But Ulysses’ oral agenda in the orazion is 
different from his actual deeds. And then, let us recall that he is not among the spiriti magni in 
Limbo, nor in Purgatorio. He is punished in hell in the spiritual area of fraud. 242
A companion of Ulysses in Dante’s underworld, in the sense that they share the same 
location and the same punishment, is Guido da Montefeltro, an important political leader in 
Dante’s time.243 Famous for his political cunning, Guido was a public figure, whose movements 
and gestures could have hardly escaped popular attention. One of his publicly known gestures 
was his conversion to Franciscanism, a conversion that occurred in his later years. In Convivio, 
Guido appears in a favorable light particularly because of this religious gesture.244 This favorable 
light has been partly preserved in the Commedia, where Guido’s intervention is realized through 
                                                 
242 As to Ulysses’ relationship with the author of the Comedy, excellent studies have been written over the years by 
Jurij Lotman, John Freccero, Giuseppe Mazzotta, Teodolinda Barolini, and others. Repeating their theories about the 
(non) identity Ulysses-Dante would be, as Barolini justly points out, repeating what is by now “critical dogma.” I 
will only quote the latter, who analyzes the Ulysses theme in rapport with Dante’s writerly undertaking and reaches 
the conclusion that: “Ulysses reflects Dante’s conscious concern for himself. “ He is “the lightning rod Dante places 
in his poem to attract and defuse his own consciousness of the presumption involved in anointing oneself God’s 
scribe.” (The Undivine Comedy, 52). 
243 Noting the pilgrim’s simultaneous sensory perception of Ulysses and Guido, Truscott insists on the moral affinity 
between the two characters, an affinity achieved by subtle poetic means: “(…) it is as though the explicit pairing of 
Ulysses and Diomedes, reinforced by the comparison to Eteocles and Polynices, is fulfilled by Guido’s voice, not 
Diomedes’s: it is as though Guido takes Diomedes’s place as a companion in criminal deeds. This poetic stratagem 
serves to accentuate the structural pairing of Ulysses and Guido which was already suggested by Dante’s description 
of his own divided attention and also reinforces the notion that Ulysses and Guido are as much alike in their acts, 
words and eternal punishments, as were Ulysses and Diomedes, as equally paired structurally as Eteocles and 
Polynices in their flame.” (op. cit., 60) 
244 Bene questi nobili [lo cavaliere Lancelotto e lo nobilissimo nostro latino Guido montelfeltrano]… ne la loro 
lunga etade a religione si rendero, ogni mondano diletto e opera diponendo. Convivio IV.XXVIII, p. 330; ‘These 
noble men [the knight Lancelot and the most noble of the Italians, Guido da Montefeltro] late in life gave 
themselves to religious orders, forsaking all worldly delights and affairs.’ Critics point out that at the time when 
Convivio was written, news about Guido’s last fraudulent action had not yet spread. 
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the medium of courteous speech. The soul reverently asks the travelers to give him news about 
Romagna, his native land. What he is interested in is not the faith of his personal relatives, but if 
the country was at war or not. Like his reverent speech, this noble concern for the good of the 
earthly community to which he belonged projects Guido as an almost positive figure. Prompted 
by Virgil, Dante gives Guido disturbing news about the socio-political situation of the Italian 
city, torn apart by war, mal governo and tirannia.245 Against the dark background of this ethical-
political denunciation made by the pilgrim, Guido introduces himself as an internationally 
renowned politician, whose works had been those of a fox, not of a lion: 
 
(…) l’opere mie/non furon leonine, ma di volpe./Li accorgimenti e le 
coperte vie/io seppi tutte, e sì menai lor arte,/ch’al fine de la terra il suono 
uscie.”(Inf. XXVII, 75-78) 
 
(…) my works were not those of a lion but of fox./ The tricks and the hidden ways, I 
knew them all/and I so plied their art that the fame of it went out to the ends of the earth. 
 
As far as the phrase di volpe is concerned, a great deal of light is shed on its meaning by 
Alain of Lille’s dictionary, where the word vulpes (‘fox’) designates, among others, fraudulent 
people: “Dicuntur etiam homines fraudulenti, qui in fraudibus suis delectantur quas absciderunt 
in corde (…)” (Liber, PL. 210, col. 1011B). A professional of moral and political duplicity, 
Guido was well aware of the spiritual consequences of his methods; therefore, he says, when he 
grew old, he had a moment of metanoia (ciò che pria mi piacëa, allor m’increbbe) and took 
shelter in the religious life. His new status as penitent was, however, interrupted by a last 
temptation: pope Boniface VIII, unable to conquer the city of Palestrina, appealed to him for 
advice. In exchange, il gran prete--for whom now, in Hell, Guido reserves the harshest words--
                                                 
245 Freccero interprets Virgil’s scornful refusal to speak with Guido as a “commentary on false counselors in Dante’s 
world.” (The Poetics of Conversion, 143). 
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offered the counselor the promise of absolution. The terms of negotiations between the two 
reveal the awareness both men had of what was ultimately at stake: eternal salvation. First, the 
nature of the promise Boniface made to Guido indicates that the pope was well aware that what 
he was asking from his counselor was not something good, but an encouragement to evil, a 
confortare al male, as Cavalca would have put it. History tells us that, very often, political 
leaders (and it is well known that Boniface was a pope with strong political ambitions) had 
religious counselors for their spiritual concerns. But here, although he speaks of absolution, 
Boniface does not come to Guido for spiritual matters, but for worldly ones. It is the earthly 
shepherd, the one who is supposed to be the supreme spiritual guide, the cleanest of counselors, 
who comes in all awareness to ask for an iniquitous counsel. It is a Jack-of-all-trades kind of 
politician who comes to another reputedly malicious politician to ask for a suggestion they both 
know cannot be good.246 For both men, religiosity and sacred concepts are just masks that fall 
off when greed or deeply ingrained corrupt ways are activated. The way in which in Hell the 
former political advisor now turned a friar describes the pope’s mental state is remarkably 
similar to Cavalca’s lexicon of counseling as healing:  
 
Ma come Costantin chiese Silvestro/d’entro Siratti a guerir de la 
lebbre,/così mi chiese questi per maestro/a guerir de la sua superba 
febbre;/domandommi consiglio, e io tacetti/perché le sue parole parver 
ebbre. (XXVII. 94-99) 
 
But, as Constantine asked Sylvester in Soracte to/ cure him of leprosy, so he asked me to 
teach him/ to recover from his proud fever; he asked my/ advice, and I was silent, for his 
words seemed/ drunken. 
 
                                                 
246 Trovato synthesized admirably the meaning of Boniface’s role in this episode: “(…) Bonifacio è per Dante, 
l’exemplum, per eccellenza, del cattivo governo spirituale e, insieme, temporale; il punto canceroso ove si annida il 
cattivo genio della storia, che ha operato attraverso Diomede, Ulisse e tutti gli altri fino a Guido da Montefeltro; ma 
tutti superando, proprio in forza dell’ibrido potere che si accoglie in lui.” (op. cit., 54). 
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 Secondly, Guido himself, at hearing Boniface’s request, is conscious of what he is being 
asked: the word peccato he uses in his dialogue with the pope is symbolic of this awareness. He 
knows that by giving the pope the advice he needs to conquer the city—and only devious ways 
will work here--he commits a moral transgression:  
 
(…) “Padre, da che tu mi lavi/di quel peccato ov’io mo cader 
deggio,/lunga promessa con l’attender corto/ti farà trïunfar ne l’alto 
seggio. (108-111) 
  
Father, since you wash/ me of that sin into which I must now fall, a long/promise with a 
short keeping will make you triumph/on your high throne. 
 
 
Promising something with the awareness that the promise will never be fulfilled was 
presumably one of the most common of Guido’s opere di volpe (and the false promise is itself a 
sin of the tongue, according to the medieval moralists quoted above). Here, however, Guido’s sin 
consists in teaching Boniface himself how to use this kind of method. The sin of male 
consigliare is in a synonymic relationship with the inducement into evil (confortare al male), in 
Cavalca’s ethical system, and this synonymy illuminates Guido’s placement in the same zone 
with Ulysses. Through their verbal suggestions, both Ulysses and Guido induced other people 
into transgressive actions. As a spiritual advisor, Guido realized that the pope was a morally ill 
man: the series of words with medical resonance (guerrir, febbre, ebbre), and the half-medical, 
half-moral term consiglio placed in the middle of this series, all contribute to the idea that Guido 
knew exactly what kind of condition Boniface had. And yet, instead of healing the pope with a 
truly Christian message, he aggravated his fever and state of frenzy with the inducement into 
further sins. 
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The only problem is that, after death, one has to give account for one’s evil counsels, 
Cavalca repeatedly asserts, who warns that there is no way this type of counselors can end up 
well. The divine penalty for evil counseling is unavoidably the loss of the soul: il misero 
consigliere pure ne pierde l’anima (Pungilingua, p. 183), and this severe moral pronouncement 
is exemplified magisterially in the poetic account of Guido’s death: St. Francis comes down to 
claim Guido’s soul, but a devil intervenes declaring that Guido’s membership was in fact to the 
infernal orders. The semantic value of the general term peccato that Guido used to describe his 
speech to Boniface is clarified by the devil on the occasion of the struggle for Guido’s soul:  
 
Non portar; non mi far torto./Venir se ne dee giù tra’ miei meschini/perché 
diede’l consiglio frodolente,/dal quale in qua stato li sono a’ crini. (Inf. 
XXVII. 114-117)247
 
‘Do not take him,/ do not wrong me./ He must come down among my slaves, because/ he 
gave the fraudulent counsel, since when, until/ now, I have been at his locks.  
 
As a Franciscan friar, Guido was supposed to know that the punishment for the kind of 
peccato he spoke of to Boniface was very serious. And the same holds for Boniface, who, as a 
leader in spiritual matters, knew what type of risks and consequences incurred every sin. 
Otherwise this whole discussion between the two men about absolution from sins as a retribution 
for Guido’s help would be futile. Only this papal power turned out to be a kind of fraud, as well. 
Both Dante’s handling of the episode and Cavalca’s treatment of the sin of male consigliare e 
confortare al male convey the idea that no human promise, judgment or decision can compete 
with higher, divine laws.  Cavalca says that very often evil counselors fall themselves in the traps 
                                                 
247 Truscott specifies that: “‘False counsel’ as used by the cherub of Guido’s advice, means simply advice to use 
false promise, and nothing else.” (op. cit., 610). But, as I have noted, false promise was itself, in the moral tracts 
from Dante’s time, a verbal sin (the term technical was indiscreta promissio), and the true sin of Guido is basically 
that he counsels… a sin. Rather then being ‘simple’ matter, as Truscott suggested, the interrelationship between sins 
is a complex issue in the “trattatistica morale” of the late Middle Ages.  
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they set,248 and the end of Guido exemplifies this idea: Guido, the master of false promise falls 
pray to Boniface’s own (impossible to keep) promise of absolution.  The forgiveness of sin 
granted by the corrupt father of the church availed Guido nothing at the moment of his death; the 
devil still prevailed over St. Francis in the struggle for the counselor’s soul. Both Dante’s text 
and Cavalca’s treatment of malicious counsel tell us that, however great the power of forgiveness 
held by ecclesiastics is, there is a greater power, above the Church, which, if the Church is 
corrupted by wicked leaders, cancels the ecclesiastic absolution and ridicules the so-called wise. 
There is no power in the world and in the Church, however great and cunning that power is, that 
can change the fundamental moral laws established by the divine providence. The capacity for 
absolution of the prelates is stymied if it contravenes transcendental moral rules. This is the 
lesson that Dante’s story of Guido da Montefeltro sets forth, and the same is the conclusion 
Domenico Calvaca, Dante’s contemporary, reaches in his chapter dedicated to evil counselors:  
 
Or ecco dunque, come Iddio perverte i consigli umani; e, come dice il 
Salmista: Il suo consiglio sta fermo in eterno. Sicchè, come dice la 
Scrittura: Non è consiglio, nè prudenza, nè sapienza contra a Dio. (…) 
Che poichè immutare non si può il divino consiglio e la divina sentenza, in 
ogni cosa dobbiamo inchinare le spalle, e sottometterci alla sua santissima 
volontà. Or questo sia detto contro agli stolti savi del mondo che credono 
con loro astuzie fuggire o impedire i giudici, o i consigli divini. (p. 185). 
 
So this is how God alters the human advises; and, as the Psalmist says: His counsel stays 
firm in eternity. Therefore, as the Scripture says: There is no advice, no prudence, no 
wisdom against God. (…) For since the divine counsel and the divine sentence cannot be 
changed, in everything we do we have to bend our back and submit to his most sacred 
will. And this is to be said against the foolish wise of the world who believe that they can 
shun or prevent the divine jusdgments or counsels with their tricks. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                 
248 Sicchè eglino per giusto giudicio di Dio caggiono in quella fossa ed in quello lacciulo ch’eglino apparechiavano 
per altrui. Sicchè bene si verifica il detto de’i Proverbi, che chi ordina lo iniquo consiglio, sì gli torna in capo. (p. 
183; ‘So those men, through God’s fair judgment, fall into the same ditch and trap they were preparing for the other. 
Therefore, this confirms the saying of the Proverbs: the unfair advice turns against the head of he who gave it’). 
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A close reading of Inferno XXVI and XXVII from the perspective of the moral tracts on 
the sins of the tongue demonstrates that the sin punished in the eighth pouch of Malebolge is the 
sin Dante names consiglio frodolente (XXVII. 116). Ahern’s argument that “neither consiliari 
male, nor pravum consilium are synonymous with consiglio frodolente” is not tenable,249 since in 
both the Latin tracts and their translation into Italian vernacular this sin is, as I have shown, 
tightly connected with, and defined in terms of, fraud. If Dante used the adjective ‘fraudulent’ 
instead of ‘evil’ or ‘wicked’ it is because on the one hand, the fraudulent feature seemed to him 
prevalent, and on the other hand, because he embedded this sin into the moral area of fraud, in 
Malebolge. Of all the spectrum of features of the sin of pravum consilium, for Dante the most 
salient aspect—and, at the same time, the most relevant to his ethical system--was fraudulence. 
The three main moral readings I have proposed so far—Aquinas, Peraldus and Cavalca—
demonstrate that the other transgressions that critics have posited as alternatives for the sin of 
fraudulent counsel: astutia, fraud, injustice, betrayal250—are not different from consiglio 
fradudolente, but characteristic traits of it. Far from being a “preposterous misnomer,” as Anna 
Hatcher has argued, the label consiglio frodolente is the correct name for the sin punished in the 
eight pouch of Malebolge.251 Both the text of the Comedy, which offers this term, and the 
                                                 
249 Ahern, Dante’s Slyness, 276. 
250 Lawrence Ryan speaks in both Ulysses and Guido’s case of betrayal that leads to the destruction of community, 
be this a secular or a religious community: “For the two sinners represent, in turn, the fraud that undermines res 
publica, ordained by providence, as Dante concludes in his De Monarchia, to help human beings fulfill the potential 
of their nature within time, and the ecclesia, the divinely instituted means for attainment of the supernatural end of 
the species.” (“Ulysses, Guido and the Betrayal of Community,” 228). 
251 “Dante’s Ulysses and Guido da Montefeltro.” Dante Studies 88 (1970): 109-117. One of the reasons why Hatcher 
argues against this denomination is the distinction she sees between “the use of fraud in counseling” (as embodied 
by Ulysses) and “the counseling the use of fraud” (as personified by Guido da Montelfeltro). This distinction is 
however inoperative and irrelevant, since the medieval moral species of evil counsel is extremely elastic and 
encompasses both meanings. A simple perusal of the dozen of exemplary stories told by Cavalca to illustrate this sin 
reveals a much greater variety of fraudulent facets than these two detected by Hatcher.  
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historical context of the late Middle Ages, which provides us the evidence for the moral category 
of evil counsel—confirm the appropriateness of this term. 
With the sharpness germane to the moralist, Dante takes an ethical category modern for 
his time and applies it like an analytical grid not only to his contemporaries, but also to the 
cultural material of Classical antiquity.252 Thanks to the poetic enterprise of the Comedy, the 
category of ‘evil counsel’ leaves the stern and abstract sphere of the moral treatises and enters 
the realm of poetry, in the shapes of the memorable characters of Ulysses and Guido da 
Montefeltro. The former is meant to represent the long history of fraudulent verbal practice, and 
the latter its adherence to the Italian, contemporary soil. If Peraldus and Cavalca gave their 
medieval readers the main traits of the moral profile of the malicious counselor, Dante has given 
his own readers concrete examples of fraudulent counselors in action, examples that have 
fascinated posterity for seven centuries. 
4.3 ‘DOUBLE-TALK’ (BILINGUIUM) IN FAUS SEMBLANT’S DISCOURSE 
“The problem of Faus Semblant”253 in criticism of the Rose is similar perhaps only to “il 
problema di Ulisse” in Dante Studies. Over the course of time, the two characters have sparked 
an almost equal amount of controversy among critics and engendered equally passionate 
polemical writings. If for Ulysses the main problem remains the exact nature of the sin for which 
Dante punished him in Hell, for Faus Semblant, the issue at stake is the reason why Jean de 
                                                 
252 This aspect, along with the changes he operated into the Homeric myth, contributes to the creation of the new, 
Ulyssean, mito in chiave christiana, of which the Italian critics speak. 
253 The phrase comes from Kevin Brownlee. “The Problem of Faus Semblant: Language, History, and Truth in the 
Roman de la Rose, in The New Medievalism, Kevin Brownlee and M. S. Nichols, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1991), 253-71. 
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Meun included among the barons of Love an evil character, responsible for a great deal of 
extraneous and irrelevant poetic material. To counter this negative critical assessment expressed 
by C. S. Lewis and William W. Ryding,254 recent studies have offered powerful arguments 
justifying Faus Semblant’s textual presence in the Rose from different standpoints. In her 
groundbreaking study of Jean de Meun’s structures of duality and deceit in the Romance of the 
Rose, Susan Stakel sees Faus Semblant as the main site where Jean de Meun articulates his 
literary treatment of moral duplicity.255 In a similar vein, Richard Emmerson and Ronald 
Herzman promote Jean de Meun’s controversial character as a key element for understanding the 
poem’s apocalyptic framework.256 Kevin Brownlee also argues that Faus Semblant’s discourse is 
vital to the poem because it provides “one of the most important meditations on the status of 
language.” 257
In this section, I investigate Faus Semblant’s relevance to Jean de Meun’s poem from the 
viewpoint of the writer’s treatment of the sin of bilinguium, or double-talking, an ethical 
category of the medieval treatises on peccata linguae which applies in privileged ways to Jean de 
Meun’s controversial character. After examining the bipolar discursive structure that 
characterizes Faus Semblant’s self-portrait, I will argue that, far from damaging Faus Semblant 
as a fictive construct, as some critics have maintained,258 discursive bipolarity is Jean de Meun’s 
main technical means for articulating the mimetic coherence of his hypocritical personage.  
                                                 
254 C. S. Lewis. The Allegory of Love (New York: Oxford UP, 1936), 142, and William W. Ryding “Faus Semblant: 
Hero or Hypocrite?” in Romanic Review 60 (1969), 163. 
255 False Roses. Structures of Duality and Deceit in Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose (Saratoga, California: Anma 
Libri, 1991). 
256 Richard K. Emmerson and Ronald B. Herzman. “The Apocalyptic Age of Hypocrisy: Faus Semblant and Amant 
in the Roman de la Rose,” Speculum 62 (1987): 612-634. 
257 “The Problem of Faus Semblant,” 253. 
258 Lewis (The Allegory of Love), Ryding (“Faus Semblant”), and Lee Patterson. “For the Wyves Love of Bathe: 
Feminine Rhetoric and Poetic Resolution in the Roman de la Rose and the Canterbury Tales.” Speculum 58 (1983), 
656-95. 
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Like Friend and the Old Woman, Faus Semblant is not an entirely allegorical character. 
He is not the personification of an abstraction, in the old-fashioned mode of Prudentius’ 
Psychomachia, although he does display some allegorical features, but he is a character with a 
real biography.  Jean de Meun casts Faus Semblant as the representation of the mendicant friar, a 
religious type with a central and controversial role in the religious arena in Jean de Meun’s days. 
By virtue of his historically-grounded biography, Faus Semblant acquires a clear and distinctive 
social identity: he is a preacher, and a confessor, one whose life is supposed to be dedicated to 
God and to the spreading of the Word. His ecclesiastical skills are exceptional, the character 
claims, and his allegedly long experience in preaching attests to his magisterial expertise in the 
use of religious language:  
 
Prelat ne sont mie si sage/Ne si lettré de trop com gié;/J’ai de devinité 
congié, /Voire, par dieu, pieça leü.  (12354-57)  
 
‘There are no prelates so wise and learned as I. I have a license in divinity, and, in fact, 
by God, I have lectured for a long time.’ 
 
  
In reality, however, Faus Semblant uses his ecclesiastical privileges for the purpose of 
defrauding people, as he himself admits: Mais de religion sanz faille,/J’en lais le grain et preng 
la paille./Pour genz enbascher y abit: Je n’en quier sanz plus que l’habit (‘But without fail, I 
leave the kernel of religion and take the husk. I dwell in religion only to trick people; I seek only 
its habit, no more’, 11219-11222).  His sermons are in sharp contrast with his moral depravation, 
and his discourse in the poem will unrelentingly highlight the contradiction between what he 
says and what he really thinks and does. Faus Semblant establishes a genetic affiliation with 
fraudulent language from the very beginning of his textual activity. Not only is he introduced in 
the world of the characters through a sin of speech signaled by the god of love: c. mile foiz t’es 
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parjurez (‘you have perjured yourself a hundred thousand times’, 10947), but he is also the son 
of a grievous sin tightly linked to speaking: Hypocrisy. The lineage of the character, with Barat 
(Fraud), as the father, and Hypocrisy, as the mother, preordains the textual life of Faus Semblant 
and will circumscribe his evolution in the narrative within essentially immoral parameters. The 
dialogue between Faus Semblant and the God of Love at the beginning of the poem reveals the 
discrepancy between Faus Semblant’s preaching and his inner structure: 
 
  
«Car si com tes habiz nous conte,/Tu sambles estre .i. sainz hermites! » 
/(Faus samblant): « C’est voirs, mes je sui ypocrites. » (Li dieus 
d’amours): «Tu vas preschant astinance! »/(Faus samblant): «Voire voir, 
mais j’emple ma pance/De tres bons morsiaus et de vins/Tels comme il 
affiert a devins. » / (Li dieus d’amours): «Tu vas preschant povreté. » 
/(Faus samblant): «Voire, riches a poesté./Mais combien que povres me 
faigne/Nul povre je ne contredaigne. » (11234-11244) 
 
‘As you tell us of your habits, you seem to be a holy hermit/-It is true, but I am a 
hypocrite./-You go around preaching abstinence/-True, indeed, but I fill my paunch with 
very good morsels and with wines such as are suitable for theologians./-You go around 
preaching poverty./-True, abundantly richly. But however much I pretend to be poor, I 
pay not attention to any poor person.’ 
 
 
The spirited dialogue between the two dramatis personae hinges on three sets of replies, 
each of which contains a statement by the God of Love about Faus Semblant’s ways and Faus 
Semblant’s subsequent responses, which mercilessly deny each of the god’s statements. With 
lines swiftly moving back and forth between the two interlocutors like in a miniature dramatic 
scene, the short remarks of the God of Love seem to have the mere function of prompting long 
replies from Faus Semblant, who, in reaction to what he claims to be the god’s incorrect 
assertions, is compelled to introduce and define himself. This humorous dialectical play is 
designed to emphasize the contradiction between appearance and moral essence, between truth 
and lie, and to dismantle conventional systems of signs--the clothes and the words—, commonly 
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regarded as faithful indicators of social identity and moral profile, respectively, but which can 
easily deceive. The first of these pairs of lines posits the equivalence between the most severe 
type of religious figure—the hermit—, identifiable by his clothes, and the vice of religious 
hypocrisy, the utmost form of verbal fraud.259 The last replies bring into greater focus the breach 
between words and deeds, between preaching the word of God and acting, a breach that will 
define the entire evolution of the hypocritical personage, and which, in Jean de Meun’s view, 
characterizes many of the preachers of his day.  
To gain a better grasp of Jean’s distaste for these preachers, it is necessary to take a look 
at one of the most controversial authors contemporary with Jean de Meun, and who seems to 
have greatly influenced Jean’s ideas. In his fundamental study about the medieval antimendicant 
tradition, Penn Szittya argues, in the wake of Ernest Langlois, one of the editors of the Rose, for 
the impressive presence of William of St. Amour’s antimendicant ideas in the discourse of Faus 
Semblant.260 As Penn Szittya has only briefly underscored ideological affinities between Faus 
Semblant’s speech and the position of St. Amour in the quarrel with the mendicants, I will take 
specific notions from the writings of William of St. Amour to show how Jean de Meun 
assimilated some of St. Amour’s ‘signs’ for recognizing a hypocritical preacher and used them as 
representational devices for patterning the textual behavior of Faus Semblant. 
                                                 
259 The equation is also realized in the text at the level of prosody: the words hermite/hypocrite are each placed in 
the last position of the verse, in a rhyme highlighting the dishonest relationship between a purported man of God and 
his evil use of language. The technical device is repeated for an identical effect later on, in the same discourse: Je sui 
des vallez antecrist,/Des larrons dont il est escrist/Qu’il ont habit de sainteé/Et vivent en tel fainteé (11717-11720 ; 
‘I am one of Antichrist’s boys, one of the thieves of whom it is written that they have the garment of saintliness and 
live in pretense’). The message conveyed by these two rhymes is a double-edged sword, for at once it generalizes 
the sin of hypocrisy by extending it to all hermits—the sign of a Christian society in crisis—and warns the reader 
about the deceitfulness of the semiotic system of clothing. As Faus Semblant himself will restate at another point in 
his discourse, li habiz ne fait pas le moine (11062), and just because some people wear the symbols of a religious 
order or rank, this does not identify them with the order they claim to represent. 
260 “this section of the Roman is saturated with the language of W. of St. Amour (…) Jean de Meun clearly had texts 
of William’s works in front of him.” [Penn Szittya, The Antifraternal Tradition in Medieval Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1986), 186]. 
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William of St. Amour’s De periculis novissimorum temporum is a virulent attack against 
the mendicant orders, a text that ‘earned’ St. Amour his exile from Paris. Jean praises this text in 
the Roman and explicitly expresses his sympathy for its author. De periculis draws attention to 
the heretical climate of the day prefiguring the end of the world, and calls for true Christians to 
take a stand toward the many dangers that threaten Christianity.261 The dangers St. Amour fears 
are, basically, the great social powers of the Franciscan and Dominican orders, and the extremist 
Christian movement initiated by Joachim of Fiore. Animated by his strong antipathy for the 
friars, St. Amour does not hesitate to call them servants of the devil. Most of the De periculis 
deals with these Antichristi, who are extremely dangerous, St. Amour says, because of the great 
power of seduction of their preaching. But, although these ecclesiastics are very skilled verbally, 
admits St. Amour, their doctrine is nothing but poison, because it does not spring from the heart, 
but from their devilish thirst of powers and privileges. These false preachers will corrupt 
people’s morals and drive them away from true faith, as they are corrupt and heretics themselves 
(in moribus erunt corrupti, et tandem in fide reprobi (…); tunc ispi facilius mettent eos in errors, 
tam contra bonos mores, quam contra fidem.).262 Both their intelligence and their oratorical 
talent are real, warns St. Amour, and because of this, people of good faith cannot recognize them 
as false preachers, but succumb to their diabolical power of seduction. Feeling compelled to 
                                                 
261 Those who refuse to take action or engage in the fight against these dangers will themselves perish in hell, St. 
amour claims: Quod qui non proeviderunt praedicta pericula, aut previsa non praecaverint, peribunt in illis 
sciendum est, quod qui haec pericula non previderint, transferentur procul dubio a civitate Dei in civitatem diaboli, 
et ibi captivi detinebuntur (‘It is to be known that those who will not foresee the predicted dangers, or will not be on 
guard against the foreseen things, will perish in them; and those who will not have foreseen these dangers will 
undoubtedly be moved from the city of God into the city of devil, and they will be detained therein;’ translation 
mine.) De periculis novissimorum temporum, in Opera Omnia (Paris: Constance, 1632), 34. 
262 De periculis, 31. 
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instruct Christians on how to recognize these false preachers, William of St. Amour gives his 
audience a list of forty-one signs as tools for identification.263
Besides minor indexes like the love of fine food, soft garments, and riches which, 
according to William of St. Amour, characterize the false friar, and which are overtly admitted to 
by Faus Semblant, one of the major aspects that is salient in Faus Semblant’s self-revelations is 
that he does not act alone in the social arena. He constantly speaks of his likes, either by using 
the third person plural pronoun “they,” when he presents them as a diffuse and dangerous whole 
that he takes pain not to upset with disparaging words, or by using the inclusive pronoun “us,” 
when he asserts his belonging to this never named but always evil social force which he speaks 
of as a representative. Thus, Faus Semblant’s cohorts, although depicted as a vague presence 
(mes amis, mes compagnons), are always there, in the outside world, lurking in the background, 
never manifesting themselves in the romance, but constantly felt as an unsettling and menacing 
evil power.264 This apocalyptic image closely echoes William of St. Amour’s portrayal of the 
friars as a multitude of false preachers (pseudopredicatores) and antichristi, embodying the 
apocalyptic prophecies of the New Testament. According to St. Amour, one of the main actions 
of this large and evil mob is penetratio domos (penetrating into houses), a violent intrusion 
                                                 
263 Quod autem in simulate religione tam verborum, quam operum decipiant, nec est credendum illis operibus, quae 
ostentant in aperto, que bono esse videntur; nam illa faciunt simulando, vid. ut sancti videantur esse, cum non sint. 
(…) Quasi dicent, ab operibus eorum manifestis, que bono videntur exterius, cognosci non possunt, quia ea prava 
intentione faciunt. Sed ab illis operibus, quae ostentare non audent, sed occultare nituntur, eo quod mundana sunt, 
et ad mundana tendunt, cognosceri possunt. (De periculis, 29; ‘But since they deceive in false religion both through 
words and deeds, we must not trust those works which are shown in public and which seem to be good; for those 
works they do by dissimulation, so that they may appear holy, when in fact they are not. (…) from those external 
works of them, which seem good on the outside, they [the false friars] cannot be known to do them out of evil 
intention. But they [the false friars] can be known from those of their works that they do not dare to display, but try 
to conceal, for those works are of the world and tend towards the world.’). In a subsequent text (Contra Pericula 
imminentia Ecclesiae generali per Hypocritas, Pseudopredicatores, et Penetrantes Domos, et Otiosos, et Curiosos, 
et Gyrovagos), St. Amour extends this list to fifty signs.  Here too, he specifies that since the false ecclesiastics play 
their roles of preachers so well, it is necessary for the Christians to learn the signs after which they can recognize the 
new “Antichrists.”   
264 In one place he speaks of their cruelty (leur cruauté connui, 10964) and in another he reasserts: trop son cruel 
malament (10975; ‘they are very cruel in an evil way’). 
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exerted by people able to infiltrate everywhere, even places where they are normally excluded 
from and where they do not belong. By “houses” St. Amour did not just mean places of lodging, 
but also the place, or house, of the soul, and the idea is almost literally taken up by Jean de Meun 
who has Faus Semblant describe himself as an intruder in all types of settings: religious and 
secular, and even as a thief of hearts. After confessing to the god of love that he can be found 
either in the cloister, or in the world, the friar admits, however, to his preference for open and 
intensely populated areas: 
 
 
Es bours et es chastiaus, as citez/Ai mes sales et mes pales/Ou l’en puet 
corre a plain eslais,/Et di que je suis hors dou monde ;/Mais je m’i plunge 
et m’i affunde/Et m’i aese et baigne et noe/Mieus que nus poissons de sa 
noe.  (11710-16) 
 
I make my halls and palaces in towns, castles, and cities, where one can run with 
a free rein. I say that I am out of the world, but I plunge into it and immerse 
myself in it; I take my ease and bathe and swim better than any fish with his fin. 
 
 
As the verses tellingly reveal, the urban location is a faithful identifier for the fraternal 
orders, whose mendicant way of life and preaching activities would draw them to cities rather 
than to rural settings.  Remarkable in this passage is the open cynicism with which Jean de Meun 
highlights, on the one hand, the easy movement of Faus Semblant in an urban setting, and on the 
other, the contradiction between his compatibility with a worldly type of life and his purported 
isolation from the world.   
Apart from the false friars’ unsettling presence in the seculum, there are two other signs 
connected with the mendicant orders--as personified by Faus Semblant--that render them 
publicly dangerous: their power of seduction and the ease with which they get in touch with 
people from all social estates. Both seduction and social skills rely on the care with which the 
 194 
character is “composing” his public figure.  In order to ensure a better circulation from one level 
of society to another, Faus Semblant is constantly and carefully building his external image, 
based on his physical appearance (his clothing which represents his “masks”) and his linguistic 
skills: 
 
 
Trop sai bien mes habiz changier,/Prendre l’un et l’autre estrangier:/Or sui 
chevaliers, or sui moines,/Or sui prelaz, or sui chanoines,/Or sui clers, 
autre heure sui prestres/Or sui deciples, or sui mestres,/Or chastelains or 
forestiers;/Briement, je sui de touz mestiers./Or sui princes, or resui 
pages,/Et sai par cuer trestouz langages./ Autre heure sui vieulz et chenuz,/ 
Or resui juenes devenuz./Or sui Roberz, or sui Robins,/Or cordeliers or 
jacobins.  (11191-11204)  
 
I know very well how to change my garment, to take one and then another foreign to it. 
Now I am a knight, now a monk; at one time I am a prelate, at another a canon; at one 
hour a clerk, at another a priest; now disciple, now master, now lord of the manor, now 
forester. Briefly, I am in all occupations. Again I may be prince or page, and I know all 
languages by heart. At one hour I am old and white, and then I have become young again. 
Now I am Robert, now Robin, now Cordelier, now Jacobin.  
 
  
In light of this detailed description of himself which foregrounds his chameleon-like 
nature, Faus Semblant represents the mendicant friar as an actor on the social stage.  The masks 
he changes with great ease assure him direct and guaranteed access to all the people with whom 
he wants to interact, and his self-portrayal shows us the full complexity of his significance in a 
moral world.265 By collapsing differences in both the religious and lay hierarchies, by blurring 
distinctions between professions (métiers) and by asserting at once his lack of ethnic specificity 
and his ability to speak any language, the character is in fact affirming his universality as an 
                                                 
265 It is worth noting in this respect that, according to Sylvia Huot, Faus Semblant’s discourse was felt to be so 
subversive by its medieval copyists that is was often altered: “the discourse of Faus Semblant, with its biting satire 
on the mendicant orders, was viewed as dangerous by some scribal editors of the Rose, who occasionally inserted 
warnings that the passage was not for the general dissemination or even deleted parts of the text.” [The “Romance of 
the Rose” and Its Medieval Readers (Cambridge: University Press, 1993), 17]. 
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agent of evil, as the all-invasive incarnation of sin.266 The three elements on which his identity is 
based--lineage, wearing apparel and verbal activity—all point in this direction. From the 
viewpoint of his family line, as son of the world-governing Fraud and of Hypocrisy, Faus 
Semblant is genetically predisposed to a fraudulent existence; from the viewpoint of the wearing 
apparel, a type of language itself, he is a lie; and finally, from the viewpoint of his verbal 
activity, he breathes forth lies, perjury and false promises.  
Another sign of the friar’s composing their fraudulent public image is the care they take 
to be perceived by people they want to convert as virtuous persons and holy pastors. A tool in 
this fabrication of a false social and moral perception is, according to St. Amour, the request of 
letters of commendation. The idea reappears in Faus Semblant’s discourse, within the framework 
of his confessed hatred of honest work and poor people:  
 
Et pour avoir des genz loanges,/Des riches hommes par 
losanges/Empestrons que lettres nous doignent/Qui la bonté de nous 
tesmoignent,/Si que l’en croie par le monde/Que vertuz toute en nous 
habonde./Et touz jours povres nous faignons...  (11673-11679). 
 
In order to win people’s praise we tell lies to rich men and get them to give us letters 
bearing witness to our goodness, so that throughout the world people will think that every 
virtue abounds in us. We always pretend to be poor… 
 
 
According to De periculis novissimorum temporum, requesting letters of recommendation 
is routinely counter-pointed by the false preachers’ intolerance to any kind of criticism. The 
friars’ distaste for any form of correction--a new sign for identification in St. Amour’s view--is 
present in Faus Semblant’s discourse as well. Jean de Meun’s character asserts not only his 
incapacity to accept criticism from others and his will to order and control people’s lives, but 
                                                 
266 “Faus Semblant identifies himself and his cronies with avarice, hypocrisy, cruelty, pride, gluttony—all of the 
seven deadly sins, in fact, except lust.” (Susan Stakel, False Roses, 48). 
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also his determination to physically exterminate any person who would dare oppose his methods 
of conversion to evil.267 The killer instinct of Faus Semblant and of the antichristi whom, 
according to the interpretation of Emmerson and Herzman, he is supposed to represent, is not 
only verbalized in his discourse when he warns about the faite awaiting those who do not follow 
him,268 but actually enacted on two separate occasions: with the heinous extermination of 
Malebouche (‘Evil Mouth’), and with the slayer of the Norman soldiers, the guardians of the 
Castle of Jealousy. 
Another major pattern of figuration in the discourse of Faus Semblant that harks back to 
William of Saint Amour is the conception of the mendicant friars as the embodiment of the third 
historical persecutors of the church. St. Amour had a particular scheme about Salvation History, 
a scheme that posited three major phases of persecution against the Church. The first one, from 
the time of the first martyrs of the Church, was a persecutio violenta, based on an effusion of 
blood; the second, from the time of Augustine and Hilary, was a persecutio fraudulenta; whereas 
the third, close to the time of William of Saint Amour, was a persecution performed by 
hypocrites and predicated upon the conjunction of violence and fraud. According to Penn Szittya 
who takes up Emmerson and Herzman’s interpretation, St. Amour casts the friars as agents of the 
third persecution, in that they are both simulators of pastoral care (fraudulent ecclesiastics) and 
perpetrators of violence.  
                                                 
267 A tout le monde avons pris guerre/Et volons du tout ordener/Quel vie l’en i doit mener. (11724-6) 
268 Car pluseur par moi mort reçurent/Qui ainc mon barat n’aperçurent,/Et reçoivent et recevront (11177-9 ; 
‘several who have never recognized my fraud have received their deaths through me, and many are receiving them 
and will receive them without ever recognizing it’). Or in another place: Les genz encontre euls esmouvrons/Par les 
baraz que nous couvrons/Et les ferons deglavier/Ou par autre mort devier/Puis qu’il ne nous vorront ensivre 
(11853-6; ‘We will incite people (…) by the frauds that we hide, and we will make them perish by the sword or by 
some other death if they don’t follow us’). This type of anti-social activity was treated by medieval moralists as a 
verbal sin called seminantium discordiam ‘sowing of discord’. Dante will punish the sowers of discord among the 
fraudulent in Malebolge. 
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The mix of falsehood and physical abuse is blatant in the depiction of Faus Semblant. At 
the beginning of his dialogue with the god of Love, the friar confesses to pursuing fraud, and 
nothing but fraud, in the following terms: 
 
  
Mais en quelque lieu que je viengne,/Ne comment que je m’i 
contiengne,/Nient plus fors barat n’i chaz./Ausi com dant Tyberz li 
chaz/N’entent qu’a soriz et a raz,/N’entent je a riens fors a baraz.  (11069-
74)  
 
But whatever place I come to, no matter how I conduct myself, I pursue nothing but 
fraud.  No more than Tibert, the cat, has his mind on anything but mice and rats, do I 
think of anything except fraud.  
 
 
In keeping with the traditional view of St. Amour of the falsi fratres as apocalyptic 
persecutors of the Church by means of fraud and violence, Jean de Meun makes his character 
threaten to kill people and has him perform criminal acts. Nowhere in the romance is this 
combination of fraud and violence more evident than in the section of Malebouche’s slayer in the 
middle of his pious act of confession. Since Malebouche represents a danger for Amant’s 
conquest of the beloved, Faus Semblant and his concubine Astinance Constrainte (‘Constrained 
Abstinence’) decide to get rid of him. Before going to Faus Semblant’s house where Malebouche 
is lodged, the two felons premeditate their act and debate how best to kill him. They wonder if 
they should make themselves known to Malebouche or assume false identities. Of course, they 
choose to assume false identities and disguise themselves as pilgrims. With meticulous care, they 
compose their masks to appear as virtuous and pious Christians. Constrained Abstinence puts on 
a robe of cameline and disguises herself as a Beguine, whereas:  
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Faus samblant qui bien se ratorne/Ot aussi com pour essoier/Vestuz les 
dras frere Soier:269/La chiere ot mout simple et piteuse/Ne regardeüre 
orgueilleuse/N’ot il pas, mais douce et paisible./A son col portoit une 
bible./A pié s’en va sanz escuier,/Et pour ses membres apuier/Ot ausi com 
par impotence/en sa main destre une potence/Et fist en sa manche 
glacier/.i. bien tranchant rasoir d’acier,/Qu’il fist forgier en une forge/Que 
l’en apele coupe gorge.  (12086-12100) 
 
False Seeming, who was also equipping himself well, had dressed, as though to try it out, 
in the clothing of brother Seier. He had a very simple, compassionate face without any 
appearance of pride, a sweet, peaceful look. At his neck he carried a Bible. Afterward, he 
went off without a squire, and, to support his limbs, as though he had no power, he used a 
crutch of treason. Up his sleeve he slipped a very sharp steel razor, that he had made in a 
forge and that was called Cut-Throat. 
 
 
 
 
The detailed description of the religious attire of the two criminals and the compassionate 
looks they display while pretending to be holy people serve to highlight the disjunction between 
appearance and moral substance, between the outer self and the inner self. Both their external 
image and the pious speech they skillfully deliver to gullible Malebouche, before killing him, 
will turn out to be deceptive codes meant to warn the reader about the dangers represented by 
what William of St. Amour labeled falsi fratres sub habitu sanctitatis (‘false friars wearing the 
habit of sanctity’) and whom he identified with the hypocritical representatives of the mendicant 
orders of his day.270 The slaying of Malebouche in the midst of his act of confession conveys St. 
Amour’s message of the religious persecution by hypocrites.   
   The several ‘signs’ we have seen so far attached to the figure of Faus Semblant in the 
Romance of the Rose show that Jean de Meun projected this character in the wake of William of 
                                                 
269 Nickname based on a pun (soie ‘silk’), and standing for the Dominican friars, reputed for their love of silk 
garments. 
270 Ja ne les connistrez as robes,/Les faus traytres plains de lobes:/Leur faiz vous estuet regarder/Se vous voulez 
d’euls bien garder (11791-94; ‘You will never recognize them by their garments, these false traitors, full of trickery; 
you must look at their deeds if you really want to protect yourself from them’,) 
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St. Amour’s perception of the mendicant preachers of the day. Jean arguably knew these 
preachers directly, from his own experience, but when he built Faus Semblant into the text of his 
poem, he relied not only on his own experience, but also on the list of tens of signs posited by the 
secular master he admired so much. St. Amour considered hypocrisy to be the main vice of those 
who would bring about the end of the world, and in his view, this was the major trespass of the 
mendicant friars, the agents of the third historical persecution of the church.  
To understand in an apocalyptic framework why this vice is so pivotal to Jean de Meun’s 
portrayal of Faus Semblant, we now need to turn our attention to the way in which William 
Peraldus, the author of the most popular medieval encyclopedia of vices, defined hypocrisia. In 
Peraldus’ scheme, hypocrisy is one of the subspecies of the deadly vice of superbia ‘pride’, for 
the hypocrite sins mainly by his presumptuous attitude before his brethren and God. The 
association of hypocrisy with superbia appears several times in the self-revelations of Faus 
Semblant. In one place, the personage specifies that those who are truly religious are not at all 
prideful, but rather pious and humble,271 whereas in other moments, he confesses to living with 
the proud (je maing avec les orgueilleux, 11041) and characterizes the hypocrites as ‘haughty, 
proud and overbearing’(fieres et orgueilleus et gogues, 11634). Although Peraldus credits the 
hypocrites with the gift of intellectual subtlety, a feature that will define Faus Semblant as well, 
he condemns them for their duplicity, for the split between their inner and outer self. They hide 
their true evil intentions only to corrupt people and make new proselytes, therefore, hypocrites, 
warns Peraldus, constitute an extremely serious threat to the welfare of God’s church (multum 
ecclesie dei nocere possunt). They are skillful speakers, he asserts several times, but they preach 
the doctrine of the devil. The most perilous of the three categories of hypocrites, Peraldus notes, 
                                                 
271 Religieus sont tuit piteus,/Ja n’en verrez un despiteus:/Il n’ont cure d’orgueill ensivre/Tuit se veulent 
humblement vivre (11031-34). 
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is that represented by people who not only speak skillfully with an appearance of sincerity, but 
also accomplish praiseworthy deeds when, and only when, they can be seen by other people.  
Several of the features identified by Peraldus as hypocritical can be traced in the portrait 
of Faus Semblant, who is defined by Jean de Meun as li lierres (...) qui de trayson ot la 
face/Blanche dehors, dedenz nercie, 12015-17 (‘the thief with the face of treachery, white 
without and black within’). The friar will characterize himself and his likes around the same 
polarity inner/outer self: Dehors semblons aigniaus pitables/Dedenz sommes leus ravissables, 
11721-22 (‘seemingly pitiful sheep without, but ravening wolves within’). When the God of 
Love is asking him to justify some his extravagant statements, Faus Semblant is admitting to 
have said granz diablies apertes (11532, ‘great and open devilish things’). Extremely interesting-
-because based on an obvious paradox--is the passage in which the hypocritical friar condemns 
in vitriolic terms the hypocrites, especially those who, like in Peraldus’s description, perform 
good deeds only when they are in the public eye: 
 
 
(...) les fausses genz maudites/Que la lettre apele ypocrites:/ Faites ce qu’il 
sermoneront,/ Ne faites pas ce qu’ils feront;/ Dou bine dire n’ierent ja 
lent,/ Mais il n’ont dou faire talent. (…) S’il font oevres qui bonnes 
soient,/C’est pour ce que les gens les voient.  (11613-28) 
 
(…) ‘the accursed false people that the letter calls hypocrites: Do what they say but do 
not do what they do. They are not slow to speak well, but they have no desire to do so. 
(...) If they do jobs that may be good, it is because people see them.’) 
 
 
Not being “slow” in speaking well, in other words, being a very good rhetorician, is the 
fundamental asset of the hypocrites, argues Faus Semblant in the wake of the biblical text and 
the medieval theologians. For both William Peraldus and William of Saint-Amour the chief trait 
of hypocrites is the ability to speak well. Peraldus notes with a particular stress the joy this 
 201 
category of sinners find in speaking and the ease with which they communicate with people, 
while St. Amour suggests that a too sophisticated argumentation paralleled by outstanding verbal 
skills corrupts the Word and undermines the spiritual message to be conveyed. In St. Amour’s 
view, the gift of rhetoric is one of the major signs that may help identify a false friar, and Jean de 
Meun’s treatment of Faus Semblant repeatedly illustrates this point of view.272 The hypocritical 
character gives details on several occasions about his preaching skills, and boasts about his 
ability to speak all languages: et sai par cuer trestouz langages (11200). His manipulation of 
speech associated with fraudulent ecclesiastic activities is best seen when he brags about 
systematically breaking the secrecy of the confessional. According to Faus Semblant’s 
“philosophy,” pastoral care must be directed primarily at the rich, as they are much more sinful 
than the poor, and therefore in more need of his guidance. He uses the privileges that he gains as 
a confessor to the rich for fraudulent purposes: he blackmails the sinners over their moral errors 
and is willing to give pardon only to those who pay for his silence. Making public other people’s 
secrets is a sin of the tongue according to the medieval moral treatises, a sin called secreta 
revelare (‘the disclosing of secrets’), and according to William Peraldus, this sin is all the more 
damning when committed by religious figures. Faus Semblant makes of secreta revelare his 
political and social agenda, since this sin is one of his main means of making a living.  
                                                 
272 Credit enim vulgus quandoque illum Praedicatorem sanctiorem esse, qui linguam habet in praedicando 
eruditam, et eloquentiam elegantem, cum tamen ista non faciant sanctitatem, sed plaerumque operentur peccatum. 
(William of St. Amour. Contra Pericula, 393; ‘But since they deceive in false religion both through words and 
deeds, we must not trust those works which are shown in public and which seem to be good; for those works they do 
by dissimulation, so that they may appear holy, when in fact they are not. (…) from those external works of them, 
which seem good on the outside, they [the false friars] cannot be known to do them out of evil intention. But they 
[the false friars] can be known from those of their works that they do not dare to display, but try to conceal, for those 
works are of the world and tend towards the world’; emphasis and translation mine). There is a difference, however, 
between the truly saint preaching and the skilled (but false) preaching: the words of the true preachers do not spring 
from talent or skills, but from sacred inspiration: Verba enim Sanctorum Praedicatorum, non ab ingegno, vel arte 
procedunt; sed a spiritus sancti gratia; op. cit., 393). 
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If we gather all these traits related to the moral outlook of Faus Semblant, it becomes 
evident that the sins mainly associated with him are the sins of the tongue; through him, they 
invade the lives of both the rich and the poor, affect both the young and the old, and infiltrate the 
languages of both the native and the foreigner. The meaning Jean de Meun gives the sentence “Je 
parle tous les langages” (an ironic allusion to the Pentecost) is not ‘I speak French as well as 
Italian or German,’ but rather I speak the inner language of every soul, I know how to get to 
every person’s moral substance, I therefore know how to take people and manipulate them. This 
assertion seems a verbatim translation of William Peraldus’ definition of double-talkers: 
Bilingues sunt pseudo apostoli variis linguis loquentes (‘The double-talkers are false apostles 
able to speak various languages’).273
Further clues in the text contribute to the process of unmasking the corruption of rhetoric. 
Thus, one of the constants of Faus Semblant’s speech is the care he takes to make visible and 
explicit the gap between his words and his deeds. Apart from a the programmatic avowal Mout 
est en moi muez li vers:/Trop sont li fait au diz divers, 11223-26 (‘The tune is very much changed 
in me; my deeds are very different from my words’), he values praying over working, although, 
he says, his prayers are in contrast with what he does behind people’s backs. When he comes to 
speak about chivalry as an eminently honest social class, he curses all the honest people for the 
harmony between their sayings and their actions. Another interesting instance occurs when he 
warns the God of Love about the deceitfulness implicit in his way of talking: Ne ja certes pour 
mon habit/Ne savrez o quel gent j’abit; /Non ferez vous voir as parole,/Ja tant n’ierent simples 
ne moles (11076-79; ‘Certainly by my habit you would never know with what people I dwell, 
any more that you would from my words, no matter how simple and gentle they were’). 
                                                 
273 Peraldus, Summa Vitiorum, 582. 
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The passage is important for what it reveals about Faus Semblant’s manner of speaking. 
His words, he says, should not be trusted despite their appearance of simplicity and kindness. In 
this context, it is useful to note that in the Middle Ages the adjective simple had a different 
connotation than its current core meaning. It was the opposite not of complicated but of double, 
which had a negative moral connotation. Being double meant being dishonest and William 
Peraldus took up these initially Augustinian terms--simplex/duplex—in his treatment of 
hypocrisy. As we have seen, for Peraldus the hypocrite is a twofold person, an individual with a 
split personality: one whose outer self (exterius) does not correspond to the inner self (interius). 
The fact that Faus Semblant constantly establishes for himself the textual posture of a double 
dealer, who says one thing and does the opposite, brings also into focus his talent as a double-
talker, another medieval term denoting a person whose outer speech does not correspond to his 
mental speech. Although the words of the hypocrite seemingly convey simplicity (in the 
medieval sense of honesty), they are in fact “double,” because what the hypocrite says is 
different from his mental scheme, from his internal speech. If one wants to recognize a hypocrite, 
asserts Peraldus, one must look not at what that person says or does, but at his true intention. It is 
the good “thought,” the mental speech, says Faus Semblant, that qualifies a person as honest and 
religious:  
 
Bon cuer fait la pensee bonne;/(...)/Et la bonne pensee l’oevre,/Qui la 
religion descoevre./Illuec gist la religion/Selonc la droite entencion.  
(11121-26) 
 
A good heart makes the thought good (...). And it is good thought that inspires the man 
who reveals the religious life. In such a life lies religion based upon a right intention. 
 
 
In a world in which even the deeds are sometimes deceiving because performed only for 
the sake of the public eye, of the appearance, as we have seen, the sole, unmistakable indicator of 
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righteousness is intention, an element that belongs to the sphere of inner life. Couched in the 
terms of Abelard’s doctrine of intention, the passage is central for the discussion on moral 
duality and the connection between hypocrisy and double-talking. Like snakes, the sinners by 
bilinguium have two tongues, says Peraldus. One is the outer tongue that proclaims the good 
intention, and the other, the inner tongue that speaks the evil thought. The words of the double-
talker seem simple, to wit honest, but are in sharp contrast to his verba interiora mentis, the inner 
words of the mind, which translate the evil intent of wrongdoing. The sin of double-talking has 
extremely dangerous consequences for the public life, concludes Peraldus, and it is all the more 
grievous when committed by those who are supposed to teach Christian doctrine. 
All throughout his discourse, Faus Semblant casts himself as the embodiment of religious 
hypocrisy and double-talking. His immorality is predicated upon the split between his words and 
his deeds, between his outer speech and his cast of mind. This is what renders Faus Semblant’s 
speech in the Rose paradoxical; this is what confers to the organization of his discourse the so 
much-disputed contradictory aspect. All of the critics who have dealt, from a perspective or 
another, with the “problem” of Faus Semblant have noted the paradoxes inherent in his 
discourse, paradoxes rooted in the fact that the character engages with several topics and 
alternately adopts, with respect to them, a pro- and con- position: he curses the noble people for 
not being as hypocritical as he is (11935-40), and later on he compares the hypocrite with a pig 
returning to his vomit, and teaches how a hypocrite can be recognized. He abhors working, but 
refuses mendicancy. He speaks in favor of William of St. Amour in the quarrel against the 
mendicant friars, and then he feels personally threatened by his book. He vituperates against the 
Eternal Gospel that he considers full of grossly erroneous comparisons and then he regrets that 
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this book was not circulated more. He deplores the state of the Church and praises the University 
as a defender of Christianity and then he proclaims that he is one of Antichrist’s boys. 
These unrelenting shifts should not surprise us in a hypocrite; they are to be accounted 
for in light of the same bad habit of bilinguium (‘double-talking’), germane to this category of 
sinners. Domenico Cavalca developed some of Peraldus’ insights vis-à-vis bilingues (‘men with 
double-forked tongues’) and added a forth class of double-talkers to the three already mentioned 
by Peraldus. Thus, according to Cavalca: Bilingui anco sono detti quegli, i quali dicono ed una 
prima, ed una poi, sicchè rivoltano le parole a suo modo, e dicono e disdicono; non hanno 
fermezza in loro parole, sicchè per seguente generano molti scandoli (‘People with double-
forked tongues are those who first say one thing, then another, and thus twist the words at it 
pleases them, they say and unsay things; they lack steadfastness in their speech, therefore 
generate many scandals.’—translation mine).274 
In the wake of this definition that applies in spectacular ways to Jean de Meun’s 
hypocritical character, I respectfully disagree with the assessment expressed by Lee Patterson 
who considers Faus Semblant a representational failure. The conflicting positions on which Faus 
Semblant’s speech is patterned have prompted the critic to assert that: “these crude 
juxtapositions make it impossible for Jean to portray either the ethos or language of hypocrisy. 
As a speaker, Faus Semblant dissolves before the pressure of the inherited rhetorics that jostle 
side by side in his discourse, dissipating any coherence of the character before it can coalesce.” 
275
The descriptions of the bilingues that William Peraldus and Domenico Cavalca made in 
their famous treatises on the sins of the tongue contradict Lee Patterson’s pronouncement. The 
                                                 
274 Il Pungilingua, 199. 
275 Lee Patterson, “For the Wyves Love of Bathe,” 672. 
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shifts in perspective that characterize Faus Semblant’s discourse are a mimetic tool for 
representing his duplicitous nature; here, the “jostling of rhetorics” that Patterson is speaking of 
works not to demolish the character but to figure him forth. Particularly because the changes in 
perspective are a recurrent motif, the spotlight falls on the pattern of speech, and the variation, by 
being a productive pattern, reveals a premeditated literary technique for portraying the sins of 
bilinguium and hypocrisy. Emmerson and Herzman have noted in this respect that “Faus 
Semblant is unique not because of his hypocritical nature, but because his hypocrisy is so 
blatant.”276 My opinion is that this blatancy is a deliberate representational strategy adopted by 
the writer. Jean de Meun surely knew the mendicant friars from his own daily life, but the close 
reading of this section of the poem proves that he also drew on the energies of two important 
traditions: that of antifraternal literature, as best expressed by William of Saint-Amour, and that 
of the moral writings of his time. 
All throughout Faus Semblant’s intervention in the romance, the authorial stress on his 
pattern of speech is too evident and cultivated to be a deficiency of craftsmanship, as Patterson 
argues. The constant bipolarity of the friar’s speech is not a factor of mimetic dissolution, but the 
hermeneutical key to the character. His discourse is indeed, as all his critics have noted, 
paradoxical in nature, but paradoxia, is, as Charles Presberg, one of the theorist of this figure of 
speech, has pointed out, an “artful discourse,” that is both “trope of thought and rhetorical 
strategy.”277 Paradoxical discourse has its roots in Plato’s definition of dialogue as the art of 
simultaneously arguing opposite sides of a question, the effect of which is, in Presberg’s view, to 
“systematically use the categories of language and logic to question and mock the very 
                                                 
276 “The Apocalyptic Age of Hypocrisy,” 627. 
277 Charles Presberg. Adventures in Paradox (University Park: Pennsylvania Sate UP, 2001), 2. 
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categories that undergird language and logic as discursive systems.”278 In analyzing Faus 
Semblant, we have to consider not only what the character says and does, but across his 
fluctuating moods and statements, also what the writer does with his character and with the text. 
Faus Semblant’s textual figure is constructed along paradoxical lines as a coincidentia 
oppositorum; his discourse is designed by Jean de Meun as a dialectical space in which each 
argument can be seen from both sides. The speech of the character is cast by the writer in the 
medieval mold of a dialogue between the two sides of man—the inner and the outer--, each with 
its attendant speech, the aural and the mental, here constantly in disagreement. Since the internal 
structure of Faus Semblant is mutability, the organization of his discourse, as an authorial 
project, had to reflect mutability. Jean de Meun not only makes his character say he is a 
hypocrite, but also makes him express himself as a double-talker, designing his discourse as 
systematically bipolar. The carefully cultivated linguistic duality is a textual rendering of the sins 
of double-talking and hypocrisy, otherwise less perceptible for the reader. Only by having Faus 
Semblant constantly bounce from one ideological position to its opposite, from one assertive 
statement to its denial, can Jean de Meun render transparent the secret workings of the mind of 
his character and expose the potentially fraudulent resources of language.  
Faus Semblant’s speech is the embodiment of Presberg’s definition of paradoxy.  Using 
the voice of the false friar, Jean de Meun constantly mocks language and logic as human 
institutions, with both their seductions and their weaknesses, and makes visible to the reader the 
dangers they entail. The target audience of the Romance of the Rose will now be more on guard 
against external signs of sincerity and religiousness and more inclined to follow the path of 
interiority and look for the true intent underlying each word or deed.  
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
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 Far from being a literary fiasco as some have suggested, the portrayal of Faus 
Semblant is so accomplished, and it has played such an impressive role in the history of 
European literature that George Puttenham, an English Renaissance writer, used the name of 
Faus Semblant in his rhetorical encyclopedia as a technical term for a figure of speech. In his The 
Arte of English Poetry, Puttenham uses “False Semblant” as a common noun to designate 
allegory, and defines it as “speaking otherwise than one seems to speak.279
4.4 SOWING OF DISCORD AND FALSIFYING OF WORDS: TWO VERBAL SINS 
ASSOCIATED WITH FRAUD IN DANTE’S INFERNO 
 
 
 
Cavendum tibi summe, ne aliquid seditiosum dixeris; nihil enim 
perniciosius in civitate, quam seditio: (ubi seditio, ibi civium divisio. Sed ut ait 
Dominus: Omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur, et domus supra domum 
cadet. ‘Be warned not to say anything seditious, anything which would bring the 
city to ruin. Where there is sedition, there is a divided city. The Lord says: Every 
kingdom divided against itself is ruined and a household divided against itself 
collapses.’ (Albertano da Brescia).280
 
                                                 
279 George. Puttenham, The Arte of English Poetry, Doidge Willcok G., Walker A., eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1936). Puttenham’s term is also quoted by Richard A. Lanham in A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 2nd edition 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
280 De Doctrina loquendi et tacendi, 2.8., col. 102, published electronically at: 
http://freespace.virgin.net/angus.graham/Loquendi.htm
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4.4.1 The seminator di scandalo e di scisma 
The intellectuals of the Middle Ages had an acute awareness of the importance of maintaining 
social and political concord, and of the tragic consequences that could arise from the disruption 
of this harmony. In his treatise on vices and virtues, Alain of Lille, defines concord as that virtue 
on account of which inhabitants of the same city and fellow countrymen live together in the 
respect of the same legal institutions.281 And whereas Alain’s definition of concord stresses the 
common dependence on juridical forms of organization, his concept of discord emphasizes a 
more spiritual side of society: discord is that form of dissension that separates people previously 
bound by ties of charitable love.282
In the concrete, historical context of the late medieval Italy, Albertano da Brescia, a 
reputed lawyer and intellectual, warns about the dire consequences of the verbal practice of 
sedition in a moral tract written in Latin and dedicated to the art of speaking. Albertano’s words 
that serve as an epigraph to this essay evince a great awareness of the disasters sedition brings 
about in the life of a community. In a similar vein, Brunetto Latini, another leading Italian 
intellectual of the time, voices his concerns about an ill-governed city:  
 
Ed io, ponendo cura,/ Tornai a la natura/C’audivi dir che tene/Ogn’uom c’al 
mondo vene/E nasce primamente/Al padre e al parente,/E poi al suo 
comune;/Ond’io non so nessuno/Cu’i’ volesse vedere/La mia cittade 
avere/Del tutto a la sua guisa,/Né che fosse divisa/Ma tutti per 
                                                 
281 “Concordia est virtus concives et compatriotas in idemptitate instituti iuris et cohabitationis spontanee vinciens.” 
[Tractus de Virtutibus, et de Vitiis et de Donis Spiritus Sancti. Lottin, O., ed. Medieval Studies 12 (1950), 32]. 
282 Discordia est dissentio aliquorum quos prius amoris vinculum colligavit. (op.cit., p. 41; ‘Discord is the 
dissent/disunion of those previously bound by the tie of love’; translation mine). 
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commune/Tirassero una fune/Di pace e di ben fare,/Ché già non può 
scampare/Terra rotta di parte.(163- 79).283
 
And, becoming sorrowful,/I returned to the nature/That I have heard is possessed/By 
every man coming into the world:/First he is born/To parents and relations,/And then to 
his city state;/So that I know none/Whom I would wish to see/Have my city/Entirely in 
his control, /Or that it be divided;/But all in common/Should pull together on a rope/Of 
peace and of welfare/,Because a land torn apart cannot survive.” 
 
 
A man is naturally predestined to own and transform the geographical environment where 
he is born. Within this economic framework of land ownership (tenere la natura), man thrives 
not only with respect to nature but also inside a complex network of social relationships. He 
situates himself with respect to the world first by relating to his immediate family, then by 
expanding this inter-relational net to his extended family and to the comune. Nature, man and 
society constitute key-terms in a philosophical worldview that prompts Brunetto to air a political 
statement: abhoring both tyranny, dangerous for the abuses it can engender, and division, which 
can lead to political extinction, Brunetto calls for his fellow citizens to pull all on one single, 
allegorical rope: that of prosperity and harmony.  
Although Brunetto does not get more philosophical then that in this passage, the 
communality of effort that leads to social consensus is based on a union of wills. In the wake of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, Dante, Brunetto’s disciple, defines concord in these terms: “For concord 
is the uniform motion of more wills than one. From this definition it is apparent that a unity of 
wills, which is implied by their uniform motion, is the root of concord, or simply concord itself,” 
Monarchy 1.15, p. 82-83). For the politically engaged poet who, in De Monarchia, deems that 
                                                 
283 Il Tesoretto (The Little Treasure), Julia Bolton Holloway, ed. and transl., vol. 2, series A, Garland Library of 
Medieval Studies, (New York: Garland, 1981), 11.  The concern with discord is also stated in The Book of the 
Treasure, this time in connection with language: “Be careful not to speak to sow discord, for there is nothing worse 
among men” (New York: Garland, 1993), 207. 
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universal peace is the highest good of a happy life on earth (1.4., p. 25), concord, first within 
family, then within the state, is the indispensable requisite for the attainment of this universal 
good: “Now, the best condition of the human race is a kind of concord, for, just as the best 
condition of one man is a kind of concord because it consists in a harmony between body and 
soul, so the same is true of a household, a city, and a kingdom, and thus of the whole human 
race.” 1.15, 82-83). In another passage from the same political tract, a passage advocating the 
cause of a unique empire guarantor of the security of the world, Dante tackles the problem of the 
political division from a religious angle, invoking the same scriptural quote as Albertano: omne 
regnum in se divisum desolabitur. (‘Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate, 
Monarchy 1.5, 32-33)284, which prophetically sheds light on the destiny that awaits a divided 
political form. 
 Dante’s concerns about social divisions will acquire again prophetic tones in the Comedy, 
in the pilgrim’s colloquia with Ciacco and Cacciaguida, and even more dramatically in the circle 
of the sowers of discord (the ninth pouch of Malebolge). In the third circle of Hell punishing the 
gluttonous, Dante meets Ciacco, a Florentine who verbally excoriates the city of Florence for its 
reputed viciousness (la tua città, ch’ piena di invidia sì che già trabocca il sacco; ‘your city—
one so full of envy that its sack has always spilled’). Paradoxically, the same discourse that 
expresses Ciacco’s appartenenza to Florence posits a split between the man and the city itself: 
Ciacco calls Florence not la mia città, but Dante’s (la tua città).285 The identification of Florence 
                                                 
284 Kay informs us that these words spoken by Jesus are reproduced by Luke 11.17, Matthew 12.25 and Mark 3.24. 
(Dante’s Monarchia. Translated, with a commentary by Richard Kay. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1998; note, p. 32). 
285 Even the name with which the sinner identifies himself is described not as his personal “property,” but as a habit 
of those who socially identified him with this name: voi cittadini mi chiamaste Ciacco ‘you citizens called me 
Ciacco’, Inf. VI. 52). 
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leads Dante to enquire about the fate awaiting the inhabitants of so divided a city and about the 
cause of this tragic division:  
 
 
Ciacco, il tuo affanno/ mi pesa sì, ch’a lagrimar mi’nvita;/ma dimmi, se tu 
sai, a che verranno/li cittadin de la città partita;/s’alcun v’è giusto; e 
dimmi la cagione/ per che l’ha tanta discordia assalita. (Inf. VI. 58-63)  
 
Ciacco, your trouble weighs on me so/ that it calls me to weep; but tell me, if you know, 
to/what will come/the citizens of the divided city;/if any there is just;/and tell me the 
reason so much discord has assailed it. 
 
Dante’s desire to understand the reasons for the partition of the city beset by discord 
prompts Ciacco’s terrible prophecy: the plight of the city is due to the moral corruption of its 
denizens, Ciacco says, who are tormented by three great evils--envy, pride and covetousness. 
This is the state of affairs at the root of hate and bloodshed that will lacerate Florence for many 
years to come, Ciacco explains. Overwhelmed by the news and by the abundance of details with 
which it was delivered, the pilgrim asks his interlocutor about the destiny met in the afterlife by 
Florentines of good-faith such as Farinata, Tegghaio, Mosca, Jacopo Rusticucci, and others who 
had dedicated their lives to the promotion of good (ch’a ben far puose li’ngegni).  Ciacco’s 
words fall like a death sentence; all of these people, he says, are punished deeper down in Hell, 
for the darkness of their hearts: Ei son tra l’anime più nere;/diverse colpe giù li grava al 
fondo:/se tanto scendi, là i potrai vedere. 85-87). It will, therefore, come as no surprise that 
Dante will meet Mosca, one of the evoked Florentines, in the bolgia of the sowers of discord. 
Before proceeding to an examination of this new infernal zone, I will take a look at another 
meaningful encounter able to enhance our understanding of Dante’s treatment of discord in the 
Comedy.  
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Paradiso XV, XVI and XVII narrate the pilgrim’s encounter with a member of his own 
family, Cacciaguida, a forefather of Dante’s, also native to Florence. The words with which the 
character describes the civil setting in which he was born stress Florentine peace and harmony 
almost tautologically: A così riposato, a così bello/ viver di cittadini, a così fida/ cittadinanza, a 
così dolce ostelo,/Maria mi diè, chiamata in alte grida.  (‘To so peaceful, to so comely a life of 
citizens, to/so loyal a citizenry, to so sweet a dwelling,/Mary gave me, invoked with loud cries’, 
Paradiso XV, 130-133). Cacciaguida’s Florence stands in sharp opposition with Ciacco’s: it is 
an Edenic city, where the social relationships are imbued with beauty, trust and sweetness. It is 
almost an exemplification of Alain’s words about fraternal love as a cornerstone of civic 
concord. In contrast to these golden, peaceful times in which Florentine noble families lived in 
harmony stands the Florence of Dante’s day, torn apart by rivalries between families: 
 
Ma conveniesi, a quella pietra scema/che guarda’l ponte, che Fiorenza 
fesse/vittima ne la sua pace postrema./Con queste genti, e con altre con 
esse,/vid’io Fiorenza in sì fatto riposo,/che non avea cagione onde 
piangesse./Con queste genti vid’io glorïoso/e giusto il popol suo, tanto 
che’l giglio/non era ad asta mai posto a ritroso,/né per divisïon fatto 
vermiglio.” (Paradiso XVI. 145-154). 
 
But it was necessary that Florence, in her last/ peace, should offer a victim to that broken 
stone/that guards the bridge./With these folks, and others along with them, did/I see 
Florence in such repose that she had no cause/to make her weep./With these folk I saw 
her people so glorious and/ just that the lily had never been reversed upon the/ staff nor 
made scarlet by division. 
 
The broken stone to which Cacciaguida alludes are the remains of the Roman God of 
war, Mars, the former protector of the city, that the Christian Florentines had replaced with the 
protection of St. John the Baptist. The popular superstition held that many of the social plights of 
the city were due to Mars’ wrath for having been betrayed. But the main reason why this passage 
is important for the discussion of the circle of the seditious is that the victim alluded to by 
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Cacciaguida is the count of Buondelmonte, whose vicious murder would lead to the discord 
between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the cause for the tragic history of medieval Florence. 
Allegedly, the assassination of Buondelmonte was a political decision sanctioned by Mosca dei 
Lamberti, and Dante, in canto XXVIII of the Inferno, literally quotes the words by which Mosca 
approved of this execution.286 Ciacco and Cacciaguida’s discourses on Florence offer an 
important topical picture of the social-political background of Florence, and at the same, furnish 
us a useful glimpse into Dante’s rationale for the inclusion of the sin of sedition into the moral 
structure of Hell.  
As far as the history of this sin is concerned, it is valuable to recall Bruno Purcelli, who 
notes that the sequence ‘fraudulent counsel-sowing of discord’, established by Dante in the eight-
nine pouches of Malebolge corresponds perfectly to Peraldus’s arrangement of the sins of the 
tongue in his Summa Vitiorum, where pravum consilium is immediately followed by seminatium 
discordias.287 Although Porcelli’s article does not deal with the latter, I adhere to his opinion that 
the correspondence between Dante’s arrangement and Peraldus’s is too great to be a coincidence. 
My belief is all the more firm since a comparison between Peraldus’s text and Dante’s 
contrapasso for the sowers of discord show a remarkable congruency.  
The verb Peraldus uses all throughout the chapter he dedicates to this sin is scriptural and 
metaphorical: seminare, which sometimes appears followed by discordia as direct object, 
sometimes by semen, which develops the initial metaphor. Rooted in malizia, the sin of sedition 
is most hateful to God because it causes enmity inter fratres (here taken as brethren). Christ 
                                                 
286 I return to this detail when I examine the ninth round of Malebolge. 
287 “In Peraldo, che distingue venti-quattro specificazioni del peccato di lingua, delle quali almeno cinque 
(periurium, mendacium, col connesso falsum testimonium, adulatio, pravum consilium, peccatum seminantium 
discordias) trovano corrispondenza nelle Malebolge dantesche, il pravum consilium occupa il dodicesimo posto, 
cioè una posizione che per la sua centralità è di assoluta evidenza, come quella che gli attribuisce Dante, sia pure in 
altro modo. Per di più, esso è seguito nello stesso Peraldo dal peccatum seminatium discordias; e l’ordine si ripete 
(non è facile dire per caso) nella successione pravi consiglieri-seminatori di discordie. “ (Peccatum linguae, 426). 
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loved the body of the Ecclesia more than his own, which he offered as a sacrifice for her welfare. 
In this light, those who break the unity of the church do more harm than they would do by 
tearing apart their own body.288 Just as the greatest harm one can do the human body, this 
organic whole, is laceration or rupture, so the greatest harm one can do to the body of the church 
is division: (…) nihil magis nocivum est corpori humano, quam divisio continuitatis, nec magis 
nocivum est ecclesiae Dei, quam divisio unitatis. Despite his focus on the religious side of 
division, Peraldus does not neglect the civic side either, considering that one word of a seditious 
man can cause so great a social discord that it can lead to the destruction of the body politic. In 
conclusion, disseminating discord is a diabolical enterprise, for, unlike Christ, who came onto 
earth to make peace and unify, the devil came to break and disperse.289  
Peraldus’s words seem to be graphically illustrated in the Inferno, in the round punishing 
the seditious: on the bottom of the infernal valley, pained shades walk in a circular path watched 
by a devil who breaks the “continuity” of their bodies with a sword.  
As a result, Mohamed is cleft from the throat to the belly, and his intestines hung out, 
Curio has his tongue cut off, Pier da Medicina has his nose and one ear sectioned, Mosca has 
                                                 
288 Et numerat Salomon 7 loco, eum qui seminat inter fratres discordias tanquam magis exosum Deo, quam alios 
peccatores. Plus enim dilexit Cristus corpus ecclesiae, quam corpus proprium, quum pro corpore ecclesiae, corpus 
proprium morti exposuerit, unde qui fodiunt corpus ecclesiae, unitatem eius dividendo, magis videnter nocere ei, 
quam qui corpus eius proprium foderunt, continuitatem in eo dividendo. (Summa Vitiorum, 581; ‘And Solomon 
counts on the seventh place the man who sows discord among brethren as one who is more disliked by God than 
other sinners. For Christ loved the body of the Church more than his own, since he gave to death his own body for 
the body of the church. From which it results that those who harm the body of the church by destroying its unity are 
deemed more harmful than those who harm Jesus’ body, destroying its natural unity’). 
289 Ex uno verbo quod dicit ille qui discordiam seminat, quandoque nascitur discordia tanta, ex qua distruitur patria 
una. Unde magnae malitiae est seminar semen tale, cum ex uno gradu illius, talis messis surgat. Ad Cristum et ad 
servos eius pertinet unire e pacificare. Hac de causa filius Dei venit in mundum, ut pacem reformaret in mundo. Ad 
diabolo vero pertinet dispergere. (op. cit., 581; ‘Sometimes, from one word uttered by a sower a discord may arise 
such a great discord that an entire country is destroyed. Hence, sowing such a seed is indicative of a great malice, 
because from a single movement of this seed grows such a great crop. It behooves Jesus to unite and make peace. 
This is why the Son of God came into this world, to reform peace in the world. Whereas dissipating is the work of 
the devil). 
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both hands severed, and Bertrand de Born is decapitated and holds his head in front of his torso 
like a lantern.  
After the terrible pain of the mutilation, the wounds heal, but since the souls follow a 
circular path, every time they pass in front of the devil they have their wounds reopened and their 
atrocious pain resumes. Since for Dante the relationship between parts and whole is a circular 
relationship underlying unity,290 the circuit the sinners have to follow in this bolgia seems to hint 
at the idea of unity; with their walk they are forced to move in an undivided circle, the unity of 
which their actions in life could not achieve. Peraldus’s comparison between the body of the 
church and the human body seems to account perfectly for Dante’s choice of this contrapasso: 
Mohamed’s intestines figure the intestinal strife he provoked within Ecclesia,291 and Alì’s face, 
cleft from chin to forehead, stands for the disfigurement he brought to the harmony of the faith.  
That the type of sin Mahomed and Alì are designed to represent is of a verbal nature can 
be deduced indirectly from what a character in Paradiso says about the method underlying his 
conversion: ‘l benedetto Agapito, che fue/sommo pastore, a la fede sincera/mi dirizzò con le 
parole sue. (Par. VI. 16-18; underlining mine). Just as words may serve to convert a person to 
true faith, so they can be abused and pressed into the service of disconversion and schism. 
                                                 
290 In the Monarchy, he describes the relationship between the part and the body in the following way: “Again, the 
purpose of the part is related to the purpose of the whole as the part is related to the whole. (…) what is good for the 
part of an organization, is not greater than what is good for the whole organization, but rather the contrary is true,” 
Mon. 1.6.1, 35) Although in this passage, the relationship parts-whole is discussed in connection with mankind 
(“mankind in its entirety is a kind of whole,” Mon. 1.7.1, 39) and the necessity of political subordination to a 
monarch, the same relationship parts-whole can be extrapolated to the anatomic imagery figuring the punishment of 
the sowers of discord. The whole of their bodies cannot function properly without a good working of the parts of 
these bodies, but these bodies are all dismembered or mutilated. It is also interesting that in the same political 
treatise, Dante defines sin itself as a breaking of unity and dispersion into multiplicity: “sinning is nothing else than 
scorning unity and moving away from it towards multiplicity.” Mon.1.15.3, 81) 
291 It is well known that for the medieval Western Europe, Mohamed was a Christian preacher, who deluded in his 
expectations, brought the first great schism to the body of the Church. Alì, his cousin and son-in-law, was held 
responsible for the creation of a new schism within Islam. 
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Whereas, in Paradiso, Justinian embodies the first case, Mohamed and Alì represent in Hell the 
latter. 
Peraldus’s references to the civic dimension of discord are exemplified by Dante’s 
seminator di scandalo: Curio, Mosca, Pier da Medicina and Bertran de Born are all characters 
designed to embody the division of political nature. The first in this series, Curio, is the famous 
Roman general who advised Caesar to cross the river Rubicon, an action that led to civil war. 
Curio’s presence among the sinners of the ninth bolgia is important in the economy of my 
discussion of the sins of the tongue in the Inferno, therefore I will dwell on him in a little more 
detail. Curio’s action and punishment are described in the canto with words that emphasize the 
linguistic nature of Curio’s sin: 
 
“Questi è desso, e non favella./Questi, scacciato, il dubitar sommerse/in 
Cesare, affermando che’l fornito/sempre con danno l’attender 
sofferse.”/Oh quanto mi pareva sbigottito/con la lingua tagliata ne la 
strozza,/Curïo, ch’a dir fu così ardito. (XXVIII. 96-103) 
 
“This is he, and he cannot speak./ He, an exile, drowned Caesar’s doubts, affirming/ that 
one prepared always suffers from delay.”/ Oh how dismayed Curio seemed, with the 
tongue/ cut out of his throat, he who was so bold to speak!  
 
 
The verbs Dante uses to describe Curio’s sway on Caesar’s political decision: affermare e 
dire--the latter accompanied by ardito ‘bolding’ that enhances the stylistic effect-- point to the 
oral dimension of Curio’s transgression; his words, his act of political counseling, are at the root 
of the civil war that tore the Roman unity apart. Through the figure of Curio, Dante achieves in 
the text the link between the sin of evil counsel, as embodied by Guido in the eight pouch of 
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Malebolge, and that of sedition.”292 To the medieval theorists of the sins of the tongue, the moral 
categories of ‘evil counsel’ and ‘dissemination of discord’ were so blatantly related that 
Domenico Cavalca, for instance, before giving exempla of dissemination of discord, asserts: Or 
sopra ciò non mi estendo molto, perocchè ciò che è detto di sopra, biasimando le liti e le 
contenzioni, ed anco i mali consiglieri, a questa materia si possono riferire. In other words, the 
tens of exemplary stories he had written about the sins of contentio and the sin of male 
consigliare could well apply to illustrate the sin of sedition, so great the affinity among these 
three classes of verbal sins is.293 In Dante, the genetic relationship between the sin of evil 
counsel and that of sedition is evident through several factors: first, both the evil counselors and 
the sowers of discord are located in Maleboge, the infernal area where sins of malice are 
punished. Second, the two bolgia where these two distinct categories of sinners are located come 
right one after the other (consiglieri frodolenti in bolgia eight and seminator di scandalo e 
                                                 
292 Several modern interpreters have pointed to this link; Truscott, for instance notes that “(…) both the counselors 
of fraud and the sowers of discord use language to create scisma: they are all, in their different ways, ‘evil 
counselors’ (Ulysses and Guido, 70.)  Along the same lines, Joan Ferrante maintains that “the effects of evil counsel 
in the ninth section of fraud are even more direct and widespread: divisions in church and state.”(The Political 
Vision, 186). Mazzota, too, points to the association between city and language in the circles of the lower hell 
(Dante, Poet of the Desert, 72-73). 
293 It is interesting that, in analyzing the degree of gravity of sedition with respect to contention, Cavalca comes to 
the conclusion that the former is more grievous, as it springs from malizia: Ma per uno rispetto questo peccato di 
seminare discordie eccede quello delle contenzioni; perocchè quello comunemente procede da infermità di mente, 
che non può patire le ingiurie; ma questo sempre procede da pura e diabolica malizia (p. 193; ‘But in one respect 
this sin of sowing discords exceeds that of contentions; because the latter ordinarily proceeds from weakness of 
mind, which cannot take offences, whereas the former comes from sheer and devilish malice.’  (Cavalca does not 
specify, however, if sedition is graver even than evil counsel). The notion of malizia as origin of specific vices of the 
tongue, such as pravum consilium and seminatio discordias, harks back to Peraldus, and it is worth noting that both 
Cavalca and Dante follow this moral pattern. Cavalca asserts not only with respect to seminare discordie but also to 
male consigliare that they are verbal trespasses stemming from malice. Both Peraldus and Cavalca furnish evidence 
for the fact that the medieval theorists of the sins of the tongue used to establish hierarchical relations within this 
class of sins, based on a criterion of gravity. The practice is occasional in Peraldus, but frequent in Cavalca and 
Aquinas. In his treatment of the sins of the word (peccata verbi) in Secunda Secundae, Aquinas’s constantly 
“weighs” specific sins of words in relationship with others, related, and establishes which is more grievous than 
which. This evidence confirms our sense that the sins of the tongue punished in Dante’s hell are not dispersed 
randomly, but distinguished and distributed according to certain criteria important for Dante. The cantos describing 
the pouches eight and nine, for instance, suggest that the criterion Dante had in mind for “weighing” the sin of 
dissemination of discord with respect to evil counsel was social: the former had the greatest public dimension--civil 
disorder. 
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scisma in bolgia nine. Thirdly, Curio’s sin is related to that of Guido in the sense that it is a form 
of counsel; at the same time, it is more grievous than Guido’s because it led to a civil war. That 
Curio’s transgression is a sin of the tongue is also confirmed by the words with which his 
punishment is described: he can no longer speak (favellare) because his tongue was cut off. In 
Dante’s time, the providential punishment of the evil doers through the members with which 
they had sinned was a common notion, so it should not come as a surprise that Dante reserved 
Curio this type of punishment.294 The portrayal of Mosca dei Lamberti brings again in focus an 
act of speech: the words with which he approved of the murder of Buondelmonte are inserted in 
the text in the form of free discourse, introduced by a verb of assertion (dire). When he 
beseeches the pilgrim not to forget him, the character speaks of himself in the third person and is 
in fact quoting himself:   
Ricordera’ti anche del Mosca,/che disse, lasso!, ‘capo ha cosa fatta.’/che 
fu mal seme per la gente tosca. (XXVIII.106-109). 
You will remember Mosca, too, who said,/alas, ‘A thing done is done,’ the seed of evil 
for the/ Tuscans. 
 
Cast in the shape of a (micro) discourse within a discourse, Mosca’s words capo ha cosa 
fatta are in now, in Hell, branded by Mosca himself as an evil seed which germinated into the 
disruption of the social balance in Tuscany. The character’s self-comment, besides being a 
                                                 
294 See for instance, Corinne Leveleux, who in her study on medieval blasphemy asserts: “Nombreuses sont en effet 
les histoires qui mettent en scène des impies dont le cadavre est découvert sans langue ou avec une langue énorme, 
quand cet organe n’est pas avalé, mangé par les vers…” (in La parole interdite. Le blasphème dans la France 
médiévale, XIIIe-XIVe siècles: Du péché au crime. Paris: De Boccard, 2001). Among the late medieval sources that 
Leveleux evokes to substantiate her claims is Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum morale, from which Leveleux quotes 
a remark about the divine punishments awaiting those who sin through their tongues:  Saepe enim puniuntur in 
lingua per quam peccat; iuxta illud Sap. 11 ‘per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur’: ut dives epulo in inferno 
cruciatur in lingua in qua peccaverat… (‘For often the sinners are punished in the tongue with which they sin, 
according to Solomon, 11, “in that with which one sins one shall be punished,” as the rich party-man is tortured in 
Hell in the tongue with which he sinned’; quoted by Leveleux in op. cit., 146). 
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repetition of the agricultural metaphor common to Holy Writ and Peraldus, is reasserting Dante’s 
older assessment of words as seeds of human actions, made in the Convivio.295 Mosca’s words, 
pronounced while he was alive, were a political sanction that bore evil fruits of hate and war 
between two Christian families, citizens of the same country. Like in Curio’s case, through the 
Florentine character of Mosca, Dante is again emphasizing the verbal nature of the sin of 
sedition, and, at the same time, the linkage with the sin of evil counsel punished in bolgia eight.  
Both the oral aspect of the sin of dissemination of discord and the connection with 
wicked counsel reemerge in the discourse of Bertrand de Born, the famous martial poet of the 
Provençal lyric: 
E perché tu di me novella porti,/sappi ch’i’ son Bertram dal Bornio, 
quelli/che diedi al re giovane i ma’ conforti./Io feci il padre e’l figlio in sé 
ribelli;/ Achitofèl non fé più d’Absalone,/e di Davìd coi malvagi punzelli. 
(Inf. XXVIII.133-138)296
And that you may take back news of me, know/ that I am Bertran de Born, he who gave 
the young/ king the bad encouragements./I made father and son revolt against each 
other:/Achitophel did no worse to Absalom and David with his evil proddings. 
 
Bertran’s significance for the political view of the Divine Comedy has been thoroughly 
examined by Teodolinda Barolini, who, collating the Provençal poet with Dante’s Sordello, has 
                                                 
295 Da vedere è come ragionevolemente quel tempo in tutte le nostre operazioni si dee attendere, e massimamanete 
nel parlare (...) Per che le parole, che sono quasi seme di operazione, si deono molto discretamente sostenere e 
lasciare, perché bene siano ricevute e fruttifere vegnano, sì perché da la loro parte non sia difetto di sterilitade (pp. 
222-223; ‘It is to consider how reasonable it is that we should await the proper moment in all our undertakings, and 
most of all in speaking. (…) This is why great discretion must be shown in using or in avoiding the use of words—
which are, as it were, the seed of our activity—so that they may well be received and fruitful in effect, so as to avoid 
any defect of sterility on their part.’). As I have mentioned in the Introduction, the metaphorical notion of words as 
able to “germinate” and produce deeds will reccur in Count Ugolino’s discourse (Inf. XXXIII. 7-9). 
296 According to Edwin Craun, the reference to Achitophel in connection to the sowingof  discord was a medieval 
topos, present in the works of William Peraldus, Etienne de Bourbon and pseudo-Vincent of Beauvais. (Lies, 
Slander and Obscenity, 51). For a possible source for Bertran’s punishment, see Danuta Shanzer’ s note according to 
which Dante drew his inspiration from Alain of Lille’s Anticlaudianus, where the allegorical figure of Discord is 
beheaded [“The Punishment of Bertran de Born,” Yearbook of Italian Studies 8 (1989), 95-97].  
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highlighted the reasons for Dante’s negative assessment of Bertran in the Comedy.297 One of the 
remarks she makes about Bertrand is of relevance for my approach to the ninth pouch of 
Malebolge. Based on a close comparison between Dante’s text and the Provençal texts that 
sketched the biography of the warmonger troubadour, Barolini comes to the conclusion that the 
key to understanding Dante’s Bertran resides in the vidas’ exaggerated account of Bertrand as a 
counselor for Henry.  More significantly, Barolini says, “the vidas specify that Bertrand did this 
with his poetry: (…) se penava e si percassava ab sos sirventes de desfar la patz e de mostrar 
cum chascuns era desonratz en la patz (‘he would put himself to great pains and strive with his 
sirventes to undo the peace and to show how each one was dishonored by peace’).298  
Further textual evidence can be adduced to substantiate Teodolinda Barolini’s remarks: 
poetry, before being an ideological statement, is language--a tool of communication. It is a 
written expression of one’s thoughts and words. Language can do at least as much damage in its 
written forms as in its oral ones, if not more. In the wake of the vidas’ accounts of Bertran’s 
misuse of the gift of (written) speech, his discourse in the Comedy offers us more indications of 
Bertran’s misuse of language. Not coincidentally, I believe, the vocabulary Dante places in 
Bertran’s mouth is reminiscent of the medieval moral lexicon of peccata linguae: i ma’ conforti 
suggest, through their hint at Bertran’s alleged office of political counselor, the sin of evil 
counseling. Male confortare are the very Italian words with which, during the years in which 
Dante wrote the Comedy, Domenico Cavalca translated Peraldus’s notion of pravum consilium; 
                                                 
297 In Barolini’s view, whereas Sordello is assigned in the text the role of symbol of politic and linguistic unity, two 
ideals achieved through his poetry, Bertrand is Sordello’s polar opposite, insofar as he used his poetry to foster 
divisiveness, disunity: “In the Comedy, therefore, Dante uses Bertran and Sodello as exempla of the uses to which a 
poet can put his poetry in the service of the state. (….) As one would expect, the poet in Hell, Bertran, is the 
exemplum of the political poet who misused his position in life. By abetting disobedience and revolt, Bertran put his 
poetry to bad use, mishandling the responsibility that a poet has to his audience.” [“Bertran de Born and Sordello: 
The Poetry of Politics in Dante’s Comedy.” PMLA 94. 3 (1979), 402]. 
298 op. cit., 400. The fragment quoted and translated by Barolini belongs to Le biografie trovadoriche, ed. Guido 
Favati (Bologna: Libreria Antiquaria Palmaverde, 1961), 147. 
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along these lines, the perpetrators of evil counseling were called by Cavalca confortatori al male. 
The link with the sin punished in the eight pouch of Malebolge becomes once again transparent.  
Dissemination of discord was, however, in both Peraldus and Cavalca’s treatments, a sin 
related to, but technically different from, evil counsel, and therefore described in different terms. 
Sedition was characterized in terms of persistent oral incitements to evil. The notion appears in 
Dante’s portrayal of Bertran, as well, when the troubadour indirectly labels his own divisive 
verbal activity as malvagi punzelli, a phrase that conveys insistent evil suggestions.299 
Another important indication of Dante’s relationship to the moralists of the sins of the 
tongue is the label seminator di scandalo e scisma the poet applies to the sinners punished in the 
ninth pouch of Malebolge. It is worth taking a closer look at the two technical terms in Dante’s 
appellation. Both scandalo and scisma represent moral categories well defined in the Middle 
Ages. Alain of Lille’s dictionary of theological terms, for instance, defines scandalum in a very 
complex way, starting with the very etymology of the word: coming from Greek, scandal denotes 
etymologically the action of those who set up obstacles in the ways of the travelers. Morally, it 
signifies the act of inducing another into evil, through words or deeds. It also means saddening or 
offending someone.300 Both the relationship of scandal to words and the notion of spiritual 
damage brought to another occur in Dante’s text: Inferno XI. 23 describes lower hell as the place 
inhabited by that type of people who con frode altrui contrista (‘injures someone with fraud’, the 
same verb used by Alain) and we have just seen the great extent to which Inferno XXVIII 
                                                 
299 The words is interpreted as incitamenti, by Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi: “punzelli: come il più comune 
pungelli, vale ‘pungoli’, incitamenti (si veda sopra: i ma’ conforti); puntellare nel senso di pungere, spronare, è in 
Petrarca, RVF CCLIV 4.” [Note to Inferno XXVIII, in La Divina Commedia. Inferno. (Milano: Mondadori, 2005), 
853]. 
300 PL 210, col. 936. 
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suggests the link between words and scandal. Another source important for Dante, Thomas 
Aquinas, echoes Alain’s definition of scandalum in virtually identical terms: “While going along 
a spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s word or deed, in so 
far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this 
is scandal properly called.” (ST II-II, 43.1). It is interesting, however, that Aquinas establishes a 
difference between ‘scandal’ (opposed to Beneficence) and ‘sedition’ (opposed to Peace), a 
distinction that does not appear in Inferno XVIII, where the two theological notions seem to 
overlap. Aquinas characterizes sedition as a sin threatening the unity of a people, city or state, 
but this sin is not explicitly defined in terms of linguistic acts, as scandal is. There is, however, a 
Thomistic distinction that appears in Dante as well: that between sedition and schism. For 
Aquinas, schism was a sin contrary to the ecclesiastical unity, while sedition had to do with the 
temporal or secular unity of the multitude. Furthermore, schism did not involve preparation for 
material fights, as sedition did. The divide between sedition and schism reoccur in Dante’s label 
seminator di scandalo e di scisma, only that what for Dante scandalo covered the meanings of 
both Thomistic terms scandalum and sedition.         
Dante’s departure from Aquinas in his lexical choices is, however, not a drift apart from 
the moral lexicon of the late Middles Ages. Conjoining the notions of scandalo and scisma in the 
description of the sowers of discord seems to have been a rather usual practice, if we consider 
that Dante’s contemporary and countryman Domenico Cavalca gives us in his Pungilingua 
textual evidence in this respect. In the chapter dedicated to the sowers of discord, Cavalca uses 
both scandalo and scisma, the first in a quote of Jesus’ words: “Guai a quegli, per cui lo scandalo 
viene” (human referent that Cavalca identifies as ‘gli seminatori di discordie’), and the second 
term in a quote from one of Paul’s letters to the Corinthians: Priegovi, che siate, e diciate tutti 
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uno, e non abbiate in voi scisma e divisione (p. 194; ‘I beseech you that ye all speak the same 
thing, and that there be no divisons among you’).301 Although the two terms appear separately in 
Cavalca’s text, it is significant that both appear in the same chapter, in reference to the same type 
of sinners: the seminatori di discordie.   
The textual clues that Inferno XXVIII offers us point significantly to the wrongful verbal 
activity that underlies the sin of those who sow discord either on a religious level or on a political 
plan. Implicit in Mohamed and Alì’s presence (for how is faith spread or distorted other than 
through the medium of speech?), the linguistic side of dissemination of discord is explicitly 
expressed in the portrayals of Curio, Mosca and Bertran. The latter is to be interpreted as a 
counterpart not only to Sordello, but to Dante-poet himself. De Vulgari eloquentia, the first 
modern treatise of literary history, drew parallels between the poetry produced on the Italian soil 
and that beyond the Alps, and tried to find correspondences between the best exponents of 
Occitan lyrics and the poets of vernacular Italian. Thus, Arnaut Daniel’ s poems of love had their 
Italian equivalent in the poetry of Cino da Pistoia; Guirault de Borneil’s moral lyrics in the 
artistic output of Dante himself, only for Bertran de Born there was no Italian equivalent; this 
was the conclusion of the author of the treatise on the vernacular eloquence. And if Dante, the 
literary historian, left empty the spot reserved for Italy’s poetry of war, Dante the poet marked an 
even greater distance between himself and this type of verse. By placing the sin of dissemination 
of discord, as a verbal sin, in one of the lowest and most repulsive places in hell, and by having 
the warmonger Provençal troubadour represent this sin, Dante made clear that he transcended the 
temptation of using poetry for spreading the evil seeds of social and political discord. Had he 
fallen to this temptation, the harshness and bitterness of his exile would have accounted for it; his 
                                                 
301 Corinthians, 1.10. 
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own brilliant artistic means would have served him. But the good company of his coscïenza 
pura, the one that he evokes in the same Inferno XXVIII, has helped him not succumb to this 
temptation. In a supremely moral and poetical anti-Bertranian effort, Dante turned the genius of 
his poetry toward the Christian ideals of harmony and peace. In the fictional realm of the 
Commedia, the pity the pilgrim feels toward Geri del Bello, his own kinsman punished in the 
same bolgia with Bertran, is the pity of the man who rose above earthly laws of blood and 
revenge, and was striving to adhere to the higher values of forgiveness and charity.  
4.4.2 The verbal falsador 
On the side opposite Truth, enmity-causing Falsehood stood in strained pose. Her face, 
darkened with the soot of ugliness, bespoke no gifts given her by nature; rather old age, 
subjecting her face to the hollows of wrinkles, had gathered it all over into folds. It was 
plain to see that her head was not clothed with a veil of hair and it had no robe to cover 
its baldness: rather, a countless assemblage of rags, joined by a limitless conjunction of 
threads, had woven a garment for her. This one, secretly lying in wait for the picture of 
truth, disgraced by deformity whatever truth graced by conformity.  
(Alain of Lille, The Plaint of Nature) 
 
 
In the Inferno, forms of transgressive speech such as flattery, fraudulent counsel, sowing discord, 
are punished in lower hell. With the sole exception of blasphemy, which is a sin of violence, all 
the other linguistic transgressions we have seen so far are assigned to the area of Fraud. The most 
striking absence in this list of sins seems to be mendacium (‘lie’), one of the most basic (and 
most debated) sins of the tongue of all times. In the biblical tradition, lying was considered the 
“progeny” of the devil, and in consonance with this scriptural view, Dante has Malacoda, one of 
the devils from the circle of barraters, lie to the pilgrim and his guide that in Hell there is a 
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bridge that can lead them to the next circle, that of the hypocrites.302 But despite this fictional 
enactment of the sin of mendacium, Dante does not use the denomination “liars” for any category 
of sinners in Hell. What he uses instead is a series of terms interconnected by the idea of falsity: 
dire falso, la falsa (for Potiphar’s wife), ‘l falso Sinon, (non) ver testimonio, spergiuro (all used 
in Inferno XXX, the last of the thirteen cantos devoted to Malebolge). Trying to fill the gap 
created by Dante’s omission of the name of the sin (a situation similar to that from Inferno 
XXVI-XXVII), early commentators came up with the phrase “falsari di parole” to refer to the 
category of sinners represented in the text by two figures: the wife of Potiphar and Sinon.  
In what follows, I will examine the textual clues offered by Inferno XXX, and will seek to 
determine what specific sins of speech Dante envisioned when he introduced Sinon and Potifar’s 
wife into his hell. The fact that Dante omitted the name of the sin is rather uncommon for the 
poet-moralist, who is usually very thorough in distributing and naming sins. In an attempt to 
solve this new hermeneutical knot, I will look again at the way in which the major medieval texts 
on peccata linguae conceived of the relationship of speech to falsehood. More specifically, I will 
briefly examine the treatment of the sins of ‘lying’ (with it subclass ‘false testimony’) and 
‘perjury’ in Peraldus, Aquinas and Cavalca, and will use these notions to interpret the verbal sins 
punished in the last pouch of Malebolge.  Peraldus and Cavalca are particularly important since 
the former provided an authoritative discourse on these two sins and the latter introduced the 
                                                 
302 As we will find out in Canto XXI, Malacoda is lying: in fact, all the bridges of the sixth pouch are broken. For a 
medieval perception of a liar, see Alain’s definition of mendax from his Liber de distinctionibus: Mendax dicitur 
falsus, unde in Evangelio Christus ait de diabolo quod ipse mendax est et pater ejus, id est mendacii. Dicitur 
dolosus, unde in Psalmo: quod mendaces sunt in stateris, id est dolosi in suis negationibus. Dicitur mutabilis, unde 
in Evangelio: Solus Deus verax, omnis homo mendax. (PL 210, col. 856; ‘The liar is called false, hence in the 
Gospel Jesus says about the devil that he is a liar himself and the father of it, that is, of the lie. It is called guileful, 
hence the Psalm [says] that the liars are in swaying, that is guileful in their denials. It also means changing, hence 
the Gospel: Only God is true, every man is a liar.’).  In Inferno XXIII, Dante inserts the biblical definition of the 
devil as father of lying within the context of hypocrisy: Io udi’ già dire a Bologna/del diavol vizi assai, tra’ quali 
udi’/ch’elli è bugiardo e padre di menzogna (142-143). The point here is that one does not need to have a 
theological training to know that the devil is the prototypical liar. This was common knowledge. 
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attendant terminology into the Italian vernacular. I will finally argue that Dante’s reasons for the 
omission of the name of the verbal sins represented by Sinon and Potiphar’s wife lie in Dante’s 
effort to bring together several types of sinners within one category of fraudulent speakers: the 
practitioners of ‘lying’ (with its subspecies ‘false testimony’) and perjury, two sins that in the 
medieval moral texts were allied through a common element of falsehood.303 I will also take a 
closer look at the association of words with coins, an analogy that might represent another 
possible link between Dante’s poem and Peraldus’s encyclopedia of sins. 
According to Casagrande and Vecchio, two texts—one theological, the other juridical--
are responsible for the moral tracts’ close association between the sins of mendacium and the sin 
of periurium: Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, which use the biblical notion of false testimony as a 
starter in his analysis of the couple mendacium/periurium, and Gratian’s Decretum, where 
mendacium and periurium are constantly and closely intertwined. The alignment of these two 
sins persists in Peraldus, Aquinas and Cavalca, with the important mention that in their texts the 
discourse on perjury stems from the analysis of lying.304 In other words, although the two sins 
are treated distinctly, they are allied and investigated by means of a common lexicon of 
intentional falsehood. Peraldus starts from Augustine’s definition of lying as falsa significatio 
vocis cum intentio fallendi (‘using a word to make someone believe something untrue, with the 
intention to deceive’), and, recalling the biblical image of the devil as the archetypal liar, evolves 
an idiosyncratic approach to the problematic of lying, an approach that might have left an 
important mark of Dante’s handling of this sin. Among the reasons that should prompt the 
                                                 
303 According to Casagrande and Vecchio, long before the medieval constitution of the systems of sins of the tongue, 
mendacium, periurium and falsum testimonium formed an inseparable sin-triad. Medieval texts, they say, showed 
however little interest to the sin of falsum testimonum, privileging instead the other two (I peccati,  251). 
304 “Partire dalla menzogna è una scelta obbligata: l’analisi del periurium, anche quando nei testi viene affrontata per 
prima, presuppone logicamente l’analisi del mendacium e da essa soltanto può prendere le mosse.” (I peccati, 253). 
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detestation of this vice abominable to God, Peraldus lists the human natural repulsion to falsity. 
To be more concrete and easy to understand, the moralist draws a long parallel between lying 
and the counterfeiting of money:  
 
(…) quantum praevalet bonus denarius denario falso, tantum praevalet 
homo verax, homini falsi et mendaci. Unus bonus denarius valet centum 
falsos, unus homo verax centum mendaces. Unde multum melioraret se 
aliquis, si remoto peccato mendacci vera de cetero loqueretur: quia cui non 
displiceat si aliquem de denariis suis invenit falsum? Quis est qui non 
potius velit habere denarios bonos quam falsos? Sed de ipsis non dolent 
miseri homines, quando seipsos falsus inveniunt, et potius se volunt esse 
falsos quam veros.305
 
Just as the good dinar has more value than the forged one, so the man who tells the truth 
is worthier than the false and lying man. A good dinar is worth one hundred forged ones, 
and a man who tells the truth (is worth) one hundred liars. Therefore, every man would 
better himself if, casting away the sin of lying, would always say true things. For who 
does not hate to discover that one of his dinars is false? Who would not have true coins 
rather than false? But the unfortunate men have no regret when they discover themselves 
false and want to be rather false than true. 
 
 
 
A liar is a traitor who breaks the bonds of trust and deceives those who confide in him. 
He is worse than a thief, for the latter harms the body,306 whereas the former harms the soul by 
inducing it into error. Even the evil appetite that characterizes a thief is more understandable than 
the evil appetite of a liar, because the thief longs for good things belonging to others, whereas the 
liar desires evil things. Stealing is, therefore, not as bad as lying, because the motivation for theft 
comes from self-concern, whereas the motivation for lying comes mainly from the malicious will 
to harm others. Lying is therefore a devilish sin that springs from malice and can do much harm 
                                                 
305 Summa Vitiorum, 558. The same notion occurs in another Peraldian text, De eruditione principum, where the 
moralist instructs the prince to control his speech as he would control money forging in the state.  This second text is 
referred to by Casagrande and Vecchio (op. cit., 265). 
306 By ‘body’ Peraldus most likely means the temporal goods necessary for the physical and biological well-being of 
humans. 
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to the militant Church, who speaks the message of truth, and to society, as a whole.307 A most 
socially disruptive speech is for Peraldus ‘false testimony’, a subclass of lying, which harms not 
only God (whose name is invoked as a token for the oath), but also the judges and those against 
whom the testimony is addressed and who are innocent.  
Treated separately from mendacium, the sin of periurium is clearly defined by Peraldus in 
terms of falsifying the truth, and the practitioners of this sin are labeled falsarii (‘falsifiers’): 
 
Quartum est hoc quod ipse falsarius est. Si quis sigillo alicuius domini sibi 
commisso ad confirmandam aliquam veritatem, uteretur ad aliud 
confirmandum, ipse falsarius iudicaretur et excommunicatus est (…). Sic 
quam Deus permiserit hominibus ut assumant nomen suum ad 
confirmationem veritatis, si utant nomen eius ad confirmandum falsum 
ipsi falsarii suunt.” (Summa Vitiorum, p. 555). 
 
The fourth (consideration) is that he himself is a falsifier. If someone has the seal of his 
master, (a seal) entrusted to him for the confirmation of a truth, and uses it in order to 
confirm something else, this man would be considered a falsifier and would be 
excommunicated. Thus, since God allowed men to use His name to confirm a truth, if 
they use His name to confirm a falsehood, they become falsifiers themselves. 
 
 
Like Peraldus, Aquinas takes up the Augustinian definition of lying as a false 
signification by words, but introduces the Aristotelian tripartition of lying into officious, jocose, 
mischievous. The intention to deceive belongs only to the latter class, which represents the 
                                                 
307 Peior qui affuetus et mendaciis, quam fur: quia fur nocet corpori; ille autem qui mentitur, nocet animae, dum 
eam in errorem inducit. Item appetitus malus qui est in furore, quo ipse appetit rem alienam, est appetitus rei 
bonae; sed appetitus eius qui mentitur, est appetitus rei malae. Fur enim suum bonum temporale quaerit, sed 
mentiens alienum malum, errorem proximi. Unde peccatum meandacii peccatum diabolicum est, et peccatum 
malitiae. (…) Peccatum istud valde nocivum est ecclesiae Dei. Facit enim ut vix alicui fides adhibeatur. (…) 
Opprobrium magnum in homine, mendacium (…). (Summa Vitiorum: 558-560; ‘He who is given to lying is worse 
than a robber, because the robber harms the body, whereas the liar harms the soul, inasmuch as he is driving it into 
sin. Likewise, the evil desire underlying the ardor with which the robber wants an alien thing is a desire for a good 
situation; whilst the desire of the liar aims at an evil thing. For the robber pursues a temporal good, and the liar seeks 
an alien evil, namely the error of the other. Therefore, the sin of lying is a sin of the devil and of malice. (…) This 
sin is very harmful to the Church of God, for it causes someone to be trusted. (…) Lying is a great shame for man’). 
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perfection of lying.308 Perjury is also described in terms of falsehood: “That perversity in 
swearing, which is called perjury takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Lack of truth, lack of 
justice, lack of judgment; by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of 
lapsing into falsehood.”309 The noun ‘falsifier’ does not appear, however, in Aquinas’s handling 
of the types of verbal falsehood, as it did in Peraldus, nor is the parallel between money and 
words drawn. 310 
Peraldus’s metaphorical terminology recurs instead in Cavalca’s Pungilingua, which uses 
this analogy to lobby for harder legal punishments for perjurers:  
 
Se dunque ci vieta Dio per la sua legge di non nominare lo suo nome in 
vano, ben dobbiamo credere che egli ha per peggio prenderlo, e nominarlo 
a giurare la falsità. Onde per questo rispetto ogni spergiuratore è falsario 
in ciò che usa lo nome di Dio a confermare la falsità. Onde se chi falsifica 
lo suggello del papa, è scomunicato per ragione; e così ogni falsatore di 
moneta, o di lettere secondo la giustizia della legge civile dee essere arso; 
bene dobbiamo credere, che quelli che falsificano lo nome di Dio giurando 
per esso la falsità, lo quale Dio ci concedette a giurare la verità, merita più 
dura sentenza. (pp. 69-70; emphasis mine). 
 
If therefore, through His law, God forbids us to use His name in vain, we have good 
reasons to believe that He considers it worse if we take His name and invoke it to swear 
what is false. Hence, in this respect, every perjurer is a falsifier, in that he uses the name 
of God to confirm a falsehood. Hence whoever falsifies the papal seal is rightly 
excommunicated, and, in the same way, every falsifier of coin, or letters, must be burnt to 
stake, according to the justice of the civil law; we have good reasons to believe that those 
                                                 
308 “The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying. (…) The sin of lying is aggravated if by lying a person 
intends to injure another, and this is called a mischievous lie.” (Q. 110, Art. 1-2, 1659). 
309 Q. 98, Art. 1, 1610-1611. 
310 Apparently, Aquinas knew of this equivalence, but was reluctant to using it: “la comparaison (de la monnaie) 
avec le signe linguistique s’impose évidemment (…) Aussi bien chez Thomas d’Aquin, qui la critique, que chez des 
dominicains d’Oxford et chez des franciscains de Paris, qui la prennent à leur compte, se trouve évoquée une 
doctrine qui, faisant reposer le signe sur une sorte de pacte sans faire appel à aucune virtus impressa, développe la 
comparaison avec la pièce de la monnaie.” (‘The comparison of the coin with the monetary sign evidently imposes 
itself  (…) In Thomas Aquinas, who criticizes it, as well as in the Oxfordian Dominicans and the Parisian 
Franciscans, who appropriate it, found itself evoked a doctrine, which, attributing to the sign a sort of pact without 
using any virtus impressa, develops the comparison with the coin.’ Joel Biard: “Signe monétaire et signe 
linguistique: La critique de la chrématistique dans l’école buridanienne,” in Les philosophies morales et politiques 
au Moyen Age. Proceedings of the 9th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy. Ottawa, 17-22 August, 1992. 
Vol. 1, 1420. 
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who falsify the name of God swearing, through It, the false—when God gave us His 
name as a concession for us to swear the truth—deserves a harsher punishment. 
 
 
And as far as eternal life is concerned, the perjurers will spend theirs in hell like all the 
other enemies of justice: quello che falso giura, non sarà in cielo ma discenderà in abisso: in 
abisso d’inferno come pessimo nemico della giustizia (p. 72; ‘he who swears falsely will not go 
to heaven but will descend to the abyss: into the abyss of hell as the worst enemy of justice’). 
The notion of verbal falsity reemerges in the chapter Cavalca devotes to the peccato del bugiare, 
cioè dire bugie e menzogne, which immediately follows the chapter on perjury.311 Lying falsifies 
the human being especially in that part of the body divinely appointed for the expression of the 
truth: the tongue, says Cavalca. Then he goes on translating into the vernacular Peraldus’s 
parallel between lies and false coins and concludes the paragraph with a personal, topical 
allusion to contemporary liars: those who would accidentally get a false coin would be reluctant 
to using it for fear of the legal sanctions imposed by the court, whereas those who lie use false 
words with no shame or fear whatsoever. 312
                                                 
311 In this, Cavalca faithfully follows Peraldus’ arrangement, where periurium occupies the forth position and 
mendacium (with its appendix falsum testimonium) the fifth. 
312 Nella terza parte dico, che si mostra la gravezza di questo peccato in ciò, e perciocchè falsifica l’uomo; 
massimamente in quella parte, nella quale debbe avere e sonare più verità, cioè nella lingua. E però si dice 
ne’Proverbi: Abbominazione sono a Dio le labbra mendaci. Onde quanto migliore è il danaio buono che il falso, 
tanto più vale l’uomo vero che il mendace, anzi ci è troppo maggiore disguaglio, perocchè almeno molti danari falsi 
vagliono un buono, ma non seguita così, che molti falsi uomini vagliono un verace, anzi sono al tutto contrari, come 
la verità e la falsità. Ma tanto è oggi la nostra cecità e miseria, che, come dice santo Agostino, ogni cosa vogliamo 
buona eccetto che noi stessi, sicchè eziando quelli, li quali si sdegnerebbono, se fosse dato loro un danaio falso 
posto per uno buono, e temerebbono d’usarlo per paura della corte, la quale giudica li falsari, non si vergognano 
d’usare e d’avere lingua falsa. (p 85; ‘In the third part I say that the gravity of this sin is shown in that it falsifies the 
man; especially in that body part where the truth should lie and resound best: the tongue. Hence the Proverbs: 
Abominable are to God the lying lips. Hence, just as the the good coin is better than the false, so is the truthful man 
worthier than the liar; here there is an even too great inequalty, for at least many false coins are worth one good one, 
but it does not hold for men that many false men are worth a truthful one; on the contrary, they are entirely opposed, 
as truth and falsehood. But our blindness and misery are so great today, that, as St. Augustine says, we want every 
thing to good, but ourselves; therefore even those who would be reluctant, if they were given a false coin, to use it as 
a good one, and would be afraid to spend it our of fear of the court, which judges the falsifiers, are not afraid to use 
and have a false tongue’) The rest of the chapter as well follows the outline of Peraldus’s treatment of mendacium 
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Peraldus and Cavalca’s handling of mendacium and periurium sheds a great deal of light 
on Dante’s treatment of false speakers in the ultima chiostra (‘the last ring’) of Malebolge. Here, 
alchemists are assembled with impersonators, falsifiers of objects, money forgers and those who 
speak falsely (dire falso, in the text).313 Although these moral categories have been identified by 
Dante’s commentators,314 the demarcation is somewhat artifcial: in the text, all these (slightly 
different types of) sinners are grouped by Dante under the generic noun i falsador, that he 
introduces in Inferno XXIX. 57.  
 
 
The link between the sins of the falsifiers with Dante’s fundamental moral notion of 
malizia is established through a metaphor that compares this pouch with the island of Egina: Non 
credo ch’a veder maggior tristizia/fosse in Egina il popol tutto infermo,/quando fu l’aere sì pien 
di malizia…” Here malizia denotes the biologically infested, contagious quality of the air, but 
even when taken metaphorically, the term may be read as a grim reminder that we are still in 
Malebolge, the deep infernal zone where sins of malice are condemned. Moreover, malizia as a 
pathological quality of the air is reminiscent of Dante’s (and the general medieval) conception of 
sin as disease.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(the eight species of lying; false testimony as the worst type of lie because is intended to injure others; social classes 
that are more prone to lying, etc.) 
313 The association of alchemy with money forging and the assumption of false identity is not unusual, notes 
Durling, who also volunteers possible sources for Dante’s series of falsador: “The grouping together of alchemy, 
impersonation, and counterfeiting has a traditional basis. Alchemy, repeatedly condemned as fraudulent by the 
popes, often involved passing off base metals as gold (…). The traditional association of counterfeiting and 
impersonation goes back at least as far as Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan, to Brangane’s impersonation of Isolt 
on her wedding night (ed. Ranke, 12601-12670); it is possible that Gottfried’s passage derives from one of the lost 
portions of the Old French Tristan by Thomas, which Dante probably knew”; “Dante among Falsifiers” Lectura 
Dantis: Inferno. A. Mandelbaum, A. Oldcorn, Ch. Ross, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, 393). 
314 The first to have made this division is, according to Roberto Sarolli, Luigi Pietrobono. Sarolli gives this 
information in the Enciclopedia Dantesca, under the heading “Moglie di Putifarre,” where he evokes “the 
quadruplice suddivisione dei falsatori (struttura rivelata dal Pietrobono)”.  
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It should, thus, come as no surprise that people who spoke falsely from malice, as 
Peraldus and Cavalca described the liars and the perjurers, can be found side by side with other 
types of forgers in the last division of fraud. Important textual indications reveal Dante’s reasons 
for the alignment of impersonation with fraudulent speech:  Mirra, who in the myth took a 
fictitious identity to sleep with her own father, is depicted as falsificando sé in altrui forma (41; 
‘by counterfeiting herself’).  
With a variation of the same phrase, Buoso Donati’s sin is described as falsificare in sé 
(44; ‘to counterfeit in himself’). But also an act of forging one’s own identity was considered by 
Cavalca the act of lying, which was a falsifying of one’s self in the tongue. The same idea of 
lying as assuming a false identity seems to underlie Dante’s introduction of Potifar’s wife, 
presented as la falsa ch’accusò Gioseppe (97; ‘the false woman who accused Joseph’, and of the 
fraudulent Greek, introduced as ‘l falso Sinon Greco di Troia (98). As we shall see, the notion of 
altrui forma Dante uses in reference to Mirra may be applied to the two fraudulent speakers, as 
well.  
According to Gen 39. 6-23, the wife of the Egyptian wealthy man for whom Joseph 
worked tried unsuccessfully to seduce Joseph. Outraged by the young man’s rejection and using 
the garment Joseph accidentally lost trying to avoid her, she told the men of her house that 
Joseph left his garment in her hand in his attempt to do violence to her. Using the same proof to 
support her story, i.e. Joseph’s garment, she lies for the second time, this time to her husband, to 
whom she tells the same story of the attempted rape. By inventing this story, the wife of the 
Egyptian constructed an altered reality (in the etymological sense of to alter: that of coming up 
with another fact), and by imagining herself within this fabricated reality, she falsified herself; 
she imagined a ‘raped self’ that did not correspond to the factual truth. The medium she used to 
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accomplish this substitution of realities were the words she uttered to build her false accusation 
against Joseph: a lie that, as we know, changed Joseph’s destiny, and thereby the fate of the 
Jewish people. A sole incident recounted by the Bible was enough for Dante to declare the 
Egyptian woman falsa, an adjective that refers to her entire identity, not only to this isolated act 
of speech that condemned innocent Joseph. This adjective is reminiscent of another story alluded 
to in the Malebolge, a story involving a character contemporary with Dante. In the circle of the 
thieves, Vanni Fucci evokes how he escaped a death sentence, when somebody else was unjustly 
accused of robbing the church in Pistoia: falsamente già fu apposto altrui (Inf. XXIV. 139). This 
line too establishes a linkage between somebody’s identity (altrui) and an act of speech (the false 
accusation) that caused great harm to another, innocent person. Both the story evoked by Vanni 
Fucci and the episode of Potiphar’s wife confirm the evil power of words when they blur the 
lines between true and false. In Vanni Fucci’s story, those inaccurate words sent an innocent man 
to death, just as, in the biblical story, an unjust accusation had sent Jospeh, another innocent 
man, to prison. 
Along the same lines, the figure of the Greek drawn from the myth of the Trojan horse 
(and we remember from Canto XXVI Dante’s fascination for this story), is presented with the 
adjective falso, followed by an ironical phrase that only compounds the adjective: greco di Troia. 
Obviously, Sinon was a Greek… from Greece, but by mocking him, Dante in fact alludes to the 
fictitious identity Sinon built for himself in order to enter the city and convince the Trojans to 
accept the gift of the horse (a great fraud itself): he passed himself off as a defector of the Greek 
cause who wanted to side with the Trojans. Again, the medium he used in this enterprise was his 
powerful, Ulyssean rhetoric, the gifts of his tongue. Sinon possesses in fact a falsa lingua, to take 
up a scriptural phrase dear to Peraldus, who used his art of speech in fraudulent ways to enforce 
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another, big fraud: the Trojan horse, a horse that is not what it seems to be. Here again, words, 
gifts, identities shift in a complex interplay to deceive and harm others: Sinon’s artful lies 
eventually caused the fall of Troy and the destruction of the Trojan civilization. In the text, this 
mythical figure engages in strife with one of Dante’s contemporaries: a reminder of the 
immunity of sin to history. Hell levels the differences between eras, spaces and languages, just as 
Dante’s poetry conflates mythical history with real figures from his own days.  At hearing 
himself named a false Greek from Troy by master Adam (a famous English money forger), 
Sinon reacts violently --forse d’esser nomato sì oscuro (101;‘perhaps resented being named so 
darkly’, explains Dante--, and strikes Adam in his aching belly.315 When Adam strikes back, 
Sinon uses his words as a tool for revenge, telling master Adam that the arm with which he 
struck him had not been so fast when Adam was burnt at the stake for money forging. In a 
strongly realistic vein, the two sinners swear at each other with an impressive eloquence of evil 
and curse the two organs responsible for their wicked words: Sinon curses Adam’s tongue and 
Adam Sinon’s mouth.316 The dialogue between the two sinners is worth quoting, for the wealth 
of linguistic references it bears:  
 
E l’idropico: “Tu di’ver di questo:/ma tu non fosti sì ver testimonio/là ‘ve 
del ver fosti a Troia richiesto.”/ “S’io dissi falso, e tu falsasti il 
conio,”/disse Sinon; “e son qui per un fallo/, e tu per più ch’alcun altro 
demonio!”/ “Ricorditi, spergiuro, del cavallo,”/ rispuose quel ch’avëa 
infiata l’epa;/ “e sieti reo che tutto il mondo sallo!”/ “E te sia rea la sete 
onde ti crepa,”/ disse’l Greco, “la lingua, e l’acqua marcia/che’l ventre 
                                                 
315 Sinon’s violent reaction to the verbal insult is clear evidence of the powerful effect of words on somebody’s 
psyche. The act of naming or, more exactly, calling somebody bad names, is never problem free; it always bears 
psychological (and here also physical) consequences. 
316 The two anatomic references are reminiscent of the first phase of the medieval discourse on peccata linguae, a 
phase in which the tongue or the mouth were held directly responsible for malicious utterances. Only with the great 
scholastics, Vincent of Beauvais, for instance, and especially Thomas Aquinas, will the cause for transgressive 
speech be transferred from a purely biological level to that of the will. For more on this shift, see Casagrande and 
Vecchio’s I peccati della lingua, 175-209. 
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innanzi a li occhi sì t’assiepa!”/ Allora il monetier: “Così si squarcia/la 
bocca tua per tuo mal come suole/ché, s’i’ho sete e omor mi rinfarcia,/tu 
hai l’arsura e’l capo che ti duole,/e per leccar lo specchio di Narcisso,/non 
vorresti a’ nvitar molte parole.” (Inferno XXX.112-129) 
 
And the hydroptic: “You say true there, but you/were not such a true witness where you 
were asked/for the truth at Troy.”/ “If I spoke falsely, you falsified the coinage,” said/ 
Sinon, “and I am here for one fault, but you for more/than any other demon!”/ 
“Remember, perjurer, the Horse,” replied he of the/ swollen liver; “and let it be bitter to 
you that the/whole world knows of it!”/ “And to you bitter be the thirst that cracks,” 
said/the Greek, “your tongue, and the stagnant water that/makes of your belly a hedge 
before your eyes!”/ Then the coiner: “Your mouth gapes because of/ your disease, as 
usual; for, if I am thirsty and liquid swells me,/you have burning fever and a head that 
aches,/ and to lick the mirror of Narcissus you would not/need to be invited with many 
words!” 
 
 
 
The first verses in this quote persistently revolve around the dynamic truth/falsehood and 
offer us the complete terminology for Sinon’s verbal sins: the word ver occurs obsessively in 
three separate positions (as noun, adjective and adverb) and is played against the synonyms for 
falsehood: non (…) sì ver testimonio, dire falso, falsare, spergiuro.317 Important is that the latter 
list of terms spans the whole range of types of transgressive speech associated by Peraldus and 
Cavalca in their tracts: false testimony, lying, perjury. All three varieties of false talk apply to 
Dante’s character, not just the sin of lying. This may be one of the reasons why Dante avoided to 
come up with the label ‘liars’ for this type of verbal sinners: the complexity of the process by 
which speech can appropriate falsehood goes beyond simple lying. Lies can be uttered in a 
public place, in front of official authorities, and then they acquire false testimonial connotations, 
or they can be shored up by an oath and become perjury. It is also worth noting that Dante’s 
perception of Sinon was common in the literary culture of the Middle Ages. In Alain of Lille’s 
                                                 
317 Regarding the word spergiuro, Truscott points out that it must have been suggested to Dante by Virgil’s text, 
where Sinon is guilty of perjury, or false oath: Talibus insidiis periurique arte Sinonis/credita res… (Aeneid II, 195-
6; ‘Due to the ploys of the perjurer Sinon, the things were believed’), quoted by Truscott in “Ulysses and Guido. 
Inferno XXVI-XXVII,” 64).  Brugnoli points to the relationship between Ulysses and Sinon in the Aeneid, stressing 
that Sinon was instructed by Ulysses on what to tell and how to speak. (“Dante filologo: l’esempio di Ulisse,” 36-7). 
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The Plaint of Nature, for instance, we see Sinon “arming himself with subterfuges for a sinuous 
speech.” (1980: 217). Only that what for Alain of Lille was sinuous speech for Dante becomes 
transgressive speech, since the deceitful Greek is punished in Hell, in the deepest ring of Fraud. 
Sinon’s outrageous lies trespassed the limit between truth and falsood and thereby helped the 
Greek warriors trespass the boundary that was separating them from the people of Troy: the 
walls of the city. For this, he is intended by Dante as a prototypical transgressive speaker, who, 
by having to spend the rest his afterlife in hell, is set as a moral counter-example.  
An important element in the “tenzone” between Master Adamo and Sinone is the 
association of words with money in a verse that synthetically establishes the equivalence 
between falsifying of words and counterfeiting money:  S’io dissi falso, e tu falsasti il conio. 
This alignment by means of prosody recalls on a textual level the grouping of counterfeiters with 
liars within the world of fiction. The above-quoted verse and the composition of this ring of 
sinners point to the common medieval comparison of money and words, a comparison drawn on 
the basis of their function as signs. 318 Both money and words were considered in the Middle 
Ages semiotic systems referring to specific segments of reality: the linguistic sign stood for the 
mental concept, while the monetary sign for merchandise.319  In Inferno XXX, the semiotic value 
of the coin is alluded to by master Adam, who explains his sin in metaphorical terms: io falsai/la 
                                                 
318 Biard contends that the analogy of words with coins was a common place in the medieval texts of theology:  “… 
on a pu montrer de manière plus précise que tout au long du XIIIe siècle la comparaison avec le signe monétaire est 
utilisée dans la réflexion sur le signe, aussi bien linguistique que sacramental, au sein de nombreux commentaires 
des Sentences.” (‘…it has been shown in a more specific way that all throughout the thirteenth century the 
comparison with the monetary sign is used in the reflection on the sign, both linguistic and sacramental, within 
numerous commentaries on the Sentences.’ op. cit, p. 1420). What made this analogy possible, is in Biard’s view, 
the fact that the same texts that were dealing with the sacramental function of words as conveyers of truth were 
concerned with sins of usury and avarice, that had a direct relationship with money. Biard does not mention Peraldus 
in her exemplification of medieval intellectuals who took up this comparison.  
319 According to Biard, the medieval analogy was a conflation of Aristotle’s economic theory, as expounded in the 
Politics, and Augustine’s doctrine of the words as vocal signs, as expressed in several of his works (De Doctrina 
Christiana, Confessions, De Trinitate). 
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lega suggellata del Batista (74-4; ‘I falsified the alloy sealed with the Baptist.”). Adam’s oblique 
reference to the fiorini is in fact Dante-poet’s subtle way of showing the seriousness of the sin of 
counterfeiting. Here, the Florentine coin is designated not by its name but by the symbolic image 
it bears: that of John the Baptist.  
According to Joël Biard, the name of the coin, just as the image engraved on it, were 
essential components of the monetary sign: “Le nom, on l’a vu, constitue le signe monétaire 
comme tel, par institution. Il désigne ce rapport fondateur. L’image est aussi un élément 
essentiel. Elle renvoie à l’autorité qui jouit du pouvoir monétaire. Mais elle n’est pas un simple 
signe de reconnaissance ni une simple reduplication du nom. Elle garantit la valeur. Elle devient 
ainsi signe du caractère signifiant de la monnaie. Parce qu’il y a de la convention dans le rapport 
d’équivalence ainsi établi entre monnaie et marchandise, il faut un garant. L’image témoigne de 
cette garantie.” (‘As we have seen, the name constitutes the monetary sign as such, by institution. 
The noun designates this founding linkage. The image is an essential element, as well. It points 
to the authority that holds monetary power. But the image is not a mere sign of identification, nor 
a mere duplication of the noun. The image guarantees the value and, thus, becomes sign of the 
signifying character of the coin. Since there is a convention in the rapport of equivalence thus 
established between coin and merchandise, a warrant is necessary. The image testifies to this 
warranty’; emphasis Biard, translation mine). 320
 In this light, master Adam’s sin appears even more grievous since the image on the 
Florentine coin did not represent a political leader of the day, but a biblical hero and a martyr for 
the Christian faith. Master Adam used the sacred image of the Baptist as a token for his 
fraudulent action, just as the perjurer takes, according to every standard definition of perjury, 
                                                 
320 (op. cit., 1424) 
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God’s name as a guarantor for false words. In this, master Adam can be—and is put—on a par 
with word forgers such as the Egyptian woman and Sinon. 
Within the context of the grouping of money forgers with false speakers, it is important to 
mention that, although the association between monetary sign and linguistic sign is, as we have 
seen, a common place in medieval culture, Dante is likely to have taken up this analogy from 
Peraldus’s chapter on the vices of the tongue. For nowhere in the Commedia has this synonymy 
been established as clearly and explicitly as in Inferno XXX, the canto dealing with the falsifiers 
of words and metals.321 Peraldus used the commonplace comparison words-coins to develop 
moral concepts, more specifically, to describe two sins of speech. Lying, false testimony and 
perjury represent acts of falsifying words, identical to the acts of those who forge coins. The 
alignment of falsifying of words with counterfeiting money is used by Peraldus in the specific 
chapters devoted to mendacium (with one of its subclasses, falsum testimonium) and periurium. 
The two characters, Sinon and Potiphar’s wife, whom Dante selects to represent the false 
speakers, are guilty, as we have seen, of these particular sins of speech.  What is more, they are 
grouped with the false coiners. Sinon’s phrase: S’io dissi falso, e tu falsasti il conio establishes 
an explicit rapport of equivalence between speaking falsely and forging coins. Another important 
piece of evidence for Peraldus’s stamp on this canto is adduced by Shoaf, who argues that 
                                                 
321 An interesting example of the influence of money on language occurs in Inferno XXI, the canto of the barrators 
who are described as people who for the sake of money turn the “no” into a “yes”: O Malebranche, ecco un de li 
anzïan di santa Zita!/Mettetel sotto, ch’i’ torno per anche/a quella terra, che n’è ben fornita:/gn’uom v’è barratier. 
Fuor che Bonturo;/del no, per li denar, vi si fa ita. (37-42; ‘O Evil Claws, here is/ one of the elders of Santa Zita! 
Put him under, I am/ going back for more/ to that city, which is well supplied with them:/every one is a grafter there, 
except Bonturo; for/ money there they turn ‘no’ into ‘yes.’) For a thorough investigation of Dante’s financial 
imagery, see chapter “Commerce and Language,” in Joan Ferrante’s The Political Vision of the Divine Comedy, 
where the author argues that for Dante language was a basic form of exchange, like commerce, and thus subject to 
similar kinds of abuses.  
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Peraldus’s image of “false water” lies at the root of Dante’s portrayal of the avaricious Master 
Adam.322
And if, within the last circle of Malebolge, we can find ample evidence that supports 
Dante’s alignment of money with words, for the connection of a verbal sin punished in the 
ultima chiostra of Maleboge with the sin that comes right after it, treason, numerous medieval 
pieces of evidence can also be adduced to show the traditional link between false speech and 
treason. First of all, for the medieval moralists of the vices of the tongue (Ardens, Peraldus, and 
their numerous compilers), betrayal was based on a sin of the tongue called secreta amici 
revelare. The sin of perjury, as well, was described by moralists as an act of treason.323 In Inf. 
XXXIII, Dante also describes the act of political betrayal in terms of lying: a Ceperan, là dove fu 
bugiardo ciascun Pugliese (16-17).324 The citizens of Puglia are liars because they betrayed their 
king.  
                                                 
322 “As part of a long-term study of the figuration of avaritia in medieval literature generally, and in Dante, in 
particular, I have been examining the lengthy chapter on this vice in the Summa Virtutum ac Vitiorum of William 
Peraldus. Peraldus in this chapter repeats and continues the ancient tradition of the avaricious man as suffering from 
or at least resembling one who suffers from hydropsy (Peraldus 2, 57-58). This, we know, is the disease from which 
Maestro Adamo suffers (Inf. 30. 52-57); and it is, of course, consonant with his sin that he should suffer the disease 
traditionally associated with the avaricious: after all, his prime motive for counterfeiting would have been avarice, 
which is the root of all evil (1 Ti. 6.10). (…) Numerous other sources doubtless inform Dante’s episode. But is 
seems almost certain that one of his sources was Peraldus on the vice of avarice: Peraldus’s image of false water 
corresponds tellingly to Dane’s words l’imagine lor vie… m’asciuga. Moreover, given the enormous popularity of 
the Summa, the relationship proposed here is certainly plausible.” (“Dante and Peraldus: The Acqua Falsa of 
Maestro Adamo (A Note on Inferno 30. 64-69).” Quaderni d’Italianistica 10(1980), 311-313.  Among the other 
possible sources Shoaf lists for master Adam’s episode is The Romance of the Rose, by Lorris and Jean de Meun. 
(Dante, Chaucer and the Currency of the Word. Money, Images and Reference in Late Medieval Poetry. Norman, 
(Oklahoma: Pilgrim Books, 1983), 29. Another aspect I would like to add concerns the lexicon of falsification in the 
description of a verbal sin: Guido Favati points out in the Enciclopedia dantesca that this lexicon recurs in the Fiore 
(XXXVI), where the verb falsare is used for rendere bugiardo un giuramento mancare a un giuramento (e quindi 
spergiurare). (Favati, 783). If Fiore was, indeed, authored by Dante, its definition of perjury as falsifying adds one 
more piece of evidence to Dante’s use of the Peraldian lexicon of lying and perjury. 
323 See for instance Alain’s definition in the Tractus de virtutibus, et vitiis: His evidenter traditur quod tripliciter 
periurat homo, ut supra diximus, dum scilicet vel sciens falsum iurat, vel putans falsum quod verum est iurat, vel 
existimans verum quod falsum est iurat. (p. 43; ‘A man commits perjury in three ways, as we have said above, either 
when he knowingly swears falsely, or swears deeming false what is true, or again swears deeming true what is 
false’), or Cavalca who uses Judas as an exemplum for perjurers (Pungilingua, 76). 
324 As Chivacci Leonardi’s note informs us, “Ceprano (…) era in posizione strategica, quasi porta d’ingresso al 
regno: secondo una voce che qui Dante raccoglie, ma non documentata, i baroni pugliesi che Manfredi vi aveva 
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In Inferno XXX, the Sinon episode is one of those magic moments in the Comedy, where 
the world of the myth is brought back to life with a new meaning and pressed into the service of 
a Christian cause. Just as in Ulysses’ case, through the figure of Sinon, the intrinsic value of 
eloquence is again called into question. Being an excellent speaker avails nothing when speech is 
built on a web of lies and deceit that brings only disasters.   
As Dante himself states in the Monarchia, “In matters of feeling and conduct, words are 
to be believed less than deeds (in passionibus et actionibus, sermons minus sunt credibiles 
operationis.) 325 Opposed to legendary figures such as Ulysses, Jason and Sinon, who not only 
are fraudulent speakers, but also come from a pagan world populated by dei falsi e bugiardi, is 
the Christian language of faith, the unique depository of truth. The only speech free from any 
kernel of falsehood is the speech of Faith 326 and its messengers: the Church and the saints. 327 
Dante himself as a scriba Dei is aware of the dangers he incurs in his assiduous attempts to 
describe a vision that can easily be taken and judged as false. In the encounter with Cacciaguida 
from Paradiso XVI, when Cacciaguida invests the pilgrim with the mission and responsibility of 
recounting the true story of his journey, he insists on Dante’s obligation to tell the whole, 
untarnished truth: Ma nondimen, rimossa ogne menzogna,/tutta tua vïsion fa manifesta; 
(Paradiso XVII, 127-128; ‘But nonetheless, putting aside every falsehood,/make manifest all 
                                                                                                                                                             
posto a custodia lo tradirono, lasciando entrare i francesi di Carlo d’Angiò. Di qui la ritirata su Benevento e la 
sconfitta finale con la morte del re, che Dante ricorderà nel Purgatorio (…) Dante sa bene, dunque, che la grande 
battaglia era avvenuta a Benevento, e non a Ceprano. Ma nomina quest’ultima per sottolineare il tradimento, che fu 
la principale causa della sconfitta; bugiardo: sleale verso il re, non mantenedo l’impegno di difendere la posizione.” 
(2005, 834). 
325 1.13.4, 71. 
326 In Convivio, Faith is described as immune from mendacity: La nostra Fede che mentire non puote (Convivio, 
IV.15, 278). 
327 In the depiction of the First Mobile, Dante reinforces the credibility of his populating this space with the holly by 
invoking the Catholic doctrine who cannot lie: Questo loco è di spiriti beati, secondo che la Santa Chiesa vuole, che 
non può dire menzogna.  (Convivio II.3, 94). In the same vein, in the ‘trilogia dei voti’, the truth of Piccarda 
Donati’s words is reinforced by the phrase: alma beata non porria mentire. (Par. IV. 95; ‘a blessed soul could never 
lie.’). 
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your vision.’).328 Dante’s art, as serving the divine truth, has to be free of any element of 
falsehood.  
Along these lines, the thesis that Dante-poet runs the risk of mendacity has been 
convincingly developed by several modern commentators. Teodolinda Barolini, for instance, 
points to the fact that “If the pilgrim learns to be not like Ulysses, the poet is conscious of having 
to be ever more like him.”329  Shoaf as well points to the risk of linguistic falsifying that Dante-
poet, as a maker of images, incurs, a risk that assimilates him to Master Adam,330 whereas 
Giuliana Carugati draws attention to the potential transgressiveness of Dante’s poetic language. 
Carugati interprets the poet as a maker of lies (‘menzogna’), asserting at the same time that the 
inherent mendacity of his representational undertaking is redeemed by the silence that establishes 
itself at the end of the third cantica.  
 
                                                 
328 The phrase is an intratextual response to the poet’s address to the reader in Inf. XIII: s’ì vederai/cose che torrien 
fede al mio sermone (21-22; ‘you will see things that would/ make you disbelieve my speech.’). 
329 In Barolini’s interpretation, the Paradiso is, paradoxically, the most transgressive of the three canticas, because in 
its strenuous attempt to represent a suprasensorial reality, the poet has to coin words, or signs that go beyond the 
limits of human language: “The Paradiso, if it is to exist at all, cannot fail to be transgressive; its poet cannot fail to 
be a Ulysses, since only a trapassar del segno will be able to render the experience of trasumanar.” (The Undivine 
Comedy, 54). [Dalla menzogna al silenzio.  La scrittura mistica della Commedia di Dante. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
1991), 79]. 
330 “Dante the poet, (…) confronts the question of imagery in the canto of the falsifiers, and in the vertically related 
cantos, because he must differentiate his coinage as poet form the false coinage of master Adam. We his readers 
must be able to spend his coin--read his language--for the vision which he experienced. So it is that, from his 
position of the allegory of the theologians, he must convince us that his coin or language is not fraudulent, not false, 
but a true and a valuable representation of what he saw when grace dispensed with the ordinary limits of human 
sight.” (Dante, Chaucer, 36). 
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5.0  DISTORTING THE VERTICAL DIMENSION: THE PROBLEM OF 
BLASPHEMY 
The discussion of the sin of blasphemy poses a few problems. Most medieval tracts on 
immoral speech considered blasphemy the most grievous verbal transgression. As it was directed 
against God himself or the saints (and thus altered the vertical dimension of speech), the 
tendency was to view this sin as far worse than verbal trespasses that offended one’s neighbor 
(and distorted the horizontal dimension of speech).331 Against this background, it will come as a 
surprise that neither Jean de Meun nor Dante follow this line of thought. Jean de Meun tackles 
the problem of blasphemy only in an allusive manner, in Faus Semblant’s section of the Rose. In 
Dante’s structure of hell, the sin of blasphemy is outweighed by all the other verbal trespasses 
considered by Dante.  
For Jean, it is understandable why the sin of blasphemy was not a main concern: his 
poem is addressed to the amoureus, men and women in the grip of carnal desires, who talk to or 
about each other, and never to or against God. It would, however, be a mistake to dismiss the 
problem of blasphemy in the Rose only on this ground. The issue of blasphemous speech is much 
more serious in the poem than it might seem, and occurs not on the level of the characters, but on 
that of the writerly discourse. About one hundred-and-twenty years after the completion of the 
                                                 
331 The exeptions are very few, but notable in the context of this dissertation: Raoul Ardent, for whom the sin of 
secreta amici revelatio was the most serious, and Laurent d’Orléans, who, writing his moral summa for his king, 
was not very concerned with blasphemous speech and treated it last in his series of ten verbal sins. 
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Rose, one authoritative voice in the field of moral theology would accuse Jean de Meun of 
blasphemies. In the famous Querelle de la Rose that took place in the first years of the fifteenth 
century, Jean Gerson, one of the most remarkable French ecclesiastics of all times, pronounced 
harsh words of condemnation about Jean de Meun’s art.332 The Romance of the Rose was 
promiscuous, incited people to sins, and deserved to be burnt like any other blasphemous or 
heretical book.  
In the first part of this chapter, I analyze Jean de Meun’s excusacion in the Romance of 
the Rose (vv. 15139-15306) from Jean Gerson’s ethical perspective.333 I undertake to confront 
Gerson’s charges against Jean de Meun with Jean de Meun’s own plea for forgiveness, to 
demonstrate that what Jean is in fact apologizing for are his verbal abuses.334 Making this point 
is important in the economy of my dissertation since it allows me to gauge one more time Jean 
de Meun’s awareness of the sins of word, an awareness expressed in a literary work written 
between 1270-1280, shortly after the “golden age of the sins of the tongue” (1190-1260).  How 
sinful authorial speech may affect the quality and the reception of a literary work of art is a 
highly important question to which Jean de Meun gives the most serious consideration. 
                                                 
332 Under the denomination “querelle de la Rose” are grouped several polemical exchanges of letters between moral 
critics of the Romance of the Rose (Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson, in particular), and defendants of the poem 
(and its author), such as Jean de Montreuil, Gontier and Pierre Col. What was mostly debated by these leading 
intellectuals of the time was not the talent of Jean de Meun as a writer, for this even his opponents acknowledged, 
but the morality of the Rose, and, of course, of Jean de Meun himself. These polemical letters have been edited by 
Eric Hicks, in Le débat sur le Roman de la Rose, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1977. All the French quotes I use come 
from this edition, whereas for the English translation I rely on the edition by Joseph L. Baird and John R. Kane: La 
Querelle de la Rose. Letters and documents (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and 
Literatures, 1978).  
333 I take up Armand Strubel’s term excusacion, to group and threat as an individual thematic block vv. 15139-15306 
of the Romance of the Rose (1992 edition, 805). 
334 Gerson is one of the major theorists of verbal sins in early modern Francel; he wrote several texts dealing with 
the theme of the government of the tongue, and with flattery and blasphemy. (See Pour qu’on refrène sa langue, 
Contre les tentations de blasphème, Contre les fausses assertions des flatteurs, and Contre le péché de blaspheme, 
treatises that can be consulted in Jean Gerson. Oeuvres complètes, vol. VII, P. Glorieux, ed., Paris: Desclée & Cie, 
1966). 
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The last section of this chapter examines the treatment of blasphemy in Dante’s Inferno 
and seeks to elucidate Dante’s motives for considering the sin of blasphemy to be the “lightest” 
verbal transgression in the system of hell. 
5.1 THE “BLASPHEMIES” OF JEAN DE MEUN 
Mais ainz que plus m’en oiez dire,/Ailleurs vueill un petit entendre/Pour 
moi des males genz deffendre,/Non pas pour vous faire muser,/Mais pour 
moi contre euls escuser./Si vous pri, seigneur amoreus,/ Par les geus 
d’amours savoreus,/ Que se vous i trouvez paroles/Semblanz trop baudes 
ou trop foles,/Par quoi saillent li mesdisant/Qui de nous aillent 
mesdisant/Des choses a dire ou dites,/Que cortoisement les desdites./Et 
quant vous les avrez des diz/Repris, retardez ou desdiz,/Se mi dit son de 
tel maniere/Qu’il soit droiz que pardon en quiere/Pri vous que vous me le 
pardoingniez/Et de par moi leur respoingniez/Que ce requeroit la matire/ 
Qui vers teus paroles me tire/Par les propietez de sai:/Et pour ce teus 
paroles ai (…)/Et s’il y a nule parole/Qui sainte eglise tiengne a fole,/Presz 
sui k’a son voloir l’amende/Se je puis souffire a l’amende. (15162-15306) 
 
But before you hear me say anything more, I want to move aside a little to defend myself 
against wicked people, not so much to delay you as to excuse myself to them. Therefore I 
beg you, amorous lords, by the delicious games of love, if you find here any speeches 
that are too bawdy or silly and that might make slanderous critics who go around 
speaking ill of us rise up over things that I have said or will say, that you will courteously 
oppose them. Then when you have reproved, prevented, or opposed these speeches, if 
what I say is of such nature that I may justly ask pardon for them, I beg you to pardon me 
and to reply to them through me that my subject matter demanded these things; it draws 
me toward such things by its own properties, and therefore I have such speeches (…) And 
if I make any utterance that Holy Church may consider foolish, I am ready at her wish to 
change it if I am capable of making the change.335
 
 
Although this small excerpt manages to give us the core of Jean’s apologies to his reader, it is 
worthwhile mentioning that, on the whole, the apologies span more than one hundred thirty 
verses, a telling measure of Jean’s feeling of guilt. Structurally inserted at the midpoint of the 
                                                 
335 The word ‘change’ Dahlberg uses is somewhat unfaithful to the spirit of the original. In the text,  
amende or amender have a moral connotation. 
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poem, the segment represents a spectacular move on the part of a medieval poet. If we consider 
Paul Zumthor’s assertion that the most difficult task of a medievalist is to find poetic 
subjectivities, to find, in other words, medieval authors who had the wit to say “I” when they 
wrote, we grasp the full significance of Jean’s decision to step forward and address his reader 
openly. The poet’s first--and last in the text--assumption of his own voice, in defiance of all the 
other characters whom he had impersonated hitherto, raises in the reader the awareness of an 
exceptional moment of both textual and extra-textual activity. It is the moment in which the 
“producer” of the show, or more appropriately, the actor able to interpret magisterially so many 
different characters—whether we call them with Baktinian terms voices or masks—unexpectedly 
drops all disguise, reveals his own face and speaks in his own voice. Strategically, it is an 
ingenious move, because once the writer steps out of the world of the fiction and the readers get 
the full grasp of the importance of this event, they will no longer focus on the plot, on the text, 
but on the writer as an extra-textual figure.  
And where does Jean de Meun lead his readership outside of the poem? He leads them 
not only into his literary workshop, to disclose to them secrets of the process of literary 
composition, but also into his own conscience, to reveal to them aspects of his own process of 
moral self-examination. Thus, Jean’s excusacion is important from a twofold perspective: that of 
the artificer who in the very eyes of the public slips out of the bounds of the literary fiction and 
turns toward his own text as toward an artifact, a product of artistic effort and linguistic practice, 
and secondly, that of the Christian tortured by remorse, who raises issues of morality related to 
the process of literary creation, and then apologizes to the Church. Jean’s discourse in the first 
person reveals to his hearers/readers a facet of his personality that they did not expect to see: that 
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of a self-declared penitent sinner, who problematizes in dialogue with them the qualities of his 
writerly speech. And what vices does Jean de Meun himself say that his literary art has?  
Jean’s direct address to his readers posits as a motivation the need for self-defense, 
occasioned by his virtual detractors. Thus, the excusacion takes the form of a two-pronged 
dialogue: one with his admirers, whose assistance he asks for as a personal favor, and one against 
his enemies, whose calumnies he seeks to anticipate and counter. At a first instance, by admitting 
to having dropped some imprudent words (paroles trop baudes ou trop foles) here and there, the 
writer seems to apologize for some seemingly innocent slips of the tongue. Without being 
personally sure that these words are really blameworthy, he says, he nevertheless realizes that 
they might upset his admirers, so he leaves the assessment of his linguistic daringness to them: if 
they really deem that Jean’s language offers reasons for apologies, they should not only forgive 
him in their hearts, but also defend him publicly, against his potential calumniators. Putting his 
own defense into his admirers’ mouths institutes an ingenious dialogic technique that allows Jean 
de Meun to address not only his supporters but also his enemies. He asks his faithful readers to 
reply to his attackers that if he used bad words throughout his work, he did not do it by levity of 
mind, but because the topic of the poem itself required so.  
Jean invokes the excuse of the stylistic decorum to legitimize his use of coarse language: 
if his speech is sometimes uncouth, it is because what he is talking about is so low. To justify his 
bold verbal choices, he brings up the principle of literature as a mimetic art, and, in an ingenious 
move, blends the requisite of the veracity of the narrative to the moral imperative of telling the 
truth. The classical authority that serves him best here is the Roman historian Sallust, whom our 
poet does not hesitate to paraphrase freely and who gives him the opportunity to problematize his 
status as a writer of contemporary events and mores. Poetry is placed one on one with history in 
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Jean’s rewriting of Sallust, since what for the Roman author was the task of the historian, in Jean 
de Meun becomes the task of the poet. The one who writes poetry, just like the chronicler who 
writes objectively about history, has to preserve the truth in his words. Just as the historian 
depicts faithfully and truthfully the events he is witnessing, so the poet has to represent the facts 
with no alterations. There is a genetic affiliation between language and reality, the words are 
neighbors and cousins of the deeds, Jean says, and whoever makes of truthful writing a moral 
duty has to put words and deeds in a specular relationship, in which the former perfectly 
correspond to the latter. Sallust’s description of the daunting task of the historian serves Jean de 
Meun as a springboard from which to launch his apologetic display: the selection of language is 
justified by the imperative of the truth. It is this moral requisite that makes of writing an 
enterprise whose difficulty Jean wants his readers to be aware of.  
The Sallustian paraphrase introduces us into the core of Jean’s excusacion, and what at 
first seemed an excuse for some unhappy lexical choices reveals now something much deeper. 
Narrowing the field of his targeted audience, Jean ends up addressing only two segments of it, 
the ones he knows he criticized most: women and the religious figures of his days. It is, thus, not 
the mere choice of inappropriate words that eventually worries Jean and that he expects to arouse 
the anger of his readers; it is the fact that these harsh words were aimed at two specific segments 
of the civic life. In the discourses of the Old Woman and Jealous Husband, Jean presented a 
horrendous picture of feminine mores, whereas through the figure of Faus Semblant he mounted 
a virulent attack against contemporary religious orders. It is this group of discourses that he 
alludes to, being aware that not only his language, but also the content of his sayings may 
discontent some. The figure of the historian is coupled with that of the educator, and Horace 
joins Sallust in an effort to account for the intricate web of purposes of the poem. Jean argues 
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that besides the fact that he consigned the historical truth to his book, he also took care to instruct 
and correct depraved women and hypocritical friars. His book is therefore not only a book of 
history that immortalizes people and events in writing, but also a didactic book, intended to the 
correction of bad morals.  
The issue of the truthfulness of the text becomes more specific when Jean counters the 
potential charge of lying about women by invoking the longstanding misogynistic tradition he 
heavily relied on. There can be no place for lies, he says, in a long series of writers who said the 
same things about women at different moments of times, and in different places of the world. 
Again, writing equates telling the truth, and Jean contends he is lying to the extent that so many 
erudite figures from the past lied about women, which cannot be. The Horatian tenet of docere 
delectandi, that Jean is quick to invoke, gives him afresh the opportunity to reflect on his text as 
an artifact: in his attacks against women, he maintains, he reproduced faithfully what the 
authorities in the matter have said, and then, he contributed some remarks of his own to this 
impressive tradition. This is the part of the delectatio in art, Jean argues, and his personal 
developments in the text are part of the poetic game.  
Beyond the diplomatic move of devolving the responsibility of his virulent attacks to his 
predecessors, there is another element in Jean’s relationship to this tradition that compels 
attention. Writing poetry is for Jean de Meun not only immortalizing the truth or reproducing 
what others have said, it is also creation, and creation involves playing, having fun. The 
description of poetry as geu ‘game’ is an important factor in Jean’s direct address, not only 
because it has the value of a profession of artistic faith, but also because it is meant to attract the 
sympathy and the understanding of the reader. Jean calls himself a poet, who, like all other poets, 
has to play according to some rules. One of these rules demands that the poet come up with 
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something new in the material he is treating, in order to please the public. And although the few 
personal remarks Jean made about women might displease those who recognize themselves in 
the picture, the same remarks might please a larger body of society that is morally upright.  
The same mechanism of argumentation takes place in the justification of the criticism 
against the hypocritical religious, only that here the emphasis is put no longer on tradition, but on 
Jean de Meun’s own moral profile.  His attacks are not aimed at truly religious people, he takes 
care to mention, but against those who under the appearance of sanctity are arrogant and vicious 
people. Jean is better than they, therefore entitled to criticize them, because he, at least, overtly 
admits to being a sinner, whereas the hypocritical friars present themselves as holy men. 
Moreover, Jean at least fasts periodically and by belief, whereas the hypocrites only pretend to 
do so. These contrasts justify the strikes on the writer’s part, the ‘arrows’ (saiete) he shoots from 
the bow of his art, the ‘iron’ (fers) of his sword. The powerful imagery of the attack is telling 
about Jean de Meun’s awareness of the linguistic aggressiveness to which he resorts in his 
vituperation of the mendicant orders. It is an awareness that culminates with his apology to the 
Church, the only official institution toward which the writer feels he can be held accountable and 
toward which he is ready to mend his verbal abuses. Language as strike, arrow and sword is 
justified, as in the case of the criticism of depraved women, by ethical purposes: it is language 
that assumes the difficult task of eradicating social evil. It is corrupted because it deals with 
corruption; it is violent because it deals with violence.  
The fact that the only direct intervention of Jean de Meun in the poem ends with an 
address to his ‘Holy Church’ bespeaks his ultimate concern: his words might have upset many, 
and he is well aware thereof, but what really seems to matter to him is the sanction of the 
Church. All the linguistic trespasses confessed hitherto are now related to the reception the 
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ecclesiastical authority may give to his book. A hermeneutic question that might arise here is the 
semantic value of the phrase: parole fole (‘foolish word’), a phrase that, by its ambiguity, lends 
itself to multiple interpretations: does Jean mean that the Church might consider his attack 
against the friars excessive? That it might consider it untruthful? But he just said he did not put 
anything in his attack that is not legitimized by other books, proven by experience or by reason. 
One more time the issue of the text as a speaker of the truth surfaces in a vital point of the 
writerly discourse. Taking into account the generality of the expression and the other instances in 
the poem in which Jean used the adjective ‘foolish’ (fol/fole), it is more likely that the phrase 
describes the poet’s overall usage of language in the poem.336 Writing in a time when so many 
new words entered the vocabulary of the Romance languages, and when the ecclesiastical 
authorities were trying hard to impose an institutional control over the too unbridled way people 
used language, Jean sets his anxiety in relation to the overall quality of his speech. Here the 
concerns of the poet are coupled with that of the Christian, an element of novelty in literature, 
and the drama that arises is that the sharp tongue of the satirist, whom Jean might have inherited 
from the Roman poets he cultivated, clashes with the late medieval Christian ideals of 
disciplined speech. It is the awareness of this clash that compels Jean de Meun to intervene 
directly in the text and bring in it the authority of the Church.  
But did the way in which Jean tries to justify his verbal abuses convince his virtual judges 
of his good intentions? The answer to this question would be given by Jean’s posterity. Jean de 
Meun’s apologies to the Church would indeed be answered by the Church with one of its finest 
voices, that of Jean Gerson, who will respond to Jean de Meun in terms that would establish one 
                                                 
336 The modern French translation seems to support this idea: ‘Et s’il se trouve dans mon poème une parole que la 
sainte Eglise tienne pour imprudente, je suis prêt à la corriger selon sa volonté, si je puis suffire à la réparation.’ Out 
of respect for the original, however, I feel compelled to mention that ‘mon poème’ is the translator’s addition; it 
does not exist in the Old French version. 
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of the most fascinating facts of cultural history. From the viewpoint of its time of composition, 
Jean’s Rose belongs to the “golden age of the sins of the tongue” (Vecchio and Casagrande), and 
the poem will be judged specifically under the optic of the sins of the tongue, by a moral writer 
who came more than one century after Jean de Meun: Jean Gerson.337
Although Jean did not explicitly label the things he apologizes for in the Romance as 
peccata linguae, Gerson’s thought on the sins of the tongue, as expressed in his moral texts, and 
the treatise on the Rose he wrote within the Querelle, identify Jean de Meun’s confessed 
trespasses as verbal sins. Jean de Meun was an incorrigible sinner, Jean Gerson and Christine de 
Pizan repeatedly assert, and the picture that emerges from the collation of the Excusacion with 
the judgmental documents of the Querelle strikes us as being the picture of a particular type of 
sinner. Not one in the flesh, but one in speech, more precisely in the written word; a sinner, in 
other words, in literature and through literature. Jean Gerson never specifically addressed the 
apologetic segment of the Rose, on the contrary, he seems to have totally disregarded it. What he 
was interested in, in fact, was not to find mitigating circumstances for the morally decayed art of 
Jean de Meun, but to demolish it. Even if he read carefully the Excusacion, he might have had a 
hard time believing a writer who through his characters made the apology of lie and deceit 
throughout his work, gambling thus the veracity of his didactic enterprise. 
Gerson’s treatise against the Romance of the Rose is a judicial allegory, which unfolds at 
the Court of Holy Christianity and in which Chastity and Theological Eloquence accuse Jean de 
Meun (here designated as the Foolish Lover) of crimes against morality. The supreme judge is 
                                                 
337 For an overall account of the role Jean Gerson palyed in the querelle, see Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski’s 
thorough and recent study: “Jean Gerson and the Debate on the Romance of the Rose,” in A Companion to Gerson. 
Brian P. McGuire, ed. (Leiden, Boston: Brill), 317-355. Very interesting is also David Hult’s analysis of Jean 
Gerson and Christine de Pizan as “censors” of the Rose who illustrate the close link between “the problems of 
shameless speech and shameful reaction.”  (“Words and Deeds: Jean de Meun’s Romance of the Rose and the 
Hermeneutics of Censorship,” New Literary History, 28.2 (1991), 361. 
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Canonical Justice and the universal court of Christianity is composed of allegorical characters 
representing: Mercy, Truth, Faith, Sound Judgment, Reason, Knowledge, Humility, Conscience 
and the four cardinal virtues. Both the framework and the selection of the characters leave no 
doubt as to the framework in which the writer of the Rose is accused: we are inside a highly 
theological setting in which moral virtues shore up the canonical law.  
It is obvious that we are not dealing with literary criticism on the part of Gerson, but with 
deep moral judgment. Canonical Justice, in Gerson’s view, holds the place of God on earth and 
is here the judge bound to pronounce the final verdict, whereas the Theological Eloquence plays 
the role of the advocate of the court in the allegory, by virtue of his moderate and prudent 
rhetoric. Chastity plays the role of the accuser who, deeply wounded in her soul by the offenses 
of the Foolish Lover, asks the high court to find a remedy and put an end to Lover’s misdeeds. 
The word remedy in Chastity’s vocabulary provides us with the first clue as to the moral 
portrayal of Jean de Meun in this debate: in the ethical encyclopedias of the time, remedium 
‘remedy’ functioned as a technical term designating the solution, a sort of treatment that was 
offered to the problem of vices. In William Peraldus’s Summa Vitiorum, for instance, the most 
popular moral encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, each of the capital vices, including those of the 
tongue, was offered several healing remedies. Thus, Jean de Meun, under the name of Foolish 
Lover, the very character he contrived in the Romance of the Rose, is from the very outset 
introduced to the audience as a vicious person on whom both penance and therapy ought to be 
imposed by legal ruling. And Chastity starts leveling the specific charges against the Foolish 
Lover in a proper judicial form: she reads her petition in eight articles. These correspond more or 
less to each of Jean’s most controversial characters.  
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Article one, for instance, addresses the issue of La Vieille, who is nothing but a devilish 
old woman who in lewd language advises young girls to seduce men and sleep with them outside 
of marriage. Articles two, three and four move on to Jealous Husband who speaks against 
marriage, indiscriminately bad-mouths women, and condemns the men who embrace the 
religious life for laying aside their basic nature. These four articles provide us with the first 
reason why Gerson, through the agency of Chastity, is so upset with Jean de Meun: the 
characters of the Old Woman and Jealous Husband constantly undermine in the Romance two 
institutions that were the pillars of Christian society: first, marriage, that granted the cover of 
morality to all intimate relationships between man and woman, and second, the organized 
structures of the religious life: the cloister or the church. Not only the content of the Old Woman 
and Jealous Husband’s discourses in the Romance does upset Gerson, but also the way in which 
the two corrupt characters speak: they use low language and impure words that pollute the soul 
and spread the evil seed of lechery. 
With the issue of improper language, Gerson’s Chastity moves on to another key figure 
in the Romance of the Rose: Lady Reason. As an allegorical character with a quite long tradition, 
Reason is the worthy daughter of Divinity, representing the noblest part of man. As such, before 
Jean de Meun, in Guillaume de Lorris or Alain of Lille’s works, Reason’s discourses had been 
marked by wisdom and exemplary language. In the Rose, however, Gerson imputes to Jean de 
Meun, Lady Reason is turned upside down and transformed into a quirky character, who airs her 
unconventional views of human anatomy and sexuality in lubricious language. To Jean Gerson, 
the author of several texts on the capital vices, Foolish Lover, through the character of Reason, is 
guilty of nothing less than blasphemy: his encouraging people to speak bluntly about everything, 
including the male genitalia, openly called by names, is a crime. Far worse than that, the Foolish 
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Lover mixes up holy and spiritual notions with base words, to the confusion and the corruption 
of the faithful.  
 Gerson is too perceptive a reader to succumb to the temptations of the literary fiction. 
All the characters from the Rose he mentions are just masks behind which the real danger has 
one face: the one of the poet. (Gerson never calls Jean de Meun by name in the allegory; he takes 
up Foolish Lover, the leading protagonist of the Rose as a “stage” name for Jean de Meun, but he 
quickly gets rid of this symbolic name, too).338 The writer of the Rose in his very own self is 
guilty of all the charges leveled by Chastity. The literary method that Jean de Meun uses: that of 
speaking through his characters, although very ingenious, can fool nobody, contends Gerson, and 
does not provide a sufficiently good excuse for the inflaming ideas and words expressed in the 
Romance of the Rose. Despite his undeniable literary artistry, Jean de Meun is a blasphemer, and 
the type of literature he writes makes war against all the virtues.  
 
 
Il, en sa personne, nomme les parties deshonnestes du corps et les pechiés 
ors et villains par paroles saintes et sacrees, ainssy comme toute tele euvre 
fut chose divine et sacree et a adourer, mesmement hors mariaige et par 
fraude et violence; et n’est pas content des injures dessusdictes s’il les a 
publiees de bouche, mais les a fait escripre et paindre a son pouoir, 
curieusement et richement, pour attraire plus toute persone a les veoir, 
ouÿr et recepvoir. Encores y a pis: car afin que plus subtivement il 
deceust, il a mesley miel avec venin, succre avec poison, serpens 
venimeux cachiés soubz herbe vert de devocion: et ce fait il en assemblant 
matieres diverses, qui bien souvent ne font gueres a son propos si non a 
                                                 
338 The rhetoric that structures the eight articles of Chastity’s petition is relevant in this sense: with the exception of 
the first article, that begins by mentioning the name of Foolish Lover, each of the remaining seven uses only the 
pronoun “he,” in a progression that culminates with the unambiguous “in his own person” of articles seven and 
eight, which leaves no doubts as to the identity of the culprit. Later on in the Vision, Gerson explicitly sets forth the 
reasons that led him to adopt this name for Jean de Meun: Vraiement, quant j’auroie dis plusseurs diffames d’ung tel 
acteur, je ne ly puis gueres imposer que de le nommer fol amoureux: ce non emporte trop grant fardel et pesant fais 
de toute lubricité et de charnalité murtriere de toutes vertus, bouteresse de feu par tout ou elle puet (295-9; Hicks, 
70; ‘Truly, if I were to say slanderous things about such an author, scarcely could I accuse him more harshly than by 
naming him the Foolish Lover. This name bears the heavy burden and the weight of excessive lustfulness and bestial 
carnality, which murders all the virtues and throws fire wherever possible’). 
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cause dessusdicte, et pour ce qu’il fut mieulx creu et de plus grande 
auctoritey de tant que il sambleroit avoir plus veu de choses et plus 
estudié. (100) 
 
In his own person, he uses holy and sacred words to name the dishonorable parts of the 
body and impure and shameful sins, as if all such works were divine, sacred and holy, 
even though they are done through fraud and violence and not within the marriage state. 
He was not content simply to utter the above mentioned affronts everywhere publicly, but 
he also took care, to the limits of his power, to have them portrayed skillfully and lavishly 
in words and pictures, the more quickly to allure people into hearing, seeing, and holding 
fast to these things. But still worse remains: the more subtly to deceive, he mixed honey 
with poison and sweetness with venom, like poisonous serpents lying under the green 
grass of devotion. And he does this by drawing together diverse materials, which often 
are scarcely to his purpose, aside from such deception, so that, by seeming to have 
experienced and studied many things, he would be better believed and have greater 
authority. 
 
That Jean’s part of the Romance of the Rose is a compilation of disparate materials that 
have no relevance to the plot is a fact noted by all the critics of the Rose. But Gerson again 
considers this artistic flaw from the viewpoint of the moralist, not from that of the literary critic. 
The verbosity of de Meun has a precise objective: that of conferring more weight to his message 
and thereby enhancing his dangerous moral influence on the readership. This leading accusation 
is all the more serious, since it highlights Jean de Meun’s writerly perversity: in order to deceive 
successfully, Jean mixes up the negative moral values with the positive ones, so that the readers 
don’t realize that they are being corrupted and perverted themselves. 339 When after the end of 
Chastity’s discourse, Theological Eloquence, the advocate of the Christian court, begins his own, 
the idea of the dangers represented by Jean’s art is further developed: the human souls are the 
Lord’s most precious houses and there is nothing more perilous for them than dissolute words or 
images that set them on fire and burn them.  
The notion of morally destructive art expressed in the Querelle is not an isolated 
occurrence in Jean Gerson’s activity as a defender of Christian values: according to his 
                                                 
339 We will see that Christine de Pizan pointed out these strangely mixed ethical signals in almost identical terms. 
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biographers, Gerson repeatedly asked the public authorities of his day to remove from public 
places images that were “suggestive of evil.”340 More relevant for our discussion is the 
reoccurrence of the idea of evil-inducing speech in one of Jean Gerson’s treatises dealing with 
blasphemy. In Contre les tentations du blasphème, he draws attention to the dangers represented 
by those who freely speak of indecent or immoral things in front of young people. The words, he 
says, can move the youngster to do the shameful things they hear, and the same holds for those 
who display indecent paintings:  
 
 
(…) on doit très diligemment garder que chose ne se die en face ou 
presente devant enfans et jeusnes gens qui les puisse lors ou après 
esmouvoir a telles temptations vilaines comme font ceux qui parlent 
hardiment contre la foy en guise de jeu ou aultrument, comme font aussi 
ceulx et celles qui parlent de secrez de marriage ou font parler ou les 
monsterent de fait en la presence de leurs enfants ou autres; ou qui 
presentent laides ymages ou paintures de dissolution (…). (Glorieux, 416) 
 
(…) One must take very diligent care that nothing be said or done in front of the chidren 
and the youth that can at that moment or later one move them to such base temptations, 
like the ones committed against faith, in jest or otherwise, like others committed by those 
men and women who speak about the secrets of matrimony, or cause other people to 
speak about them, or even perform these secrets in the presence of their children or the 
others; or those which display vile images or dissolute paintings (…). (translation mine) 
 
 
 
To Gerson, Jean de Meun’s art presents itself to the readers/hearers in exactly the same 
terms: it is a dissolute art that, depicting or alluding to shameful acts, encourages people, 
especially the young and immature ones, to mimic them. Moreover, it is an art that takes holy, 
religious ideas in derision and thereby undermines the foundation of the Christian faith. The 
                                                 
340 “Against the many influences that might have corrupted the youth of the city, he set up a cry of protest, and 
demanded of the public authorities that they take means to remove from the shops and public places images that 
were suggestive of evil” [James L. Connolly, John Gerson, Reformer and Mystic (Louvain: Uystpruyst, 1928)], 87. 
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perils represented by Jean’s verbal abuses are all the more dangerous since they are fixed in 
writing and able, thus, to provoke an even more widespread evil in space and time.  
The accusation of blasphemy was a very serious charge in the late Middle Ages, and it 
was all the more grievous when it was directed against a writer. Jean Gerson not only does not 
hesitate to use repeatedly the word blasphemy in describing Jean de Meun’s poem, but what is 
more serious is that he does so from the position of a theorist of the sins of the tongue. Jean 
Gerson was a leading ecclesiastical figure of his times: chancellor of the University of Paris and 
author of numerous religious writings that made him famous Europe wide. He was also a 
powerful preacher and a moralist, very much concerned to draw the Christians from the clutches 
of the vices.  
Besides numerous sermons dealing with vices that have come down to us, very important 
are two tracts called Le profit de savoir quel est péché mortel et venial and Examen de 
conscience selon les péchés capitaux, in which, among the capital vices, he treats several sins of 
word, such as blasphemy, flattery, detraction, garrulity, lie, perjury. Two of these sins he found 
so grievous that he devoted them separate texts: against flattery, he wrote Contre les fausses 
assertions des flatteurs, a tract in which he studied the catastrophic impact that flattery can have 
on political leaders341, and against blasphemy he wrote two texts that became famous: Contre le 
péché de blasphème and Contre les tentations de blasphème. To sum up his ideas on the sins of 
the tongue he also wrote a treatise called Pour qu’on refrène sa langue, in which he warns again 
                                                 
341 On ne peust faire plus grant service a ung roy ou prince que de luy monstrer constamment verité et saine 
doctrine. Et par le contraire ceulz ne pourront estre assez punis, soint clers ou aultrez, qui par flatterie et pour 
plaire, ou par insconstance ou par male aultre fin tourneront ung roy ou prince a faulsez oppinions contre la foy et 
bonnez meurs, fut en espece de jeu ou aultrement (Glorieux, 360; ‘One cannot do a greater service to a king or a 
prince than to constantly teach him truth and sound doctrine. And, on the contrary, there is no punishment great 
enough against the clerics, or the others, who, by flattery and in order to please, or out of fickleness or any other evil 
end will draw a king or prince to false opinions against faith and good morals, in jest or otherwise;’ translation 
mine). 
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of the dangers of the undisciplined speech and proposes ways (remedies) in which people can 
control their tongues. 
Several of the main ideas expressed by Gerson in his ethical treatises recur in his 
discourse against the Romance of the Rose in the Querelle, and the most significant of them is 
the accusation of blasphemy. The sin of blasphemy, says Gerson in the ethical treatises occurs 
when:  
 
 
(…) on mesdit de Dieu contra sa vraye religion crestienne ou quant on dit 
chose au diffame de son saint nom, comme en le maulgreant ou despitant 
ou deshonnestement et vilainement parlant et jurant de luy et de ses benois 
sains et sainctes (Glorieux, 3-4).  
 
(…) one curses God againt one’s true Christian religion or when one says something to 
diffame his holy name, like when one grumbles against him, or despises him or 
disingenuously and basely speaks about, or swears on, him and his blessed saints and 
holy women. (translation mine) 
 
 
Blasphemy is the most serious and dangerous temptation, worse than eating meat on good 
Friday or during the fast, it is the language of the devil and the damned, a vice that more than any 
other vices requires severe punishment by both the religious and civil authorities. 342 In the 
                                                 
342 L’est expedient pour eschever l’ire et la punicion de Dieu, presente et a venir, que les prelats de France et gens 
d’esglise, chascun en son endroit, sans attendre l’un l’autre, mettent provision contre les diz vilains blasphemes, 
selon leurs pouvoirs autant ou plus que se on leur vouloit tollier ou usurper leurs temporelles possessions. L’est 
expedient que les seigneurs et capitaines de gens d’armes et officiers temporels labourent diligemment a ce que dit 
est, chascun selon son endroit, pour exequuter les peines desja instituées ou pour en instituer de nouvelles et defait 
les exequuter sans espargnier aucuns; car autrement ce n’est que une moquerie faire les loys qui ne les tient. L’est 
expedient que les bourgeois et autres qui ont menasge et famille, facent diligence que leurs enfants et serviteurs se 
gardent de telz blashemes, et que a ce faire les seigneurs de l’esglise et temporelz les enhortent et baillent 
auctorité.” (Glorieux, 412, 3-4; ‘It is necessary, in order to avoid God’s current and future wrath and punishment, 
that the prelates of France and the ecclesiastics, each in his place, without their waiting for one another, take 
measures against the said vile blasphemies, according to their powers as much as, or more than if, they were taken, 
or usurped from, their temporal goods. It is necessary that the lords and the captains of the army and the secular 
officers work diligently toward this, each in his place, to execute the already-instuted penalties or to institute others 
and execute them properly, without sparing anybody; for otherwise, it would be a mockery to make laws which are 
not observed. It is necessary that the bourgeois and the others who have households and families take diligent care 
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Querelle, Gerson openly and systematically calls Jean de Meun a heretic and a blasphemer, 
because there is nothing more dangerous than disseminating a perverse doctrine in the souls of 
the people, as does the author of the Rose, and because the same author, by using vile words in 
describing holy things, committed as much irreverence toward Divinity as if he had thrown 
Jesus’ body under the feet of the swine or on a heap of dung. Gerson goes as far as to compare 
Jean de Meun with Mohamed, the Muslim prophet, a heretic who deliberately and maliciously 
blended Christian teachings with his own evil errors. On account of the great crimes of 
blasphemy and heresy, not only the Romance of the Rose, but also the other works of Jean de 
Meun’s foolish youth should be burned, exterminated. To buttress this request, Theological 
Eloquence, Gerson’s spokesperson in the allegory, draws an interesting parallel with the faith of 
the Roman poet Ovid, and his celebrated Ars amoris. In his book, Ovid too, used dissolute words 
and expressed immoral ideas, and for this, he was condemned and banished from the empire. 
Although his book too had the excuse of the dream as a literary framework and used the method 
of speaking through various characters, and although Ovid wrote a second book Of the Remedies 
of Love, to amend his former mistakes, the Roman authorities decided to send him in exile, 
because his writings were too serious a threat for the good morals of the Roman people. But Jean 
de Meun’s book, Gerson says, is far worse than Ovid’s Ars amoris, and it is unacceptable that 
such an utterly evil book should be tolerated and read and praised. If the Romans, who were 
pagans, deemed right to condemn a Roman pagan writer for his dissolute writings, it is all the 
more necessary to destroy Jean de Meun’s writings, when he is a Christian author who does 
harm to his Christian readers.  
                                                                                                                                                             
that their children and servants guard themselves against such blasphemies, and that the majors of the church and of 
the secular world exhort them and confer authority’; translation mine.) 
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The notion of writing as an aggressive act occurs several times in Jean Gerson’s treatise 
against the Romance of the Rose and it is worth taking a closer look at the association of 
literature with violence for what it tells us about the assessment of Jean de Meun by his critics. 
Jean de Meun is a violent writer in many ways: he first does violence to human language, by 
using smutty talk all throughout his poem, then, he violently takes up materials from other 
writers’ works and forces them to suit his own interests, he ultimately forcibly drags the readers 
into profligacy343 and condemns them to perdition. Jean abuses language as a noble human 
institution, and harms the Catholic faith and people’s good morals. Gerson analyzes all these 
threats from a twofold perspective: civil and political. The Romance of the Rose makes the claim 
of being an educational book, when in fact it subverts the very grounds of the Christian 
instruction by disseminating so many heretic ideas. All throughout the treatise, the idea of 
education is uppermost in Gerson’s mind, and there is hardly a page that does not express the 
importance of providing youth with sound moral lessons. Literature should be not only an 
informative but also a formative art, but the Romance of the Rose does not form good Christian 
citizens; it deforms them.  It is by bringing in the sight of young readers immoral characters like 
Foolish Lover that rapine, robberies, civil conspiracies, and many other great crimes, occur, says 
Gerson. Such abominable things can happen by imitating bad examples from literary texts; 
therefore, such writings as those of Jean de Meun are a grievous danger to a great kingdom. Evil 
speaking and writings corrupt moral virtues because they cancel in youngsters the praiseworthy 
feeling of shame that keeps them from imitating the sins they see, hear or read about 
The author of the Rose also does violence to his own text, by turning it into a compilation 
of alien sources, and does violence to the source-texts he uses, by misinterpreting them and 
                                                 
343 Pousser (‘push’) or tirer a dissolution (‘draw to dissolution’) are the two verbs with a connotation of violence 
that Gerson uses (Hicks, 68).   
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altering them to the point that they become unrecognizable. He is a bad continuator of Guillaume 
de Lorris’ first part of the Romance, because Guillaume did not borrow from other writers, he 
composed his own, original poem where there was no room for filth. Furthermore, although Jean 
de Meun draws his inspiration from Alain of Lille’s great and virtuous book The Plaint of 
Nature, he uses this text in an erroneous way and turns Alain’s Nature and Genius from good 
into evil characters that exhort people to the commission of sins.  
The preaching of sins, or peccati predicatio as it was technically called in the late Middle 
Ages, was an extremely grievous sin of the tongue because it worked at cross-purposes with the 
goals of the Christian teachings, based on the idea of the cultivation of moral virtues. Gerson 
points out that in Alain’s book, neither Nature nor Genius preaches sins, as they do in the 
Romance of the Rose, and that this is a very perverse way of using literary characters and the 
written moral tradition. Through the agency of Theological Eloquence, Gerson maintains that 
Jean should have used these characters in a positive way, for sending out an unequivocal 
instructive message. The model he should have followed is the Bible that spells out 
unambiguously what is a vice and what is a virtue: 
 
(…) je voulroie bien que ce Fol Amoureulx n’eust usé de ces personnaiges 
fors ainssy que la sainte Escripture en use, c’est assavoir en reprouvant le 
mal, et tellement que chascun eust apperceu le reproche du mal et 
l’approbacion du bien, et—qui est le principal—que tout se fist sans excès 
de legiereté. Mais nenin voir. Tout semble estre dit en sa persone; tout 
semble estre vray come Euvangille, en especial aux nices folz amoureulz 
auxquelz il parle; et, de quoy je me dueil plus—tout enflamme a luxure, 
meismement quant il la samble reprouver (…). (379-88; Hicks 74). 
 
I would wish that this Foolish Lover had not used these characters, except as Holy 
scripture did, that is, to reprove evil, in such a way that every man might perceive that 
condemnation of evil and that approbation of good, and (what is most important) that all 
those things could have been done without excessive frivolity. But no. Everything seems 
to be said in his own person; everything seems as true as the Gospel, particularly to those 
foolish and vicious lovers to whom he speaks. And I regret to say, he incites the more 
quickly to lechery, even when he seems to reproach it.  
 263 
Jean’s blending of the two antithetical moral categories of good and evil is a recurrent 
reason for discontentment in both Gerson and Christine de Pizan’s texts against the Romance of 
the Rose.344 In their views, it is extremely dangerous that an author who claims to write a 
didactic work, as Jean de Meun does, misleads his readers about what is good and what is bad, 
about what is morally correct and what is morally incorrect. Jean is sending mixed and confusing 
signals to his readers about how they should behave in families or in society. He makes the 
apology of lie, flattery and deceit, to the point that he seems to recommend them to his readers, 
and raises the sin of lechery to the level of virtue.  
The situation is all the more upsetting since Jean de Meun was a man of great erudition 
and of great literary talent who put his learning and his art into the service of evil. By blurring 
the lines between right and wrong, by presenting vices as exemplary virtues, Jean de Meun failed 
as a teacher of morals, and his book represents even one hundred years after the death of its 
author a public disgrace and a threat to society. The posthumous judgment of Gerson and his 
ally, Christine de Pizan, is implacable; although they acknowledge that Jean de Meun’s poem has 
some good parts, they lobby for the total destruction of the work because it throws its potential 
readers into the arms of the devil. Men are far too weak in their nature to need encouragement 
                                                 
344 Christine reiterates Gerson’s notion that de Meun depicts lechery as a virtue (Et par ce semble que maintenir 
vueille le pechié de luxure estre nul, ains vertu—qui est erreur et contre la loy de Dieu (152-4; Hicks, 16), and calls 
openly the Romance: Exortacion de vice confortant vie dissolue, doctrine plaine de decevance, voye de dampnacion, 
diffameur publique, cause de souspeçon et mescreantise, honte de pluseurs personnes, et puet estre d’erreur (323-6; 
Hicks 21; ‘an exhortation to vice, a comfort to dissolute life, a doctrine full of deception, the way to damnation, a 
public defamer, the cause of suspicion and misbelieving, the shame of many people, and possibly the occasion of 
heresy’). What Christine finds most perverse in Jean de Meun’s method is the fact that he embeds the evil in the 
good, and thus has people adhere more readily to the former. This his a subtle but blamable method, used mostly by 
heretics: Et de tant est plus grand le peril: car plus est adjoustee foy au mal de tant comme le bien y est plus 
auttentique; et par ce ont mains soubtilz aucunes foiz semees de grans erreurs par les entremesler et palier 
d’aucune verité et vertus (299-302; Hicks, 21; ‘but therein lies the greater peril, for the more authentic the good the 
more faith one puts in the evil.  And in this way many learned men have sometimes sown great errors by 
intermingling good and evil and by covering the errors over with truth and virtue.’). 
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and exhortation to vices, they need a kind of literature that teaches them good not perverse 
morals; they need books that depict in unambiguous terms fair and virtuous attitudes, both in 
private and in public life, not books that seduce men into sin. As Jean Gerson put it: 
 
Vices et pechiés, croy moy, s’aprannent trop de legier: n’y fault maistre 
quelconque; nature humaine, par especial en jeunesse, est trop encline a 
trebuchier et a glassier et cheoir en l’ordure de toute charnalité: n’estoit 
besoign que tu les y tirasses ou a force boutasses. Qui est plus tost empris 
ou enflanmé au feu de vilains plaisirs que sunt les cuers humains? Pour 
quoy donques souffloies tu ce feu puant par les vents de toute parole 
legiere et par l’auctorité de ta personne et de ton example? (…) Et tu fais 
pis; tu enhortes a pis: tu as par ta folie—quant en toy est—mis a mort et 
murtri ou empoisonné mil et mil personnes par divers pechiés, et encore 
fais de jour en jour par ton fol livre. (207-224; Hicks, 67) 
 
Vice and sin, believe me, are all too easily learned, nor is there any need for a teacher. 
Human nature, especially in youth, is far too prone and inclined to falling, plunging and 
immersing itself in impurity and the filth of all carnality. There was no need for you to 
drag them or forcibly push them in. For what thing can more easily be seized and 
inflamed with the fire of filthy desires than the human heart? Why, therefore, do you fan 
this stinking fire with the winds of the most frivolous of all words and with the authority 
of your own person and your own example (…) Yet, you do worse things; you exhort to 
worse. Because of your foolishness, you have put to death, murdered, and poisoned 
thousands and thousands of men through various shameful actions, and still yet do so 
daily by your foolish book. 
  
Books may continue to exist long after their authors’ death, and literature has a 
unique ability of fixing things in writing and sending them down to next generations. What is 
contained in a book, especially in a skillfully written one, escapes the laws of time and is 
saved for posterity. Immortalized in the script, the sin is brought back to life every time a sin-
inducing book is open and read, and literature may thus become a channel for the 
transmission of the contaminating power of evil. Expressed in highly dramatic terms that 
describe art as a crime, Gerson’s attack against the virtual dangers of literature is not an 
isolated fact. Dante’s Inferno depicts a similar peril in one of its most famous cantos. The 
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danger for the reader that both Gerson and Christine de Pizan warned about is the same for 
which Francesca and Paolo find their eternal places in hell: under the influence of the book 
they were reading, they committed the adulterous act described by the book: 
 
Noi leggiavamo un giorno per diletto/di Lancialotto come amor lo 
strinse;/soli eravamo e sanza alcun sospetto./Per più fïate li occhi ci 
sospinse/quella lettura, e scolorocci il viso;/ma solo un punto fu quel che 
ci vinse./Quando leggemmo il disïato riso/esser basciato da cotanto 
amante,/questi, che mai da me non fia diviso,/la bocca mi basciò tutto 
tremante./Galeotto fu’l libro e chi lo scrisse:/quel giorno più non vi 
leggemmo avante. (Inferno V, 127-138) 
 
We were reading one day, for pleasure, of/Lancelot, how Love beset him; we were alone 
and/without any suspicion./During many breaths that reading drove our eyes/together and 
turned our faces pale; but one point/alone was the one that overpowered us./When we 
read that the yearned-for smile was/kissed by so great a lover, he, who will never 
be/separated from me,/kissed my mouth all trembling. Galeotto was the/book and he who 
wrote it: thast day we read there no/further. 
 
This fragment introduces to us Francesca and Paolo while they were reading the Old 
Frech prose romance Lancelot del Lac.  
From the outset the literary text is presented as a sort of third “character” in the scene. 
The solitude Francesca mentions (soli eravamo) is in fact a false one; it is solitude only with 
respect to other fleshly beings, but the book they were reading will prove to be the most powerful 
and dangerous presence by their sides. The two readers are in fact not alone, but together with 
the knight Lancelot and his queen Guinevere, in a blend of life and literature that will prove fatal 
to the readers.345 Francesca and Paolo display toward their reading an attitude that somehow 
anticipates the sinful outcome of their encounter: they read for entertainment (per diletto), and 
become so captivated by the reading of the love scene between Lancelot and Guinevere (an 
                                                 
345 As the documents of the time tell us, the adulterous relationship between the two will be discovered by 
Gianciotto Malatesta, Francesca’s husband and Paolo’s brother, who will kill both of them. 
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adulterous love, as we know), that they look several times at each other and turn pale. Again, the 
emphasis Dante places on the effects of the book is clear: it is quella lettura (‘that reading’) 
which prompts Francesca and her brother-in-law to look into each other’s eyes and empties their 
cheecks of blood.  
What they are reading affects them in a personal way and to the highest degree: the 
fallacious process of identification between the readers and the characters of the romance has 
begun. It will reach its climax when Francesca and Paolo visualize the adulterous kiss between 
Guinevere and Lancelot. It is this precise moment of their reading that makes them yield to the 
temptation woven around them by the literary love story: ma solo un punto fu quel che ci 
vinse.346 It is likely to believe that Francesca and Paolo had been attracted to each other even 
before they started reading together--their isolation from other people in order to read a book is 
indicative in this respect. The literary description of Lancelot’s falling in love (come amor lo 
strinse) made them feel personally concerned and brought them even closer together; but it is 
only the visualization of the literary kiss that “overcame” them (ci vinse).  
Here, the power of literature becomes so seductive as to act almost like an aphrodisiac on 
the two readers. They are unable to go on with their reading, and materialize what in the book 
had been an immoral, but fictitious kiss into a kiss of their own, as immoral as the literary one, 
but this time real.  
The verb vincere Dante uses to describe the book’s effect on his reader has strong moral 
connotation: here, the book is the conquering enemy who breaks the human resistance of 
morality. As Renato Poggioli beautifully put it, this moment of defeat marks: “the descent from 
                                                 
346 For the complex way Dante thematizes the notion of point throughout the Comedy, raising it from erotic and 
temporal to divine and eternal, see Franco Masciandaro: “Notes on the Image of the Point in the Divine Comedy,” 
Italica 54.2 (1977), 215-226. 
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literature to life, from fiction to reality, from romanticism to realism; or more simply, from 
sentimental fancy to moral truth.”347 The moral of this episode in the Inferno seems to be offered 
by Francesca herself, the deluded victim of courtly literature: Galeotto fu il libro e chi lo scrisse. 
In other words, the role of go-between played by Gallauhaud in the adulterous love story from 
the French romance, was played, in Francesca and Paolo’s own lives, by the book they were 
reading and its author. 348 Francesca’s cry of sorrow and regret excoriates both literary tradition 
and the writer as agents of sin.349 Through her story of literary taste, lust and death, Dante 
condemns the fictional literature’s tendency of depicting immoral attitudes that can offer wrong 
models to follow to the superficial readers.350  
Literary texts figure, or emulate, life—a mimetic relationship between reality and writing, 
in which art is the one that “copies,” i.e., depicts, human nature. But, in its turn, literary tradition 
                                                 
347 “Tragedy or Romance? A Reading of the Paolo and Francesca Episode in Dante’s Inferno,” PMLA 72.3 (1957), 
338. 
348 I find far-fetched Mark Musa and Anna Hatcher’s opinion that Francesca was not a victim of literary influence, 
but knwowingly exploited the power of literature to seduce Paolo: “instead of being aroused by the text, she was 
exploiting it for the purpose of satisfying her pent-up passion.” See “The Kiss: Inferno V and the Old French Prose 
Lancelot,” in Comparative Literature, 20.2 (1968), 108. There is truly no indication in the text that would encourage 
such an interpretation. 
349 This condemnation comes as the culmination of the entire visit of Virgil and the pilgrim to the circle of lustful, 
among which are punished legendary lovers, such as Semiramis, Dido, Cleopatra, Achilles, Tristan, all figures 
consecrated by the literary tradition. The enumeration of all these characeters is made in the text by Virgil, in a way 
that makes Poggioli assert that literature plays an important part in the selection of the examples of lustful: “Vergil 
seems to warn us that it is through books that we learn not only of great feats and noble deeds, but also of sinful 
passions and criminal acts. This brief incidental sentence [Virgil’s words di cui si legge, in reference to Semiramis] 
anticipates the moral of the canto, with its implied claim that history and poetry, or literature in general, by 
preserving and transmitting through the written word the love stories of old, may lead us into sin, as Paolo and 
Francesca were led by the reading of their libro galeotto, the romance of Lancelot du Lac. Literature is full of falli 
scritti, of ‘faults written down,’ to employ an expression which Dante uses in another passage of the Commedia, 
where he refers again, this time incidentally, to the same romance (Paradiso XVI, 13-15).” 
350 Although Francesca’s (and through her, Dante the writer’s) condemnation of  Lancelot del Lac is quite adamant, I 
admit that there might be a grain of truth in Susan Noakes’s claim that Dante did not necessarily condemn the 
French romance per se, but rather the faulty way in which Francesca and Paolo read, i.e., interpreted, the love story. 
Recalling that the “traditional Lancelot story, already condemned by the papacy a hundred years before the 
Commedia was written, had in the prose Lancelot, been transformed into a religious attack on chivalric values,” 
Noakes underscores that the Lancelot text Paolo and Francesca failed to read until the end provides a clear 
condemnation of adultery. In Noakes’s view, Francesca and Paolo’s fault is primarily an intellectual one, insofar as 
they are “blind to the text’s meaning.” Their second mistake is that, instead of realizing that what they are reading is 
just a literary convention, they want to change their lives into literature. (“The Double Misreading of Paolo and 
Francesca,” Philological Quarterly 62 (1983), 226 and 229. 
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is capable of affecting lives--another mimetic relationship in which people from the realm of 
reality may imitate what they see depicted in literary outputs. Writing—history or literary 
fictions—is not without risk, for the writer is the empowered agent that mediates the transfer of 
significations from lives to other lives, from past to present or future. The writer can influence 
people’s lives in a way that can evade both geographical divisions and temporal barriers. 
Lancelot del Lac was written many years before Dante’s time, and in French, but, in Dante’s 
episode of the carnal sinners, it ended up corrupting two contemporaries of Dante’s, in an Italian 
city. The ability of books to circulate in space and time, the persisting danger that even the good 
books may be misread and misinterpreted increases the responsibility of writers as moral agents. 
Dante’s swooning at the hearing of Francesca’s tragic love story, conveys, in Francesco 
d’Ovidio’s view, Dante’s fear that he too “could become a Gallehaut to somebody else.”351
Within this perspective, Gerson’s criticism of Jean de Meun, of his obscene language, 
and more importantly, of the confused moral message of the Rose become fully understandable. 
The kind of danger for morality Dante saw in the literary texts depicting sinful love is identical 
to the threat Gerson saw in Jean de Meun’s Romance of the Rose. In fact, by attacking Jean de 
Meun and his work, Gerson was attacking all of potentially immoral literary culture. If in 
Dante’s terms (with reference to Brunetto Latini), through writing man makes himself eternal, by 
the same art, the human sins are “preserved” and “transmitted” through the ages. 
                                                 
351 See his reading of canto V of the Inferno, in Nuovi studi danteschi, II (Milan, 1907), 531. Noakes brings an 
inspired nuance to D’Ovidio’s interpretation of the pilgrim’s swooning, and argues for Dante’s awareness that his 
Vita Nuova and even the Commedy, despite the intentions of their author, can be misread, even in the sense that the 
readers may see in the text the opposite of the meaning intended by the author. 
 269 
5.2 THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY IN DANTE 
Quelle que fût la diversité de leurs opinions sur sa 
consistance et son contenu, les juristes médiévaux définirent 
toujours le blasphème comme un ‘crimen’, sans jamais cesser 
de voir en lui un ‘peccatum’. (‘Whatever the diversity of their 
opinions on its consistency and its content, the medieval 
jurists always defined blasphemy as a crime, without ever 
ceasing to see in it a sin’; Corinne Leveleux, La parole 
interdite) 
 
 
In Dante’s system of hell, largely modeled on the three Aristotelian dispositions toward 
evil--incontinence, violence and fraud--the sin of blasphemy occupies the seventh circle: the one 
assigned to the sins of violence against God.352 As such, blasphemy is aligned with sodomy and 
usury, both transgressions that represent offenses against the highest Good. At a first glance, the 
association seems unusual in that it assimilates a sin of a verbal nature with a sin of flesh--
homosexuality--and a socio-economic practice relatively legal: money-lending at interest. A 
reading of some of the moral texts in the late Middle Ages reveals, however, that the association 
of blasphemy and sodomy was common in the writings of the moral analysts from Dante’s time. 
There are also scholastic tracts that, as we shall see, allow the comparison of blasphemy with 
usury. What is unusual in Dante, however, is the fact that the sin of heresy, which in medieval 
interpretations was conflated with blasphemy, is treated as different and punished as a “lighter” 
sin on the borderline between the sins of incontinence and those of violence.  
In what follows, I will draw on medieval opinions about blasphemy to seek to account for 
the presence of this trespass in Dante’s triad of the sins of violence against God. I will first 
                                                 
352 The structure of the circle of violence itself is threefold: violence against others, against oneself and against God: 
Di vïolenti il primo cerchio è tutto;/ma perché si fa forza a tre persone,/in tre gironi è distinto e costrutto./A Dio, a 
sé, al prossimo si pòne/far forza… (Inf., XI, 28-32). This tripartition originates in Isidore of Sevilla who is 
mentioned by Aquinas in his Summa Theologica : “(…) Isidore, De Summo bono, in giving the division of sins, says 
that man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor.” (Pt. I-II, Q. 72, Art 4). 
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present a short history of the sin, from the biblical text to the theories coeval with Dante, and 
then compare the scholastic view of blasphemous phenomenon to Dante’s approach. My goal is 
to highlight the specificity of Dante’s handling of blasphemy against the general background of 
the medieval views. I also look at the relationship between blasphemy and heresy, on the one 
hand, and blasphemy and sodomy, on the other, in an attempt to determine the reason why Dante 
framed the sin of blasphemy between these two others, thus setting up a hierarchy of human 
errors in which blasphemy is a crime more serious than heresy, but less grievous than 
homosexuality. 
To the modern reader the term ‘blasphemy’ conveys a rather vague idea of irreverent 
speech aimed at a supra-sensorial entity. In a loose sense, blasphemy denotes speaking ill of 
things divine, a profanation of the sacred.353 To understand the reasons why a Christian poet 
from the thirteenth century included such a sin in his structure of hell, we need to understand 
what blasphemy means in a theological sense and, especially, what it meant to the people in the 
Middle Ages. The term ‘blasphemy’ is a scriptural term, used already in the Old Testament to 
describe an overall disrespectful linguistic attitude toward God. In Leviticus 24:16, Moses is 
ordered by the godly voice to isolate from society a man who had cursed and to have him stoned 
to death. Despite the seriousness of the punishment it advocates with respect to the blasphemer, 
the Old Testament gives no example about what kinds of words or discourse are to be technically 
considered blasphemous. The omission seems to be deliberate on the part of the authors of the 
testament, who did not want to sully their own text with impious words.  
                                                 
353 In Webster’s dictionary, the term "blasphemy" is defined as "to speak in an impious or irreverent manner of; to 
speak ill or to the prejudice of; to use insulting or abusive language."  It is further defined as "evil or profane 
speaking and irreverence of God, derogating from His power or claiming His attributes; the expression of defiant 
impiety and irreverence against God or things held sacred."  
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Due to the lack of a clear definition to describe the blasphemous practice in both the Old 
and the New Testaments, the term blasphemy will gradually acquire a degree of obfuscation that 
will persist through early Christianity.354 The approach to the sin of blasphemy will become 
more analytic only in the fifth-sixth centuries, thanks to the first systems of capital sins achieved 
by Cassian and Gregory, who both introduced blasphemy into their systems, albeit in different 
ways. 355 But despite these inclusions, the bulk of the moral texts from the High Middle Ages 
pay scant attention to sacrilegious speech. The reasons for this disinterest seem to lie, first, in the 
vagueness of the concept, and second, in the fact that the authors of the moral texts were monks 
who by their profession were immune from crimes of speech.356  
On a practical, legal level, however, the habit of speaking ill of divine matters will be 
sanctioned with a severity equal to that of the Old Testament. In the sixth century AD, Justinian, 
in his Corpus Iuris Civilis, introduced a section on blasphemy, which explained the famine, 
earthquake and pestilence of his days as signs of the divine anger, triggered by a failure to punish 
blasphemers. The conviction led the emperor to impose death for the sin of blasphemy. In the 
ninth century, Charlemagne reinforced the provision on blasphemy from Justinian’s code, 
initiating a legal tradition faithfully followed by his close successors, and in 1140, Gratian, in his 
Decretus, still made dozens of references to blasphemy, and some others to perjury and lie. By 
                                                 
354 “Under Christianity, blasphemy became so bloated with meanings that it burst all bounds, becoming almost 
meaningless. By the year 400, blasphemy was hardly more than a vile epithet, and in a confused way similar to the 
concept of heresy. The word heresy originally meant factionalism, which was a form of b to early Christians because 
it exposed the true faith to contention, even scorn. Eventually, heresy became the more encompassing term. Not 
until the time of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century did the church coherently define blasphemy, although 
even then it continued as a peculiar species of heresy. (…). For early Christians both offenses blurred in meaning 
and blended with faction, sedition, schism, apostasy, and sacrilege.” See Levy, L.W. Treason against God: A 
History of the Offense of  Blasphemy. (New York: Schocken Books, 1981), 31-32. 
355 In Cassian’s eight-fold scheme of capital sins, blasphemy is a daughter of pride, whereas in Gregory’s 
septuagenary it was an offspring of wrath. Gregory’s seven-fold scheme, including his view of blasphemy, will 
prevail. 
356 At least this is Corinne Leveleux’s opinion. See La parole interdite. Le blasphème dans la France médiévale 
(XIIIe-XIVe siècles): Du péché au crime. (Paris: De Boccard, 2001), 100.  
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the thirteenth century, the legal punishments against this crime of speech became much more lax: 
no condemnation to death was pronounced against the blasphemer, but financial penalties were 
imposed.  
Close in time to Dante, verbal sacrileges against God or the Virgin Mary were 
distinguished from lighter profanities--those against the saints--and penalized with a larger 
amount of money. According to Corinne Leveleux, who studied the legal treatment of blasphemy 
in the Middle Ages, verbal impieties directed at religious matters were a widely disseminated 
practice, which, between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries, caused the canonists from 
France and Italy to keep promulgating laws against blasphemy. The preoccupation of the 
lawmakers with this crime of speech, Leveleux says, is to be explained by the proliferation, in 
the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, of theological tracts on the sins of the tongue. It is the major 
moral summae written in Dante’s own time, all of which included lists of verbal trespasses, that 
revived the interest in the nature and consequences of blasphemy. Omitted by Alain of Lille in 
his twelfth-century encyclopedia of vices, blasphemy becomes a common denominator of the 
thirteenth-century tracts of moral theology. It will also become a constant presence in the 
manuals of confession of the time. 
All of the literary critics who have analyzed the circle of violence against God in Dante’s 
Inferno made reference only to Aquinas’s theory of blasphemy from Secunda Secundae. To gain 
a better understanding of how Dante treats the sin of blasphemy in the Inferno, I think we need 
also to consider other major medieval authors on vices. The collation will not serve to 
demonstrate a possible influence of these authors on Dante, but to frame and grasp better the 
complexity of Dante’s treatment of the blasphemers in the Inferno. 
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Peraldus begins his tract on the sins of the tongue with blasphemy, which he considers by 
and large the most serious verbal crime, punishable by death. Stressing the magnitude of the sin, 
Peraldus acknowledges the manifoldness of forms in which the sin of blasphemy can manifest 
itself. What unifies these varied manifestations is the element of anger present all throughout 
these forms and which leads the blasphemer to seek revenge against God.357 Grounded in wrath 
and scorn toward things divine, blasphemy is a diabolical speech, recognizable by the horror it 
arouses in the listeners. Guilty thereof are not only the blasphemers, but also those who listen 
and tolerate blasphemies among them.358  
A twofold level of implications is thus present in Peraldus: the threat that blasphemers 
represent to the moral health of society, and on a transcendental level, that those who commit 
blasphemous acts are denied salvation. As far as the latter implications are concerned, Peraldus 
foreshadows that those who after death will go to hell will keep blaspheming because of the great 
pain to which they will be subjected.359 Two elements are worth mentioning in Peraldus’s 
treatment of blasphemy, elements that cannot be found in Aquinas, but that illuminate Dante’s 
treatment of blasphemy in the seventh circle: the perversity specific to blasphemers and the 
gravity of this sin with respect to heresy. Blasphemers are extremely perverse, Peraldus asserts, 
because instead of assuming the blame for their bad deeds and praising God for the good ones, 
                                                 
357 Nos autem hic blasphemiam intelligimus verbum in contumeliam Dei prolatum, ut cum aliquis iratus, vindicare 
se volens de Deo, aliqua membra de ipso nominat, quae nominanda non sunt. (Summa Vitiorum, 538; ‘But we 
understand here that blasphemy is a word/speech uttered to insult God, like, for instance, when someone, being 
angry and willing to take revenge against God, names parts of Him that are not to be named’). 
358 Blaspemia peccatum diabolicum est, et quasi loquela infernalis, cuius signum est horripilatio quam facit istud 
peccatum in audientibus. (…) culpabiles sint, qui blasphemos tolerant. Nec solum blasphemi culpabiles sunt apud 
Deum, sed etiam illi qui tolerant peccatum istud, cum prohibere possint. (op. cit., p, 542; ‘Blasphemy is a devilish 
sin, a sort of hellish speech, the sign of which is the disgust this sin arouses in the listeners. (…). Guilty are those 
who tolerate blasphemers. According to God, not only blasphemers are guilty but also those who condone this sin, 
when they can forbid it.’). 
359 Illi qui in inferno erunt, blasphemabnut Deum propter magnitudinem dolores. (op. cit., 542; ‘Those who will be 
in hell will say blasphemies against God because of the intensity of their pain.’). 
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they invert the terms and attribute what is good to themselves, assigning evil to God.360 The 
perversity of blasphemy is all the more obvious when compared to heresy: heretics sincerely 
believe in their ideas because they think they are correct, while the blasphemers know that what 
they say is wrong and still say it.361 By the same token, maius etiam peccatum videtur esse 
blasphemia, quam haeresis (‘it is evident that the sin of blasphemy is even more serious than 
heresy’). Blasphemy ultimately reduces man to an infra-animal condition and deserves the 
heaviest of punishments. We will encounter some of these elements again, when we will 
consider Dante’s text. 
Aquinas, too, establishes comparative relationships between blasphemy and other sins, 
such as perjury and homicide. In his definition, the sin of blasphemy lies in disparaging the 
surpassing goodness of the divinity and is opposed to the confession of faith (ST II-II, Q. 13, Art. 
1). Just as faith is predicated not only on an attachment of the heart but also on verbal 
declarations and works of charity, so unbelief can actualize itself in words or deeds (ST II-II Q. 
12, Art. 1). Along with heresy and apostasy, blasphemy is therefore a symptom of unbelief, 
which can manifest itself in two ways, as an inner disparagement (blasphemia cordis) or as an 
                                                 
360 Peraldus notes: perversitas magna quae est in peccato isto. Multum enim perversi sunt homines blasphemi, qui 
bona quae agunt sibi attribuant, mala vero Deo adscribunt: quum econtrario mala propter culpas eorum eis 
eveniant. Bona vero ex gratia Dei recipiant. (op. cit., 540; ‘The great perversity which is in this sin. Blasphemers are 
very perverse, for they attribute to themselves their good deeds, and reproach God for their bad ones, although, on 
the contrary, the bad things they do happen because of their own fault, whereas the inspiration for their good deeds 
they receive through God’s grace.’). The assertion is to be related to St. Augustine’s definition of heresy, which 
Peraldus quotes at the beginning of his section on blasphemy and where the inverted relationship between a 
blasphemer and God is first underlined. Instead of attributing to God what belongs to Him, blasphemers go counter 
to the natural law of faith and assign Him what does not pertain to Him, or they deny or usurp what is His domain. 
As we have seen, Peraldus highlights without hesitation the unnaturalness of such a relationship, which he calls 
magna perversitas. 
361 Haereticus enim ea loquitur de Deo, quae credit esse vera: blasphemus vero contra conscientiam suam de Deo 
dicit quae scit non esse dicenda. (op. cit., 542; ‘For the heretic says about God things he believes to be true, whereas 
the blasphemer, although he knows he is not telling the truth, says things he knows should not be said.’). 
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oral declaration (blasphemia oris).362 The latter represents the perfect form of blasphemy. What 
is interesting is that Aquinas too detects a kernel of perversity in blasphemers, as Peraldus did, 
and insists on the same element of falsity discussed in the Augustinian definition of blasphemy 
quoted by Peraldus.363 Blaspheming is committing an act of fraudulence, a falsehood in one’s 
intellect, whereby one denies something befitting God or asserts something unbefitting him. The 
word perversity as pronounced by Aquinas with respect to the blasphemer’s will conveys the 
impression that blasphemy, the exact opposite of the confession of faith, is an inverted praise: the 
vocalis blasphemia represents a perverted version of what in the holy is vocalis laus Dei. The 
fraud of the blasphemer is greater than that of a perjurer since the latter only invokes the name of 
God in confirmation of a falsehood, whereas the blasphemer pronounces something false about 
God himself. In terms of the crime committed, blasphemers are even more at blame than 
murderers, because they do harm to God directly.  
The note of falsity present in Thomas Aquinas’s view of blasphemy does not seem to 
play any part in Dante’s conception. Had Dante considered blasphemy a fraud-based sin, he 
would have punished the blasphemers among the falsifiers of words not among the violent. What 
Dante really took from Aquinas is, as Federigo Tollemache points out in Enciclopedia 
                                                 
362 I respectfully disagree with Corinne Leveleux, who, in the wake of Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio, 
contends that in Aquinas the sin of blasphemy is deprived of all verbal specificity. Since confession of faith is a 
verbal act, blasphemy has a clear verbal component that Aquinas himself calls blasphemy of the mouth. Not only 
this sin, but also heresy entails a strong linguistic factor: “inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to 
corruption of the faith” (ST II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2, vol 3, p. 1220). 
363 In Aquinas, the term perverse is applied to the will of the blasphemers who, once in hell, will keep having the 
same unnatural feelings toward God and committing the same dishonest acts. Just as Peraldus did, Aquinas pictures 
the countless blasphemies of the damned in the underworld: “Now those who are in hell retain their wicked will 
which is turned away from God’s justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use 
them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for these same sins. They regret indeed the sins 
which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly, this 
detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the 
resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the Saints will praise Him with their voices.” And 
further: “(…) in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their 
wicked will suggest to them.” (ST II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4, v. 3, 1226). 
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dantesca,364 the twofold nature of blasphemy--of the heart and of the mouth—and the note of 
disparagement inherent in blasphemous attitudes: 
 
Puossi far forza ne la deïtade,/col cor negando e bestemmiando quella,/e 
spregiando natura e sua bontade;/e però lo minor giron suggella/del segno 
suo e Sodoma e Caorsa/e chi, spregiando Dio col cor, favella. (Inf. XI. 46-
51) 
 
One can use force against the Deity by denying it/and cursing it in one’s heart or by 
scorning Nature/and its goodness;/and therefore the smallest subcircle stamps with its 
seal Sodom and Cahors and whoever speaks with scorn of God in his heart. 
  
Apart from the element of falsity present in Aquinas’s definition of blasphemy and absent 
in Dante’s, there is another essential point in which Dante diverges from Aquinas: the separate 
treatment of heresy. For the Dominican doctor of the church, heresy and blasphemy were species 
of unbelief, and although they did differ by the element of disparagement present in blasphemy 
and absent from heresy, the two species fundamentally overlap.365 As a matter of fact, by 
punishing the blasphemers lower down in hell than heretics, Dante seems to go counter an entire 
trend in the late Middle Ages. The theologians of the day, on the rare occasions when they took 
time to demarcate the two sins, considered heresy much more preoccupying than blasphemy. The 
reason lay in the religious tensions of the late Middle Ages, a time marked by intense heretical 
movements that threatened the unity of the church.  As Levy points out: “Blasphemy was not a 
threat to the church. Heresy was. (…) God could not be harmed, although he might avenge 
                                                 
364 Vol. 1, p. 611. 
365 One of the reproaches leveled by analysts against Aquinas is precisely the fact that, in the separation of heresy 
from blasphemy, Aquinas stopped halfway through. See for instance Levy: “Thus, having begun with the element of 
disparagement as the basis of a distinction between blasphemy and heresy, Thomas Aquinas ignored it thereafter and 
left heresy and blasphemy as interchangeable as ever.”  (op. cit., p. 52). 
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himself on those who tolerated blasphemers. The heretic, however, could harm the church by 
dividing it and winning away its adherents.” 366
The superior gravity of heresy with respect to blasphemy is not reflected in Dante’s 
structure of hell, which clearly differentiates between heretics and blasphemers and assigns the 
latter lower down in the underworld. There is a certain relationship between blasphemers 
(punished in the seventh circle) to heretics (assigned to the sixth circle), but this relationship is 
mediated by two other rings: the ring of the violent toward others and that of the violent toward 
oneself. For Dante, heresy is a sin of incontinence that pushes people to look for religious ideas 
beyond the traditional faith, whereas blasphemy springs, as in Peraldus’ s Summa, from a violent 
interiority.  
In recent Dante criticism, the problem of the loose proximity between the circle of 
heretics and that of violent has been raised in interesting terms. Highlighting the differences 
between heresiarchs and schismatics in the system of Hell, Marc Cogan identifies the heresiarchs 
from the sixth circle as Epicureans and Photinians (in the Middle Ages, Pope Anastasius V was 
mistakenly assimilated to the latter). What both classes of heretics had in common was the denial 
of the possibility of salvation.367 Both heresy and blasphemy are, in Cogan’s interpretation, sins 
of the irascible appetite, and what unites them on an imagistic level is the element of fire present 
in the tombs of the heretics and in the rain that torments the blasphemers. In the case of the 
heretics, the fire would indicate the specific type of passion that underlies the sin of heresy: 
                                                 
366 Levy, op. cit, 56. 
367 “The (only) two heresies that Dante identifies in the sixth circle share a very similar content: human beings are 
incapable of an eternal life.” (Marc Cogan, Design in the Wax: The Structure of the Divine Comedy and its Meaning. 
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, 64). 
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despair, one of the five passions at the root of the irascible appetite. Despair is responsible for the 
overcoming of reason that leads to heresy.  
The link between heresy and blasphemy, which Cogan shows has somewhat been 
preserved by Dante, comes from the tradition of the medieval texts, those of Thomas Aquinas 
mainly, that aligned the two sins. But Dante’s debt to this traditional approach vis-à-vis 
blasphemy stops here, since the poet decides not only to dissociate but also to geographically 
distance the two otherwise similar sins. Moreover, unlike Aquinas, he considers the sin of 
blasphemy more serious than heresy, thereby reinforcing Peraldus’s interpretation in which 
blasphemy prevailed.  
If in the sixth circle, Dante punishes heretics who were not blasphemers, let us take a 
look at the blasphemers themselves: who they are and what they tell us about Dante’s conception 
of blasphemy. Blasphemous speech emerges early on in the Inferno as a constant verbal attitude 
of the damned. Against a very noisy background of laments and cries that will accompany the 
pilgrim and Virgil all along their journey, the curses of the dead are noted by the poet as early as 
the third canto, in an effort to highlight the terrible despair of all those in the Ante-Hell. The 
image is strong and reenacts both Peraldus and Aquinas’s “prognosis” of the faith of the dead in 
hell: 
Bestemmiavano Dio e lor parenti,/l’umana spezie e l’ loco e’l tempo e’l 
seme/di lor semenza e di lor nascimenti. (Inferno III, 103-105) 
 
They cursed God and their parents, the human/race and the place and the time and the 
seed of their/ sowing and of their birth. 
 
The poet’s dramatic rhetoric develops a crescendo that runs the whole gamut of the 
objects of hate and curse: from God, through family to themselves, covering space and time, the 
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infamous speech of the shades leaves nothing untarnished in the Universe. Their hate, verbalized 
in hell as it had been on earth, touches not only the Creator, but also the created, humankind and 
themselves as representatives of it, even the origin of their own life. Speech here nullifies the 
attachment to a creating God, family ties, human dignity, self-respect, and the seed of life… this 
symbol of all potentialities. The bestemmia of the damned translates the most arduous form of 
hate into the most perversely perfect form of speech. Once in hell, Dante’s sinners will not want 
to pay attention to the way they speak, on the contrary, most of them will use words like 
weapons, to harm and destroy once more. Cursing is the systematic reaction of the souls in hell 
to their new condition, and blasphemy, before being a sin punished in the system, is enacted as a 
verbal practice to figure linguistically this condition. Noting the verbal crimes in hell is for Dante 
an artistic duty as important as describing the various contrapassi or the discourses of the 
characters with whom the poet will engage in conversation. 
The blasphemy directed at God is noted one more time in dramatic terms in the circle of 
the carnal sinners, to describe the intensity of the suffering. Here, the torments give rise again to 
cries and words of hate:  
 
Quando giungon davanti a la ruina/quivi le strida, il compianto, il 
lamento;/bestemmian quivi la virtù divina. (Inf. V, 34-36)368
 
When they come before the landslide, there the/shrieks, the wailing, the lamenting; there 
they curse/God’s power. 
 
                                                 
368 The French interpreter Pierre Mandonnet, who reads Dante in a theological key, links the ruin of this circle to the 
words of the sinners to interpret their blasphemies as blasphemies against the Holy Ghost, the most grievous type of 
blasphemy in the New Testament.  [Dante le théologien (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, 1935), 302].  I cannot, 
however, agree with Mandonnet’s assertion that “Dante ne fait blasphémer Dieu par les reprouvés qu’au seul circle 
des luxurieux.” (‘Dante has the damned curse God only in the circle of the carnal lovers.’ 303). There is more than 
one place in which Dante has his characters blaspheme: one is in Ante-Hell, as I have shown, the other is Vanni 
Fucci’s transgressive gesture in the circle of the thieves, and another occurrence is in the area of betrayal. 
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As we have seen in the previous section, one of the most fascinating encounters in the 
Comedy is depicted in this canto: that with Francesca and Paolo. After the description of the 
wailing and blasphemies of the sinners, a discourse takes place that calls into question this very 
description: Francesca will tell Dante the pilgrim her story of love and death. In analyzing her 
intervention in the poem, critics have noted that Francesca is a careful speaker. The elegance of 
her linguistic expressions strikes the reader as much as her tragic story in which a book is 
responsible for the sin of adultery: 
 
O animal grazïoso e benigno/che visitando vai per l’aere perso/noi che 
tignemmo il mondo di sanguigno,/se fosse amico il re de l’universo,/noi 
pregheremmo lui de la tua pace,/poi c’hai pietà del nostro mal perverso. 
(Inf. V, 88-94) 
 
O gracious and benign living creature who/through the black air go visiting us who 
stained the/world blood-red,/if the king of the universe were friendly we would/pray to 
him for your peace, since you have pity on/our twisted pain.  
 
In fine terms redolent of the rhetoric of the courtly love lyric, Francesca addresses the 
living stranger, graciously and generously yielding to his request to tell her story. The way she 
speaks to him translates the delicacy of her inner structure, the graciousness and the benignity 
she sees in the pilgrim are in fact her own qualities, and the desire to please the visitors bespeaks 
not her sin, but her noble nature. All of her fine qualities are in sharp contrast to her situation in 
the afterlife, just as her refined discourse is in strange opposition with the blasphemies Dante had 
shortly before ascribed to all carnal sinners. Can then Francesca be a blasphemer, she, so 
gracious and benign herself? To answer this question we have to consider that Francesca is not 
only a careful speaker, she is also a responsive one. Her adultery is a reaction to the book she 
was reading, the telling of her story is a response to the visitors’ desire to learn it, and her 
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blasphemies--the blasphemies of the block of souls she belongs to--are responses to her/their 
new condition. Her strange mention of the impossibility of praying only heightens the drama of 
the situation. Her adultery won the implacable enmity of the divine virtue, and as a consequence, 
prayer-- this expression of remorse and willingness to reform--is denied to her. The words of 
prayer are contorted and turned into sacrilegious ones, a perversity as serious as the perversity of 
the punishment she complains about (‘il mal perverso’). By virtue of their feud with God, i 
peccator carnal, to whom Francesca is assimilated, cannot pray, they can only curse, and this is a 
hellish mechanism from which Francesca cannot escape.  
After having seen all these clues about the “diabolical” habit of blasphemy as a constant 
verbal practice in the Inferno, we get to the circle of the violent against God, a circle that spans 
four cantos. Blasphemy is assigned to the first subdivision of a ring that punishes three different 
classes of sinners in the same way: on a plane of burning sand one group of souls lies supine, 
another moves restlessly in a circle, and another is seated–all groups are desperately trying to 
protect themselves from a merciless rain of fire.  
Although less numerous than those who move in a circle, the damned who lie supine, 
says Dante, have looser tongues.369 Thus, long before we come to know the nature of the sin of 
those who lie supine, we are prepared for what will follow by an allusion to their propensity to 
verbalize their feelings.370 Among these people, the pilgrim’s attention is drawn by the 
impressive stature of a man who seems immune from fire, holding a contorted but at the same 
                                                 
369 “Quella che giva’ ntorno era più molta/ e quella men che giacëa al tormento,/ma più al duolo avea la lingua 
sciolta.”  (Inferno, XIV, 25-27; ‘The flock that was walking was largest by far, and/fewest were those lying to be 
tortured, but their/tongues were looser to cry out.’). Could this be an indication that those who--we will find out 
shortly--were homosexuals were more numerous than blasphemers, when we know how widely spread was the 
verbal habit of blasphemy in Dante’s time?  
370 The quote is also an index of the intensity of the torment of the blasphemers: while the other groups have the 
illusion of protecting themselves from the fiery rain either by moving or by offering their backs, the group of 
blasphemers are blocked to the ground, and expose their faces and their chests. 
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time scornful attitude. Intrigued, the pilgrim asks Virgil: Chi è quel grande che non par che 
curi/lo’ncendio e giace dispettoso e torto,/sì che la pioggia non par che’l maturi? (Inf., XIV, 46-
48; ‘Who is that great one who seems not to mind the/fire, and lies there scornful and frowning, 
so that the/ rain does not seem to ripen him?’).371
 Before Virgil gets the chance to answer Dante’s query, “il grande dispettoso” 
intervenes directly with clues about his identity:  
 
 
“Qual io fui vivo,/tal son morto,/Se Giove stanchi’l suo fabbro da 
cui/crucciato prese la folgora aguta/onde l’ultimo dì percosso fui;/o s’elli 
stanchi li altri a muta a muta/in Mongibello a la focina negra,/chiamando 
“Buon volcano, aiuta, aiuta!”,/sì com’el fece a la pugna di Flegra,/e me 
saetti con tutta sua forza:/non ne potrebbe aver vendetta allegra.” (XIV, 
51-60) 
 
“As I/ was alive so I am dead./Though Jove tire out his smith, from whom he/wrathful 
took the sharp thunderbolt that struck me/on the last day--/and though he weary the 
others, turn after turn, at/the black forge in Mongibello, calling, ‘Good Vulcan,/ help, 
help!’/as he did at the battle of Phlegra--and strike me/ with all his force,/he could not 
have happy/ vengeance thereby.” 
 
 
 The presence of the name Giove in the intervention alerts the reader about the origin of 
the speaker: it is a man who comes from the pagan, ancient world and who, moreover, waged 
war against the supreme deity. Nothing has changed in his nature, says the soul: death and his 
newly minted condition of being damned did not alter in any respect his essential human 
qualities. 372 And what are these qualities? From what the character says about himself, we note 
                                                 
371 Capaneus’s attitude has often been compared with Farinata’s who looks at the surrounding landscape come se 
avesse l’inferno a gran dispitto, Canto X, 36). But, as critics have pointed out: “Il Capaneo di Dante non illustra la 
virtù della magnanimità, concessa invece a Farinata, bensì il vizio della presunzione, ossia la deformazione grottesca 
della magnanimità.” [Georges Güntert, Lectura Dantis Turicensis, vol. I, (Firenze: Franco Cerati Editore, 2000), 
203]. 
372 The phrase Qual io fui vivo, tal son morto is in fact an ironical one, as Giuseppe di Scipio notes: “While he--
Capaneus--wishes to appear as a great hero who fought and dared against the gods, he is actually expressing his own 
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his arrogance and his ambition. The whole discourse obsessively turns around one idea: how the 
mightiest god of the pagans cannot vanquish him no matter what. As he speaks, the character 
tries to the best of his abilities to slight the power of the god, depicting him as impotent and 
having to beg the aid of another, subaltern god: the repetition of the verb in Buon volcano, aiuta, 
aiuta! underlines the smallness of Giove and the adjective buon is an additional sign of the need 
Giove has to get Volcano’s favor. Capaneus’s presumptuous words are all meant to convey the 
image of a “beggar” Giove, the opposite of the all-mighty chief of the pagan pantheon that an 
entire tradition sent down to us. Ridiculing a deity is, undoubtedly, a blasphemous gesture, 
irrespective of the cultural setting in which the act takes place, and Virgil’s harsh rebuke, which 
castigates the arrogance of the character and uncovers his identity, further clarifies the sin:  
 
 
 
“O Capaneo, in ciò non s’ammorza/la tua superbia, se’ tu più punito;/nullo 
martiro, fuor che la tua rabbia,/sarebbe al tuo furor dolor compito”./Poi si 
rivolse a me con miglior labia,/dicendo: “Quei fu l’un d’i sette 
regi/ch’assiser Tebe; ed ebbe e par ch’elli abbia/ Dio in disdegno, e poco 
par che’l pregi;/ma, com’io dissi lui, li suoi dispetti/sono al suo petto assai 
debiti pregi.” (Inf. XIV, 63-72).373
 
“O Capaneus, since your pride/is not extuinguished, you are punished more; 
no/punishment, other than your rage, would be/ suffering of a measure with your 
                                                                                                                                                             
condemnation having failed while alive, and failing now in his impotence.” (Lectura Dantis VI: Supplement 
(Spring, 1990), Lectura Dantis Virginiana, I, Tibor Wlassics, ed., 180). 
373 According to Classical mythology, Capaneus was an outstanding warrior against Thebes. He was notorious not 
only for his gigantic stature and physical strength, but also for his arrogance, that eventually was sanctioned by 
Jupiter by death through lightning. Dante presumably knew the story from Statius’s Thebaid, from which I quote a 
small excerpt to show the basis on which Dante rebuilt the mythical figure: “Unseeing Capaneus gripped the 
walls/and said, as often as the clashing clouds/caused lightning, “These are fires to use in Thebes!/These will renew 
my oak torch, which grows weak!”/Jove’s lightning hit him full strenght as he spoke./The clouds absorbed his crest; 
his shield’s boss dropped;/his limbs ignited; those who watched retreated:/his burning corpse might fall on any 
spot./Nevertheless he stayed and breathed his last/while facing towards the stars and leaned his smoking/body 
against the walls that he detested. His earthly members fell. His soul departed./Had Capaneus lost his strength more 
slowly,/he might have hoped to feel a second bolt.” [The Thebaid. Seven against Thebes. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), Book X, 296).For a detailed textual comparison between this passage and Dante’s 
reworking of it, see Edward Moore, Studies in Dante. Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante. (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1968), 243-255. 
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fury.”/Then he turned back to me with a better look,/saying: “This was one of the seven 
kings who/besieged Thebes; and he had, and seems still to have/ God in disdain, and 
respects him little; but, as I/ said, his spite is the ornament his breast deserves.” 
 
 Virgil’s words leave no doubt as to the sin of which the Theban king is guilty: on account 
of his superbia, Capaneus had and still has a scornful attitude toward God. Virgil’s repetition of 
the verb avere in two different tenses--past and present--corresponds to Capaneus’s own Qual io 
fui morto, tal son vivo, while the text subtly changes the name Giove into Dio. An accumulation 
of artistic means serves to figure linguistically Capaneus’s transgression: the moral elements of 
superbia and disdegno, which echo the adjective dispettoso from line 47, are themselves 
reinforced by the two tenses of avere above mentioned and, as if the idea were not already clear, 
by the expression poco par che’l pregi. All this remarkable wealth of lexical clues are the means 
by which the poet attempts to build the figure of a blasphemer who otherwise would be difficult 
to interpret as such. In his discourse in hell, Capaneus does not curse Giove, his blasphemy is 
rather a matter of attitude and of representing Giove in speech as an impotent god. It is not based 
on imprecatory talk--no malediction is uttered upon the deity; it is something more subtle than 
that, and had it not been for Dante’s care to underscore so many times the disdainful attitude of 
the character--this sine qua non index in all medieval definitions about blasphemy--we might 
have failed to recognize Dante’s Capaneus as a blasphemer. Along with the frequent allusions to 
scorn, there is, however, one more element that helps us identify Capaneus as a blasphemer, an 
important element furnished again by Virgil’s rebuke. Virgil mentions twice the wrath 
underlying Capaneus’s transgressive behavior:  both rabbia and furor are strong words in the 
Italian vocabulary, and here they are meant to help us better understand the nature--and the 
gravity--of the sin. In Peraldus’s description of blasphemy, a wrathful inner disposition is the 
key-factor that leads to sacrilegious speech. Blasphemers are essentially people mad at God, who 
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use words to get revenge against a power they otherwise cannot overcome. Irreverent, violent 
speech is the only—illusory—means by which they can inflict pain on the otherwise untouchable 
entity against whom their anger is directed. Capaneus’s lack of faith, the little price he puts on 
God, to use Dante’s expressive phrase, his untamed and untamable anger at the deity he despises 
so intensely and the way he verbally tries to diminish the image of this deity, are all leads that 
point to the nature of Capaneus’s sin: blasphemia. 
 Dante’s decision to use this mythological figure to represent the sin of blasphemy—a sin 
“reinvented” in Dante’s own times—is problematic. Why did the poet choose a character coming 
from the world of the mythical pagans to embody a sin consecrated by the Christian world? The 
answer lies in the same motivation that determined Dante to choose Ulysses and Diomede to 
represent the fraudulent counselors, or Sinon the Greek to stand for the falsifiers of words. It is 
their symbolic value for the medieval cultural community; it is their emblematic power that made 
these characters so suitable for Dante’s purposes.  Just as Ulysses and Sinon were for the 
medievals symbols of human guile and the power of rhetoric, so Capaneus was emblematic of 
the power of a king at odds with, and finally punished by, a supernatural power: the supreme 
king of the Christians.374 And just as the pagan, mythological Ulysses dies in Dante’s reworking 
of the myth as pleased the Christian God—com’altrui piacque--, so Capaneus, the one who 
defied Giove, is here punished among the blasphemers against the Christian God. Neither in the 
case of Ulysses, nor in that of Capaneus, has Dante for a single moment mixed up Zeus/Jupiter 
                                                 
374 An interesting occurrence of the same characters, and I am referring to Capaneus, Ulysses and Sinon, is in Alain 
of Lille’s Plaint of Nature, in a passage in which Genius’s pen paints legendary figures of people to represent what 
is specific about humankind. Besides Helen, Turnus, Hercules, Plato, Cicero, and others, Alain speaks of 
Capaneus’s gigantic stature, of the fox-like cleverness of Ulysses, and of Sinon’s sinuous speech. See Plaint of 
Nature (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980), 216-217. Alain’s selection is representative for the 
entire panoply of legendary figures (mythical or historical) that medievals were fond of. Interesting is also the fact 
that Dante sees in Capaneus, Ulysses and Sinon more than what Alain saw. Dante virtually reinvents new identities 
for them and brings these characters back to life in a new way. 
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with God; the two notions came to overlap for him because what matters to him is the essential 
idea of respect for the sacred. The notion of divinity is so powerful in the poet’s mind that the 
value of the words used to represent this notion--Giove o Dio--counts less. 
 And if there is any regret on the part of the reader that Dante did not punish among the 
blasphemers a contemporary of his, but chose instead a figure from a book distant in time, let us 
take a look at the circle of the thieves. As if Dante had felt that his choice of Capaneus as a 
blasphemer was a risky writerly decision—for how will Christian poetry convincingly condemn 
a sin of the tongue so widely disseminated in the late Middle Ages, by invoking a remote, 
historical figure?--, in the Malebolge, Dante has the sin of blasphemy enacted by a thief, in a 
guise more powerful than any possible injurious words. In the seventh ring of Malebolge, the 
horrified pilgrim and his guide attend the spectacle of a sinner who, being bitten at the neck by a 
serpent, turns first instantly into ashes, and then, like the phoenix, retakes his former shape. Like 
all infernal punishments, the process is cyclical and meant to take place in eternity. Each time he 
transforms the sinner experiences tremendous pain and psychological trauma.375  Just as in Canto 
XIV the nature of the punishments of the violent against God made the pilgrim note di giustizia 
orribil arte (‘justice’s dread work’), so here, the severity of the punishment evokes in Dante the 
power of God’s just vengeance.376 As far as the identity of the incinerated and “reborn” damned 
is concerned, we find out from his own mouth that: 
 
 
                                                 
375 E qual è quel che cade, e non sa como,/per forza di demon ch’a terra il tira,/o d’altra oppilazion che lega 
l’omo,/quando si leva, che’ntorno si mira/tutto smarrito de la grande angoscia/ch’elli ha sofferta, e guardando 
sospira:/tal era’l peccator levato poscia. (Inf. XXIV, 112-118; ‘And like one who falls, he knows not how, by the/ 
force of a demon that pulls him to the earth or of/ some other occlusion that can bind a man,/when he stands up he 
gazes abut all dismayed/by the great anguish he has suffered, and sighs as he/looks:/ such was the sinner when he 
stood up.’) 
376 Oh, potenza di Dio, quant’è severa,/che cotai colpi per vendetta croscia! (Inf. XXIV, 119-120; ‘Oh the/ power of 
God, how severe it is, what torrents of /punishment it pours forth.’). 
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Io piovvi di Toscana,/poco poco tempo è, in questa gola fiera./Vita bestial 
mi piacque e non umana, /sì come a mul ch’i’ fui; son Vanni Fucci/bestia, 
e Pistoia mi fu degna tana. (Inf. XXIV. 122-126). 
 
I rained down from Tuscany, not long ago,/into this fierce throat./ Bestial life pleased me, 
not human, mule that I/ was; I am Vanni Fucci the beast, and Pistoia was a/worthy lair for 
me.  
 
  
 Although punished primarily for being a thief,377 Vanni Fucci as a poetic figure displays 
a more complex aspect: what characterizes him is not, as we would expect, a certain guile that 
the sinners of Malebolge display, but a pure and openly confessed animality. His violent nature 
is textually rendered by an accumulation of words like vita bestial, non umana, mul, bestia, tana. 
Critics have justly noted that as a character in the fiction he would have better fitted among the 
violent of the seventh circle. His impulsive nature and the propensity toward a merely instinctual 
mode of life are doubled by an overweening pride. Recognized by the pilgrim, Vanni Fucci 
confesses first his shame and embarrassment about having been seen in his hellish posture, then 
talks to Dante about the future. He foreshadows, more exactly, the defeat of the Ghibelline 
Whites by the Black Guelphs, news that concerns Dante in the keenest way.378 The reason why 
Vanni Fucci makes this prophecy is to hurt Dante and, thus, to take revenge for having been seen 
in a humiliating situation: E detto l’ho perché doler to debbia! (Inf., XXIV, 151: “And I have 
                                                 
377 In 1293, he allegedly robbed the treasury of San Jacopo in the Church of San Zeno, Pistoia, and got away with 
the theft when another person was wrongly convicted of it. Analyzing the speech of the character, George 
Economou notes the reversal of the notion of justice that takes place in this encounter: “The trials of human justice 
unavoidably must suffer shortcomings, and here, quite appropriately, false impressions of guilt and innocence are 
spelled by testimony given sub species aeternitatis. [Lectura Dantis VI: Supplement Spring (1990), Lectura Dantis 
Virginiana, I, Tibor Wlassics, ed., 314]. 
378 In May 1301 the Blacks were banished from Pistoia, as a result of a vote endorsed by Dante himself. Just a few 
months later, in November 1301, with the help of Charles of Valois, the Blacks reentered Florence, and in April 
1302 expelled the Whites and brought Florence under their administrative and legal rule. According to the legend, 
the city of Pistoia had been founded by the remnants of Catiline’s army, an origin that also accounts for Dante’s 
negative assessment of Pistoia in Canto XXV: Ahi Pistoia, Pistoia, ché non stanzi/d’incinerarti sì che più non 
duri,/poi che’n mal fare il seme tuo avanzi? (10-12; ‘Ah, Pistoia, Pistoia, why do you not decree your/incineration, 
so that you may not endure, since you/ surpass your sowers in doing ill.’). 
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told you this that it may grieve you!”). The reply is placed in the text in a privileged position--it 
concludes not only the prophecy but also the canto--and is meant to echo Vanni’s confession of 
shame from lines 133-135: Più mi duol che tu m’hai colto/ne la miseria dove tu mi vedi,/che 
quando fui de l’altra vita tolto. (Inf. XXIV; ‘It pains me more to be caught in the/wretchedness 
where you see me than when I was/taken from the suffered the other life.’). Shame is worse than 
physical death for Vanni Fucci and no offense directed at him--or offender--can get away 
unpunished. As a matter of fact, that Vanni Fucci is still able to feel shame, a feeling that has 
moral overtones, could be interpreted as a positive aspect: a kind of remorse for what he did and 
what earned him his condition.  His hurt pride, however, is not a measure of his feeling of human 
dignity, but of his overweening ego.  By the same token, as if punishing Dante were not enough, 
at the end of the prophecy, Vanni does not stop acting. Canto XXV begins with a new, 
unexpected “performance” of his: Al fine de le sue parole il ladro/le mani alzò con amendue le 
fiche, /gridando: “Togli, Dio, ch’a te le squadro!” (1-3; ‘At the end of his words, the thief raised 
his hands/with the figs, crying: “Take them, God, I’m/ aiming at you!”). 
Not only Vanni’s only living visitor in Hell deserves punishment for having hurt him… 
with his eyes, but the creator of hell himself. That Vanni Fucci’s obscene gesture has an 
important meaning can be culled from Dante’s “translation.” As any other language, gestural 
language itself can be translated, and by putting words in the character’s mouth, the poet ensures 
that his public—Vanni Fucci’s public--“reads” correctly Vanni’s message. It is a message with 
sexual connotations, directed at God. A defiance as great as Capaneus’s arrogant and 
contumelious attitude that Dante evokes here is not a matter of chance, but an essential key for 
understanding Fucci’s moral profile:  Per tutt’i cerchi de lo’nferno scuri/non vidi spirto in Dio 
tanto superbo,/non quel che cadde a Tebe giù da’ muri. (Inf. XXV, 13-15; ‘Through all the dark 
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circles of Hell I saw no spirit/ so pround against God, not him who fell from the wall/ at 
Thebes.’). 
The comparison with the blasphemer from the circle of the violent against God sheds 
light, if it was still necessary, on the nature of Vanni Fucci’s gesture.379 The contempt for God, 
the anger that calls for revenge, the sacred name pronounced here with no fear, the provocation 
hurled at the divinity, just as the sexual meaning of the gesture of making the fig, are all 
manifestations described by medieval theologians as forms of blasphemy. I adduce here again 
Peraldus’s definition, which best synthesizes them: Nos autem hic blasphemiam intelligimus 
verbum in contumeliam Dei prolatum, ut cum aliquis iratus vindicare se volens de Deo, aliqua 
membra de ipso nominat, quae nominanda non sunt. (Summa Vitiorum, 538; ‘But we understand 
here that blasphemy is a word/speech uttered to insult God, like, for instance, when someone, 
being angry and willing to take revenge against God, names parts of Him that are not to be 
named.’).  
Peraldus’s description contains not only the elements of contumelia, verbum, ira, 
vindicare de Deo, specific to blasphemers, but also the potential sexual aspect of the 
blasphemous words. Here the reference is to Christ’s genitalia, frequently ridiculed, but as the 
analysts of the medieval blasphemy tell us, the sexual reference was also often made to the 
blasphemer’s own private parts.380 Documents from the end of thirteenth-century Italy testify to 
the frequency of the gesture of making the fig, as well as to its blasphemous nature on account of 
                                                 
379 Mariana Shapiro interprets the comparison between the two blasphemers as having connotations that extend to 
the city of Pistoia:  “To exceed all other infernal souls in pride, as Dante claims for Vanni, is no mean task and the 
invective against Pistoia which follows establishes two mutually supporting parallelism of Capaneus/Vanni Fucci, 
and of Thebes/Pistoia,” [Lectura Dantis VI (Supplement Spring, 1990), Lectura Dantis Virginiana, I, Tibor 
Wlassics, ed., 328). 
380 As similar examples of what was interpreted as impious and offensive gestures, Alan Cabantous notes: “spitting 
in heaven’s direction, or gnashing one’s teeth” [Blasphemy. Impious Speech in the West from the Seventeenth to the 
Nineteenth Century. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 12]. 
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which the perpetrators were actionable.381 Along these lines, interpreting Vanni Fucci’s obscene 
gesture in the context of the Italian society of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, Baldelli notes: 
“I gesti alludenti alle parti più intime sono supremamente ingiuriosi e sono di contenuto fin 
blasfemo. In questa società dunque il gesto di fare le fiche era l’ingiuria suprema; e, se rivolta a 
Dio, la bestemmia più atroce.”382 In Dante’s text, the fact that Vanni pronounces God’s name in 
hell might also be interpreted as a profanatory act of language, if we take into account the 
medieval sense that God’s name(s) was to be uttered rarely and only with extreme caution and 
reverence. This attitude derives, in Alan Cabantous’s view, from “the prime importance of the 
Word and the Name in revealed religion. God could not be called by name as no one knew his 
Name.”383 Naming God was an extremely delicate enterprise, since on the one hand, the creator 
of the world and language could not become a part of his own creation, and on the other hand, 
the divine name was the most important legacy bestowed on man: it was the way to prove the 
falsity of other gods. Abusing the gift of speech and the Name, further says Cabantous, implied 
going astray.384 In this light, Vanni Fucci’s naming of God in hell, right after the completion of 
his gesture, appears all the more impious, and is in contrast with Dante’s constant care not to 
name Christ in the Inferno.  
                                                 
381 Baldelli argues in this respect: “Al gesto allude, in un simile contesto, lo statuto di Prato del 1297, in latino, 
riportato dal Tommaseo: ‘Nello statuto di Prato chiunque ficas fecerit vel mostraverit nates versus coelum vel versus 
figuram Dei o della Vergine, paga dieci lire per ogni volta; se non, frustate.” [Ignazio Baldelli, “Le fiche di Vanni 
Fucci.” Giornale storico della letteratura italiana. CLXXIV (1997), 5]. 
382 Baldelli, op. cit., 10. 
383 op. cit., 5. 
384 Cabantous justly points out that the rationale for the medieval condemnation of blasphemy derived from the 
importance attached to the Word: “Speech opens humanity to the possibility of transcendence and is bestowed with 
a highly specific intention: that it be placed in the service of glorifying the divine, as emphasized in the second 
commandment to which the line from the Lord’s prayer “hallowed be Thy name” answers. (…). Blasphemy 
constitutes, therefore, the perfect inversion of this conception and prayer. (…). And just as the authentic and 
necessary spoken prayer will be “heard” in the sense of hearkened to or answered because listened to by God, so the 
profanatory word will call forth the often dreadful and immediate punishment of the one who has travestied the 
essential function of language.” Cabantous, op. cit., 6). 
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Another essential element in the medieval analysis of blasphemy that is present in the 
encounter between the pilgrim and the thief from Pistoia is the participation of the will in the 
sinful act. In Aquinas’s theory, intention is the key factor that identifies blasphemy as a mortal 
sin. Impulsive blasphemers, who utter impious words inadvertently, on the spur of the moment, 
are less blamable than those who knowingly, with a full exercise of their will, pronounce 
injurious words about the divinity.  
Here, Vanni Fucci knows what he is doing: the defeat of the Whites that he prophesies to 
hurt Dante is proof that the acts of the character are not due to chance, but calculated. The use 
Vanni makes of language is as perverse as his will, both when his evil omen offends Dante and 
when his impious words offend the divinity.385 That Vanni Fucci’s lubricious gesture is 
interpreted already in the order of hell as transgressive is confirmed by the way in which the 
scene ends: the snakes resume their attack on Vanni, and the poet “translates” again for his 
reader the significance of this attack:  Da indi in qua mi fuor le serpi amiche, /perch’una li 
s’avvolse allora al collo,/come dicesse ‘Non vo’ che più diche’… (Inf., XXV, 4-6; ‘From then on 
snakes have been my friends,/because one of them wrapped itself around his neck,/ as if to say, 
“I won’t let him say more.”) 
It is also worthwhile to mention that the attack occurs not after Vanni Fucci makes the 
prophecy concerning the defeat of the White Guelph faction, but after his blasphemous gesture. 
The phrase Non vo’ che più diche may refer not only to the prophecy itself, but also to Vanni’s 
words (and gesture) to God.  
                                                 
385 Highlighting Vanni Fucci’s signification for Dante, D. L. Derby Chapin notes: “As a leader of the Blacks, he is 
before all else for Dante the symbol of an apotheosis of power, self-will and pride, which knows no end but its own 
glorification. Vanni Fucci has challenged the power of God and has literally stolen sacred images. Like Satan, by 
claiming for his own what belongs to God, he loses his resemblance to God. In rejecting Christ as a model, he 
becomes an imitator of the Devil and takes on a resemblance to him and to the beast, whose name he bears.” (“IO 
and the Negative Apotheosis of Vanni Fucci,” Dante Studies 89 (1971), 28. 
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 And outside of the world of the fiction, on the level of what the poet-artifex does to his 
characters, it is to be noted the admirable way in which language, the same language that Fucci 
abuses in so many ways, is made turn against him. Ironically, the horrendous portrayal of the 
character who is lavishly described as animal, non-human, beast, mule, is not made by Virgil or 
any other person in the fiction, it is made… by the character himself. It is Vanni Fucci’s own 
mouth that speaks against him with offensive words.386
If Dante casts Capaneus, the Theban king, as an emblematic blasphemer meant to 
represent the universal value of this sin of speech, he casts Vanni Fucci as a historically anchored 
blasphemer, who illustrates this sin in contemporary society, in the Italian vernacular. In Canto 
XIII of Purgatory, the figure of the Sienese Sapia Salvani has the same historical status. She, too, 
is an Italian contemporary of Dante’s, but unlike Vanni Fucci, a blasphemous thief in life and a 
blasphemous speaker in death, she provides in the text the remedy for the sin. On the purgatorial 
mountain, Sapia makes amends for her human failings on the terrace of envy. Her main human 
defect--envy--was foolish (‘folle’), she says, in that she would rejoice more at the others’ 
misfortune than at her own good luck. More perversely, she felt joy even when her own 
countrymen were defeated at the battle of Colle, in which her own nephew died. On this 
occasion, she felt so empowered that she uttered an impious oath to God: Omai più non ti temo!  
(v. 122: ‘Now I fear you no more’). The difference between Vanni Fucci and Sapia is that at the 
end of her life she repented for her treasons and benefited from the charitable prayers of a man of 
                                                 
386 George Economou makes an interesting connection between the mysterious voice unable to form words that 
Dante describes in the same canto (vv. 65-66) with Vanni Fucci’s failures of speech: “Whether the voice in the 
middle passage is indeed Vanni Fucci’s is not as important as the complementary nature of these two instances of 
defective human utterance, each of which for its own reasons fails to make sense or accomplish its aim. Each 
illustrates a radical distortion of speech and deserves the silence it gets.” (op. cit, 315). 
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God.387 Sapia’s repentance earned her the possibility of salvation, where for Vanni Fucci there 
was nothing left; the sante orazioni of Ser Pier Pettinaio to whom she also owes her presence on 
the mountain reversed the terms of her blasphemy and reestablished the sacred function of 
language: reverent communication with the transcendent. While Francesca da Rimini was at war 
with God and incapable of uttering a prayer, Sapia’s repentance earned her peace with the 
divinity, just as the prayers spoken by the hermit on her behalf quickened her salvation. Through 
Sapia, Dante restores to the dialogue with God its true nature. To blasphemy, as a perverted 
prayer, is opposed the prayer itself. Sapia is just one of the numerous characters in the Purgatory 
who allude to the power of prayer in the process of salvation and to the ability of the prayer to 
accelerate the souls’ ascension to the terrestrial paradise.  
In hell, however, the sin of blasphemy, as a sin of word, is assimilated by Dante with 
sodomy and usury, an association, which, needless to say, has been puzzling interpreters for 
centuries. What do blasphemers have in common with homosexuals and usurers? To answer this 
question, I will first look at the link between blasphemy and sodomy, and then at the connection 
of blasphemy with usury. I will not insist on these other two transgressions of the circle of the 
violent against God, because, first, the two sins have received an extremely rich attention over 
the course of time, and second, because sodomy and usury not being sins of word, their treatment 
would exceed the scope of my dissertation.    
The main clue of the alignment of these three sins in the system of hell is offered by the 
text itself. In Canto XI, that contains the so-called “map” of hell, Virgil defines the medieval 
notion of “art” as divine: since art imitates nature, and nature is God’s daughter, art too has a 
                                                 
387 Pace volli con Dio in su lo stremo/de la mia vita; e ancor non sarebbe/o mio dover per penitenza scemo,/se ciò 
non fosse, ch’a memoria ebbe Pier Pettinaio in sue sante orazioni.  (Purg., XIII, 124-128; ‘I wished peace with God 
at the end of my life,/and my debt would not yet be canceled by/ penance,/were it not that Piero the comb-
seller/remembered me in his holy prayers, having pity on/me in his charity.’).  
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divine origin. According to this interpretation, the seventh circle of hell suggests that 
blasphemers offend God directly, and sodomites and usurers indirectly: the former by offending 
nature, and the latter by offending art (here understood as a profession). What is less apparent in 
this classification is the remarkable effort of synthesis Dante has made to get to such simplicity 
of distribution. The view of nature and art(s) as originating in the creator is, of course, a solid 
scholastic acquisition, with roots in Abelard and Alain of Lille (to name just a few of the 
contributors to this view), but what made the theory of the relationship “God-Nature-Art” so 
popular in the late Middle Ages was an impressive number of moral texts that developed ideas 
about deviations with respect to nature and art.  
If blasphemy is an insult to God through the medium of language (spoken or unspoken), 
sodomy is an offense as base as the first, only the medium is different: the flesh substitutes for 
words. The medieval association of blasphemy and sodomy was not uncommon, and according 
to analysts, it had roots in the famous Novellae 77, of Jusitinian’s code.388 In the wake of this 
document, we have early-modern juridical texts that treat blasphemy and homosexuality on a 
par, to the extent that they are attached the same legal penalties.389 In the moral texts of the time 
as well, we find connections that justify Dante’s placement of blasphemers beside sodomites. In 
the famous and widely circulated twelfth-century treatise Verbum abbreviatum, Peter the Cantor 
metaphorically describes the sodomites as muti a laude dei.390 An important association of 
language with sex (especially inverted sex) is made in the same century by one of Dante’s 
                                                 
388 Ut non luxurietur contra naturam neque iuretur per capillos aut aliquid huiusmodi neque blasphemetur in Deum 
(‘One shall not lust against nature, nor swear on the hair of his head or anything like that, nor shall commit 
blasphemy against God.’ (AD 538 ). R. Schoell & G. Kroll, Corpus Iuris Civilis, III, Berlin, 1954.
389 Corinne Levelux quotes Ludovicus Montaltus, with his Tractatus de repprobatione sententiae Pilati and Tiberis 
Decianus, with Tractuatus criminalis (op. cit., p. 169). 
390 Patrologia Latina, 205, 335B. 
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models: Alain of Lille. In The Plaint of Nature, Alan describes sex in terms of grammar, and 
stigmatises sodomy as follows:  
 
The active sex shudders in disgrace as it sees itself degenerate into the 
passive sex. A man turned woman blackens the fair name of her sex. The 
witchcraft of Venus turns him into a hermaphrodite. He is subject and 
predicate: one and the same term is given a double application. Man here 
extends too far the laws of grammar. Becoming a barbarian in grammar, 
he disclaims the manhood given him by nature. (…). For the human race, 
fallen from its high state, adopts a highly irregular (grammatical) change 
when it inverts the rules of Venus by introducing barbarisms in its 
arrangement of genders. Thus man, his sex changed by a ruleless Venus, 
in defiance of due order, by his arrangement changes what is 
straightforward attribute of his. Abandoning in his deviation the true script 
of Venus, he is proved to be a sophistic pseudographer. Shunning even a 
resemblance traceable to the art of Dione’s daughter, he falls into the 
defect of inverted order. 391
 
Just as blasphemy inverts the terms of language turning it away from prayer and 
confession, so sodomy is, in Alain of Lille’s view, a perverted grammar, in which the genders are 
inverted, and the relationship between subject and predicate reversed.392  Blasphemy and 
sodomy also meet on the common ground of the referential function of language: just as 
blasphemies cannot be retold or reproduced, neither in spoken language nor in writing, in the 
same way the acts of sodomites cannot be described. Here human language has to keep quiet. By 
the same token, blasphemy (or heresy) and homosexuality are in the Middle Ages categories of 
                                                 
391 Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980, 68-134.
392 The notion of sex as grammar and of homosexuality as a perverted science of language would prove so 
successful that from De planctu naturae on all major medieval discussion around sexuality would be formulated in 
terms of the science of language. An interesting interpretation given to the sin of Brunetto Latini and the three 
courteous Florentines from canto XVI of the Inferno belongs to Andre Pézard. The French critic interprets their sin 
as blasphemy, not sodomy, arguing that by preferring French to Italian vernacular in the writing of his Trésor, Latini 
is guilty in Dante’s eyes of “apostasie linguistique,” whereas the other three Florentines are guilty as well of 
blasphemy [Dante sous la pluie de feu (Enfer, XV). (Paris : Vrin, 1950), 236]. More recently, Richard Kay has 
devoted a series of studies to the sins of there characters. See, for instance, 1) Dante’s Swift and Strong. Essays on 
Inferno XV. (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), which includes “The Sin Of Brunetto Latini,” [initially 
published in Medieval Studies 31 (1969), 262-286], and 2) “The Sin(s) of Brunetto Latini,” Dante Studies 112 
(1994), 19-31. 
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nefandum, i.e., things impossible to say or describe.393 Reproduced, blasphemous words would 
have tarnished the ears and souls of the hearers, whereas the description of the technical details 
of homosexual relationships would have polluted the mores of Christians and subverted the very 
foundations of family.394
Also a perversion, and also subversive of the divine and social orders was considered in 
the late Middle Ages money-lending at interest. Usury was, in Thomas Aquinas’s opinion, a sin 
similar to sodomy, in that they were both sins contrary to nature: natural laws required that 
money should increase from natural goods not from their own, perverse, propagation. There was 
the sense that usury was a diabolical sin in that usurers in fact did not sell money, but time. They 
did not work themselves to earn their daily bread, but made time work for them.395 Time was, 
however, a divine function, and its dilation for the purpose of lucre was an extremely grievous 
sin against the divinity.396 ‘L tempo fugge che t’assonna sounds one of the most celebrated 
                                                 
393 See in this respect Corinne Leveleux: “Associés dans la radicalité d’une condamnation absolue, ces deux crimes 
figuraient logiquement dans la très extensive catégorie du nefandum-celle de l’indicible et de l’impie.” (‘Associated 
in the radicality of an absolute condemnation, these two crimes logically belonged to the very extensive category of 
nefandum-that of the inexpressible and of impious’, op. cit, p. 168). 
394 Examining the concept of nefandum, the French analyst Jacques Chiffouleau notes that it was as much a literary 
topos as a moral and juridical category. He also points out that among the classes of nefandum, sodomy was 
considered to have the most serious social implications in that it threatened the soundness of family life (“Dire 
l’indicible: remarques sur la catégorie du nefandum du XIIIe au XVe siècles. Annales. Economie, Sociétés, 
Civilisations, 1990, 295-6).
395 Verbum abbreviatum which stigmatises the sin of usury in vitriolic terms is again indicative of this perception: Et 
sicut diabolus talentum peccati non vult sibi reddi (quia quanto diutius detinetur, tanto amplius multiplicatur), sic 
nec fenerator talentum pecuniae creditum proximo, qui etiam dando ad usuram pejor est exactore diabolo, quia 
diabolus auctor omnis malitiae talentum suum, non alienum, mutuum dat; fenerator vero dando mutuum talentum 
pecuniae, non suum, sed Dei, et quo proximus gratis esset juvandus, et ob hoc sibi collatum nequiter dat ad usuram, 
qui etiam tempus vendit, ut propter dilationem temporis majorem, plus lucri recipiat. (PL 305, col. 157B; ‘And just 
as the devil does not want to get a reward [from his human followers] for his sinful help (for the more the reward is 
delayed, the more it increases), so the publican does not want to get immediately the interest for the loan. But he 
who gives money in order to make profit is worse than the exacting devil, because the devil, being the author of all 
evils, makes a loan with his own property, not with someone else’s, whereas the publican, by lending the property of 
the money, does not give his own property, but that of God. And since the other should be helped in a disinterested 
way, and the money-lender is rich through the grace of God, it results that the publican commits an injustice when 
he lends money, for he sells the time in order to make more profit from the dilation of it’; translation mine). 
396 In his well-known essay Au Moyen Age: Temps de l’Ėglise et temps du marchand, Jacques le Goff quotes a 
similar vision on usury belonging this time to William of Auxerre (1160-1229) “L’usurier agit contre la loi de la 
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phrases in the Paradiso, a human time that, as Giafranco Contini has pointed out, for Dante runs 
back toward the eternal.397 Along these lines, it is likely that what Dante condemns through the 
sin of usury, is not so much the abuse of money, as some have suggested,398 as the abuse of time. 
And if it was natural in Dante’s time to associate blasphemy with sodomy, in the wake of 
Justinian’s Ut non luxurietur, it was also natural to equate usury with blasphemy and heresy. In 
1311, the council of Vienna pronounced usury a grievous a sin as heresy and blasphemy. What 
Dante ultimately did in the circle of the violent against God was to offer an extraordinary 
synthesis of disparate trends of moral thought; he tightly mainstreamed three discrete types of 
perversions and grouped them together on account of their common nature of violations of divine 
attributes: speech, life and time. 
For Dante, speech is the divine gift that allows us to communicate with each other, and 
then with the Highest Good; the body and life are given to man as part of a providential design, 
and time is given again to him for the execution of this transcendental design. Language, life and 
time--all manifestations of the divinity--are at stake in the transgressions of the blasphemers, 
sodomites and usurers. Blaspheming the name of the Highest Good is abusing the sacral function 
of language, having intercourse with people of the same sex means violating the natural 
                                                                                                                                                             
nature universelle, car il vend le temps, qui est commun à toutes les créatures. Augustin dit que chaque créature est 
obligée de faire don de soi; le soleil est obligé de faire don de soi pour éclairer; de même la terre est obligée de faire 
don de tout ce qu’elle peut produire et de même l’eau. Mais rien ne fait don de soi d’une façun plus conforme à la 
nature que le temps; bon gré, mal gré les choses ont du temps. Puisque donc l’usurier vend ce qui appartient 
nécessairement à toutes les créatures, il lèse toutes les créatures. (…) et c’est une des raisons pour lesquelles l’Ėglise 
poursuit les usuriers.” (‘The usurer always acts against the law of universal nature, for he sells time, which belongs 
to all creatures. Augustine says that each creature needs to offer itself; the sun needs to offer itself in order to 
illuminate; by the same token, earth needs to offer all she can produce, and the same holds for water. But nothing 
offers itself in a way more conform to nature than time; wittingly or unwittingly things have time. So, since the 
usurer sells what necessarily belongs to all creatures, he hurts all creatures… this is one of the reasons why the 
Church condemns the usurers.’ Summa Aurea, III, 21, fol. 225v, quoted by Jacques Le Goff, in Pour un Autre 
moyen Age. Temps, travail et culture en Occident: 18 essais. (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), 46-47; translation mine. 
397 See Contini’s analysis of Canto XXVIII of Paradiso, in Un’idea di Dante. Saggi danteschi. (Torino: Einaudi, 
2001), 205. 
398 Ferrante, for  instance, in The Political Vision, and Lisa Freinkel, in “Inferno and the Poetics of Usura.” MLN 
107 (1992), 1-17. 
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functioning of the body and threatening life itself by blocking the possibility of procreation. 
Usury is itself an unnatural interaction with time, a perversion of the notion of value from the 
divine through the human to the diabolical. In the text, the verb Virgil uses to describe usury is 
spregiare—the same element that appears in the definitions of blasphemy: Dante’s Capaneus 
hates God e poco par che’l pregi. All three sins are acts of violence which directly or indirectly 
do harm to the Supreme Being and which affect the everyday life of an entire community.399
Thus, like all the other sins punished in the Inferno, the triad blasphemy-sodomy-usury is 
seen from a twofold perspective: the transcendental and the human. Besides from offending God, 
these transgressions also had devastating consequences on an immediate level, that of public life. 
For in accordance to medieval interpretations, the sin(s) of the individual had deep repercussions 
on the fate of the multitude. 400 Blasphemy was for the medieval society more than just a form of 
phonic pollution, what was truly at stake in the act of cursing the name of God and all such else 
was the core of the Christian religion with which medieval communities identified themselves. It 
was an infraction that could not go unpunished, because it offended the ecclesiastical structures, 
the profound beliefs of worshippers, and the moral values of the Christian community. 
Blasphemies also touched the representatives of political power: the leaders of the political 
organizations of the time who were considered symbols of divine authority.401  The act of 
blaspheming was an act of lèse-majesté directed as much at supreme political figures as at the 
ineffable majesty of God. Moreover, in the wake of Justinian’s Ut non luxurietur, there was the 
                                                 
399 Joan Ferrante sharply notices that all the sinners of the circle of the violent against God are set against social 
backgrounds: Capaneus is a king, the sodomites are represented by statesmen or teachers, and usurers by leading 
Italian families involved in economic life. For Ferrante, the three sins that these souls embody are as many threats to 
the social order and concord. Along these lines, Capaneus is the figure of the “human anarchist” (The Political 
Vision, 159-160). 
400 I quote again as illustrative in this respect the widely popular treatise of moral philosophy written by Peter the 
Cantor (see especially chapter LXXIII Peccatum unius saepe redundant in universitatem), PL 305, col. 217C. 
401 Illustrative for this perception is John of Salisbury’ s Policraticus, especially chapter twenty-five in which he 
discusses the notion of the prince as an image of the deity.  
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sense that natural calamities were a direct result of blasphemies gone unpunished. Laws had been 
promulgated therefore, to keep such criminal acts under control. The failure to control the 
blasphemous phenomenon would have meant political and institutional inability to keep society 
under control.402
To Dante, a Christian poet, the sin of blasphemy was of the utmost importance. It was a 
current phenomenon impossible to tolerate and whose gravity had to transpire in the structure of 
hell. It was a sin as old as humankind, and Capaneus, as an emblematic blasphemer, is in Dante’s 
text a literary testimony to the evil tendency to rebellion and irreligion inherent in the corrupt 
human nature. At the same time the practice of blasphemy was a plague of Dante’s own time, 
and Vanni Fucci, as a historical blasphemer, testifies to the seriousness of the crime in the Italian 
society of the fourteenth century… and of the sins expressed with the linguistic means of Italian 
vernacular. Dante’s remedy for the sin of blasphemy is the remedy of the medieval moral texts 
on peccata linguae: only prayer can restore to language the sacredness erased by blasphemy, and 
Sapia in the Purgatory shows the way to follow in the human use of language. 
                                                 
402 See Cabantous, Blasphemy, 3, and Corinne Leveleux, La parole interdite, 163. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the preceding chapters, I have sought to bring to the fore those features of the 
Romance of the Rose and the Divine Comedy that best show the degree to which literary culture 
in the vernacular was sensitive to the animated medieval debate around peccata linguae. Both 
allegorical poems laid claim, in their own, specific ways, to offering lessons about morality. The 
reading of these poems in the context and through the lenses of the moralists on transgressive 
speech from the later Middle Ages shows that both Jean de Meun and Dante absorbed many 
aspects—ideas, images, quotes, technical terms—of the rich tradition of the lingua-texts. 
In the treatment of verbal sins, the most salient feature common to the two poets is their 
adherence to the scholastic principle of the will as the root of evil speech. On account of his 
philosophical erudition, Jean was acknowledged as a scholastic thinker as early as the fifteenth 
century, when Jean de Meuntreuil and the Col brothers generously “bestowed” the title of doctor 
to the poet. In my reading of the Rose, the discourse that best justifies de Montreuil and Cols’s 
assessment is that of Lady Nature, which is extremely rich in ideas about human morality, ideas 
expressed from a scholastic standpoint. The most important postulate of Nature’s discourse is 
that human deeds or words do not “happen” by necessity; men freely choose what to do or what 
to say. As we have seen, both the realm of actions and that of spoken words depend on men’s 
inner intentions, on their free choice:  Ainz font bien ou mal franchement,/Par leur voloir tant 
seulement (17265-6). I consider Lady Nature as the most important mouthpiece of Jean de Meun 
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as a moralist. Not only does she express philosophical opinions incongruent with her allegorical 
essence (and which would have better fitted Lady Reason), but also her view of human morals is 
so cynical that it can belong only to Jean de Meun, as a satirist of contemporary society. 
 Will is the agent of verbal sins for Dante, as well. On the one hand, in the Convivio, the 
writer argues that l’arte di parlare, being a rational act, is rooted in the will. By the same token, 
it follows that the sins committed through the medium of speech are rooted in the will. On the 
other hand, in the Comedy, with the sole exception of blasphemy, which is a sin of violence, all 
the other verbal sins are punished as sins of fraud in Malebolge, an area that, as Cogan has 
proven, corresponds to the appetite of the will. 
One of the most important achievements of Jean de Meun and Dante as moralists of 
speech is the vernacular lexicon they implement. The ethical category of peccata linguae or 
verbi was an important part of the scholastic discourse on human morality, but this discourse was 
developed in Latin. Peter the Cantor, Alain of Lille, William Peraldus, Vincent of Beauvais, 
Thomas Aquinas wrote their texts on sins in academic Latin. Jean de Meun composed the 
Romance of the Rose in the langue d’oïl, Dante wrote both the Convivio and the Divine Comedy 
in the Florentine dialect. For both poets, the choice of the vernacular was the result of a 
deliberate choice, and was intertwined with didactic purposes. In the Rose, the character Lover 
insists that Lady Reason should instruct him in French, not in Latin (Or me dites donque 
ainçois,/Non en latin, mais en français/De coi voulez que je vous serve; 5835-7). This remark is 
to be read in correlation with Jean’s marked concern to be understood when he expounded 
philosophical principles. In the fragment of the text where the poet debates the relationships 
between predestination, divine foreknowledge, and free will, he notes that these relationships are 
not easy to explain to lay people (Forz est a gens lais a descrivre; 17110). The task of the poet 
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becomes at this point to “translate” and explain in the vernacular a scholastic discourse about 
sins (and verbal sins) routinely written in Latin. And we have historical evidence that Jean was 
an outstanding translator. Jean de Meun was actually doing in poetry what Laurent d’Orléans 
was doing in a technical moral tract. Only that Jean de Meun’s extraordinary linguistic verve 
enabled him to go further than Laurent d’Orléans. We have remarked that where d’Orléans 
proposes two vernacular terms for the translation of a verbal sin in French (the sin of flattery, for 
instance), Jean de Meun comes up with about five terms, all taken from the living language. It is 
no small achievement to enrich the moral lexicon in poetry more than an ecclesiastic writer does 
it in a moral tract proper. 
Likewise, Dante had access to the corpus of philosophical and moral knowledge of his 
time through the mediation of Latin. He too “translated,” explained and exemplified in Italian 
vernacular scholastic notions about sins. In analyzing Dante’s relationship to William Peraldus, 
Mancini has noted that Dante is a traduttore-traditore of Peraldus. We have seen how many 
controversies the term consiglio frodolente aroused in Dante studies. Such a moral category did 
exist in the medieval tracts, but what in Peraldus was the sin of malum consilium, for instance, 
for Dante becomes fraudulent counsel. Cavalca, the Dominican friar who would translate 
Peraldus’s text on the sins of the tongue, would publish his Pungilingua after Dante’s death. But 
Cavalca’s vocabulary on the sins of the tongue is very similar to Dante’s terms for the verbal sins 
assigned to hell. The two meet, thus, in the common effort of transferring the discussion on 
peccata linguae/verbi from the context of academic Latin to that of the vernacular Italian. Only 
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that Dante preceded Cavalca’s work in a conscious and constant agenda of  “italianizing 
Scholasticism.”403
Thus, in the poetic treatment of verbal sins Jean de Meun and Dante are brought together 
by their significant contribution to the cultural movement of “vernacularization” of the pastoral 
discourse on transgressive speech. 
The main difference between Dante’s assimilation of ethical theories about speech and 
Jean de Meun’s is that Dante fuses these theories within a very rigorous system with internal, 
hierarchical relationships, whereas Jean contends himself with a non-organized framework, in 
which the moral terms--vices or sins---do not always seem to occupy the same positions in the 
structure, but rather are constantly revised and re-arranged (what is vice for one character is 
virtue for others). For Dante, the five verbal transgressions he treats constitute a micro-system 
within the larger system of the sins of hell. Jean de Meun does not have a moral system per se; 
we can glean his view of morality from disparate passages throughout his poem. To make things 
more confusing, in the Rose, some of the ethical ideas expressed by a character are at variance 
with ideas expressed by other characters: Friend and thr Old Woman’s notions of morality stand, 
for instance, in sharp contrast with Reason’s. We have noted that this was one of the main 
charges leveled by Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson in the querelle: that Jean de Meun failed 
to give his readership a clear moral instruction. Christine de Pizan even compared Jean de Meun 
and Dante, and gave the latter as the perfect embodiment of a true moral writer. It is a 
comparison out of which Jean comes… ruffled, since it is made with the explicit purpose of 
diminishing Jean’s stature as a moral writer with respect with Dante’s exemplary stature.  
                                                 
403 I borrow this phrase from Giovanni Gentile, who has pointed out that Dante “rompe in letteratura l’universalità 
medievale” of Latin expression and “italianizza la scolastica.” (I Problemi della scolastica [Bari: Laterza, 1923]: 38-
9). Gentile’s view is quoted by Bruno Nardi, in “Il Linguaggio,” 189. 
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The differences between the two, however, come not from a different degree of talent, or 
a discrepancy in the concern for morality, but from the diversity of their artistic tempers and 
from the nature of their works. Jean de Meun never assumes in his poem the status of a judge, as 
Dante will do. Jean de Meun is a satirist in the tradition of the Roman poets, for whom ridendo 
castigat mores was the best attitude in art. Jean laughs at sins and mocks the sinners. Dante sends 
them to hell. Jean de Meun writes a “mirror” for lovers, in which the art of love is considered 
from every single angle: inner, outer, good, bad, commendable or blamable. Dante imagines a 
literary universe so strict, within a theological poem so difficult, that those embarked on a 
picioletta barca cannot follow him.  
In what concerns Dante’s relationships to the moral authorities of the day, one detail must 
be noted about Thomas Aquinas. In the introductory part, we have underlined that among the 
moral writers of the time, Aquinas was the only one who systematically established degrees of 
comparisons among sins, and mixed verbal sins with sins of flesh or of intellect. He also argued 
that it was a heretic error to consider all pains of hell equal. 
The hierarchy of sins and punishments that constitutes a fundamental principle of the Thomistic 
system also represents the hallmark of Dante’s infernal universe. Thus, although in the Inferno 
Dante presents some deviations with respect to Aquinas’s views, I believe that the general notion 
of a hierarchy of sins, just as that of embedding verbal sins into sins of non-linguistic nature, was 
inspired by Aquinas. As a moralist, however, Dante was original. He took painstaking care to 
build an idiosyncratic hierarchy of sins, and as a poet he went further than Aquinas could do: he 
imagined a scale of hellish punishments with a remarkable wealth of details and an evident 
concern for variety and symbolism.  
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By virtue of his well-acknowledged eclecticism, Dante drew his inspiration for verbal 
sins from several sources: Peraldus and Aquinas may be just two of them. More challenging than 
detecting the ultimate, absolute wellspring for Dante’s treatment of transgressive speech, it 
seemed to me to discover why Dante chose five specific sins: blasphemy, flattery, fraudulent 
counsel, sowing of discord, and falsifying of words, to punish in the Inferno. The main factors 
that seem to have determined Dante’s selection of these specific sins (out of the twenty-four 
posited by Peraldus, for instance), three imposed themselves to me as salient: 1) the selected 
verbal trespasses are motivated by their large diffusion in Dante’s own days; 2) they have social 
and political implications; 3) they also seem to concern Dante in a personal way.404 
The problematic of sinful speech opened in the Inferno in dramatic ways finds closure in 
the third cantica of the Comedy. Paradiso proposes itself as the realm in which words can no 
longer “sin,” they can no longer be transgressive, since the rules of language are reinvented and 
speech is no longer a matter of individual will; it is the pure, collective thought reflected in the 
mirror of the godly mind. Verbum Dei. The word made not flesh, but POETRY. 
                                                 
404 Ferrante, for instance, interprets Dante’s hesitation among the evil counselors as symbolic of his own temptation 
to commit this sin: “Dante almost falls into the flames of this circle, perhaps because he was tempted to counsel 
fraud in his political dealings and knows at first hand this tendency in the clever mind.”  (The Political Vision, 463). 
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